

No. 26A_____

**In the
Supreme Court of the United States**

DENNY HOSKINS, *in his official capacity as Missouri Secretary of State,*
Applicant,
v.

RICHARD VON GLAHN,
Respondent.

**APPENDIX TO EMERGENCY APPLICATION FOR STAY AND
ADMINISTRATIVE STAY PENDING APPEAL**

VOL. I OF V

APPENDIX

Volume I

Opinion of the Missouri Supreme Court (September 3, 2026)	1a
Mandate of the Missouri Supreme Court (September 3, 2026)	15a
Order Denying Stay by the Missouri Supreme Court (September 4, 2026)	16a
Judgment of the Circuit Court of Cole County, Missouri (August 19, 2026)	17a
Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief Under Section 116.200 (August 4, 2026)	54a
Exhibit 1 to Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief Under Section 116.200 (August 4, 2026)	63a
Exhibit 2 to Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief Under Section 116.200 (August 4, 2026)	88a
Exhibit 3 to Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief Under Section 116.200 (August 4, 2026)	91a
Exhibit 4 to Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief Under Section 116.200 (August 4, 2026)	103a
Exhibit 5 to Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief Under Section 116.200 (August 4, 2026)	232a
Order Granting Amended Motion to Intervene of Republican National Committee, National Republican Congressional Committee, and Missouri Republican State Committee (August 13, 2026)	242a

Secretary of State’s Answer to the Petition and Affirmative Defenses (August 18, 2026)	252a
Intervenors Republican National Committee, National Republican Congressional Committee, and Missouri Republican State Committee’s Answer to Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Injunction Relief Under Section 116.200 (August 9, 2026)	260a
Secretary of State’s Pre-Trial Brief (August 18, 2026)	273a
Intervenors’ Trial Brief (August 18, 2026)	331a
Plaintiff’s Trial Brief (August 18, 2026)	362a
Joint Stipulation of Facts and Exhibits (August 18, 2026)	399a

Volume II

Stipulated Exhibit 1 – Referendum Petition 2026-R004	408a
Stipulated Exhibit 2 – October 14, 2025 Letter Approving Referendum Petition 2026-R004 as to Form	474a
Stipulated Exhibit 3 – Signature Pages Submitted to the Local Election Authorities for Referendum Petition 2026-R004	477a ¹
Stipulated Exhibit 4 – August 6, 2026 Report PM-007 for Referendum Petition 2026-007	478a
Stipulated Exhibit 5 – August 4, 2026 Certificate of Insufficiency for Referendum Petition 2026-R004	597a
Stipulated Exhibit 6 – Complaint, <i>Missouri General Assembly v. von Glahn</i> , No. 4:25-cv-01535-ZMB (E.D. Mo. Oct. 15, 2026)	607a
Stipulated Exhibit 7 – Motion for Preliminary Injunction, <i>Missouri General Assembly v. von Glahn</i> , No. 4:25-cv-01535-ZMB (E.D. Mo. Oct. 15, 2025)	632a

¹ Stipulated Exhibit 3 was submitted to the circuit court via a flash drive because of its voluminous contents. A copy of the flash drive can be provided on request.

Stipulated Exhibit 8 – Memorandum and Order, <i>Missouri General Assembly v. von Glahn</i> , No. 4:25-cv-01535-ZMB (E.D. Mo. Dec. 8, 2025)	636a
Stipulated Exhibit 9 – State of Missouri’s Motion to Alter Judgment and Memorandum in Support, <i>Missouri General Assembly v. von Glahn</i> , No. 4:25-cv-01535-ZMB (E.D. Mo. Jan. 5, 2026)	648a
Stipulated Exhibit 10 –Memorandum and Order, <i>Missouri General Assembly v. von Glahn</i> , No. 4:25-cv-01535-ZMB (E.D. Mo. May 11, 2026)	665a
Stipulated Exhibit 11 – Make Your Voice Heard: Missouri’s Initiative Petition Process	673a
Stipulated Exhibit 12 – October 15, 2025 Press Release from the Secretary of State	717a
Stipulated Exhibit 13 – October 16, 2025 Press Release from the Secretary of State	719a
Stipulated Exhibit 14 – Jason Rosenbaum, <i>Missouri Republicans learn that redrawing congressional lines isn’t so easy</i> , St. Louis Public Radio (Oct. 28, 2025)	722a
Stipulated Exhibit 15 – Jason Rosenbaum, <i>Group asks judge to force Missouri secretary of state to decide redistricting referendum</i> , St. Louis Public Radio (May 18, 2026)	731a
Stipulated Exhibit 16 – Kacen Bayless, <i>Is Missouri GOP dragging out redistricting cases? ‘Delay works in our favor’</i> , Kansas City Star (Jan. 8, 2026).....	736a
Stipulated Exhibit 17 – 1922 Election Results for Proposition 17	740a
Stipulated Exhibit 18 – Newspaper Articles Regarding the Attempted 1922 Referendum Election on Congressional Redistricting.....	744a
Stipulated Exhibit 19 – Newspaper Articles Regarding the Attempted 1952 Referendum Election on Congressional Redistricting.....	748a

Volume III

Stipulated Exhibit 20 – House Bill 2909 (2022)	752a
Stipulated Exhibit 21 – Affidavit of Brianna Lennon (Aug. 13, 2026)	904a
Stipulated Exhibit 22 –Motion to Expedite, <i>State ex rel. People Not Politicians v. Limbaugh</i> , No. WD88821 (Mo. Ct. App. April 1, 2026).	908a

Stipulated Exhibit 23 – Suggestions in Support of Petition for a Writ of Prohibition, <i>State ex rel. People Not Politicians v. Limbaugh</i> , No. WD88821 (Mo. Ct. App. April 1, 2026).	912a
Stipulated Exhibit 24 – Motion to Expedite Appellate Proceedings, <i>Luther v. Hoskins</i> , No. SC101412 (Mo. Dec. 31, 2025)	924a
Stipulated Exhibit 25 – Plaintiffs’ Suggestions in Opposition to Continue Trial Setting, <i>Wise v. State</i> , No. 2516-CV29597 (Jackson Cnty. Cir. Ct. Dec. 15, 2025)	929a
Stipulated Exhibit 26 – Plaintiffs’ Suggestions in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Consolidation with Hearing on Merits, <i>Maggard v. State</i> , No. 25AC-CC09120 (Cole Cnty. Cir. Ct. Jan. 14, 2026)	938a
Stipulated Exhibit 27 – Brief of Respondent Denny Hoskins, <i>Luther v. Hoskins</i> , No. SC101412 (Mo. Feb. 9, 2026)	960a
Stipulated Exhibit 28 – Affidavit of Tammy Brown (Aug. 13, 2026).....	1023a
Stipulated Exhibit 29 – Brief of Amicus Curiae Brianna Lennon, County Clerk & Election Authority of Boone County in Support of Appellants, <i>Maggard v. State</i> , No. SC101581 (Mo. April 10, 2026)	1029a
Stipulated Exhibit 30 – Brief of <i>Amici Curiae</i> St. Charles County Director of Elections Kurt Bahr, in his personal capacity, the American Redistricting Project, and Restoring Integrity and Trust in Elections in Support of Defendants-Respondents, <i>Maggard v. State</i> , No. SC101581 (Mo. April 28, 2026)	1050a

Volume IV

Stipulated Exhibit 31 – Transcript Excerpts, <i>Wise v. State</i> , No. 2516-CV29597 (Jackson Cnty. Cir. Ct. Feb. 19, 2026).....	1082a
Stipulated Exhibit 32 – Mathew Pilger, <i>Missouri’s New Congressional Map Could Complicate Midterm Voting Clerks Warn</i> , MissouriNet (Sept. 15, 2025).....	1228a
Stipulated Exhibit 33 – Jen Rice & Yunior Rivas, <i>Missouri Block’s anti-gerrymander referendum from November ballot in attempt to silence voters</i> , Democracy Docket (Aug. 4, 2026).....	1235a
Stipulated Exhibit 34 – Jen Rice, GOP derails bid to stop Missouri gerrymander for 2026, Democracy Docket (Mar. 27, 2026).....	1242a

Stipulated Exhibit 35 – Affidavit of Republican National Committee (Aug. 13, 2026)	1248a
Stipulated Exhibit 36 – Affidavit of Executive Director of Missouri Republican State Committee (Aug. 11, 2029)	1253a
Stipulated Exhibit 37 – Affidavit of Deputy General Counsel of National Republican Congressional Committee (Aug. 17, 2026)	1259a
Trial Transcript (August 19, 2026)	1264a

Volume V

Appellant’s Brief in the Missouri Supreme Court (August 25, 2026)	1335a
Respondent’s Brief in the Missouri Supreme Court (August 27, 2026)	1442a
Intervenors-Respondents’ Brief in the Missouri Supreme Court (August 27, 2026)	1519a
Appellant’s Reply Brief in the Missouri Supreme Court (August 30, 2026)	1605a
Motion for a Stay of Injunction Pending Emergency Appeal and Application for Stay to the Supreme Court of the United States (September 4, 2026)	1639a
Declaration of Denny Hoskins in Support of Respondent’s Motion for a Stay Pending Appeal (September 3, 2026)	1664a
Declaration of Christopher Brundick in Support of Applicant’s Motion for a Stay Pending Appeal (September 4, 2026)	1669A



Supreme Court of Missouri

en banc

SC101805

Richard von Glahn,

Appellant,

v.

Denny Hoskins, in His Official Capacity,
et al.,

Respondents.

FILED

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CLERK, SUPREME COURT

Appeal from the Cole County Circuit Court
The Honorable Daniel R. Green, Judge

Overview

This case involves a straightforward question of law: Does the Missouri Constitution permit a referendum on a congressional redistricting act passed by the General Assembly? There is no dispute the referendum petition (2026-R004) seeking a referendum on House Bill 1 ("HB 1") was timely filed.¹ Likewise, there is no dispute the referendum petition has the number of signatures required by the Missouri Constitution. The only issue is whether the Missouri Constitution authorizes the referendum petition as a matter of law. About one hour before the statutory deadline of 5:00 p.m. on August 4, 2026, Missouri Secretary of State Denny Hoskins

¹ H.B. 1, 103d Gen. Assembly, 2d Extraordinary Sess. (2025).

held a press conference and issued a “Certificate of Insufficiency of Petition” finding “the referendum petition is insufficient under the Missouri Constitution because the Missouri Constitution does not authorize a referendum on congressional redistricting plans passed by the General Assembly.” The secretary directed the referendum petition should not be placed on the November 2026 general election ballot.

Because the plain language of article III, section 49 of the Missouri Constitution authorizes a referendum as to “any act of the general assembly” and no exception applies, the referendum petition was legal, sufficient, and timely. This Court reverses the circuit court’s judgment. Pursuant to Rule 84.14, this Court enters judgment ordering the secretary to issue a certificate of sufficiency as to the referendum petition (2026-R004) (attaching a copy of this opinion thereto), to place the referendum petition on the November 2026 general election ballot, and to take any and all additional steps necessary to place the referendum petition on the ballot at that election before September 8, 2026. The secretary and all of those acting in concert with him are restrained and enjoined from implementing, using, or mandating the use of the congressional redistricting in HB 1 for the November 2026 general election or at any other time thereafter unless and until HB 1 is approved by the voters at the November 2026 general election and takes effect 30 days thereafter. Mo. Const. art. XII, sec. 2(b).

Factual Background and Procedural History

The circuit court held a bench trial on the following joint stipulated facts and exhibits. On September 12, 2025, the General Assembly passed HB 1, which, if it becomes effective, will repeal the congressional districts established in 2022 and establish new congressional districts. On September 29, organizers submitted a referendum petition form to the secretary. The secretary approved the referendum petition for circulation. On December 9, the organizers

submitted to the secretary 691 boxes purporting to contain more than 300,000 signatures in support of the referendum petition.

The December 9 filing triggered several obligations of the secretary. First, the secretary had to “examine the petition to determine whether it complies with the Constitution of Missouri and with this chapter [116].” Sec. 116.120.1.² Second, the secretary had to issue a certificate of sufficiency or insufficiency as to the petition within the statutory timeframe. Sec. 116.150.1-3. There is no dispute the secretary could have issued his certificate any time after the December 9 filing but had to issue it by August 4 at 5:00 p.m. At about 4:00 p.m. on August 4, the secretary issued a “Certificate of Insufficiency of Petition” finding “the referendum petition is insufficient under the Missouri Constitution because the Missouri Constitution does not authorize a referendum on congressional redistricting plans passed by the General Assembly.” The secretary directed the referendum petition should not be placed on the November 2026 general election ballot.

On the same day, Richard von Glahn timely sued under section 116.200.1 in the Cole County circuit court, seeking reversal of the secretary’s certification decision and an injunction restraining the secretary from using, implementing, or mandating the use of the congressional redistricting in HB 1. Von Glahn is one of the referendum petition proponents, a Missouri

² All statutory references are to RSMo 2016, and all rule references are to Missouri Court Rules (2026).

citizen, a St. Louis County resident, a taxpayer, and a qualified Missouri voter.³ The circuit court upheld the secretary's insufficiency certification. Von Glahn appealed.⁴

Standard of Review

"This Court will affirm a declaratory judgment unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, unless it is against the weight of the evidence, unless it erroneously declares the law, or unless it erroneously applies the law." *Maggard v. State*, 733 S.W.3d 411, 413-14 (Mo. banc 2026) (internal quotation omitted). "Because the facts are stipulated, this Court's review is limited to determining whether the circuit court properly declared and applied the law." *Id.* at 414 (internal quotation omitted). "Questions of law involving constitutional interpretation are reviewed *de novo*." *Id.* (internal quotation omitted).

³ The circuit court permitted the Republican National Committee, the National Republican Congressional Committee, and the Missouri Republican State Committee to intervene in defense of HB 1. *See* Rule 52.12. Von Glahn challenges this ruling, citing *Committee for Educational Equality v. State*, 294 S.W.3d 477, 487 (Mo. banc 2009) (holding the circuit court abused its discretion in allowing permissive intervention when the intervenors merely repeated the state's arguments and failed to show the state could not defend its interests adequately), and *Toder v. Hoskins*, 730 S.W.3d 129, 135-37 (Mo. App. 2026) (holding the circuit court erred in granting intervention because the intervenor would not lose by direct operation of the judgment and offered only defenses already asserted by the secretary). Because von Glahn prevails on other grounds, this Court declines to address this issue.

⁴ Because of the general interest and importance of the legal issue involved, this Court, on its own motion, granted discretionary transfer of this case under Rule 83.01 and article V, section 10 of the Missouri Constitution. As a result, this Court need not decide whether any defense asserted by the secretary invokes this Court's exclusive appellate jurisdiction, as von Glahn contends.

Analysis

The secretary's sole basis for declaring the referendum petition insufficient is that the Missouri Constitution does not authorize a referendum on congressional redistricting passed by the General Assembly.⁵

The secretary correctly limited his analysis to the Missouri Constitution because both: (1) under section 116.120.1 the secretary's review is limited to "examin[ing] the petition to determine whether it complies with the Constitution of Missouri and with this chapter [116]" and

⁵ The secretary attached to his certificate a seven-page "opinion" signed by the attorney general. In his certificate, the secretary states: "The grounds for insufficiency are more fully articulated in the attached opinion ..., which is incorporated by reference into this certificate." This does not comply with section 116.150.2, which provides the secretary "shall issue a certificate stating the reason for the insufficiency[.]" and does not authorize the secretary to delegate his statutory duty by attaching and incorporating by reference a document prepared and signed by another person or entity. Sec. 116.150.2. *See Mesker Bros. Indus., Inc. v. Leachman*, 529 S.W.2d 153, 158 (Mo. 1975 (noting it is well-settled "an opinion of the Attorney General is not binding upon the courts or the citizenry")). The secretary must state in his certificate "the reason for the insufficiency." *Id.* In this case, the secretary stated a single reason: "the Missouri Constitution does not authorize a referendum on congressional redistricting plans passed by the General Assembly." As a matter of law, this is the only reason preserved for this Court's review, and this Court considers only the single reason set out in his certificate. Therefore, to the extent the secretary, by attaching the attorney general's "opinion" or through subsequent briefing, has attempted to raise other arguments beyond those set out in his certificate, those arguments have been waived and abandoned. This includes claimed federal law violations and whether the congressional redistricting in HB 1 should or must remain in place through the 2026 election cycle, which are also outside the scope of the secretary's authorized statutory review in section 116.120.1. In raising hypothetical scenarios and arguments wholly unrelated to whether the Missouri Constitution authorizes a referendum as to congressional redistricting passed by the General Assembly, the secretary also requests an advisory opinion, which this Court lacks the authority to issue. *Graves v. Mo. Dep't of Corr., Div. of Prob. & Parole*, 630 S.W.3d 769, 774 (Mo. banc 2021). Likewise, by failing to include in his certificate any reason for insufficiency related to the filing deadline or signature requirement for referendum petitions, the secretary has waived and abandoned any argument as to noncompliance with either requirement and has conceded the referendum petition was timely filed and contained at least the minimum number of signatures required under article III, section 52(a) (requiring the petition be filed "not more than ninety days after" the General Assembly adjourns the session and be signed by "five percent of the legal voters in each of two-thirds of the congressional districts in the state"). In fact, the secretary concedes in his answer the petition met the signature requirement in article III, section 52(a).

does *not* extend to whether the referendum petition complies with the United States Constitution or other federal laws; and (2) the United States Supreme Court has held on multiple occasions the United States Constitution permits a state to authorize a referendum as to legislation drawing new congressional districts. *See Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrandt*, 241 U.S. 565, 569 (1916) (rejecting as “plainly without substance” the argument that a state constitution’s authorization of a referendum as to legislation drawing new congressional districts violates the Elections Clause)⁶; *see also Hawke v. Smith*, 253 U.S. 221, 230-31 (1920) (noting *Hildebrandt* held “the referendum provision of the state [c]onstitution, when applied to a law redistricting the state with a view to representation in Congress, was not unconstitutional”); *Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n*, 576 U.S. 787, 805 (2015) (“In upholding the state court’s decision [in *Hildebrandt*], we recognized that the referendum was part of the legislative power in Ohio, legitimately exercised by the people to disapprove the legislation creating congressional districts.” (internal citation and quotation omitted)); *id.* at 840 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“*Hildebrandt* simply approved a [s]tate’s decision to employ a referendum *in addition to* redistricting by the Legislature. The result of the decision was to send *the Ohio Legislature* back to the drawing board to do the redistricting.” (internal citation omitted)); *Luther v. Hoskins*, 730 S.W.3d 567, 582 n.7, 583 (Mo. banc 2026) (Wilson, J., dissenting) (noting the United States Supreme Court has approved the use of both the referendum process and a gubernatorial veto for

⁶ The Ohio constitutional provision at issue in *Hildebrandt* provided:

[T]he people reserve to themselves the power to propose to the General Assembly laws and amendments to the Constitution, and to adopt or reject the same at the polls on a referendum vote as hereinafter provided. They also reserve the power to adopt or reject any law ... passed by the General Assembly, except as hereinafter provided[.]

State ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrandt, 114 N.E. 55, 56 (Ohio 1916) (quoting Ohio Const. art. II, sec. 1, as amended Sep. 3, 1912).

legislative acts purporting to draw new congressional districts, with Missouri using the former in 1922 and the latter in 1932).

A mere three years ago, the Supreme Court reaffirmed *Hildebrandt* and again rejected the argument the Elections Clause prohibits a state referendum as to legislation drawing new congressional districts. *Moore v. Harper*, 600 U.S. 1, 25-26 (2023) (concluding “redistricting is a legislative function, to be performed in accordance with the [s]tate’s prescriptions for lawmaking, which may include the referendum and the Governor’s veto” and rejecting “the contention that the Elections Clause vests state legislatures with exclusive and independent authority when setting the rules governing federal elections” (internal quotation omitted)). The Supreme Court affirmed: “A state legislature may not create congressional districts independently of requirements imposed by the state constitution with respect to the enactment of laws.” *Id.* at 26 (internal quotation omitted).

The secretary asserts the Missouri Constitution does not permit a referendum as to HB 1 because the Missouri Constitution has no plain, clear statement subjecting legislation drawing new congressional districts to a referendum. But this ignores article III, section 49, which provides: “The people ... reserve power to approve or reject by referendum *any act of the general assembly*, except as hereinafter provided.” Mo. Const. art. III, sec. 49 (emphasis added). The language in article III, section 49 subjects “any act of the general assembly” to a referendum as the default. This Court has held congressional redistricting by the General Assembly “is a legislative act.” *State ex rel. Carroll v. Becker*, 45 S.W.2d 533, 537 (Mo. banc 1932). HB 1 is an act of the General Assembly. There is no meaningful difference between article III, section 49 and the Ohio constitutional provision the Supreme Court upheld in *Hildebrandt* in 1916. *See supra* note 6.

This Court has recognized in *dicta* that the right of referendum applies to legislation drawing new congressional districts. *See Preisler v. Hearnnes*, 362 S.W.2d 552, 557 (Mo. banc 1962) (upholding congressional redistricting dividing the state into 10 districts and noting: “the people of this state have a remedy for even valid redistricting, which they do not like, through our initiative and referendum provisions”); *State ex rel. Moore v. Toberman*, 250 S.W.2d 701, 703, 706 (Mo. banc 1952) (noting, in the context of considering whether a referendum petition as to congressional redistricting could be supplemented outside of the constitutional time periods, “[i]t seems clear that the intentment of the framers of the Constitution was that all laws, except those declared non-referable, should be subject to referendum if petitions to refer them were duly filed before their effective date” and noting the circuit court had held the redistricting was subject to the referendum provisions of the Missouri Constitution).

This Court holds that the referendum and initiative petition power in article III, section 49, like the Governor’s veto power in article III, section 31, is an essential part of the state’s lawmaking process under the Missouri Constitution.

The secretary next asserts even if legislation drawing new congressional districts might otherwise be subject to a referendum under article III, section 49, one of the exceptions in article III, section 52(a) applies. Article III, section 52(a) excepts from referendum “laws necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety, and laws making appropriations for the current expenses of the state government, for the maintenance of state institutions and for the support of public schools[.]”

First, the secretary asserts in his brief, with no supporting authority, that “the immediate preservation of the public peace” exception “exempts election laws, such as the HB 1 map, from referendum challenges.” HB 1 did not have an attached emergency clause as required for the

“immediate preservation” exception. Mo. Const. art. III, sec. 29; *Maggard*, 733 S.W.3d at 414 n.8; *Inter-City Fire Prot. Dist. of Jackson Cnty. v. Gambrell*, 231 S.W.2d 193, 199-200 (Mo. banc 1950) (noting the emergency clause requirement applies to article III, sections 29 and 52 and, even with an emergency clause, “[w]hether or not the act is one necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety is a judicial question”). Further, the plain language of article III, section 52(a) does not support the secretary’s argument. This Court cannot rewrite the Missouri Constitution to substitute “all election laws” for “the immediate preservation of the public peace[.]” The secretary’s argument is even less persuasive in this case, involving an optional, mid-decade redistricting in no way necessary for “the immediate preservation of the public peace” because the 2022 congressional districts established by the General Assembly remain in place unless and until repealed by HB 1.

Second, the secretary asserts, with no supporting authority, that suffrage is a state institution, congressional redistricting is required by the state and federal constitutions, and congressional redistricting is necessary to maintain the suffrage right as populations change, invoking the “for the maintenance of state institutions” exception. The secretary’s argument ignores that this exception applies only to “laws making appropriations ... for the maintenance of state institutions[.]” *See Heinkel v. Toberman*, 226 S.W.2d 1012, 1013, 1016 (Mo. banc 1950) (concluding it was unnecessary to decide whether the state highway system is a “state institution” under the exception in article III, section 52(a) after determining the bill at issue did not make an appropriation); *State ex rel. Harvey v. Linville*, 300 S.W. 1066, 1068 (Mo. 1927) (concluding “the provision relating to laws making appropriations for the current expenses of the state government, for the maintenance of state institutions, and for the support of public schools, means that the word ‘appropriation’ applies to each of those conditions[.]” and “it must be an act

making appropriations for the support of public schools, which are excluded from the referendum, not merely any act which tends to support public schools”). Even if the exception were to apply absent an appropriation, applying the right of referendum to congressional redistricting passed by the General Assembly does not eliminate suffrage generally or the General Assembly’s right to redistrict. Instead, if by referendum vote the voters reject the new redistricting in HB 1, the General Assembly’s prior redistricting in 2022 remains in effect. The General Assembly also remains free to go “back to the drawing board to do [new] redistricting.” *Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n*, 576 U.S. at 840 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).

That the broad language in article III, section 49 subjecting “any act of the general assembly” to referendum applies to legislation drawing new congressional districts is even more obvious when one considers article III, sections 3(i) and 7(h), which explicitly exclude redistricting plans proposed by independent bipartisan citizens commissions drawing new *state* representative districts and new *state* senate districts, respectively, from the right of referendum. Because no such explicit exception for legislation drawing new congressional districts is found anywhere in the Missouri Constitution, the broad default language in article III, section 49 subjecting “any act of the general assembly” to referendum applies.⁷

⁷ The secretary contends article III, sections 3(i) and 7(h), each of which provide that “[n]o redistricting plan shall be subject to the referendum,” apply to HB 1. This argument ignores that the phrase “redistricting plan” appears 13 times in section 3 and 12 times in section 7 and, therefore, refers solely to commission-drawn redistricting plans for state house and state senate districts. The phrase “redistricting plan” does not appear in article III, section 45, however, and this omission is significant. Section 45 provides “the general assembly shall *by law* divide the state into [congressional] districts.” Mo. Const. art. III, sec. 45 (emphasis added). By “law” and not by “plan.” This language takes an act of the general assembly purporting to draw new congressional districts out of the ambit of article III, sections 3(i) and 7(h), and places it squarely within the provision in article III, section 49 allowing for a referendum on “any act of the general assembly[.]” The secretary’s argument also ignores the plain language of article III, section 49 subjecting to referendum “any act of the general assembly, except as hereinafter provided.”

The secretary also asserts the Missouri Constitution must not permit a referendum on congressional redistricting passed by the General Assembly because this year the *last* date on which he could make his certification decision under chapter 116 was August 4, the day of the primary election. Section 116.150.3, the statute setting out the certification deadline, took effect in June 1999, more than 50 years *after* adoption of the 1945 Missouri Constitution setting out current article III, section 49 and more than 90 years *after* Missouri voters first adopted a constitutional amendment setting out a right of referendum. *No Bans on Choice v. Ashcroft*, 638 S.W.3d 484, 486 (Mo. banc 2022). This Court need not speculate about why the General Assembly chose the statutory deadline or whether the statute is valid in every case because a later-enacted statute has *no* bearing on the constitution’s plain language. The plain language of the constitution permits a referendum as to “any act of the General Assembly” regardless of any statutory deadlines set by the General Assembly decades later. Mo. Const. art. III, sec. 49.

Having concluded the Missouri Constitution authorizes a referendum on congressional redistricting passed by the General Assembly, this Court need look no further than *Maggard*, in which it explained in May of this year what result would follow if the referendum petition was deemed sufficient after the secretary issued his certificate and any judicial review authorized by the General Assembly in section 116.200 had occurred:

If, however, the December 9 referendum petition filing is ultimately determined to be sufficient, article III, section 52(b) applies. In that case, because a “legal, sufficient, and timely” referendum petition was filed on December 9—*before* HB 1 went into effect on December 11—HB 1 did not take effect on December 11, HB 1 was “referred to the people” as of December 9, and HB 1 “shall take effect when approved by a majority of the votes cast thereon, and not otherwise.” Mo. Const. art. III, sec. 52(b).

Article III, sections 3(i) and 7(h) precede article III, section 49 and do not appear “hereinafter.” Accordingly, the secretary’s argument is rejected.

Maggard, 733 S.W.3d at 420 (footnote omitted); *see also NAACP Mo. State Conf. v. Kehoe*, 734 S.W.3d 338, 341 n.4 (Mo. banc 2026) (noting *Maggard* held “if the December 9, 2025 referendum petition is sufficient after any judicial review—HB 1 never went into effect and will not go into effect unless and until approved by the voters, but—if the petition is insufficient after such review—HB 1 went into effect on December 11, 2025, and remains so”).⁸

⁸ The secretary devotes a significant portion of his briefing to discussing the confusion, expense, and practical difficulties that may result from not utilizing the congressional redistricting in HB 1 for the November 2026 election. Besides being irrelevant to the secretary’s sole basis for declaring the referendum petition insufficient, these arguments are particularly misplaced given the secretary’s delay created the confusion, expense, and practical difficulties of which he complains. In December 2025, a federal district court advised the secretary and the state that, if the referendum petition is sufficient, “the new map will be frozen until after the referendum, which could significantly disrupt the 2026 elections.” *Mo. Gen. Assembly v. Von Glahn*, No. 4:25-CV-1535-ZMB, 2025 WL 3514277, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 8, 2025). At the same time, the federal district court noted the secretary had the ability to declare the petition insufficient based on his argument in the federal litigation—identical to his argument now—that the Missouri Constitution does not permit a referendum as to congressional redistricting passed by the General Assembly. *Id.* at *4. “[T]here is no apparent reason why [the secretary] would incur the significant cost of signature verification given his stated belief that the petition is constitutionally deficient.” *Id.* at *2 n.2. In two separate cases in May, this Court stated it could not determine whether the congressional redistricting in HB 1 was in effect until the secretary issued his certification and the judicial review authorized by the General Assembly was complete. *Maggard*, 733 S.W.3d at 419-20; *NAACP*, 734 S.W.3d at 341 n.4. Despite this clear guidance from the federal district court and this Court, the secretary chose to delay his certification until the last possible day—August 4—and, in the meantime, utilized the congressional redistricting in HB 1 while incurring the time and expense of signature verification despite having represented to the federal district court he believed the referendum petition was constitutionally deficient. The secretary also chose to request verification of every signature, making the signature verification deadline July 28, when he could have chosen random sampling verification, with a deadline of not more than 30 days from the date the election authority received the petition from the secretary. *See* sec. 116.130.2. The secretary delayed certification until the last possible date and chose not to seek resolution of the constitutional question despite having been told at least as early as December 2025 he had the unique ability as secretary to do so under Missouri statutes. Given these undisputed facts, the secretary’s arguments about confusion, expense, and practical difficulties are wholly unpersuasive.

Perhaps worse, these arguments fundamentally misunderstand the status of HB 1 pending the referendum vote. HB 1 is not the law and has never been the law. There is only one valid congressional redistricting in effect—the congressional redistricting the General Assembly established in 2022. Under article III, section 52(b), HB 1 “shall take effect when approved by a majority of the votes cast thereon, and not otherwise.” Unless and until the voters approve HB 1

In summary, this Court reaffirms *Maggard*. Because the referendum petition was legal, sufficient, and timely, HB 1 never took effect and was referred to the voters as of December 9, 2025. The congressional districts the General Assembly established in 2022 remain in full force and effect for the November 2026 general election, and HB 1 will not take effect unless and until approved by the voters at the November 2026 general election.

Conclusion

This Court reverses the circuit court's judgment. The referendum petition was legal, sufficient, and timely, and the secretary incorrectly concluded otherwise. HB 1 did not go into effect and will not go into effect unless and until approved by the voters. The congressional redistricting the General Assembly established in 2022 remains in full force and effect for the November 2026 general election.

Pursuant to Rule 84.14, this Court enters judgment ordering the secretary to issue a certificate of sufficiency as to the referendum petition (2026-R004) (attaching a copy of this opinion thereto), to place the referendum petition on the November 2026 general election ballot, and to take any and all additional steps necessary to place the referendum petition on the ballot at that election before September 8, 2026. The secretary and all of those acting in concert with him are restrained and enjoined from implementing, using, or mandating the use of the congressional redistricting in HB 1 for the November 2026 general election or at any other time thereafter

at the November 2026 general election, HB 1 is of no force and effect and did not take effect on December 11 because it is subject to a sufficient referendum petition filed on December 9. Regardless of any confusion, expense, or practical difficulties caused by the secretary's delay and incorrect assumption about whether the referendum petition would be deemed sufficient, simply continuing to utilize the congressional redistricting in HB 1 does not comport with the Missouri Constitution because the 2022 map is the only map in effect.

unless and until HB 1 is approved by the voters at the November 2026 general election and takes effect 30 days thereafter. Mo. Const. art. XII, sec. 2(b).⁹ No Rule 84.17 motions are permitted.



Ginger K. Gooch, Judge

All concur.

⁹ The ballot summary statement to be used is set out in *People Not Politicians v. Hoskins*, 736 S.W.3d 518, 535 (Mo. App. 2026).

No. SC101805
Circuit Court of Cole County Case Number 26AC-CC00440

In the Supreme Court of Missouri

September Session, 2026

Richard von Glahn,
Appellant,
v. APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COLE COUNTY

Denny Hoskins, in His Official Capacity, et al.,
Respondents.

Now at this day come again the parties aforesaid, by their respective attorneys, and the Court here being now sufficiently advised of and concerning the premises, doth consider and adjudge that the judgment aforesaid, in form aforesaid, by the said Cole County Circuit Court rendered, be reversed, annulled and for naught held and esteemed, and that the said Appellant be restored to all things which he has lost by reason of said judgment in conformity with the opinion of this Court herein delivered; and that the said Appellant recover against the said Respondents costs and charges herein expended, and have execution therefor.

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(Opinion filed.)

STATE OF MISSOURI-Sct.

I, BETSY LEDGERWOOD, Clerk of the Supreme Court of the State of Missouri, certify that the foregoing is a full, true and complete transcript of the judgment of said Supreme Court, entered of record at the September Session thereof, 2026, and on the 3rd day of September, 2026, in the above entitled cause.

*Given under my hand and seal of said Court at the City of
Jefferson, this 3rd day of September, 2026.*



Betsy Ledgerwood
Clerk

Amiee Auger
Deputy Clerk



Supreme Court of Missouri

SC101805

September 4, 2026

Richard Von Glahn,
Appellant,

vs.

Denny Hoskins, In His Official Capacity, et al.,
Respondents.

Order

Respondent's motion for a stay of injunction pending emergency appeal and application for stay to the Supreme Court of the United States overruled.

By: W/BFAP
Chief Justice

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COLE COUNTY, MISSOURI

RICHARD VON GLAHN,	)	
	)	
Plaintiff,	)	
	)	
v.	)	Case No. 26AC-CC00440
	)	
DENNY HOSKINS, in his official	)	
capacity,	)	
	)	
Defendant.	)	

JUDGMENT

All parties appeared before this Court on August 19, 2026, and arguments were made by counsel. The Court has considered the pleadings, the evidence in the form of the Joint Stipulation of Facts and Exhibits filed August 18, 2026, the pre-trial briefs, and argument of counsel. Being duly advised, the Court now issues its Judgment in this matter.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. The General Assembly enacted House Bill 1 (HB 1) on September 12, 2025. HB 1 repealed Missouri's prior congressional districting plan and established new boundaries for Missouri's eight congressional districts.

2. HB 1 passed by a margin of 21 to 11 in the Senate and 90 to 65 in the House of Representatives. *See* Mo. Senate J. 25–26 (2d Extra. Sess., 103d Gen. Assembly, Sept. 12, 2025); Mo. House J. 37–38 (2d Extra. Sess., 103d Gen. Assembly, Sept. 9, 2025).

3. Governor Michael L. Kehoe signed HB 1 into law on September 28, 2025.

4. A group called People Not Politicians ("PNP") launched a

referendum campaign to challenge the HB 1 map. PNP eventually submitted a referendum petition to the Secretary of State on December 9, 2025, invoking the referendum provisions in Article III of the Missouri Constitution.

5. Under Article III, Section 52(a), “[a] referendum may be ordered . . . by petitions signed by five percent of the legal voters in each of two-thirds of the congressional districts in the state.” Mo. Const. art. III, § 52(a). Article III’s referendum provisions are silent regarding congressional redistricting. *See id.* art. III, §§ 49, 52(a)-(b).

6. PNP’s submission triggered the Secretary’s statutory duty to review the referendum petition. *See Maggard v. State*, 733 S.W.3d 411, 416 (Mo. banc 2026).

7. That review encompasses the timeliness, legality, and sufficiency of the petition, as well as the sufficiency of the signatures offered in support of the petition. *See* §§ 116.120–116.140, RSMo.

8. “After” review, “if the secretary of state finds [the petition] sufficient, the secretary of state shall issue a certificate setting forth that the petition contains a sufficient number of valid signatures to comply with the Constitution of Missouri and with this chapter.” § 116.150.1, RSMo.

9. But “[i]f the secretary of state finds the petition insufficient, the secretary of state shall issue a certificate stating the reason for the insufficiency.” § 116.150.2, RSMo.

10. The Secretary was required to complete this extensive review “not later than 5:00 p.m. on the thirteenth Tuesday prior to the general election or two weeks after the date the election authority certifies the results of a petition verification pursuant to subsection 2 of section 116.130, whichever is later.”

§ 116.150.3, RSMo.

11. The thirteenth Tuesday prior to this year's general election fell on Tuesday, August 4, the date of the State's primary elections.

12. While the Secretary and Missouri's local election officials were reviewing PNP's submission, two plaintiffs separately challenged HB 1's effectiveness, seeking a declaratory judgment and an injunction preventing use of the HB 1 map until voters approved it through the referendum process. *See Maggard*, 733 S.W.3d at 413.

13. The Missouri Supreme Court unanimously rejected their claims, holding that "the December 9 referendum petition filing did not automatically suspend HB 1 under article III, sections 49, 52(a), or 52(b) of the Missouri Constitution." *Id.* at 421. The Missouri Supreme Court also went out of its way to emphasize that its decision should not be read as endorsing referenda on congressional maps. *See id.* at 414 n.7 ("[T]his opinion presupposes without deciding HB 1 is subject to the right of referendum.").

14. Following the Supreme Court's ruling, the Attorney General released an opinion letter requiring "State and local election officials" to "take all appropriate steps to ensure the HB 1 map is fully implemented in advance of the 2026 primary elections." Mo. Att'y Gen., Op. Letter 03-2026 (May 13, 2026). Local election officials then implemented the HB 1 map in Missouri's Centralized Voter Registration ("MCVR") system, transferring hundreds of thousands of voters to the new districts. Stipulated Ex. 26 ¶ 7; Stipulated Ex. 29 at 109. After implementation, state and local officials prepared ballots and conducted the August 4 primary elections under the HB 1 map.

15. A total of 1,206,871 Missourians voted in the State's congressional primary elections under the HB 1 map. *See State of Missouri Election Results*

– Primary Election August 4, 2026, *available at* <https://enr.sos.mo.gov/> (last visited Aug. 17, 2026).

16. Prior to 5 p.m. on August 4, the last day to vote in the primary elections, Secretary Hoskins announced that he was issuing a certificate finding PNP’s petition insufficient. *See* Stipulated Ex. 5.

17. The Secretary’s certificate identified as “the reason for the insufficiency,” § 116.150.2, RSMo., that the Missouri Constitution does not permit referenda on congressional maps, *see* Stipulated Ex. 5. The Secretary’s certificate relied upon a letter from the Attorney General explaining that insufficiency. *See id.*

18. Plaintiff filed this suit later that evening. Plaintiff alleges that “he is entitled to the immediate suspension of the use and implementation of HB 1.” Pet. ¶¶ 42-43; *see also id.* at 8. He also alleges that the Court should “restrain[] the Secretary from taking further steps to implement or use the congressional districts in HB 1 to ensure that . . . the correct congressional districts are utilized to conduct the 2026 general congressional election.” *Id.* ¶ 45; *see also id.* at 8.

19. Plaintiff’s Petition does not identify what he believes to be “the correct congressional districts . . . to conduct the 2026 general congressional election.” *Id.* ¶ 45.

20. To the extent Plaintiff asks the Court to revert Missouri to the plan the General Assembly repealed in HB 1, such an action would move hundreds of thousands of voters into different districts for the imminent 2026 general election compared to the districts in which they cast their ballots in the August primary elections just two weeks ago. *See, e.g.,* Order and Judgment, Findings 27, 30, 40-46, *Wise v. State*, No. 2516-CV29597 (Jackson Cty. Cir. Ct. Mar. 12,

2026); Stipulated Ex. 26 ¶ 7; Stipulated Ex. 29 at 109.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

I. Legal Standard

21. The General Assembly “has the power to do whatever is necessary to perform its functions *except as expressly restrained by the Constitution*.” *Luther v. Hoskins*, 730 S.W.3d 567, 571 (Mo. banc 2026) (quotations omitted) (emphasis added).

22. “Deference due the General Assembly requires that doubt be resolved against nullifying its action if it is possible to do so by . . . any reasonable construction of the Constitution.” *State v. Clay*, 481 S.W.3d 531, 537 (Mo. banc 2016) (quotations omitted).

23. This case also implicates federal law. The U.S. Constitution provides that “[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” U.S. Const. art. VI.

24. The Missouri Constitution enforces this principle, declaring that “Missouri is a free and independent state, subject only to the Constitution of the United States.” Mo. Const. art. I, § 4.

25. Thus, federal law controls over any contrary provision of the Missouri Constitution or law.

26. The Secretary has the authority to apply the U.S. Constitution.

27. The Secretary must apply and adhere to the U.S. Constitution—

the supreme law of the land—in every action he undertakes. *See* U.S. Const. art. VI; Mo. Const. art. I, § 4. No statute or state constitutional provision can override that obligation. *See* U.S. Const. art. VI. In fact, the Secretary of State’s oath *requires* that he “support the Constitution of the United States and this state.” Mo. Const. art. VII, § 11.

II. Missouri’s Referendum Provisions Do Not Apply To Congressional Redistricting.

A. Article III Does Not Subject Congressional Redistricting To The Referendum.

28. Article III expressly directs that “the general assembly shall by law divide the state into [congressional] districts.” Mo. Const. art. III, § 45. This is the *only* constitutional provision addressing congressional redistricting—and it recognizes the General Assembly’s authority and mandate over that task. *Luther*, 730 S.W.3d at 571.

29. When the General Assembly conducts congressional redistricting, it acts not only under this express state constitutional command but also under an express federal constitutional grant of authority.

30. The Elections Clause provides that the “Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof,” subject to laws enacted by Congress. U.S. Const. art. I, § 4.

31. The General Assembly’s power to conduct congressional redistricting, therefore, is a uniquely robust legislative authority—emanating from a dual mandate prescribed by both the state and federal constitutions—layered on top of its plenary power to do whatever is necessary to perform its functions “except as expressly restrained by the Constitution.” *Luther*, 730

S.W.3d at 571 (quotations omitted).

32. Given the General Assembly's unique authority over congressional redistricting, this Court will not lightly infer that the Missouri Constitution elsewhere divested that authority absent a **clear statement**.

33. Missouri courts interpret the Constitution to effectuate its "plain, ordinary, and natural meaning," and any provision must be "considered as a whole with the primary objectives of the provision in issue in mind." *Id.* (quotations omitted); *see also Mo. Prosecuting Att'ys v. Barton Cty.*, 311 S.W.3d 737, 741 (Mo. banc 2010) (explaining that "due regard is given to the primary objectives of the provision at issue as viewed in harmony with all related provisions, considered as a whole") (quotations omitted).

34. Applying those principles here, the Missouri Constitution states that congressional redistricting belongs to the General Assembly. *See Mo. Const. art. III, § 45.*

35. This expectation of clarity is not novel in Missouri law. Missouri courts apply it across multiple doctrinal areas, each reflecting that where the law establishes a settled default, courts do not presume it has been silently displaced.

36. For example, Missouri courts presume that statutes apply only within the State's borders unless the General Assembly clearly says otherwise. *Tuttle v. Dobbs Tire & Auto Centers, Inc.*, 590 S.W.3d 307, 311 (Mo. banc 2019). In addition, Missouri courts presume the State cannot be sued unless the General Assembly expressly waives the State's immunity. *Ramirez v. Mo. Prosecuting Att'ys*, 694 S.W.3d 432, 436 (Mo. banc 2024). And Missouri courts presume that statutes operate prospectively unless the legislature's intent for

retroactive application “clearly appears from the express language of the act or by necessary or unavoidable implication.” *Lincoln Credit Co. v. Peach*, 636 S.W.2d 31, 34 (Mo. banc 1982).

37. In each context, the principle is the same: A reasonable reader knows the baseline under Missouri law and expects clarity before concluding it has been changed.

38. That principle also animates the Missouri Supreme Court’s substantial deference to the General Assembly’s exercise of its plenary legislative power recognized by the Missouri Constitution.

39. Missouri law’s baseline expectation that the General Assembly can exercise any and all legislative power is so strong that the Missouri Supreme Court refuses to nullify legislative acts under the Missouri Constitution if “it is possible to do so by . . . any reasonable construction of the Constitution” or by resolving any “doubt . . . against nullifying its action.” *Clay*, 481 S.W.3d at 537.

40. If anything, the expectation of clarity applies even more strongly here because congressional redistricting represents the rare circumstance where the General Assembly wields a dual mandate under the State and U.S. Constitutions. *See* Mo. Const. art. III, § 45; U.S. Const. art. I, § 4.

41. In other words, because an express restraint is necessary to limit the General Assembly’s legislative authority recognized by the Missouri Constitution, such a restraint at a minimum is required to limit the General Assembly’s exercise of its congressional redistricting authority both recognized by the Missouri Constitution *and* granted by the U.S. Constitution. *See Luther*, 730 S.W.3d at 571.

42. Against that backdrop, Plaintiff points only to the generic referendum provision in Article III, Section 49, which provides that “[t]he people reserve power . . . to approve or reject by referendum any act of the general assembly.” Mo. Const. art. III, § 49; *see* Petition ¶ 4.

43. But that provision at most merely *raises*, but does not *answer*, the question whether the referendum power extends to congressional redistricting, a domain Article III and the U.S. Constitution separately and specifically assign to the General Assembly.

44. A generic provision that says nothing about congressional redistricting cannot do the work of divesting the General Assembly of the dual mandate the Missouri and U.S. Constitutions assign to it.

45. Because Section 49 does not “expressly restrain[]” the General Assembly’s authority over congressional redistricting, it cannot limit, let alone oust, the General Assembly’s exercise of that authority. *Luther*, 730 S.W.3d at 571 (quotations omitted). And any doubt on that score must be resolved in favor of the General Assembly, not against it. *See Clay*, 481 S.W.3d at 537.

B. The Missouri Constitution’s Specific Redistricting Provisions Override The Generic Referendum Power.

46. Even if Section 49’s generic language could be read to encompass congressional redistricting, a more specific constitutional provision resolves the question. Article III, Section 7(h) provides: “No redistricting plan shall be subject to the referendum.” Article III, Section 3 similarly provides: “No reapportionment shall be subject to the referendum.”

47. By its plain text, Section 7(h) covers all redistricting. It is not limited to Senate redistricting or redistricting conducted by a commission. Nor

is Section 3 limited to House redistricting. The “plain, ordinary, and natural meaning” of these provisions exempts congressional redistricting from the referendum. *Luther*, 730 S.W.3d at 571.

48. To be sure, Section 7(h) and Section 3 appear among other provisions which address state redistricting. But that placement reflects the impetus for these provisions: undoing the Missouri Supreme Court’s decision subjecting Senate redistricting to the referendum in *State ex rel. Gordon v. Becker*, 49 S.W.2d 146 (Mo. banc 1932). That placement, however, does not delineate the scope of Section 7(h) or Section 3, neither of which expresses any limitation on its scope.

49. In all events, the construction that Section 7(h) and Section 3 cover congressional redistricting is at least reasonable, so any “doubt” on this question must be resolved in favor the General Assembly and against subjecting HB 1 to nullification through the referendum. *Clay*, 481 S.W.3d at 537.

C. Context Confirms That Congressional Redistricting Is Not Subject To The Referendum.

50. Context reinforces that a congressional redistricting statute duly enacted by the General Assembly cannot be subjected to the referendum process. Three features of Missouri’s legal landscape reinforce this conclusion.

51. *First*, in the more than eighty years since Missouri ratified its current Constitution in 1945, no referendum petition directed at a congressional redistricting plan has ever reached the ballot.

52. The lone attempt before *Maggard* occurred in 1952, when a group

filed referendum petitions against the congressional map, but the petitions were held untimely because the statute had already taken effect. *See State ex rel. Moore v. Toberman*, 250 S.W.2d 701, 705-06 (Mo. banc 1952).

53. The complete absence of any successful referendum on a congressional map over eight decades of practice underscores that Missouri never deliberately chose to extend the referendum power to this domain.

54. Indeed, given the relative ease of collecting signatures of “five percent of the legal voters in each of two-thirds of the congressional districts in the state,” Mo. Const. art. III, § 52(a)—and the charged political stakes involved in redistricting—one would expect that political opponents of the majority party in the General Assembly would have forced a referendum on a congressional redistricting plan long ago if Missouri law provided a viable path to do so. But no such thing has occurred.

55. *Second*, the 1945 Constitution itself repudiated the only Missouri Supreme Court decision that had ever sanctioned a referendum on legislative redistricting of any kind.

56. In *State ex rel. Gordon v. Becker*, 49 S.W.2d 146 (Mo. banc 1932), a divided court permitted a referendum challenging state senate redistricting.

57. The Constitutional Convention responded by inserting Article III, Section 7(h)—the very provision discussed above—which expressly declares that “[n]o redistricting plan shall be subject to the referendum.” Mo. Const. art. III, § 7(h) (1945).

58. The Convention thus eliminated referenda in the only redistricting context in which any Missouri court had approved such a referendum. *See*

Debates of the 1943–1944 Constitutional Convention of Missouri 7016 (2008). That deliberate rejection only confirms the Missouri Framers’ distrust of referenda in the redistricting sphere.

59. *Third*, Chapter 116, the statutory “framework for exercising the right of referendum” the General Assembly enacted in 1980, *see No Bans on Choice v. Ashcroft*, 638 S.W.3d 484, 487 (Mo. banc 2022), is incompatible with referenda on congressional maps.

60. Two features are particularly telling. As an initial matter, Chapter 116 restricts the ballot summary for any referendum measure to a mere hundred words and makes no provisions for visual aids such as maps. *See* § 116.334, RSMo. Congressional redistricting is a uniquely complex undertaking involving considerations of population, compactness, geography, and communities of interest. *See generally Healey v. State*, 732 S.W.3d 827 (Mo. banc 2026). It is difficult to see how voters could meaningfully evaluate competing redistricting plans based solely on a hundred-word description.

61. Had the General Assembly contemplated that Chapter 116 would govern referenda on congressional maps, it would have written it to furnish voters with far more information so they could make an informed choice regarding that complex issue.

62. Most telling, Chapter 116 sets the presumptive deadline for the Secretary’s certification decision on the very same day as the August primary elections. *See* § 116.150.3, RSMo. It is difficult, if not impossible, to fathom that the General Assembly would impose a certification timeline that extends to—or past—primary election day if it believed that a referendum could displace the congressional map under which the very primary was conducted.

63. These points merely confirm what the text already establishes: Missouri has never—by constitutional provision, by statute, or by practice—subjected congressional redistricting to the referendum. At every turn where the question might have been addressed, Missouri’s framers and legislators either remained silent or affirmatively rejected referenda on redistricting.

D. The Referendum Provisions Themselves Exempt Congressional Maps From Their Coverage.

64. In addition, the text of Article III’s referendum provisions themselves underscore that they exempt congressional redistricting from their reach.

65. Article III, Section 52(a) carves out from the referendum process “laws necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety.” Mo. Const. art. III, § 52(a). Legislation qualifies for this exception when there is “a crisis or emergency which requires immediate or quick legislative action for the preservation of the public peace, property, health, safety, or morals.” *State ex rel. Tyler v. Davis*, 443 S.W.2d 625, 631 (Mo. banc 1969).

66. Missouri courts have explained that this standard is satisfied when federal law imposes a deadline that the State must meet through prompt legislation.

67. For example, in *Osage Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. State Highway Commission*, 687 S.W.2d 566, 569-70 (Mo. App. 1984), the federal Highway Beautification Act required Missouri to enact effective billboard-control legislation before a set date or lose ten percent of its federal highway appropriation. After the General Assembly passed the required statute, the court upheld it as emergency legislation, explaining that “[t]his sequence of

events demonstrates the necessity for immediate action by the legislature and prompt enactment of the law.” *Id.* at 569.

68. The same rationale applies here with greater force. Federal law requires each State’s Legislature to prescribe the times, places, and manner of holding congressional elections. *See* U.S. Const. art. I, § 4. Federal law also imposes several constitutional and statutory mandates with which Missouri must comply, including a nationwide federal general election day on the first Tuesday in November of even-numbered years, 3 U.S.C. § 1; 2 U.S.C. §§ 1, 7, and a strict 45-day ballot transmission requirement prior to any federal primary or general election, 52 U.S.C. § 20302(a)(8). HB 1 is the legislation through which Missouri satisfies those federal requirements for congressional elections.

69. Just as the billboard statute in *Osage* was necessary to avoid the loss of federal highway funds, HB 1 is necessary to avoid a far graver consequence: the inability to hold a constitutionally valid election.

70. “[T]he political franchise of voting” has long been recognized as “preservative of all rights,” *Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections*, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966) (quotations omitted), and legislation that makes a federal election possible is plainly necessary to preserve the public peace. It cannot be suspended at the behest of a small minority of voters who prefer a different redistricting plan—particularly when that minority seeks to impose on the public a different plan in the weeks between a primary and a general election.

III. Federal Law Independently Confirms That Missouri Has Not Ousted The General Assembly’s Redistricting Authority.

71. Although Missouri law alone requires dismissal of the Petition, this Court’s conclusion is independently supported by federal law.

72. As explained, when the General Assembly conducts congressional redistricting, it wields authority expressly granted it by the U.S. Constitution's Elections Clause. *See* U.S. Const. art. I, § 4. Federal law, in turn, imposes its own **clear statement** requirement before this federal legislative authority can be displaced. Missouri's referendum provisions do not satisfy that requirement for the same reasons they fail it under Missouri law: They say nothing about congressional redistricting.

A. Clear Statement Rules Protect and Uphold The U.S. Constitution's Express Delegations of Authority.

73. Enforcing constitutional boundaries ranks among courts' most vital duties. Given the tendency of institutions to encroach on each other's powers, *see* THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison) (C. Rossiter ed., 1961), courts must serve as a "bulwark[]" against those incursions, THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed., 1961).

74. Consistent with that role, courts will not lightly infer a significant restructuring of a constitutional allocation of power. Where the Constitution assigns authority to a specific actor, that power cannot be divested absent a **clear statement**. (Emphasis added) *See West Virginia v. EPA*, 597 U.S. 697, 735 (2022) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (explaining that clear-statement rules "operate[] to protect foundational constitutional guarantees").

75. Courts deploy an array of clear statement rules to safeguard the prerogatives of each branch of the federal government in its proper sphere. For example, Article I of the Constitution delegates responsibility "to make the laws that govern us" to "the people's elected representatives." *Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. OSHA*, 595 U.S. 109, 124 (2022) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).

76. To protect Article I's grant of authority, courts will not infer that Congress delegated to executive agencies the power to resolve major policy questions absent a clear statement. *FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.*, 529 U.S. 120, 159-60 (2000).

77. This expectation of clarity reflects and reinforces the constitutional structure. *See West Virginia*, 597 U.S. at 723 (explaining that the major questions doctrine rests on "both separation of powers principles and a practical understanding of legislative intent").

78. "Because the Constitution vests Congress with 'all legislative Powers,' a reasonable interpreter would expect it to make the big-time policy calls itself, rather than pawning them off to another branch." *Biden v. Nebraska*, 600 U.S. 477, 515 (2023) (Barrett, J., concurring) (citation omitted). Accordingly, the clear statement rule keeps the legislative power "where . . . it belongs." *Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus.*, 595 U.S. at 124 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).

79. Clear statement rules likewise protect the President's constitutional prerogatives in Article II. It is axiomatic that "[t]he President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations." *United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.*, 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) (quotations omitted). So "unless there is the affirmative intention of the Congress clearly expressed to give a statute extraterritorial effect," courts will presume it does not apply extraterritorially. *Morrison v. Nat'l Australia Bank Ltd.*, 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010) (cleaned up).

80. In this context, the clear statement rule reflects the structural principle that Congress does not ordinarily intend to intrude on the President's

authority to conduct foreign relations. *See RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community*, 579 U.S. 325, 348 (2016).

81. Underscoring the point, federal courts routinely employ clear statement rules to protect their Article III authority. Federal courts will not imply a repeal of their jurisdiction in “the absence of clear congressional language mandating” that result. *McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc.*, 498 U.S. 479, 483-84 (1991); *see also Goncalves v. Reno*, 144 F.3d 110, 122 (1st Cir. 1998) (applying “the long-standing rule disfavoring repeal of jurisdictional provisions by implication”).

82. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court has long required that if Congress intends to make exceptions to the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction it must do so with unmistakable clarity, not “by mere implication.” *Ex parte Yerger*, 75 U.S. 85, 106 (1869). This principle ensures that any retrenchment of federal courts’ core functions occurs, if at all, only by Congress speaking with the clarity the Constitution’s separation of powers demands.

83. Clear statement rules also help police the “constitutional balance of federal and state powers.” *Gregory v. Ashcroft*, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991). The Constitution’s structure, including the Tenth Amendment’s reservation of powers, counsels restraint in inferring federal limitations on state authority.

84. Hence, “if Congress intends to alter the usual constitutional balance between the States and the Federal Government, it must make its intention to do so unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.” *Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police*, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989) (cleaned up).

85. This clear statement rule governs attempts to displace state sovereign immunity, *see Seminole Tribe v. Florida*, 517 U.S. 44, 55 (1996)

(“unequivocal[] express[ion]” required “to abrogate the immunity”) (quotations omitted), to preempt state legislation, *Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.*, 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (courts will assume state police powers not superseded “unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress”), to impose conditions on states accepting federal funds, see *Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman*, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) (“unambiguous[]” language required to “impose a condition on the grant of federal moneys”), and to criminalize conduct traditionally regulated by the states, *Bond v. United States*, 572 U.S. 844, 857 (2014) (absent “clear indication,” courts will not read statutes to “intrude[] upon traditional state criminal jurisdiction”) (quotations omitted).

86. In short, across multiple doctrinal settings, clear statement rules serve as a structural safeguard ensuring that only a deliberately expressed choice—not ambiguity or implication—can recalibrate the Constitution’s usual balance of shared authorities among competing actors.

B. The Elections Clause Requires A Clear Statement To Displace The State Legislature’s Redistricting Authority.

87. The Elections Clause, no less than other enumerated delegations, requires a clear statement before courts may determine that a state has reallocated power over redistricting from the state legislature.

88. This clear statement rule flows from the Elections Clause itself, which expressly provides that “[t]he Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations” U.S. Const. art. I, § 4 (emphasis added).

89. This delegation reflects a reasoned constitutional settlement. The Framers recognized “electoral districting problems and considered what to do

about them,” and they “settled on a characteristic approach, assigning the issue to the state legislatures, expressly checked and balanced by the Federal Congress.” *Rucho v. Common Cause*, 588 U.S. 684, 699 (2019). Courts “must respect” the Constitution’s “deliberate choice” to “expressly vest[] power” to conduct congressional redistricting “in ‘the Legislature’ of each State.” *Moore v. Harper*, 600 U.S. 1, 34 (2023).

90. As with other express delegations in the U.S. Constitution, courts require a **clear statement** before concluding that a state has displaced its legislature’s authority over congressional redistricting.

91. It is well established that Congress must employ “positive and clear statutes” in order to override a state legislature’s prerogative to regulate federal elections. *United States v. Gradwell*, 243 U.S. 476, 485 (1917); *see also United States v. Oregon*, 828 F. Supp. 3d 1092, 1095-96 (D. Or. 2026) (same, citing *Gradwell*, 243 U.S. at 485); *United States v. Caldwell*, No. CV 26-2025 (ZNQ) (JTQ), 2026 WL 2186515, at *3 (D.N.J. July 29, 2026) (same, citing *Gradwell*, 243 U.S. at 485).

92. Because Congress—the sole actor the Elections Clause empowers to supersede state legislative regulations—may do so only through unmistakable, affirmative enactments, any contention that some state actor or process has displaced the state legislature’s redistricting role must at a minimum rest on equally explicit and unequivocal language.

93. The U.S. Supreme Court’s Elections Clause cases confirm the point. In *State of Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant*, the U.S. Supreme Court considered whether a constitutional referendum could displace the Ohio General Assembly’s authority to redistrict. 241 U.S. 565, 566-67 (1916). The

U.S. Supreme Court concluded that it could only because state law “conclusive[ly]” “ma[d]e[] it clear that . . . the referendum constituted a part of the state Constitution and laws” applicable to congressional redistricting. *Id.* at 568.¹

94. More recently, in *Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission*, the U.S. Supreme Court weighed whether Arizona could create an independent commission to draw congressional districts. 576 U.S. 787, 792-93 (2015). The U.S. Supreme Court sustained that arrangement because Arizona’s Constitution expressly “remove[d] congressional redistricting authority from the State Legislature.” *Id.* at 796-97. In both cases, no doubt existed that the state had deliberately overridden the legislature’s authority.

95. The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in *Davis v. Hildebrant* is not controlling here for several additional reasons.

96. *First*, the provision at issue in *Hildebrant* did not involve a provision like Article III, Section 7(h) of the Missouri Constitution exempting redistricting from the referendum. Ohio’s referendum provision applied broadly to “any law, section of any law or any item in any law . . . passed by the General Assembly.” *State ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant*, 94 Ohio St. 154, 158-59 (1916). Missouri’s Constitution, by contrast, contains an express exemption:

¹ *Hildebrant* is also inapposite because it pre-dated the U.S. Supreme Court’s one-person, one-vote jurisprudence and other subsequent legal developments that require states to conduct congressional elections in equipopulous single-member districts. *See, e.g., Kirkpatrick v. Preisler*, 394 U.S. 526 (1969). Thus, at the time of *Hildebrant*, extending a referendum process to a legislature’s duly enacted congressional districting plan did not place the state in peril of violating the one-person, one-vote mandate or other federal requirements that foreclose Plaintiff’s claim and requested relief here. *See, e.g., infra* Parts IV-V. Moreover, *Hildebrant* arose in a non-election year, not between a primary and general election in the same year. *See, e.g., infra* Parts V-VI.

“No redistricting plan shall be subject to the referendum.” Mo. Const. art. III, § 7(h).

97. *Second*, the U.S. Supreme Court in *Hildebrant* did not address whether the Ohio referendum provision comported with the Elections Clause. Instead, it addressed only whether an act of Congress at issue in that case comported with the Elections Clause. *See* 241 U.S. at 567-68.

98. *Third*, *Hildebrant* arose in a non-election year. The referendum was conduct in 1915—not between a primary and a general election. *See id.* It therefore did not present the concerns at issue here regarding disruption to an ongoing election cycle.

99. *Fourth*, *Hildebrant* pre-dated the U.S. Supreme Court’s one-person, one-vote jurisprudence and other subsequent legal developments that require states to conduct congressional elections in equipopulous single-member districts. *See, e.g., Kirkpatrick v. Preisler*, 394 U.S. 526 (1969). At the time of *Hildebrant*, extending a referendum process to a legislature’s duly enacted congressional districting plan did not place the state in peril of violating the one-person, one-vote mandate or other federal requirements that foreclose Plaintiff’s claim and requested relief here.

C. Missouri’s Referendum Provisions Do Not Provide A Clear Statement Displacing The General Assembly’s Authority.

100. The Missouri Constitution does not supply *any* statement—let alone a clear one—reallocating authority over congressional redistricting away from the General Assembly to a referendum process.

101. “Article III, section 45 is the only provision of the Missouri Constitution directly addressing congressional redistricting,” *Luther*, 730

S.W.3d at 571, and it mandates that “the *general assembly* shall by law divide the state into [congressional] districts,” Mo. Const. art. III, § 45 (emphasis added).

102. Plaintiff directs this Court’s attention to the generic referendum provision in Article III, Section 49, which provides that “[t]he people reserve power . . . to approve or reject by referendum any act of the general assembly.” Mo. Const. art. III, § 49; see Petition ¶ 4.

103. This is a textbook example of a broad, undifferentiated clause that does not provide a **clear statement** overriding the U.S. Constitution’s express grant of authority over congressional redistricting to the General Assembly. See *Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd.*, 545 U.S. 119, 139 (2005) (plurality opinion) (“[C]lear statement rules ensure [the state] does not, by broad or general language, legislate on a sensitive topic inadvertently or without due deliberation.”).

104. Section 49 gives no indication that Missouri “specifically considered” whether to displace the General Assembly’s federally assigned authority over redistricting and “intentionally legislated on the matter.” *Sossamon v. Texas*, 563 U.S. 277, 290 (2011).

105. Accordingly, it does not provide a “conclusive” statement divesting the General Assembly of its Elections Clause authority over congressional redistricting, much less vesting that authority in the referendum process. *Hildebrant*, 241 U.S. at 568.

106. Lacking any **clear statement** in Missouri law to support his claim, Plaintiff’s Petition fails.

IV. The U.S. Constitution Invalidates Article III, Section 52(B) As Applied To A Congressional Map Enacted By The Legislature.

107. Even if Missouri's referendum provisions could somehow be read to encompass congressional redistricting, the U.S. Constitution would not permit it. *See* U.S. Const. art. VI; Mo. Const. art. I, § 4. Both the Elections Clause and the Guarantee Clause forbid the application of Article III, Section 52(b) to a congressional map enacted by the General Assembly.

108. As discussed, the Elections Clause vests redistricting authority squarely in the state legislature. *See* U.S. Const. art. I, § 4. Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court recently cautioned that state law may not be wielded to “arrogate” the “power vested in state legislatures to regulate federal elections.” *Moore*, 600 U.S. at 29.

109. That is what would happen if Article III, Section 52(b) applies to congressional maps.

110. Section 52(b) provides that legislation subject to a referendum is suspended once a sufficient petition is filed. Mo. Const. art. III, § 52(b); *see also Maggard*, 733 S.W.3d at 418. A referendum petition is sufficient if signed by merely “five percent of the legal voters in each of two-thirds of the congressional districts in the state.” Mo. Const. art. III, § 52(a).

111. On Plaintiff's theory, a small fraction of voters can freeze a congressional map duly enacted by the General Assembly before any majority of Missourians has voted for or against it—and even *after* that map has been used to conduct primary elections.

112. That theory inverts the constitutional design. The Elections Clause guarantees that the People’s elected representatives control the time, place, and manner of federal elections, not that a small, unelected minority can wield effective veto power over the General Assembly’s redistricting decisions.

113. HB 1 passed overwhelmingly in both chambers of the General Assembly and was signed by the Governor. *See* Mo. Senate J. 25–26 (2d Extra. Sess., 103d Gen. Assembly, Sept. 12, 2025); Mo. House J. 37–38 (2d Extra. Sess., 103d Gen. Assembly, Sept. 9, 2025). Yet Plaintiff claims that a small minority of voters can suspend the map months before the election without any statewide vote.

114. The Elections Clause forbids any arrangement that would so thoroughly “annihilate” the General Assembly’s redistricting authority. *Hildebrant*, 241 U.S. at 569.

115. The Guarantee Clause compels the same conclusion.

116. That clause provides that “[t]he United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government.” U.S. Const. art. IV, § 4. It also “necessarily implies a duty on the part of the States themselves to provide” a republican form of government. *Minor v. Happersett*, 88 U.S. 162, 175 (1874).

117. It is clear that disputes under the Guarantee Clause are nonjusticiable political questions. But the Secretary reasoned in part that the referendum is invalid under the Guarantee Clause as part of his independent obligation to uphold the Constitution. *See Minor*, 88 U.S. at 175. That reasoning is sufficient to support the Secretary’s action—and Plaintiff asserts that the very question is nonjusticiable. If Guarantee Clause questions are

political questions confined to the political branches, and the legislature is one political branch and the Secretary of State is another, then courts cannot override the Secretary's determination and must defer to the judgment of those elected branches.

118. A republican government is one in which “the scheme of representation takes place”—that is, the people govern through elected representatives who enact laws on their behalf. *THE FEDERALIST* No. 10 (Madison) (C. Rossiter ed., 1961).

119. “[T]he distinguishing feature of that form is the right of the people to choose their own officers for governmental administration, and pass their own laws in virtue of the legislative power reposed in representative bodies, whose legitimate acts may be said to be those of the people themselves.” *Duncan v. McCall*, 139 U.S. 449, 461 (1891); accord *Madden v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co.*, 192 S.W. 455, 458 (Mo. banc 1917) (Woodson, J., concurring in the judgment).

120. The result Plaintiff seeks is inconsistent with a republican form of government. On his theory, a small minority of voters can nullify a congressional map enacted by the People's elected representatives without any majority vote. See *THE FEDERALIST* No. 22 (Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed., 1961); *THE FEDERALIST* No. 58 (Madison) (C. Rossiter ed., 1961) (“it would no longer be the majority that would rule: the power would be transferred to the minority”).

121. The “immediate suspension” of HB 1, Pet. ¶¶ 42-43, would leave Missouri with no congressional map whatsoever for the imminent general election.

122. Permitting a sliver of the electorate to void the “legitimate acts . . . of the people themselves” cannot be squared with Missouri’s constitutional duty to maintain a republican form of government. *Duncan*, 139 U.S. at 461.

V. Federal Law Forecloses Any Alteration to Missouri’s Congressional Map At This Late Stage Of The Electoral Process.

123. Federal law also prohibits Plaintiff’s requested relief: “immediate suspension of the use and implementation of HB 1.” Pet. ¶¶ 42-43; *see also id.* at 8.

124. More than 1.2 million Missourians have *already* voted under the HB 1 map in the primary elections. *See* State Of Missouri Election Results – Primary Election August 4, 2026, *available at* <https://enr.sos.mo.gov/> (last visited Aug. 17, 2026).

125. Plaintiff asks the Court to nullify those votes and adopt some other congressional map for the imminent general election. Doing so would violate federal law in multiple respects.

126. *First*, UOCAVA protects the voting rights of military servicemembers and citizens living abroad by requiring state election officials to transmit absentee ballots no fewer than 45 days before any federal election. *See* 52 U.S.C. § 20302(a)(8); *see also* § 115.914, RSMo.

127. That requirement applies independently to each federal election, including a primary.

128. Accordingly, if this Court were to suspend the use of HB 1, UOCAVA would require ballot transmission to military and overseas voters 45 days before any primary under the new map. Missouri law would then require a three-day waiting period after the primary before the results could be certified. *See* §§ 115.920.1, 115.508, RSMo. And UOCAVA would again

require ballot transmission 45 days before the subsequent general election on November 3, 2026. 3 U.S.C. § 1; 2 U.S.C. §§ 1, 7.

129. Accordingly, the State needs 93 days minimum before the general election on November 3, 2026, to comply with the federal election day statute and UOCAVA.

130. That deadline has already passed. *See Foster v. Love*, 522 U.S. 67, 74 (1997) (holding that a State may not conduct federal elections in conflict with congressionally mandated timing under 2 U.S.C. § 7).

131. An injunction against HB 1 would therefore require state officials to violate federal law. And UOCAVA is enforceable by the U.S. Attorney General in federal court, 52 U.S.C. § 20307(a), meaning that Plaintiffs requested relief would expose Missouri officials to an adverse federal injunction.

132. The Court concludes that the Secretary correctly avoided that result by declining to certify the referendum petition. *See* Stipulated Ex. 5 at 9-10.

133. *Second*, holding a general election under a different congressional map than the one used in the August 4 primary would violate Article I, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution.

134. That provision guarantees that “[t]he House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 2.

135. The U.S. Supreme Court has long recognized that “[w]here the state law has made the primary an integral part of the procedure of choice,” then “the right of the elector to have his ballot counted at the primary[] is

likewise included in the right protected by Article I, § 2.” *United States v. Classic*, 313 U.S. 299, 318 (1941).

136. Missouri law makes the primary integral: “all candidates for elective office shall be nominated at a primary election,” § 115.339, RSMo., and “[t]he person receiving the greatest number of votes at a primary election as a party candidate for an office shall be the only candidate of that party for the office at the general election,” § 115.343, RSMo.

137. A candidate may be replaced only if he or she dies, is disqualified, or voluntarily withdraws. *See* § 115.363.3(1)-(3), .4, RSMo.

138. The Missouri Supreme Court has thus confirmed that “primary elections have constitutional stature” and serve as an “*integral* part of [the State’s] election machinery.” *State ex rel. McClellan v. Kirkpatrick*, 504 S.W.2d 83, 86 (Mo. banc 1974) (emphasis added).

139. Plaintiffs requested relief plainly violates the right of Missouri voters to have their ballot counted. More than 1.2 million Missourians voted in the August 4 congressional primaries under the HB 1 map and selected nominees in each of Missouri’s eight districts. Plaintiff asks this Court to ignore those votes, *see* Pet. ¶¶ 42-43; *see also id.* at 8, stripping the nominees of the mandate their voters conferred. Article I, Section 2 forbids this result.

140. The U.S. Supreme Court has long recognized that primary and general elections are not separate events but a unified process. In *Smith v. Allwright*, the Court described “[t]he fusing . . . of the primary and general elections into a single instrumentality for choice of officers.” 321 U.S. 649, 660 (1944).

141. Because the primary and general election constitute a “single instrumentality for choice of officers,” *id.*, then changing the districts between those two stages does not merely alter the ballot; it fractures the instrumentality itself. *See also Storer v. Brown*, 415 U.S. 724, 735 (1974) (describing the primary as “not merely an exercise or warm-up for the general election but an integral part of the entire election process, the initial stage in a two-stage process by which the people choose their public officers”).

142. *Third*, an order requiring a general election under a different congressional map than the one used in the primary would violate the Equal Protection Clause. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.

143. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that primary-election procedures constitute “state action” within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment” and “must be exercised in a manner consistent with the Equal Protection Clause.” *Bullock v. Carter*, 405 U.S. 134, 140-41 (1972).

144. The Supreme Court has also made clear that “[o]nce the geographical unit for which a representative is to be chosen is designated, all who participate in the election are to have an equal vote . . . wherever their home may be in that geographical unit.” *Gray v. Sanders*, 372 U.S. 368, 379 (1963).

145. If the congressional map changes between the primary and general elections, it would force hundreds of thousands of Missourians to vote in a district different from the one in which they cast their primary ballots.

146. Those voters would possess materially less voting power than voters whose district remained the same because the former group would have to select from candidates they never had the opportunity to evaluate, support, or oppose in the primary.

147. They would thus be denied the right to choose their own representative through the integrated primary and general elections. Meanwhile, voters who happened to remain in the same district would retain the full benefit of their primary vote. An order changing the congressional map would thus create two classes of voters—those who had the opportunity to select their general election candidate and those who did not—in direct violation of the Equal Protection Clause.

148. In sum, federal law precludes this Court from ordering the State to use a different congressional map than the one under which Missouri conducted the 2026 primary elections.

VI. The Court Will Not Enter Any Changes To The General Assembly's Duly Enacted Map For The Ongoing 2026 Election.

149. In all events, the Court will not order any changes to the General Assembly's duly enacted 2025 Plan for the ongoing 2026 election. *See, e.g., Purcell v. Gonzalez*, 549 U.S. 1, 4-5 (2006).

150. Missouri has already completed its August 4 primary elections, in which over 1.2 million Missourians selected nominees who are now the only candidates of their respective parties for the general election, *see* § 115.343, RSMo., which will be completed in only eleven weeks from now.

151. Any judicially ordered changes to the map at this late juncture would “result in voter confusion and consequent incentive to remain away from the polls” and erode the “[c]onfidence in the integrity of our electoral processes . . . essential to the functioning of our participatory democracy.” *Purcell v. Gonzalez*, 549 U.S. 1, 4-5 (2006); *accord Hadley v. Junior Coll. Dist. of Metro. Kansas City*, 460 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Mo. banc 1970).

152. Months ago, the U.S. Supreme Court stayed a three-judge federal district court's order enjoining use of Texas's 2025 congressional redistricting plan and requiring the State to revert to its 2022 plan. *Abbott v. League of United Latin American Citizens*, 607 U.S. ----, 146 S. Ct. 418, 419 (2025).

153. The district court issued its injunction shortly after the opening of candidate filing, approximately four months before the primary, and eleven months before the November 2026 general election. *See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Abbott*, 809 F. Supp. 3d 502 (W.D. Tex. 2025).

154. The U.S. Supreme Court issued the stay because the district court had “improperly inserted itself into an active primary campaign, causing much confusion” with its late-breaking injunction. *Abbott*, 146 S. Ct. at 419; *see*

Robinson v. Ardoin, 37 F.4th 208, 228-29 (5th Cir. 2022) (per curiam), *stay issued sub nom.*, *Ardoin v. Robinson*, 142 S. Ct. 2892, 2892-93 (June 28, 2022) (staying injunction of congressional redistricting plan issued five months before primary elections); *Callais v. Landry*, 732 F. Supp. 3d 574, 613-14 (W.D. La. Apr. 30, 2024), *stay issued sub nom.*, *Robinson v. Callais*, 144 S. Ct. 1171 (May 15, 2024) (staying injunction of congressional redistricting plan issued more than six months before the next election).

155. It is a “basic tenet of election law” that “[w]hen an election is close at hand, the rules of the road should be clear and settled.” *Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Wis. State Legislature*, 141 S. Ct. 28, 31 (2020) (mem.) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). “[L]ate-breaking, court-ordered rule changes can ‘result in voter confusion and consequent incentive to remain away from the polls,’ and thus undermine the ‘[c]onfidence in the integrity of our electoral processes . . . essential to the functioning of our participatory democracy.’” *Bost v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections*, 607 U.S. ----, 146 S. Ct. 513, 521 (2026) (quoting *Purcell*, 549 U.S. at 4-5); *see also Abbott*, 146 S. Ct. at 419.

156. After all, “running a statewide election is a complicated endeavor,” involving “a host of difficult decisions about how best to structure and conduct the election.” *Democratic Nat’l Comm.*, 141 S. Ct. at 31 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). And those decisions must then be communicated to the “state and local officials” tasked with implementing them, who in turn “must communicate to voters how, when, and where they may cast their ballots through in-person voting on election day, absentee voting, or early voting.” *Id.*

157. When a “court alters election laws near an election,” *id.*, candidates, voters, and even officials are left scrambling to understand the

court-imposed alteration, “inviting confusion and chaos and eroding public confidence in electoral outcomes,” *id.* at 30 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).

158. These considerations counsel judicial restraint and deference to the democratic process on the eve of an election. The General Assembly is responsible for redrawing the State’s congressional districts. *See* Mo. Const., art. III, § 45; U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1; *see also* *Ariz. State Legis. v. Ariz. Ind. Redistricting Comm’n*, 576 U.S. 787, 808 (2015).

159. This allocation makes practical sense. Legislatures “enjoy far greater resources for research and factfinding” than courts, and “make policy and bring to bear the collective wisdom of the whole people when they do, while courts dispense the judgment of only a single person or a handful.” *Democratic Nat’l Comm.*, 141 S. Ct. at 29 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).

160. “It is one thing for state legislatures to alter their own election rules in the late innings and to bear the responsibility for any unintended consequences. It is quite another thing for a . . . court to swoop in and alter carefully considered and democratically enacted state election rules when an election is imminent.” *Id.* at 31 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).

161. Missouri’s own precedent reinforces these principles. In *Hadley v. Junior College District of Metropolitan Kansas City*, the Missouri Supreme Court confronted a remand after the U.S. Supreme Court found that junior college trustee districts violated the one-person, one-vote principle. *See* 460 S.W.2d at 1. By the time the Missouri Supreme Court addressed the case, the State’s election machinery was already in motion. Five candidates had filed for office, officials had begun printing absentee ballots and adjusting voting machines, and the State had already incurred substantial expense. *Id.* at 2-3.

Moreover, the candidate-filing deadline fell just two days away and the election itself loomed one month out. *Id.*

162. In light of these considerations, the Missouri Supreme Court held that “it would be wholly inequitable and impracticable to attempt at this late date to apply the principles enunciated” by the U.S. Supreme Court, and ordered the election to proceed under the existing apportionment. *Id.*

163. In other words, even a *proven* violation of the U.S. Constitution could not justify disrupting an ongoing election. As the Missouri Supreme Court explained, “a court is entitled to *and should* consider the proximity of a forthcoming election and the mechanics and complexities of state election laws, and should act and rely upon general equitable principles.” *Id.* at 2 (emphasis added) (quoting *Reynolds v. Sims*, 377 U.S. 533, 585 (1964)).

164. This case presents the scenario *Hadley* and *Purcell* were designed to prevent. If courts cannot change a congressional map four months before a primary, *see Abbott*, 146 S. Ct. at 419, this Court certainly will not do so *after* the primary has already occurred and mere weeks before the general election.

165. Candidate filing closed months ago. Over 1.2 million Missourians voted in the August 4 primary. Nominees have been selected. Campaigns for the general election are underway. Plaintiff has not demonstrated how State officials could reverse course and implement some entirely new map, how nominees selected by voters in one set of districts would campaign in different ones, or how voters would make sense of a last-minute overhaul of the districts they just voted in.

166. The disruption Plaintiff seeks would exceed anything contemplated in *Abbott*, *Ardoin*, or *Callais*—and the U.S. Supreme Court stayed all of those injunctions as impermissible.

167. Missouri election officials are not aware of any precedent, in Missouri or any other State, in which a court has changed a congressional map between a State's primary and general elections. Stipulated Ex. 26 ¶¶ 5, 16.

168. On the contrary, courts have rejected attempts to change district boundaries after a primary. In *Terrazas v. Slagle*, 821 F. Supp. 1154 (W.D. Tex. 1992), after Texas held its primary elections under court-ordered interim state senate redistricting plans, the Secretary of State issued a directive attempting to switch the general election to entirely different senate districts under a new plan. The three-judge federal court enjoined the directive and explained that “[p]rimary elections for offices chosen by the electorate in separate geographical districts obviously make no sense unless the districts are the same for the ensuing general election as for the primary.” *Id.* at 1159. The court agreed with the Justice Department's undisputed assertion that the State had “never held or sought to hold a general election under a redistricting plan different from the plan used for the preceding primary election.”

169. In fact, courts have refused to change maps even when the existing districts are unconstitutional. In *Covington v. North Carolina*, 316 F.R.D. 117 (M.D.N.C. 2016), the court had found that the state legislature had engaged in one of the most extensive unconstitutional racial gerrymanders ever encountered by a federal court, affecting nearly 70% of House and Senate districts. *See Covington v. North Carolina*, 270 F. Supp. 3d 881, 892, 896 (M.D.N.C. 2017). Yet with “the 2016 primary elections already held under the challenged maps and Election Day less than three months away,” the court concluded that immediate injunctive relief was “impractical” and allowed the general election to proceed under the unconstitutional maps. *Id.* at 887, 892; *see also Covington*, 316 F.R.D. at 177.

170. In fact, changing the maps at this late juncture is not just “impractical,” it is impossible. As one election official explained, implementing a new congressional map requires local election officials to transfer hundreds of thousands of individual voters in the MCVR system. *Id.* ¶ 7; *see also* Stipulated Ex. 29 at 109. That is a meticulous process involving careful analysis of printed maps and multiple rounds of proofreading; it ordinarily takes more than two weeks, and at least 7-10 days even under emergency conditions. Stipulated Ex. 26 ¶ 7.

171. But even that timeline is academic here, because the MCVR system locks shortly before absentee ballots are distributed and remains locked until an election is certified two weeks after election day. *Id.* ¶ 8. This year, the system will remain locked until at least mid-November because of a Jackson County special election in September 2026. *Id.* ¶¶ 9-10. The Court declines to order an unprecedented remedy that is impossible to implement. *See Hadley*, 460 S.W.2d at 3 (refusing to alter districts where doing so would be “wholly inequitable and impracticable”).

WHEREFORE, this Court hereby issues its Judgment and Order in favor of Defendant Denny Hoskins and Intervenor Republican National Committee, National Republican Congressional Committee, and Missouri Republican State Committee and against Plaintiff on Plaintiff’s Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief and further ORDERS, DECLARES, and ADJUDGES that:


- A. Missouri’s referendum provisions in Article III, Sections 49 and 52 of the Missouri Constitution do not apply to congressional redistricting enacted by the General Assembly pursuant to Article III, Section 45;
- B. The Secretary of State’s decision to not certify the referendum petition directed at HB 1 was lawful;

- C. HB 1 remains in full force and effect for the 2026 general election;
- D. The Petition is dismissed and judgment is entered for Defendant;
- E. The parties are to bear their own costs.
- F. As soon as a notice of appeal is filed, if any, this

Court relinquishes its jurisdiction over this matter
and deems this Judgment final for purposes of appeal.

See Rule 81.045

So ORDERED, this 14 day of August 2026.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Daniel Green', is written over a horizontal line.

Daniel Green
Circuit Court Judge

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COLE COUNTY, MISSOURI

RICHARD VON GLAHN	)	
	)	
Plaintiff,	)	
	)	
v.	)	Case No. 26AC-CC00248
	)	
DENNY HOSKINS, in his official	)	
capacity,	)	
	)	
Defendant.	)	

**PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT AND INJUNCTIVE
RELIEF UNDER SECTION 116.200**

Plaintiff Richard von Glahn for his Petition, alleges and states as follows.

1. Plaintiff Richard von Glahn is a Missouri citizen, resident of St. Louis County, a taxpayer, and qualified voter in the State of Missouri.

2. Plaintiff von Glahn is the proponent of the referendum that is the subject of this action.

3. Defendant Denny Hoskins is the Secretary of State for the State of Missouri. His principal office is in Cole County, Missouri.

4. Missourians reserved to themselves the “power to approve or reject by referendum any act of the general assembly, except as hereinafter provided.” Mo. Const. art. III, § 49.

5. Article III, Section 52(a) of the Constitution identifies the sole exceptions to the people’s referendum right: (i) “laws necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety” and (ii) “laws making appropriations for the current expenses of the state government, for the

maintenance of state institutions and for support of public schools.” Mo. Const. art. III, § 52(a).

6. To place a referendum petition before voters, a proponent must gather signatures of “five percent of the legal voters in each of two-thirds of the congressional districts in the state[.]” Mo. Const. art. III, § 52(a).

7. For an election taking place in 2026, a proponent must gather 106,384 signatures across six congressional districts.¹

8. On September 12, 2025, the General Assembly truly agreed and finally passed—during a special session—House Bill 1 (“HB 1”) titled: “An Act To repeal sections 128.345, and 128.348, RSMo, and to enact in lieu thereof twelve new sections relating to the composition of congressional districts.”

9. Attached as **Exhibit 1** is a true and correct copy of HB 1.

10. HB 1 is an act of the General Assembly.

11. HB 1 is not a law necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, or safety.

12. The General Assembly did not attach an emergency clause to HB 1.

13. HB 1 is not a law making appropriations for the current expenses of the state government, for the maintenance of state institutions, or for support of public schools.

¹ See

https://www.sos.mo.gov/CMSImages/Elections/Petitions/MakeYourVoiceHeard_02.07.2025.pdf

14. On October 15, 2025, Defendant Hoskins, the “General Assembly” and the State of Missouri filed a lawsuit against Plaintiff in federal court, denominated *Missouri General Assembly v. von Glahn*, No. 25-cv-01535 (E.D. Mo.).

15. That lawsuit sought to prevent Plaintiff from turning in signatures on the Referendum.

16. Attached as **Exhibit 2** is a copy of the Complaint filed in the federal action.

17. Defendant claimed Plaintiff should not be permitted to turn in signatures because initiating a referendum on a redistricting bill would “violate[] both the U.S. and Missouri Constitutions.” Ex. 3 at 2.

18. Defendant Hoskins’ position in his filings was that the referendum would violate the Missouri Constitution regardless of the number of signatures submitted.

19. Defendant Hoskins’ position in his filings was that the referendum would violate the U.S. Constitution regardless of the number of signatures submitted.

20. Following expedited litigation, including Defendant seeking a preliminary injunction, the federal court issued a decision dismissing the federal lawsuit on December 8, 2025.

21. Attached as **Exhibit 3** is a copy of the decision in the federal action.

22. On December 9, 2025, Plaintiff submitted more than 300,000 signatures in support of the Referendum to the Secretary’s Office.

23. The Secretary accepted the Referendum for filing and issued a receipt for 691 boxes of signatures.

24. Each referendum petition page Plaintiff submitted to Defendant Hoskins was identical to the form approved by his office on October 14, 2025.

25. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 4** is a true and correct copy of the October 14, 2025 approval of the referendum petition as to form.

26. Each referendum petition page submitted to Defendant Hoskins included a completed and signed circulator's affidavit.

27. By statute, Defendant Hoskins is required to "examine the [Referendum] to determine whether it complies with the Constitution of Missouri and with this chapter [116]." § 116.120.1, RSMo.

28. In doing so, Defendant Hoskins "may rely on the circulator's affidavit found on each page of the petition as required by section 116.080 and 116.130.1, or [he] may verify the petition signatures by use of random sampling."

29. "Based on this sampling, [Defendant Hoskins] can approve or reject the petition signatures or proceed to a verification of all the signatures."

30. "With or without sampling, [Defendant Hoskins] has discretion to order the local election authorities to verify all the signatures."

31. Chapter 116 requires Defendant Hoskins to issue a certificate deeming the Referendum sufficient or insufficient, which decision is subject to review by the courts.

32. Chapter 116 gave Defendant Hoskins until August 4, 2026 to issue such certificate.

33. On August 4, 2026, Defendant issued a certificate of insufficiency for the Referendum pursuant to § 116.150, RSMo.

34. Attached as **Exhibit 5** is a copy of Defendant Hoskins' certificate of insufficiency.

35. Defendant Hoskins is required to "stat[e] the reason for the insufficiency." § 116.150.2, RSMo.

36. The *only* reason for insufficiency identified in Defendant Hoskins' certificate is his assertion that the referendum violates the Missouri and U.S. Constitutions. *See* Ex. 5.

37. By law, no changes can be made to the November general election ballots after September 8, 2026. *See* § 115.125.3, RSMo.

38. Plaintiff filed this Petition within 10 days of Defendant Hoskins issuing the certificate of insufficiency.

39. Plaintiff's challenge to that certificate is therefore timely. § 116.200.1, RSMo.

PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO AN INJUNCTION

40. Plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law.

41. Plaintiff will face irreparable harm absent an order enjoining the Secretary of State from further implementing or using the congressional districts contained in HB 1.

42. Plaintiff is the proponent of the referendum petition and he is entitled to the immediate suspension of the use and implementation of HB 1.

43. Plaintiff's referendum right will be undermined if the Secretary is allowed to further implement or make use of HB 1.

44. The Secretary faces no harm because the his duty is to carry out the election laws of Missouri and he should have no preference for which congressional districts are used.

45. The public interest is served by restraining the Secretary from taking further steps to implement or use the congressional districts in HB 1 to ensure that the referendum right is fully realized and that the correct congressional districts are utilized to conduct the 2026 general congressional election.

**COUNT I:
THE REFERENDUM IS SUFFICIENT**

46. Plaintiff incorporates the preceding allegations as if set forth fully herein.

47. The Missouri Constitution requires that referendum petitions be "signed by five percent of the legal voters in each of two-thirds of the congressional districts in the state." Mo. Const. art. III, § 52(a).

48. The Referendum was signed by the constitutionally required number of legal voters in each of two-thirds of Missouri's congressional districts.

49. Defendant Hoskins did not identify the number of signatures gathered as a reason for deeming the Referendum insufficient. *See* Ex. 5.

50. Defendant Hoskins instead contends the Missouri and U.S. Constitutions prohibit subjecting a redistricting bill to the referendum.

51. They do not.

52. The Missouri Constitution identifies only two categories of bills exempt from the referendum: (1) bills addressing specified emergencies and (2) specified appropriations bills. Mo. Const. art. III, § 52(a).

53. HB 1 falls into neither of those categories.

54. The Referendum does not violate the Missouri Constitution and it is sufficient.

55. Like the Missouri Constitution, the U.S. Constitution does not prohibit a state from subjecting a redistricting bill to the referendum.

56. Just three years ago, the Supreme Court “embraced the core principle espoused in *Hildebrant* and *Smiley* that redistricting is a legislative function, to be performed in accordance with the State’s prescriptions for lawmaking, which may include the referendum and the Governor’s veto.” *Moore v. Harper*, 600 U.S. 1, 25 (2023) (quotations omitted).

57. The Court squarely “rejected the contention that the Elections Clause vests state legislatures with exclusive and independent authority when setting the rules governing federal elections.” *Id.* at 26.

58. Put simply: “A state legislature may not create congressional districts independently of requirements imposed by the state constitution with respect to the enactment of laws.” *Id.* at 26 (quotations omitted).

59. All laws, except for emergency laws and appropriations, are subject to the referendum under the Missouri Constitution.

60. The Referendum does not violate the U.S. Constitution and it is sufficient.

61. Plaintiff is entitled to an order reversing Defendant Hoskins' certification decision.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays that this Court:

- a. Enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff and reversing Defendant Hoskins' certification decision;
- b. Restrain Defendant and those acting in concert with him from taking any further steps to implement or mandate the use of HB 1; and
- c. Grant such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.

Respectfully submitted,

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ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS

SC101805 Appeal Document Number 3 Page 1

26AC-CC00440

Exhibit 1

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION**

MISSOURI GENERAL ASSEMBLY,

DENNY HOSKINS, IN HIS OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS MISSOURI SECRETARY OF
STATE,

&

STATE OF MISSOURI,

Plaintiffs,

v.

Case No.

RICHARD VON GLAHN

&

PEOPLE NOT POLITICIANS,

Defendants.

COMPLAINT

Plaintiffs, the Missouri General Assembly, Missouri Secretary of State Denny Hoskins, and the State of Missouri, for their Complaint respectfully allege as follows:

INTRODUCTION

1. The U.S. Constitution expressly vests the power to apportion federal congressional districts in the state legislatures, with only Congress itself expressly given oversight authority over state legislatures. U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. Yet in Missouri, Defendants, Richard von Glahn and People Not Politicians, have initiated a referendum

process that would strip the General Assembly of its authority over redistricting. This unprecedented act violates both the U.S. and Missouri Constitutions.

2. Just two years ago, the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed the core authority of state legislatures to draw congressional districts for the U.S. House of Representatives. The court emphasized how other state-governmental actors “do not have free rein” to transgress state legislatures’ authority to apportion congressional districts. *Moore v. Harper*, 600 U.S. 1, 34 (2023). For good reason: The U.S. Constitution’s Elections Clause uniquely bestows on state legislatures the power to set the times, places, and manner of federal elections, including reapportionment authority—with only Congress itself being the enumerated overseer of legislatures’ actions. *See* U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.

3. Despite that constitutional language, some state constitutions have expressly transferred authority over federal redistricting from state legislatures to other entities—like independent redistricting commissions. *See, e.g., Ariz. State Leg. v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n*, 576 U.S. 787, 796–98 (2015). Jurists have disagreed on whether such delegations are constitutional. *See id.* at 826 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).

4. This case does not require this Court to revisit that debate. Where the U.S. Constitution expressly vests authority in a particular actor, that authority cannot be taken away without a clear and express statement. *See Moore*, 600 U.S. at 34–36. In *Arizona State Legislature*, for example, the Arizona Constitution *did* “directly and immediately” transfer the Arizona’s Legislature’s authority over redistricting to another entity. 576 U.S. at 801. And in *State of Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant*, the Supreme Court considered a federal constitutional challenge under the Guarantee Clause to

Ohio's redistricting scheme *only after* concluding that state law “ma[de] it clear” that the legislature had been partially divested of its authority over federal redistricting. 241 U.S. 565, 567–68 (1916) (holding it was “obvious” that state law was “conclusive” on that point).

5. Such clear-statement rules are fixtures of American constitutional law because they ensure that the relevant governmental actors actually intended to push the boundaries and potentially upset the careful balances struck by the U.S. Constitution's Framers. *See West Virginia v. EPA*, 597 U.S. 697, 736–37 (2022) (Gorsuch, J., concurring); Amy Coney Barrett, *Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency*, 90 B.U. L. Rev. 109, 166–67 (2010). For example, even though the Constitution vests legislative power in Congress, courts allow Congress to delegate major policy decisions to the Executive Branch—but only if Congress provides a clear statement of authority. *West Virginia*, 597 U.S. at 723; *id.* at 746–49 (Gorsuch, J., concurring); *Paul v. United States*, 140 S. Ct. 342, 342 (2019) (statement of Kavanaugh, J., respecting denial of certiorari). Similarly, courts demand a clear statement before assuming Congress intended to legislate in areas of traditional state authority—to protect the U.S. Constitution's commitment to federalism. *See Sackett v. EPA*, 598 U.S. 651, 679–80 (2023); *Gregory v. Ashcroft*, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991).

6. Defendants cannot identify any language that “makes it clear” that the Missouri Constitution transfers authority over federal redistricting away from the General Assembly. *Hildebrant*, 241 U.S. at 568. While Missouri has chosen to allow voters to revisit legislation passed by the General Assembly, nothing in the Missouri

Constitution expressly says that federal congressional reapportionment may be subjected to a referendum. *See* Mo. Const. art. III, §§ 49, 52(a). In other words, the people of Missouri have never made the conscious choice to undermine the Framers' decision to vest this State's legislature with the reapportionment authority.

7. Defendants therefore have no legal basis to proceed with their referendum. This Court should declare that such a referendum would violate both the U.S. and Missouri Constitutions.

PARTIES

I. Plaintiffs

8. Plaintiff Missouri General Assembly is the legislative branch of Missouri's government. *See* Mo. Const. art. III, § 1. The People of Missouri directly elect the General Assembly.

9. Plaintiff Denny Hoskins is the Missouri Secretary of State.

10. Plaintiff State of Missouri is a sovereign State of the United States of America.

11. Plaintiffs bring this action to prevent Defendants Richard von Glahn and People Not Politicians from unconstitutionally usurping the General Assembly's vested authority to reapportion the State of Missouri's congressional representation.

12. Plaintiffs come to this Court asking for an order barring Defendants from seeking to overturn the General Assembly's reapportionment of Missouri's congressional representation via a statewide referendum, a direct imposition on the General Assembly's authority under Article I, § 4, cl. 1, of the U.S. Constitution, and Article III, § 45 of the Missouri Constitution.

13. States and legislatures can seek, in the federal courts, to protect the congressional-apportionment authority—a power vested in the state legislatures by Article I, § 4, cl. 1, of the U.S. Constitution. *See, e.g., Ariz. State Leg.*, 576 U.S. at 803–04.

14. Plaintiffs sue to prevent the dedication of the State’s resources to a referendum whose aim is unconstitutional and at odds with the General Assembly’s vested authority over federal congressional reapportionment.

15. Plaintiffs need not wait for the outcome of the referendum before seeking to protect the General Assembly’s exercise of authority under Article I, § 4, cl. 1, of the U.S. Constitution. With the initiative process already commenced, the State must presently expend its resources on an initiative whose aim is unlawful.

II. Defendants

16. Defendant Richard von Glahn is a natural person seeking to commence a referendum that would overturn the General Assembly’s latest reapportionment of Missouri’s congressional representation.

17. Mr. von Glahn submitted a referendum petition challenging the General Assembly’s recent redistricting bill to the Secretary of State.

18. On information and belief, Mr. von Glahn resides and has engaged in actions pertaining to his pursuit of the referendum at 9 Wilshire Terrace, Webster Grove, MO 63119.

19. On information and belief, Mr. von Glahn is the Executive Director of Defendant People Not Politicians.

20. Defendant People Not Politicians is an organization dedicated to, among other things, opposing the Missouri General Assembly's actions regarding reapportionment.¹

21. On information and belief, Defendant People Not Politicians is a non-profit political and advocacy organization operating within the State of Missouri.

22. On information and belief, Defendant People Not Politicians is soliciting donations from politically progressive individuals and organizations from around the country to fund its referendum efforts.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

23. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the federal claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because a provision of the U.S. Constitution governs the disposition of this case.

24. This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the state-constitutional claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

25. This Court has the authority to issue the requested declaratory relief under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201–2202 and this Court's inherent equitable authority.

26. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant Richard von Glahn because, on information and belief, Mr. von Glahn resides and has engaged in actions pertaining to this case at 9 Wilshire Terrace, Webster Grove, MO 63119.

27. Venue is proper in this judicial district under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because Defendant Richard von Glahn resides and has undertaken efforts to secure an unlawful referendum within this District and the Eastern Division.

¹ See People Not Politicians, <https://peoplenotpoliticiansmo.org/#about>.

28. Exercising specific personal jurisdiction over Defendant People Not Politicians is proper under the Due Process Clause because Defendant has such a deep and systemic presence in Missouri that it can reasonably foresee being sued in Missouri. *See Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court*, 592 U.S. 351, 364–65 (2021).

29. Venue is proper in this judicial district under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) respecting People Not Politicians because Plaintiffs allege that the Defendant has undertaken efforts to secure an unlawful referendum within this District and Division.

FACTS COMMON TO ALL COUNTS

I. The General Assembly Reapportions Missouri's Congressional Representation.

30. On August 29, 2025, Missouri's Governor called a special session of the General Assembly to, among other things, "enact legislation establishing updated congressional districts."²

31. The General Assembly convened its special session in September, with the House of Representatives opening the session on September 3, 2025. The House of Representatives approved the new apportionment on September 9, 2025.

32. The Missouri Senate concurred and passed the redistricting bill on September 12, 2025.

33. The Missouri Governor signed the redistricting bill on September 28, 2025.

² *Governor Kehoe Announces Special Session on Congressional Redistricting and Initiative Petition Reform*, Off. of Gov. Mike Kehoe (Aug. 29, 2025), <https://governor.mo.gov/press-releases/archive/governor-kehoe-announces-special-session-congressional-redistricting-and>.

II. Defendants Initiate Their Effort to Subject the Reapportionment to a Referendum.

34. In Missouri, citizens can seek “to approve or reject” legislation by the General Assembly via a referendum. Mo. Const. art. III, § 49; *see also* *Ariz. State Leg.*, 576 U.S. at 794 (explaining how “the referendum serves as a negative check” by voters on the legislature’s actions).

35. Doing so first requires submitting a petition to the Plaintiff Secretary of State for review. *See* Mo Rev. Stat. § 116.332.1. The Secretary has limited discretion to reject the proposal. *See id.*

36. Following review by the Secretary, the petition must garner “five percent of legal voters in each of two-thirds of congressional districts in the state.” Mo. Const. art. III, § 52(a). If a petition receives the necessary signatures, the challenged law cannot take effect until a referendum occurs. *Id.* § 52(b).

37. After the passage of the new congressional map, but before the Governor signed the reapportionment into law, Defendants began their efforts to subject the new map to a citizen referendum.³

38. On September 12, 2025, Defendants submitted their petition for a referendum to the Secretary of State.

³ *See* Jason Hancock, *Three Lawsuits and a Referendum: New Missouri Congressional Map Faces Multiple Attacks*, Mo. Indep. (Sept. 15, 2025), <https://missouriindependent.com/2025/09/15/three-lawsuits-and-a-referendum-new-missouri-congressional-map-faces-multiple-attacks/>.

39. In a public statement, Mr. von Glahn made the initiative's aim clear: "The people who are going to put this issue on the ballot are Missourians. The people who are going to have the final say on this are Missourians."⁴

40. Similarly, Defendant People Not Politicians expressed its intentions of pursuing a referendum. It called the reapportionment "an illegal gerrymandering scheme that is nothing more than an unconstitutional power grab."⁵ It then said, in no uncertain terms, "*We believe that Missouri voters—not politicians—should have the final say.* We have filed a citizen's referendum to gather signatures to put this unjust map before voters on an upcoming ballot."⁶

41. The organization then asks visitors of its website to "Donate Now"—without limiting the request solely to Missouri voters or residents.⁷

42. Defendants have already seen great success in securing support and resources from out-of-state partisan special interests. Notably, the Democratic National Committee has promised to devote staff and monetary support to the referendum.⁸

⁴ Charlie Keegan, *Opponents to Missouri Redistricting Identify 2 Paths to Block Bill*, KSHB 41 (Sept. 15, 2025), <https://www.kshb.com/news/local-news/opponents-to-redistricting-going-down-2-paths-to-block-bill>.

⁵ People Not Politicians, *supra* note 1.

⁶ *Id.* (emphasis in original).

⁷ *Id.*

⁸ Jason Rosenbaum, *Democratic National Committee Will Contribute to Blocking Missouri Congressional Map*, St. Louis Pub. Radio (Sept. 29, 2025), <https://www.stlpr.org/government-politics-issues/2025-09-29/democratic-national-committee-will-contribute-to-blocking-missouri-congressional-map>.

III. Plaintiffs' Ongoing Commitments Regarding the Initiative.

43. Because Defendants have initiated the referendum process, the Secretary of State in particular and the State in general are currently being forced to commit resources in response.

44. Defendants' filing a petition seeking a referendum triggers several ongoing responsibilities that will force the committal of resources by the Secretary of State and the State as a whole. The process begins with submission of a "sample sheet" of the initiative to the Secretary of State. Mo Rev. Stat. § 116.332.1. Missouri law requires the Secretary and the Attorney General to "review the petition for sufficiency as to form and approve or reject the form of the petition, stating the reasons for rejection, if any." *Id.* The Secretary also refers the petition to the State Auditor "for purposes of preparing a fiscal note and fiscal note summary." *Id.* The Secretary must post the proposed measure on State's website within two business days of receipt. *Id.* § 116.332.2. The Secretary has fifteen days to review the petition. *Id.* § 116.332.4. As noted, Defendants have already filed their sample sheet with the Secretary.

45. Even before the Secretary issued a decision on the form of the proposed referendum, Defendants sued over the Secretary's review process. *See* Pet., *People Not Politicians v. Hoskins*, 25AC-CC07128 (Cir. Ct. Cole Cnty. Sept. 18, 2025). The State is currently being forced to expend substantial resources litigating that case.

46. A host of new obligations occurs when a proponent submits a final petition with signatures to the Secretary of State. All of these will force the Secretary to reallocate scarce resources and personnel to handling the referendum petition. First, the Secretary will need to "examine the petition to determine whether it complies with the Constitution

of Missouri and with this chapter.” *Id.* § 116.120.1. Second, responsibility for verifying signatures falls with the Secretary. *See id.* § 116.120. The Secretary may also involve election authorities in checking signatures. *See id.* § 116.130. Once the Secretary makes a determination regarding whether a petition has received the necessary number of non-fraudulent signatures, he must then issue a certificate of sufficiency or insufficiency. *See id.* § 116.150. In the latter case, the Secretary must detail “the reason for the insufficiency.” *Id.* § 116.150.2. Time limits govern when the Secretary must make a decision. *See id.* § 116.150.3.

47. Even if the Secretary finds a petition sufficient, the resource commitments do not end. Missouri law requires the State to hold a public hearing and take comments on any petition deemed to have sufficient signatures. *See id.* § 116.153. The Secretary will then be responsible for preparing the ballot initiate. *See id.* § 116.220.

48. If a referendum petition gains enough signatures to qualify for a vote before the people, the challenged law is frozen pending the public vote. Mo. Const. art. III, § 52(b). Thus, the General Assembly loses its authority over redistricting pending that public vote. And the entire State would be plunged into legal uncertainty over which legislative maps would govern Missouri elections in 2026.

49. Given these state-law requirements, the Secretary of State and the State as a whole are currently forced to expend resources facilitating a referendum initiative that they believe unconstitutionally deprives the General Assembly of its vested and previously undisturbed authority to reapportion the State’s federal congressional representation. This creates a sufficient injury-in-fact for justiciability purposes. *See,*

e.g., *New York v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.*, 969 F.3d 42, 59–60 (2d Cir. 2020) (holding “States’ alleged economic harms are sufficiently concrete and imminent to constitute injury in fact” for preliminary injunction); *City of Chicago v. Matchmaker Real Estate Sales Ctr., Inc.*, 982 F.2d 1086, 1095 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that the government plaintiff had standing because of its legally required committal of resources); *see also* *Axon Enter., Inc. v. FTC*, 598 U.S. 175, 191 (2023) (explaining that “here-and-now injury” occurs when the plaintiff alleges being subjected to an unconstitutional process); *Ariz. State Leg.*, 576 U.S. at 800–01 (explaining that government need not first violate the law to gain standing); *BTS Holdings, LLC v. OSHA*, 17 F.4th 604, 618 (5th Cir. 2021) (explaining that “the diversion of resources” and burdens on the State’s constitutionally granted role qualify as irreparable harms). Likewise, an order from this Court confirming that Defendants’ proposed referendum is unconstitutional and enjoining their actions would redress the harms alleged here. *See Ariz. State Leg.*, 576 U.S. at 800 (recognizing as much and concluding that the case met standing and ripeness requirements).

50. Plaintiffs also do not need to wait for any future actions by Defendants. As noted, Defendants have already filed their sample sheet with the Secretary of State—the first step in the initiative process, and Defendants are litigating the manner in which the Secretary handled their first sample sheet. While that litigation is ongoing, Defendants submitted an additional sample sheet, which the Secretary of State approved as to form, thus ensuring the referendum process will continue. *See Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v. Dayton Christian Schs., Inc.*, 477 U.S. 619, 625 n.1 (1986) (recognizing that

the filing of an administrative action threatening harm to the plaintiffs' interests shows that the controversy is ripe). Hence, Defendants will continue forcing the State to allocate resources on the referendum per the governing statutes, and through their ongoing litigation against the Secretary of State. These resource expenditures should not occur because the referendum's ultimate aim—depriving the General Assembly of its vested authority without a clear statement—is unconstitutional. *See Neb. Pub. Power Dist. v. MidAm. Energy Co.*, 234 F.3d 1032, 1039–40 (8th Cir. 2000) (recognizing a claim was ripe because of the hardship that delay would impose).

IV. The Effort at a Ballot Initiative Has Violated, Is Violating, and Will Continue to Violate, the Federal and Missouri Constitutions.

51. Absent a clear statement in the Missouri Constitution transferring the apportionment power from the General Assembly to a ballot referendum, Defendants cannot proceed with their referendum. The Elections Clause provides that, as an initial matter, the “Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. The General Assembly’s “vested authority is not just the typical legislative power exercised pursuant to a state constitution. Rather, when a state legislature enacts statutes governing [federal] elections, it operates ‘by virtue of a direct grant of authority’ under the United States Constitution.” *Carson v. Simon*, 978 F.3d 1051, 1060 (8th Cir. 2020) (per curiam).

52. In choosing to specifically entrust state legislatures with authority over federal congressional redistricting, the Framers of the U.S. Constitution ensured that such power would be exercised by officials “accountable by the people for the rules they write

or fail to write.” *Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Wis. State Leg.*, 141 S. Ct. 28, 29 (2020) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in denial of application to vacate stay). They also ensured that redistricting decisions would reflect “the collective wisdom of the whole people”—as expressed through the people’s elected representatives. *Id.*

53. While the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that express state constitutional amendments can divest legislatures of their apportionment power, the court has never held that a general referendum provision can curtail the legislature’s exercise of that authority. *See Ariz. State Leg.*, 576 U.S. at 814 (holding that a State can adopt an express constitutional provision transferring the legislature’s apportionment authority to an independent commission). Because the Framers of the Federal Constitution made “a deliberate choice” to vest reapportionment power in state legislatures, other state actors cannot use the vagaries of state law to transfer that power elsewhere. *Moore*, 600 U.S. at 34. Hence, state law must plainly circumscribe the legislature’s federal congressional-apportionment authority. *Cf. id.* at 34–36 (holding that state “courts do not have free rein” to intrude upon the legislature’s apportionment power absent “a fair reading” of state law limiting the power); *Carson*, 978 F.3d at 1060 (discussing how state officials cannot “override” the state legislature’s exercise of power under the Elections Clause).

54. Moreover, serious constitutional doubt persists about whether state-ballot initiatives can ever divest state legislatures of their congressional-apportionment authority. The “text, structure, or history of the Constitution” plainly show that Article I, Section 4 deliberately vests “the ‘Legislature,’” not “the people” with the power to reapportion congressional representation. *Ariz. State Leg.*, 576 U.S. at 825 (Roberts,

C.J., dissenting). “Direct lawmaking by the people was ‘virtually unknown when the Constitution of 1787 was drafted.’” *Id.* at 793 (majority opinion). And the U.S. Supreme Court has never upheld the use of a ballot referendum to nullify a legislature’s congressional reapportionment against an Elections Clause challenge. *See id.* at 840 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (explaining how the only instance where the Supreme Court considered the use of such a referendum was in the context of a Guarantee Clause challenge in *Hildebrant*).⁹

55. Clear-statement rules are fixtures of American law where doubt persists regarding the exercise of authority under the U.S. Constitution. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to find that Congress intended to use its power under the Commerce Clause to impose employment regulations on state-government officials when the federal statute did not expressly say that it applied to state officers. *See Gregory*, 501 U.S. at 464. The Court mandated a clear statement from Congress despite a prior holding that Congress possessed authority to regulate state employees. *See id.* (citing *Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth.*, 469 U.S. 528 (1985)). Likewise, given non-delegation concerns, the Supreme Court has long required that administrative agencies point to a specific grant of statutory authority before exercising some significant authority. *See West Virginia*, 597 U.S. at 721 (“[O]ur precedent teaches that there are

⁹ Plaintiffs preserve their argument that *Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission* was wrongly decided, and thus should be overruled. *See, e.g., Ariz. State Leg.*, 576 U.S. at 825 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). However, even under that precedent, this Court can grant Plaintiffs all requested relief. Plaintiffs also preserve their argument that even if there is no clear-statement rule (or that it is satisfied), this case is distinguishable from *Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission*.

‘extraordinary cases’ that call for a different approach—cases in which the ‘history and the breadth of the authority that [the agency] has asserted,’ and the ‘economic and political significance’ of that assertion, provide a ‘reason to hesitate before concluding that Congress’ meant to confer such authority.” (second alteration in original)); *see also id.* at 740 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (explaining the doctrine’s history).

56. The reasons for demanding a clear statement in the Missouri Constitution apply with equal force to the assertion that the referendum process permits usurping the General Assembly’s authority over federal congressional apportionment. As explained, the U.S. Constitution delegates that authority specifically to the General Assembly—with only Congress itself being granted the power to override the General Assembly’s actions. *See* U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. Given this evident construction, constitutional doubt remains as to the nature and extent of other state actors’ ability to transgress the legislature’s congressional-reapportionment power. *See Moore*, 600 U.S. at 34 (declining to delineate a specific standard, but explaining that state courts “do not have free rein” to revisit legislatures’ congressional reapportionments); *Ariz. State Leg.*, 576 U.S. at 825 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (summarizing the textual, structural, and historical concerns of divesting state legislatures of their apportionment authority); *Carson*, 978 F.3d at 1060 (“[A] legislature’s power in this area is such that it ‘cannot be taken from them or modified’ even through ‘their state constitutions.’” (quoting *McPherson v. Blacker*, 146 U.S. 1, 35 (1892))). Federal courts have already taken great care to ensure that other state actors—absent “conclusively established” plain direction—do not hamper the legislature’s Elections Clause authority in the name of

state law. *See Hildebrant*, 241 U.S. at 568; *see also Moore*, 600 U.S. at 36 (emphasizing how other state actors may not “arrogate to themselves the power vested in state legislatures to regulate federal elections” without express authority); *Carson*, 978 F.3d at 1060 (concluding that the legislature did not delegate authority to make major election changes through “a general statute in the election code”). At the very least, the novelty of Defendants’ efforts to place the General Assembly’s congressional redistricting on the ballot raises alarm—especially because the U.S. Supreme Court has never passed on the question in the context of an Elections Clause challenge. *See Ariz. State Leg.*, 576 U.S. at 825 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (discussing *Hildebrant*, 241 U.S. at 569).

57. Given its novelty and lack of textual support, Defendants’ efforts to displace the Federal Constitution’s vesting of redistricting authority in the General Assembly is unlawful under the Elections Clause. The Missouri Constitution’s referendum provision does not expressly say that a referendum can overturn the exercise of the General Assembly’s federal redistricting decisions. To the contrary, the Missouri Constitution specifically vests the General Assembly with the power to divide the State into congressional districts. *See Mo. Const. art. III, § 45* (stating General Assembly “shall” perform this function). Given these provisions, Missouri has not yet made a deliberate and clear choice to override the Elections Clause’s vesting the General Assembly with congressional apportionment authority. *See Ariz. State Leg.*, 576 U.S. at 817 (emphasizing how the State had made the deliberate choice of reallocating that authority to an independent commission).

58. And Missouri should have a chance to make that knowing choice before this unprecedented effort proceeds. Subjecting Missouri’s congressional redistricting to ballot referenda will invite chaos—driven by out-of-state special interests looking to gain a partisan advantage in Congress. If Defendants succeed in using the referendum, every apportionment decision going forward could now become subject to a referendum. In effect, this could create apportionment paralysis—where the General Assembly is unable to implement a congressional map because successive referendum efforts nullify them. This threatens to wreak havoc on the General Assembly’s basic obligations to reapportion congressional districts after each census. *See Wesberry v. Sanders*, 376 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1964).

59. The problem runs even deeper than that. Under Defendants’ interpretation of the Missouri Constitution, nothing would stop a voter from proposing the federal congressional map *in the first instance*—thus entirely cutting the General Assembly out of the redistricting process. The provision of the Missouri Constitution governing citizen-proposed statutory initiatives is worded—in all material respects—identically to the referendum provision. *See* Mo. Const. art. III, §§ 49–53. That provision just generally refers to “laws”—without any specific reference to federal redistricting bills. *See id.* So, under Defendants’ logic, voters—backed by out-of-state money—can just seize total control of the federal redistricting process.

60. The U.S. Constitution forecloses Defendants’ legal theory and actions. By vesting authority in the state legislature, the Elections Clause made a “compromise” that ensures a measure of deliberation, but in a representative body close to the people. *Ariz.*

State Leg. at 837 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Nor does the Elections Clause leave dissatisfied individuals—including Defendants—without recourse. They are free to take their concerns to Congress itself, which can reset the reapportionment rules under the Elections Clause. *See Wise v. Circosta*, 978 F.3d 93, 112 (4th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (Wilkinson and Agee, JJ., dissenting) (emphasizing “the brilliance” of giving Congress the authority to check state legislatures). They could also—through the citizen initiative process—seek to amend the Missouri Constitution to give the people a role in reviewing federal congressional maps through the referendum. *See Mo. Const. art. III, §§ 49–51.*

61. Finally, no history in Missouri supports Defendants’ efforts. The Missouri Supreme Court has never passed upon whether the referendum may be used to revisit federal congressional redistricting. While a closely divided Missouri Supreme Court upheld the use of referenda for apportionment of seats in the General Assembly, *see State ex rel. Gordon v. Becker*, 49 S.W.2d 146, 149 (Mo. 1932), that case is inapt. To start, federal and state legislative apportionment are governed by entirely separate provisions in the Missouri Constitution. Mo. Const. art. III, §§ 3, 7, 10 (state); *id.* art. III, § 45 (congressional). Additionally, *Gordon* never considered whether, per the Elections Clause, the General Assembly retained sole authority to apportion congressional districts. Because the authority to set federal congressional districts is a power delegated by the U.S. Constitution, federal congressional reapportionment implicates uniquely federal interests not reflected in state-legislative reapportionment. *See Moore*, 600 U.S. at 34 (“As in other areas where the exercise of federal authority or the vindication of federal rights implicates questions of state law, we have an obligation to

ensure that state court interpretations of that law do not evade federal law.”); *Carson*, 978 F.3d at 1060 (emphasizing how setting federal elections occurs “by virtue of a direct grant of authority’ under the United States Constitution”).

62. If anything, *Gordon* casts further doubt on Defendants’ legal theory. Chief Justice Atwood, in dissent, carefully analyzed Missouri constitutional history and concluded that the Missouri Constitution was not originally understood to extend the referendum *even* to state legislative apportionment. *See Gordon*, 49 S.W.2d at 152–57 (Atwood, C.J., dissenting) (contending that construction of prior Missouri constitutional provisions did not support the practice). And if such doubt exists for *state* legislative districting, it is hard to see how Defendants could satisfy the U.S. Constitution’s clear-statement rule applicable to federal congressional redistricting efforts.

63. Defendants’ actions seeking a referendum vote on the General Assembly’s 2025 federal congressional redistricting bill violates the U.S. Constitution and the Missouri Constitution. This Court should issue appropriate injunctive and declaratory relief.

CAUSES OF ACTION

Count 1 Violation of the U.S. Constitution Art. I, § 4, cl. 1

64. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

65. An actual controversy exists within this Court’s jurisdiction that would be resolved by a declaration of the rights and other legal relations of the parties in this action—namely, that Defendants’ efforts to initiate a referendum overturning the

General Assembly's most recent congressional redistricting violates the Elections Clause of the U.S. Constitution.

66. The authority to prescribe the times, places, and manner of federal congressional elections arises exclusively under the Elections Clause of the U.S. Constitution.

67. The Constitution delegates and conveys the authority to prescribe the times, places, and manner of congressional elections only to “the Legislature” of “each State.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. This delegation is a broad grant of power to the General Assembly to prescribe the means by which congressional elections are held—including the redistricting of federal congressional districts.

68. Unless the Missouri Constitution plainly limits or divests the General Assembly of its congressional-redistricting authority, the General Assembly retains its power delegated by the Elections Clause.

69. With no express authority bestowed on the referendum process to overturn federal congressional apportionments, Defendants' efforts to revisit the General Assembly's exercise of its authority under the Elections Clause are unlawful.

70. For these reasons, the State and General Assembly are entitled to a judgment declaring Defendants' actions unlawful under the Elections Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The Court should grant appropriate declaratory and injunctive relief.

Count 2
Violation of the Missouri Constitution
Art. III, § 45

71. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

72. As relevant, the Missouri Constitution provides that “the general assembly shall by law divide the State into districts corresponding with the number of [congressional] representatives to which it is entitled.” Mo. Const. art. III, § 45.

73. No other provision of the Missouri Constitution strips the General Assembly of its vested authority in redistricting the State’s congressional districts. *See* Mo. Const. art. III, § 52(a).

74. Because the Missouri Constitution does not specifically provide for referenda to countermand federal congressional apportionments, the State and General Assembly are entitled to a judgment declaring Defendants’ actions unlawful under the Missouri Constitution and preliminarily and permanently enjoining them from continuing to pursue any such referendum.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

The Missouri General Assembly, Missouri Secretary of State Denny Hoskins, and the State of Missouri pray that this Court:

1. Declare, adjudge, and decree that the actions detailed herein are unlawful under Article I, § 4, cl. 1, of the U.S. Constitution and Article III, § 45 of the Missouri Constitution;
2. Issue declaratory relief stating that Defendants’ proposed referendum is unconstitutional;
3. Issue temporary, preliminary, and permanent injunctive relief to prevent Defendants from continuing to seek a referendum on the General Assembly’s redistricting bill; and
4. Award all other relief this Court deems equitable and just.

Dated: October 15, 2025

Respectfully submitted,

CATHERINE L. HANAWAY
ATTORNEY GENERAL

s/ Louis J. Capozzi III

Louis J. Capozzi III, #77756(MO)

Solicitor General

William James Seidleck, #77794(MO)

Principal Deputy Solicitor General

Graham Miller, #77656(MO)

Deputy Solicitor General

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Counsel for Plaintiffs

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that true and correct copies of this Complaint shall be served in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4.

s/ Louis J. Capozzi III

26AC-CC00440

Exhibit 2

26AC-CC00248



DENNY HOSKINS, CPA
 SECRETARY OF STATE
 STATE OF MISSOURI

October 14, 2025

Richard von Glahn
 9 Wilshire Terrace
 Webster Groves, MO 63119

RE: Approval as to form of referendum petition regarding House Bill No. 1 (103rd General Assembly, 2nd Extraordinary Session) (2026-R004)

Dear Mr. von Glahn:

Please be advised that the Secretary of State, pursuant to Section 116.332.4, RSMo, has approved the form of your submitted referendum petition. This approval signifies that the petition complies with the technical requirements of Chapter 116 governing petition format, page layout, and affidavit language. A copy of the Attorney General's letter approving form is enclosed for your records.

Please note, however, that this approval is limited to form only. Under Sections 116.120 and 116.332, RSMo, and the Missouri Supreme Court's decision in *No Bans on Choice v. Ashcroft*, 638 S.W.3d 484 (Mo. banc 2022), the Secretary of State has an ongoing duty to ensure that referendum petitions comply with the constitutional and statutory prerequisites set forth in Article III, Sections 49 and 52(a) of the Missouri Constitution and Chapter 116.

Consistent with *No Bans on Choice*, proponents may begin circulating a referendum petition for signatures immediately upon approval as to form. However, after circulation and upon submission of signatures, the Secretary of State must examine the petition to determine whether it "complies with the Constitution and with this chapter." § 116.120.1, RSMo. If statutory or constitutional deficiencies become apparent during verification or before certification—such as failure to meet signature thresholds, improper timing under Article III, Section 52(a), or defects affecting the validity of the referendum—the Secretary may decline to certify the petition for placement on the ballot. Any such determination remains subject to judicial review.

Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact our office at (573) 751-2301 or (800) 669-8683.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read "James C. Kirkpatrick".

Director of Elections

Enclosure

James C. Kirkpatrick State Information Center
 Elections Division • PO Box 1767 • Jefferson City, Missouri 65102 • (573) 751-2301

Administrative Rules • Business Services • Elections • Publications • Securities • State Archives • State Library • Wolfner Library



ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MISSOURI
CATHERINE L. HANAWAY

October 9, 2025

OPINION LETTER NO. 314-2025

The Honorable Denny Hoskins, CPA
Missouri Secretary of State
James C. Kirkpatrick State Information Center
600 West Main Street
Jefferson City, MO 65101


Dear Secretary Hoskins:

This opinion letter responds to your request dated September 29, 2025, for our review under § 116.332, RSMo, of the sufficiency as to form of a referendum petition for House Bill No. 1 (103rd General Assembly, 2nd Extraordinary Session) submitted by Richard von Glahn, version 4 (2026-R004).

We approve the petition as to form, but § 116.332 gives the Secretary of State final authority to approve or reject the petition. Therefore, our approval of the form of the petition does not preclude you from rejecting the petition.

Because our review of the petition is simply for the purpose of determining sufficiency as to form, the fact that we do not reject the petition is not to be construed as a determination that the petition is sufficient as to substance. Likewise, because our review is mandated by statute, no action that we take with respect to such review should be construed as an endorsement of the petition or of the objectives of its proponents, or the expression of any view respecting the adequacy or inadequacy of the petition generally.

Very truly yours,


CATHERINE L. HANAWAY
Attorney General

OP-2025-333

26AC-CC00440

Exhibit 3

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION

MISSOURI GENERAL ASSEMBLY, et al.,	)	
	)	
Plaintiffs,	)	
	)	
v.	)	Case No. 4:25-CV-1535-ZMB
	)	
RICHARD VON GLAHN & PEOPLE NOT	)	
POLITICIANS,	)	
	)	
Defendants.	)	

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, Doc. 2, and Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Doc. 21. Plaintiffs—the State of Missouri, its General Assembly, and its Secretary of State (“the State”)—brought this action for declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent Defendants Richard Von Glahn and People Not Politics (“PNP”) from submitting a referendum petition to reject a recent congressional-redistricting bill. PNP, in turn, has moved for dismissal on multiple grounds, including ripeness and standing, and it also opposes relief on the merits.

After conducting a hearing and carefully considering the parties’ arguments, the Court holds that this case is not ripe for adjudication. Critically, PNP concedes that Plaintiff Denny Hoskins has the authority as Secretary of State to reject their petition as unconstitutional during post-submission review and to defend that decision based on the very same constitutional arguments the State advances in this case. *See* MO. REV. STAT. §§ 116.120, 116.200. Moreover, PNP agrees that, absent a successful court challenge, this determination would obviate the need for signature verification, publication, or a vote, and it also would prevent the displacement of the new map—the only redressable harms the State identifies. Accordingly, given that the parties’ dispute is not ripe, the Court must dismiss this action and deny the State’s motion for a preliminary injunction as moot.

BACKGROUND

I. Missouri's Veto-Referendum Process

Under the Missouri Constitution, “[t]he people . . . reserve power to approve or reject by referendum any act of the general assembly” with limited exceptions. MO. CONST. art. III, § 49. The referendum process begins when a proponent submits a sample sheet to the Secretary of State, who must “review the petition for sufficiency as to form” in conjunction with the Attorney General. MO. REV. STAT. § 116.332. If the petition clears this initial review, the referendum organizers must collect signatures from “five percent of the legal voters in each of two-thirds of the congressional districts in the state . . . not more than ninety days after the final adjournment of the session of the general assembly which passed the bill.” MO. CONST. art. III, § 52(a). The Secretary of State, Attorney General, and State Auditor also must work together to prepare a fiscal note and summary statement for the measure. MO. REV. STAT. §§ 116.175, 116.334. After the timely submission of a final petition, the Secretary of State must “examine the petition to determine whether it complies with the Constitution of Missouri and with [Chapter 116]” and verify whether there are enough valid signatures to trigger a statewide vote. *Id.* § 116.120. If the Secretary finds that the petition satisfies both requirements, *see id.* § 116.150, the challenged law is displaced and will only “take effect when approved by a majority of the votes cast thereon,” MO. CONST. art. III, § 52(b).

II. Relevant Facts

On August 29, 2025, Governor Mike Kehoe called a special session of Missouri’s General Assembly, in part, to “enact legislation establishing updated congressional districts.” Doc. 1 ¶ 30. The Missouri House of Representatives approved a redistricting bill on September 9, and the Missouri Senate passed the same bill three days later. *Id.* ¶¶ 31–32. In response, PNP immediately initiated a referendum campaign to overturn the newly enacted map. *Id.* ¶¶ 39–40. In fact, PNP submitted its initial petition before the Governor signed the bill into law. *Id.* ¶¶ 33, 38.

Secretary Hoskins and Attorney General Catherine Hanaway rejected PNP's first petition because it preceded the Governor's signature (itself the subject of litigation). Docs. 3-4, 3-5. But they approved a subsequent petition, at least as to form. *See* Doc. 3-7. The State Auditor also prepared a fiscal note, which indicates that ballot measures over the last decade have cost, on average, more than \$500,000. Doc. 25-1; *see also* Doc. 3-1 ¶ 19 (estimating this referendum may cost \$10 million due to publication costs). Most recently, Secretary Hoskins and Attorney General Hanaway approved a summary statement of the measure (also the subject of litigation). *See* Doc. 29 at 14; MO. ATT'Y GEN., OP. LETTER NO. 329-2025, at 1. And beyond these official actions, interested parties have filed a series of lawsuits in state court as the referendum process progressed. Doc. 29 at 12–13.¹

Looking forward, if PNP submits its final petition as anticipated, Secretary Hoskins must review its legality, may have to verify signatures,² and will issue a certificate of sufficiency or insufficiency. Doc. 1 ¶ 46. If the petition is sufficient, the State must hold a public hearing and take comments from the public, prepare the ballot initiative, and publicize the referendum. *Id.* ¶ 47; Doc. 3 at 11. Most important to the State, the new map will be frozen until after the referendum, which could significantly disrupt the 2026 elections. Doc. 1 ¶ 48; Doc. 3 at 11.

¹ Indeed, there are at least six cases that could impact the merits of the instant action: *Luther v. Hoskins*, No. 25AC-CC06964 (Mo. 19th Cir. Ct. Sept. 12, 2025) (challenging the General Assembly's ability to conduct mid-decade redistricting); *People Not Politicians v. Hoskins*, No. 25AC-CC07128 (Mo. 19th Cir. Ct. Sept. 18, 2025) (challenging Secretary Hoskins's rejection of the initial sample sheet); *Wise v. Missouri*, No. 2516-CV29597 (Mo. 16th Cir. Ct. Sept. 12, 2025) (challenging the new congressional map under the Missouri Constitution); *NAACP v. Kehoe*, No. 25AC-CC06724 (Mo. 19th Cir. Ct. Sept. 3, 2025) (challenging the Governor's ability to convene a special session for the purpose of mid-decade redistricting); *Healey v. Missouri*, No. 2516-CV31273 (Mo. 16th Cir. Ct. Sept. 28, 2025) (challenging mid-decade redistricting generally and the new map's compactness); *People Not Politicians, et al. v. Hoskins*, No. 25AC-CC08724 (Mo. 19th Cir. Nov. 20, 2025) (challenging the ballot summary language).

² The plan language of MO. REV. STAT. §116.120 implies but does not specify this sequence of review. However, the Missouri Court of Appeals has construed silence in this provision as a grant of discretion to the Secretary of State, and there is no apparent reason why he would incur the significant cost of signature verification given his stated belief that the petition is constitutionally deficient. *See Sweeney v. Ashcroft*, 652 S.W.3d 711, 733 (Mo. Ct. App. 2022) ("The manner in which the secretary of state fulfills this mandatory duty is not clearly, unambiguously, or unequivocally limited by *any* statutory provision."). Most importantly, the parties agree that Secretary Hoskins can take this approach and have indicated their expectation that he will do so. *See, e.g.*, Doc. 1 ¶ 46; Doc. 22 at 34–35; Doc. 38 at 33–35, 43–44.

III. Procedural History

On October 15, 2025, the State filed its complaint, seeking two forms of relief: (1) a declaratory judgment that PNP's referendum is unlawful under both the United States and Missouri Constitutions, and (2) an injunction to prevent PNP from continuing its referendum. Doc. 1 at 22. The State simultaneously filed a Motion for a Preliminary Injunction. Doc. 2. While initially seeking expedited review, Doc. 3 at 14, the State withdrew that request after PNP agreed to not submit a final petition before December 9, Doc. 38 ("Tr.") at 59. PNP timely filed its merits opposition and a motion to dismiss, and both motions were fully briefed on November 20. Docs. 21, 29, 32.

The Court held a hearing on the dueling motions on November 25. Doc. 35. At the hearing, the parties agreed that Secretary Hoskins must independently review the constitutionality of the referendum petition and that he could defend a decertification decision based on the constitutional claims at issue here. Tr. at 34–35, 43–44. They also agreed that, if the Secretary rejected the petition, the new map would go into effect unless and until a court invalidated the decertification. *Id.* at 36, 48, 49–50, 52. Finally, the State confirmed it is not seeking recovery of any pre-submission damages, only prospective relief as to PNP's submission of a final petition. *Id.* at 19, 35.

LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), a defendant may move to dismiss a case for lack of standing. *Disability Support All. v. Heartwood Enters.*, 885 F.3d 543, 547 (8th Cir. 2018) ("Standing is a jurisdictional issue."). "No principle is more fundamental to the judiciary's proper role in our system of government than the constitutional limitation of federal-court jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies." *McNaught v. Nolen*, 76 F.4th 764, 768 (8th Cir. 2023) (citation omitted). As the party invoking jurisdiction, each plaintiff has the burden of establishing standing by showing that they "have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged

conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” *Id.* at 768–70 (quoting *Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins*, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016)). Further, a plaintiff must have standing as to each asserted harm, which are evaluated independently. *See BCR Safeguard Holding v. Morgan Stanley*, 614 F. App’x 690, 698 (5th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted); *see also Frost v. Sioux City*, 920 F.3d 1158, 1161 (8th Cir. 2019) (taking this approach); *DiPierro v. Fla. Health Scis. Ctr.*, 737 F. Supp. 3d 1314, 1322 (M.D. Fla. 2024) (“[A] plaintiff’s proffered harms must be analyzed on a claim-by-claim, harm-by-harm basis.”).

Closely related to standing are the doctrines of ripeness and mootness, which address similar considerations at different time frames. A claim is not ripe when “it rests upon contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.” *KCCP Trust v. City of N. Kansas City*, 432 F.3d 897, 899 (8th Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted); *Bergstrom v. Bergstrom*, 623 F.2d 517, 519 (8th Cir. 1980) (explaining that ripeness doctrine counsels against “passing upon constitutional questions in advance of the strictest necessity for deciding them”). The Eighth Circuit applies a two-pronged test for ripeness, with the plaintiff required to “show both the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.” *Iowa League of Cities v. EPA*, 711 F.3d 844, 867 (8th Cir. 2013) (quotation omitted). The related mootness doctrine ensures that the “personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation . . . continue[s] throughout its existence.” *McNaught*, 76 F.4th at 769 (quotation omitted).

DISCUSSION

The parties have presented a host of issues, but the Court cannot address them all because it lacks jurisdiction over this case. Given Secretary Hoskins’s unique self-help remedy, the State’s only cognizable injuries are not ripe. Alternatively, the Court must abstain under the *Pullman* doctrine as relevant questions of state constitutional law will be decided by the Secretary or in state court.

I. Standing, Ripeness, and Mootness

After excluding the State's non-redressable injuries, this lawsuit is not ripe for adjudication. The State's asserted harms—as articulated in the Complaint, through its briefing, and at the hearing—fall into three buckets, which the Court will consider in turn. No injury justifies standing.

The State first highlights the harms that predated this lawsuit. These injuries include the cost of processing the referendum petition and litigating state-court cases. Doc. 1 ¶¶ 43–45, 50; Doc. 3 at 10; Tr. at 25, 32–33. To its credit, however, the State acknowledges it is not relying on these previously expended resources to establish standing given that it seeks only prospective relief. Tr. at 35; *see Frost*, 920 F.3d at 1161–62 (refusing to consider past harms for redressability purposes, as “[a]n injunction is inherently prospective and cannot redress past injuries”).

Second, the State points to the ongoing injuries it has suffered during this case through PNP's anticipated submission of a final petition tomorrow. This category is similar to the State's past harms and includes referendum-processing obligations, unspecified investigations, and litigation expenses.³ Doc. 1 ¶¶ 43–45; Doc. 25-1; Doc. 29 at 12–15; Tr. 32–33. These injuries are likewise insufficient to establish standing. Even if they were redressable at the outset of the case, the State abandoned its ability to prevent these harms when it agreed to forego emergency relief until now. *See* Tr. at 59. Thus, whether viewed through the lens of waiver or mootness, the Court cannot redress these injuries. Tr. at 35 (acknowledging that, “as time passes, [ongoing harms] become no longer redressable”); *see McFarlin v. Newport Special Sch. Dist.*, 980 F.2d 1208, 1210 (8th Cir. 1992) (“Through the passage of time and the occurrence of irrevocable events, disputes may disappear so that federal courts no longer can grant effective relief.”).

³ The State has not identified a single case holding that parallel-litigation expenses can confer standing, nor has the Court found any. But even assuming such costs could amount to a cognizable injury, the State's invocation of its state-court litigation with PNP plainly falls short. *See* Doc. 1 ¶¶ 45, 50; Doc. 3 at 10–11; Doc. 29 at 12–13. As an initial matter, it is far from clear that the Court could enjoin PNP from pursuing these cases or otherwise halt the litigation, *see* Doc. 22 at 11 n.5, underscoring why this harm is nothing like the State's analogy to agency “compliance costs,” *see* Doc. 29 at 12–13. More importantly, the State never requested this remedy. *See* Doc. 1 at 22; Doc. 2. Thus, even if the Court granted both declaratory and injunctive relief, PNP would be free to litigate these cases and likely would do so while it pursued an appeal in the Eighth Circuit. In sum, the State's litigation-expense injury lacks redressability.

Third, and most importantly, are the future injuries the State anticipates. Assuming PNP submits a final petition, Secretary Hoskins will need to review it for constitutional validity and potentially verify the accompanying signatures; and if the referendum advances, the State will incur a series of costs, including at least a temporary displacement of the recently enacted map. See Doc. 1 ¶¶ 46–48; Doc. 3 at 11; Doc. 29 at 14, 18. Fortunately for the State, Secretary Hoskins has a tool at his disposal that almost no other litigant could boast—the power to declare the petition unconstitutional himself. And at this point, decertification would forestall any remaining cognizable harms.⁴ The State’s only response for why this unique self-help remedy does not amount to a ripeness defect is that drafting a certificate of insufficiency will “require careful analysis and collaboration between the Secretary and Attorney General.” See Doc. 29 at 15. But it is hard to imagine that completing this constitutional assessment will impose any measurable burden given that the State has completed an exhaustive analysis in briefing this case. In other

⁴ At the hearing, the State expressed concern that PNP would backslide on its repeated representations to this Court that the Secretary of State will have the opportunity to review the final petition for constitutionality before conducting signature verification, that he could at least defend a finding of unconstitutionality based on the same claims the State advances in this case, and that the new map would go into effect barring a successful challenge to decertification. See Tr. at 51–52. *But see, e.g.*, Doc. 22 at 1, 8, 11–12, 13–14, 34–35, 38; Doc. 32 at 4, 6; Tr. at 43–44, 48–50. While the State cannot be faulted for failing to anticipate these concessions at the outset of the case, the Court has expressly found that PNP affirmatively waived these points, *see* Tr. at 52, precluding any argument to the contrary in future litigation (to say nothing of the ethical ramifications of counsel breaching their duty of candor to this tribunal).

In any event, the Court’s review of Missouri law indicates that a contrary position would plainly fail. There is no doubt that the Secretary of State has both the authority and duty to assess the constitutionality of the final petition. *See* MO. REV. STAT. § 116.120 (requiring that, upon submission, the Secretary “shall examine the petition to determine whether it complies with the Constitution of Missouri and with this chapter”); *Missourians to Protect the Initiative Process v. Blunt*, 799 S.W.2d 824, 828 (Mo. banc 1990) (rejecting a claim that constitutional review was limited to signature provisions because “the language used [in section 116.120] mandates a more extensive examination”). Given the State’s position that PNP’s referendum violates the Missouri Constitution itself, *see* Doc. 1 ¶¶ 71–74, that finding alone is sufficient for decertification. Moreover, the Secretary of State has an independent obligation flowing from his oath of office “to support the Constitution of the United States and of [Missouri].” MO. REV. STAT. § 28.020. And if the Secretary perceived any conflict between the Missouri and United States Constitution, he might argue that the Supremacy Clause prevents him from taking an action permitted by the latter but forbidden by the former.

words, there would be no “hardship to the parties [from] withholding court consideration.”⁵ See *KCCP Trust*, 432 F.3d at 899 (quotation omitted); see also *Neb. Pub. Power Dist. v. MidAmerican Energy Co.*, 234 F.3d 1032, 1038 (8th Cir. 2000) (requiring a showing of “significant harm”).

One final point warrants a brief mention. At the hearing, the State cited *Calzone v. Ashcroft* to suggest that Missouri courts may conclude that the Secretary of State lacks authority to conduct “a full constitutional review” before a referendum vote. Tr. at 33–34. But in *Calzone*, the Secretary already **certified** the petition, and the Missouri Court of Appeals held only that “Missouri courts recognize and follow a general rule against pre-election **judicial** review concerning the substantive legality of ballot measures.” 559 S.W.3d 32, 35 (Mo. Ct. App. 2018) (emphasis added). Thus, that case says nothing about the **Secretary’s** authority to **decertify** a petition on constitutional grounds. Moreover, the ripeness concerns underpinning *Calzone* would not be present in that scenario because there would be no vote to await absent court intervention. And even if state ripeness doctrine were relevant, a state court likely could hear the case because the State’s claims relate to “constitutional requirements and limits of power” as to whether the referendum can even occur, not the substance of the underlying measure (i.e., the validity of the map). See *Blunt*, 799 S.W.2d at 827–29 (collecting cases where “courts have conducted a pre-election review to determine if conditions precedent to placing a proposal on the ballot have been met”).

As detailed above, the State’s past injuries are no longer redressable because it seeks only prospective relief. And given Secretary Hoskins’s ability to vindicate the State’s interests, the only cognizable injuries are not ripe for adjudication. Accordingly, the Court must dismiss this case.

⁵ The Secretary’s access to a self-help tool creates another stranding problem, in that post-submission review also breaks the chain of causation between PNP’s actions and his alleged harms. See *Johnson v. U.S. Off. of Pers. Mgmt.*, 783 F.3d 655, 667–68 (7th Cir. 2015) (“[P]laintiffs cannot allege an injury from one of multiple options where they can choose another which causes them no injury.”) (quotation omitted); cf. *Berkadia Real Est. Advisors v. Wadlund*, No. CV-22-00049-TUC-JCH, 2022 WL 18495279, at *17 (D. Ariz. Mar. 3, 2022) (denying a preliminary injunction because the plaintiff could exercise self-help). The same is true for the General Assembly and the State of Missouri, whose injuries depends on the Secretary’s review, likewise breaking the chain of causation for their claims. See *E.L. ex rel. White v. Voluntary Interdistrict Choice Corp.*, 864 F.3d 932, 936 (8th Cir. 2017) (no causation for standing purposes when the injury “is the result of actions by some third party, not the defendant”) (quotation omitted).

II. *Pullman* Abstention

Alternatively, even if the case were justiciable, *Pullman* abstention would be warranted. Like other abstention doctrines, *Pullman* applies when federal courts exercise discretion to depart from their general obligation to exercise jurisdiction and “abstain from deciding an issue in order to preserve traditional principles of equity, comity, and federalism.” *Beavers v. Ark. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs*, 151 F.3d 838, 840 (8th Cir. 1998) (quotations omitted). The *Pullman* abstention doctrine requires the Court to consider five factors:

(1) the effect abstention would have on the rights to be protected by considering the nature of both the right and necessary remedy; (2) available state remedies; (3) whether the challenged state law is unclear; (4) whether the challenged state law is fairly susceptible to an interpretation that would avoid any federal constitutional question; and (5) whether abstention will avoid unnecessary federal interference in state operations.

Id. at 841. In particular, courts should avoid “needless friction between federal pronouncements and state policies,” especially in cases involving “a matter of great state concern.” *See Reetz v. Bozaich*, 397 U.S. 82, 87 (1970) (abstaining from issuing declaration that state fishing laws violated the Fourteenth Amendment and the Alaska Constitution) (quotation omitted); *see also, e.g., Harris Cnty. Comm’rs Ct. v. Moore*, 420 U.S. 77, 85 (1975) (noting that abstention is appropriate where “the nub of the whole controversy may be the state constitution”).

Applying the Eighth Circuit’s *Pullman* test, the Court concludes that abstention would be warranted. The first factor—“the effect abstention would have on the rights to be protected”—weighs strongly in favor of the PNP, as the State may protect its own interests through decertification. *See Beavers*, 151 F.3d at 841. The last three factors—whether the state law is unclear, whether that law is susceptible to interpretation avoiding the federal constitutional question, and whether the abstention avoids federal interference in state operations—also decidedly weigh in favor of PNP. Here, the State’s case rests on the premise that Missouri’s

Constitution does not provide a “clear statement” permitting a veto referendum on redistricting bills and, thus, that the General Assembly retains exclusive authority to redistrict in light of the Elections Clause. Doc. 1 ¶¶ 4–7, 50–63. At a minimum, the State has conceded that the law is unclear. *See* Doc. 1 ¶ 6. And as explained above, a decision that the Missouri Constitution does not permit a redistricting referendum would moot the State’s federal constitutional claims, while a decision that it does clearly permit them would significantly narrow the issues. Further, abstaining here would avoid federal interference in a referendum process created entirely by the Missouri Constitution and state law.

With abstention all but decided, the State contends that the second factor—“available state remedies”—torpedoes the whole analysis because it likely will be unable to raise its Elections Clause claim before the future harms occur. Tr. at 6–7, 21. But Secretary Hoskins has a self-help remedy under state law in the form of decertification for unconstitutionality. *See Fender v. Washington Cnty.*, No. 14-CV-0142, 2014 WL 1491138, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 15, 2014) (recognizing that “questions must be resolved at the state level—both administratively and judicially—before this Court may properly analyze the underlying federal constitutional claim.”). The State also cited to *Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco* at the hearing, arguing that it counseled abstention where no pending state court action existed, unless the court’s opinion would almost certainly be advisory. *See* Tr. at 25 (citing 481 U.S. 1, 11 (1987)). But that case involved *Younger*, rather than *Pullman*, abstention. *Id.* at 10. While “various types of abstention are not rigid pigeonholes,” different principles govern the application of these doctrines, and accordingly, the case is inapposite. *Id.* at 11 n.9. More importantly, as PNP notes, there was no pending state court case in *Pullman* itself, so this factor is by no means required. *See* Doc. 33 at 15 (citing *R.R. Comm’n v. Pullman Co.*, 312 U.S. 496, 501–02 (1941)).

The last aspect of abstention the Court must consider is whether to grant dismissal or hold the case in abeyance pending a state determination. While courts are required to stay an action at law “pending [the] completion of state proceedings,” the Eighth Circuit has recognized that dismissal or remand may be appropriate for equitable actions “based on abstention principles.” *Warmus v. Melahn*, 110 F.3d 566, 567 (8th Cir. 1997). In addition to the nature of this action and important state interests at play, the Court notes that this case will almost certainly be moot by the time a probably state court lawsuit is filed because decertification would leave this Court with no meaningful relief to grant. Accordingly, the Court would dismiss on abstention grounds.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the Court **GRANTS** Defendants’ [21] Motion to Dismiss and **DENIES** as moot the State’s [2] Motion for a Preliminary Injunction. The Court will issue a separate Order of Dismissal to accompany this order.

So ordered this 8th day of December 2025.



ZACHARY M. BLUESTONE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

SC101805 Appeal Document Number 6 Page 1

26AC-CC00440

Exhibit 4

SECOND EXTRAORDINARY SESSION OF THE
FIRST REGULAR SESSION

[TRULY AGREED TO AND FINALLY PASSED]

HOUSE BILL NO. 1

103RD GENERAL ASSEMBLY

3344H.01T

2025

AN ACT

To repeal sections 128.345, 128.346, and 128.348, RSMo, and to enact in lieu thereof twelve new sections relating to the composition of congressional districts.

Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the state of Missouri, as follows:

Section A. Sections 128.345, 128.346, and 128.348, RSMo, are repealed and twelve new sections enacted in lieu thereof, to be known as sections 128.345, 128.346, 128.348, 128.471, 128.472, 128.473, 128.474, 128.475, 128.476, 128.477, 128.478, and 128.479, to read as follows:

128.345. 1. All references in sections 128.451 to 128.458 to counties, voting districts (VTD), and tract-blocks (Block) mean those counties, voting districts (VTD), and tract-blocks (Block) as reported to the state by the United States Bureau of the Census for the 2010 census.

2. All references in sections 128.461 to ~~128.468~~ **128.478** to counties, voting districts (VTD), and tract-blocks (Block) mean those counties, voting districts (VTD), and tract-blocks (Block) as reported to the state by the United States Bureau of the Census for the 2020 census.

128.346. 1. The districts established by the provisions of sections 128.400 to 128.440 for the election of representatives to the Congress of the United States shall be effective beginning with election to the 108th Congress and through the election of the 112th Congress.

2. The districts established by sections 128.451 to 128.458 for the election of representatives to the Congress of the United States shall be effective beginning with the election to the 113th Congress and through the election of the 117th Congress.

3. The districts established by sections 128.461 to 128.468 for the election of representatives to the Congress of the United States shall be effective beginning with the election to the 118th Congress **and through the election of the 119th Congress.**

EXPLANATION — Matter enclosed in bold-faced brackets ~~thus~~ in the above bill is not enacted and is intended to be omitted from the law. Matter in **bold-face** type in the above bill is proposed language.

HB 1

2

10 **4. The districts established by sections 128.471 to 128.478 for the election of**
11 **representatives to the Congress of the United States shall be effective beginning with the**
12 **election of the 120th Congress.**

 128.348. 1. Effective with the election for the 113th Congress and through the
2 election of the 117th Congress, the state of Missouri shall consist of eight congressional
3 districts.

4 2. Effective with the election of the 118th Congress, the state of Missouri shall consist
5 of eight congressional districts.

6 3. **Effective with the election of the 120th Congress, the state of Missouri shall**
7 **consist of eight congressional districts.**

8 4. The legal voters of each district shall elect one member of Congress of the United
9 States.

128.471. The first congressional district shall be composed of the following:

2 **County: St. Louis City MO**

3 **County: St. Louis MO**

4 **VTD: AP001**

5 **VTD: AP002**

6 **VTD: AP003**

7 **VTD: AP004**

8 **VTD: AP005**

9 **VTD: AP006**

10 **VTD: AP007**

11 **VTD: AP008**

12 **VTD: AP009**

13 **VTD: AP010**

14 **VTD: AP011**

15 **VTD: AP012**

16 **VTD: AP013**

17 **VTD: AP014**

18 **VTD: AP015**

19 **VTD: AP016**

20 **VTD: AP017**

21 **VTD: AP018**

22 **VTD: AP019**

23 **VTD: AP020**

24 **VTD: AP021**

25 **VTD: AP022**

HB 1

3

26	VTD: AP023
27	VTD: AP024
28	VTD: AP025
29	VTD: AP026
30	VTD: AP027
31	VTD: AP028
32	VTD: AP029
33	VTD: AP030
34	VTD: AP031
35	VTD: AP033
36	VTD: AP034
37	VTD: AP035
38	VTD: AP036
39	VTD: AP037
40	VTD: AP038
41	VTD: AP039
42	VTD: AP040
43	VTD: AP042
44	VTD: AP043
45	VTD: AP044
46	VTD: AP045
47	VTD: AP046
48	VTD: AP047
49	VTD: AP048
50	VTD: AP049
51	VTD: AP050
52	VTD: AP051
53	VTD: AP200
54	VTD: AP203
55	VTD: AP206
56	VTD: AP207
57	VTD: AP208
58	VTD: AP211
59	VTD: AP214
60	VTD: AP215
61	VTD: AP216
62	VTD: AP217

HB 1

4

63 **VTD: AP218**
64 **VTD: AP225**
65 **VTD: AP230**
66 **VTD: AP232**
67 **VTD: AP233**
68 **VTD: AP237**
69 **VTD: CC012**
70 **VTD: CC013**
71 **VTD: CC022**
72 **VTD: CC043**
73 **VTD: CC048**
74 **Block: 291892155004011**
75 **VTD CC048 Subtotal**
76 **VTD: CC051**
77 **VTD: CC057**
78 **VTD: CC203**
79 **Block: 291892156001019**
80 **VTD CC203 Subtotal**
81 **VTD: CC205**
82 **VTD: CLA001**
83 **VTD: CLA002**
84 **VTD: CLA003**
85 **VTD: CLA004**
86 **Block: 291892165004005**
87 **Block: 291892165004006**
88 **Block: 291892165004007**
89 **Block: 291892165004008**
90 **Block: 291892165004009**
91 **Block: 291892165004010**
92 **Block: 291892165004011**
93 **Block: 291892165004012**
94 **Block: 291892165004013**
95 **Block: 291892165004014**
96 **Block: 291892165004015**
97 **Block: 291892165004016**
98 **Block: 291892165004017**
99 **Block: 291892165004018**

HB 1

5

100 **Block: 291892165004019**
101 **Block: 291892165004020**
102 **Block: 291892165004022**
103 **Block: 291892165004023**
104 **Block: 291892165004024**
105 **Block: 291892165004025**
106 **Block: 291892165004026**
107 **VTD CLA004 Subtotal**
108 **VTD: CLA005**
109 **VTD: CLA008**
110 **VTD: CLA009**
111 **VTD: CLA010**
112 **VTD: CLA011**
113 **VTD: CLA013**
114 **Block: 291892165004021**
115 **VTD CLA013 Subtotal**
116 **VTD: CLA017**
117 **VTD: CLA019**
118 **VTD: CLA020**
119 **VTD: CLA021**
120 **VTD: CLA022**
121 **VTD: CLA023**
122 **VTD: CLA027**
123 **VTD: CLA029**
124 **VTD: CLA030**
125 **VTD: CLA031**
126 **VTD: CLA032**
127 **VTD: CLA035**
128 **VTD: CLA038**
129 **VTD: CLA039**
130 **VTD: CLA041**
131 **VTD: CLA043**
132 **VTD: CLA044**
133 **VTD: CLA046**
134 **VTD: CLA050**
135 **VTD: CLA051**
136 **VTD: CLA052**

HB 1

6

137	VTD: CLA200
138	VTD: CLA206
139	VTD: FER001
140	VTD: FER002
141	VTD: FER003
142	VTD: FER004
143	VTD: FER005
144	VTD: FER006
145	VTD: FER007
146	VTD: FER008
147	VTD: FER009
148	VTD: FER010
149	VTD: FER011
150	VTD: FER012
151	VTD: FER013
152	VTD: FER014
153	VTD: FER015
154	VTD: FER016
155	VTD: FER017
156	VTD: FER018
157	VTD: FER019
158	VTD: FER020
159	VTD: FER021
160	VTD: FER022
161	VTD: FER023
162	VTD: FER024
163	VTD: FER025
164	VTD: FER026
165	VTD: FER027
166	VTD: FER028
167	VTD: FER029
168	VTD: FER030
169	VTD: FER031
170	VTD: FER032
171	VTD: FER033
172	VTD: FER034
173	VTD: FER035

HB 1

7

174	VTD: FER036
175	VTD: FER037
176	VTD: FER038
177	VTD: FER039
178	VTD: FER040
179	VTD: FER041
180	VTD: FER042
181	VTD: FER043
182	VTD: FER044
183	VTD: FER045
184	VTD: FER046
185	VTD: FER206
186	VTD: FER207
187	VTD: FER208
188	VTD: FLO001
189	VTD: FLO002
190	VTD: FLO003
191	VTD: FLO004
192	VTD: FLO005
193	VTD: FLO006
194	VTD: FLO007
195	VTD: FLO008
196	VTD: FLO009
197	VTD: FLO010
198	VTD: FLO011
199	VTD: FLO012
200	VTD: FLO013
201	VTD: FLO014
202	VTD: FLO015
203	VTD: FLO016
204	VTD: FLO017
205	VTD: FLO018
206	VTD: FLO019
207	VTD: FLO020
208	VTD: FLO021
209	VTD: FLO022
210	VTD: FLO023

HB 1

8

211 **VTD: FLO024**
212 **VTD: FLO025**
213 **VTD: FLO026**
214 **VTD: FLO027**
215 **VTD: FLO028**
216 **VTD: FLO029**
217 **VTD: FLO030**
218 **VTD: FLO031**
219 **VTD: FLO200**
220 **VTD: FLO201**
221 **VTD: FLO205**
222 **VTD: FLO207**
223 **VTD: GRA007**
224 **Block: 291892198011012**
225 **Block: 291892198011013**
226 **Block: 291892198011014**
227 **Block: 291892198011020**
228 **Block: 291892198012013**
229 **Block: 291892198012015**
230 **Block: 291892198012016**
231 **VTD GRA007 Subtotal**
232 **VTD: GRA015**
233 **Block: 291892197003015**
234 **Block: 291892197005003**
235 **Block: 291892197005004**
236 **Block: 291892197005005**
237 **Block: 291892197005006**
238 **Block: 291892197005007**
239 **Block: 291892197005008**
240 **Block: 291892197005010**
241 **Block: 291892197005011**
242 **Block: 291892197005012**
243 **Block: 291892197005013**
244 **VTD GRA015 Subtotal**
245 **VTD: GRA016**
246 **VTD: GRA018**
247 **VTD: GRA019**

HB 1

9

248 **Block: 291892197001024**
249 **Block: 291892197003006**
250 **Block: 291892197003007**
251 **Block: 291892197003008**
252 **Block: 291892197003009**
253 **Block: 291892197003010**
254 **Block: 291892197003011**
255 **Block: 291892197003012**
256 **Block: 291892197003013**
257 **Block: 291892197003014**
258 **Block: 291892197005002**
259 **Block: 291892197005014**
260 **Block: 291892197005015**
261 **Block: 291892198012001**
262 **Block: 291892198012002**
263 **Block: 291892198013017**
264 **VTD GRA019 Subtotal**
265 **VTD: GRA021**
266 **VTD: GRA022**
267 **VTD: GRA025**
268 **VTD: GRA033**
269 **Block: 291892199001000**
270 **Block: 291892199001001**
271 **Block: 291892199001002**
272 **Block: 291892199001003**
273 **Block: 291892199001004**
274 **Block: 291892199001005**
275 **Block: 291892199001006**
276 **Block: 291892199001008**
277 **Block: 291892199001009**
278 **VTD GRA033 Subtotal**
279 **VTD: GRA035**
280 **VTD: GRA039**
281 **VTD: GRA045**
282 **Block: 291892208011021**
283 **Block: 291892208011023**
284 **VTD GRA045 Subtotal**

HB 1

10

285	VTD: GRA202
286	Block: 291892208011018
287	VTD GRA202 Subtotal
288	VTD: HAD001
289	VTD: HAD002
290	VTD: HAD003
291	VTD: HAD004
292	VTD: HAD005
293	VTD: HAD006
294	VTD: HAD007
295	VTD: HAD008
296	VTD: HAD009
297	VTD: HAD010
298	VTD: HAD011
299	VTD: HAD012
300	VTD: HAD013
301	VTD: HAD014
302	VTD: HAD015
303	VTD: HAD016
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305	VTD: HAD018
306	VTD: HAD019
307	VTD: HAD020
308	VTD: HAD021
309	VTD: HAD022
310	VTD: HAD023
311	VTD: HAD024
312	VTD: HAD025
313	VTD: HAD026
314	VTD: HAD027
315	VTD: HAD028
316	VTD: HAD029
317	VTD: HAD030
318	VTD: HAD031
319	VTD: HAD032
320	VTD: HAD033
321	VTD: HAD034

HB 1

11

322 **VTD: HAD035**
323 **VTD: HAD200**
324 **VTD: JEF005**
325 **VTD: JEF006**
326 **VTD: JEF007**
327 **VTD: JEF008**
328 **VTD: JEF009**
329 **VTD: JEF010**
330 **Block: 291892194001026**
331 **Block: 291892194003018**
332 **Block: 291892194004000**
333 **Block: 291892194004001**
334 **Block: 291892194004002**
335 **Block: 291892194004003**
336 **Block: 291892194004004**
337 **Block: 291892194004005**
338 **Block: 291892194004006**
339 **Block: 291892194004007**
340 **Block: 291892194004008**
341 **Block: 291892194004010**
342 **Block: 291892194004011**
343 **Block: 291892194004012**
344 **Block: 291892194004013**
345 **Block: 291892194004014**
346 **Block: 291892194004015**
347 **Block: 291892194005001**
348 **Block: 291892194005002**
349 **Block: 291892194005005**
350 **Block: 291892194005006**
351 **Block: 291892194005007**
352 **Block: 291892194005015**
353 **Block: 291892194005016**
354 **Block: 291892194005017**
355 **Block: 291892194005018**
356 **Block: 291892194005019**
357 **Block: 291892194005020**
358 **Block: 291892194005021**

HB 1

12

359 **Block: 291892194005022**
360 **VTD JEF010 Subtotal**
361 **VTD: JEF011**
362 **VTD: JEF012**
363 **VTD: JEF013**
364 **VTD: JEF014**
365 **VTD: JEF015**
366 **VTD: JEF016**
367 **VTD: JEF017**
368 **VTD: JEF018**
369 **VTD: JEF019**
370 **VTD: JEF020**
371 **VTD: JEF021**
372 **VTD: JEF022**
373 **VTD: JEF023**
374 **VTD: JEF024**
375 **VTD: JEF025**
376 **VTD: JEF026**
377 **VTD: JEF027**
378 **VTD: JEF028**
379 **VTD: JEF029**
380 **VTD: JEF030**
381 **VTD: JEF031**
382 **VTD: JEF202**
383 **VTD: LC001**
384 **VTD: LC002**
385 **VTD: LC003**
386 **VTD: LC004**
387 **VTD: LC005**
388 **VTD: LC006**
389 **VTD: LC007**
390 **VTD: LC008**
391 **VTD: LC009**
392 **VTD: LC010**
393 **VTD: LC011**
394 **VTD: LC012**
395 **VTD: LC013**

HB 1

13

396	VTD: LC014
397	VTD: LC015
398	VTD: LC016
399	VTD: LC017
400	VTD: LC018
401	VTD: LC019
402	VTD: LC020
403	VTD: LC021
404	VTD: LC022
405	VTD: LC023
406	VTD: LC024
407	VTD: LC025
408	VTD: LC026
409	VTD: LC027
410	VTD: LC028
411	VTD: LC029
412	VTD: LC030
413	VTD: LC031
414	VTD: LC032
415	VTD: LC033
416	VTD: LC200
417	VTD: LC203
418	VTD: LC204
419	VTD: LC209
420	VTD: MID001
421	VTD: MID002
422	VTD: MID003
423	VTD: MID004
424	VTD: MID005
425	VTD: MID006
426	VTD: MID007
427	VTD: MID008
428	VTD: MID009
429	VTD: MID010
430	VTD: MID011
431	VTD: MID012
432	VTD: MID013

HB 1

14

433 VTD: MID014
434 VTD: MID015
435 VTD: MID016
436 VTD: MID017
437 VTD: MID018
438 VTD: MID019
439 VTD: MID020
440 VTD: MID021
441 VTD: MID022
442 VTD: MID023
443 VTD: MID024
444 VTD: MID025
445 VTD: MID026
446 VTD: MID027
447 VTD: MID028
448 VTD: MID029
449 VTD: MID030
450 VTD: MID031
451 VTD: MID032
452 VTD: MID033
453 VTD: MID034
454 VTD: MID035
455 VTD: MID036
456 VTD: MID037
457 VTD: MID038
458 VTD: MID039
459 VTD: MID040
460 VTD: MID041
461 VTD: MID042
462 VTD: MID043
463 VTD: MID044
464 VTD: MID045
465 VTD: MID046
466 VTD: MID047
467 VTD: MID048
468 VTD: MID049
469 VTD: MID050

HB 1

15

470	VTD: MID051
471	VTD: MID052
472	VTD: MID053
473	VTD: MID054
474	VTD: MID055
475	VTD: MID056
476	VTD: MID057
477	VTD: MID058
478	VTD: MID059
479	VTD: MID060
480	VTD: MID061
481	VTD: MID200
482	VTD: MID201
483	VTD: MID202
484	VTD: MID204
485	VTD: NOR001
486	VTD: NOR002
487	VTD: NOR003
488	VTD: NOR004
489	VTD: NOR005
490	VTD: NOR006
491	VTD: NOR007
492	VTD: NOR008
493	VTD: NOR009
494	VTD: NOR010
495	VTD: NOR011
496	VTD: NOR012
497	VTD: NOR013
498	VTD: NOR014
499	VTD: NOR015
500	VTD: NOR016
501	VTD: NOR017
502	VTD: NOR018
503	VTD: NOR019
504	VTD: NOR020
505	VTD: NOR021
506	VTD: NOR022

HB 1

16

507	VTD: NOR023
508	VTD: NOR024
509	VTD: NOR025
510	VTD: NOR026
511	VTD: NOR027
512	VTD: NOR028
513	VTD: NOR029
514	VTD: NOR030
515	VTD: NOR031
516	VTD: NOR032
517	VTD: NOR033
518	VTD: NOR034
519	VTD: NOR035
520	VTD: NOR036
521	VTD: NOR037
522	VTD: NOR038
523	VTD: NOR039
524	VTD: NOR040
525	VTD: NOR041
526	VTD: NOR042
527	VTD: NOR043
528	VTD: NOR044
529	VTD: NOR045
530	VTD: NOR046
531	VTD: NOR047
532	VTD: NOR048
533	VTD: NOR049
534	VTD: NOR050
535	VTD: NOR051
536	VTD: NOR052
537	VTD: NOR053
538	VTD: NOR054
539	VTD: NOR055
540	VTD: NOR056
541	VTD: NOR200
542	VTD: NOR201
543	VTD: NOR202

HB 1

17

544 VTD: NOR203
545 VTD: NOR204
546 VTD: NOR208
547 VTD: NOR213
548 VTD: NOR218
549 VTD: NOR222
550 VTD: NRW001
551 VTD: NRW002
552 VTD: NRW003
553 VTD: NRW004
554 VTD: NRW005
555 VTD: NRW006
556 VTD: NRW007
557 VTD: NRW008
558 VTD: NRW009
559 VTD: NRW010
560 VTD: NRW011
561 VTD: NRW012
562 VTD: NRW013
563 VTD: NRW014
564 VTD: NRW015
565 VTD: NRW016
566 VTD: NRW017
567 VTD: NRW018
568 VTD: NRW019
569 VTD: NRW020
570 VTD: NRW021
571 VTD: NRW022
572 VTD: NRW023
573 VTD: NRW024
574 VTD: NRW025
575 VTD: NRW026
576 VTD: NRW027
577 VTD: NRW028
578 VTD: NRW029
579 VTD: NRW030
580 VTD: NRW031

HB 1

18

581	VTD: NRW032
582	VTD: NRW033
583	VTD: NRW034
584	VTD: NRW035
585	VTD: NRW036
586	VTD: NRW037
587	VTD: NRW038
588	VTD: NRW039
589	VTD: NRW040
590	VTD: NRW041
591	VTD: NRW042
592	VTD: NRW043
593	VTD: NRW044
594	VTD: NRW045
595	VTD: NRW046
596	VTD: NRW047
597	VTD: NRW048
598	VTD: NRW049
599	VTD: NRW050
600	VTD: NRW051
601	VTD: NRW200
602	VTD: NRW201
603	VTD: NRW202
604	VTD: NRW203
605	VTD: NRW204
606	VTD: NRW205
607	VTD: NW001
608	Block: 291892132023002
609	VTD NW001 Subtotal
610	VTD: NW002
611	VTD: NW003
612	VTD: NW004
613	VTD: NW005
614	VTD: NW006
615	VTD: NW007
616	VTD: NW008
617	VTD: NW009

HB 1

19

618	VTD: NW010
619	VTD: NW011
620	VTD: NW012
621	VTD: NW014
622	VTD: NW015
623	VTD: NW016
624	VTD: NW017
625	VTD: NW018
626	VTD: NW022
627	VTD: NW023
628	VTD: NW024
629	VTD: NW025
630	VTD: NW026
631	VTD: NW027
632	VTD: NW028
633	VTD: NW030
634	VTD: NW031
635	VTD: NW032
636	VTD: NW034
637	VTD: NW036
638	VTD: NW037
639	VTD: NW039
640	VTD: NW040
641	VTD: NW041
642	VTD: NW042
643	VTD: NW043
644	VTD: NW044
645	VTD: NW045
646	VTD: NW046
647	VTD: NW048
648	VTD: NW050
649	VTD: NW051
650	VTD: NW200
651	VTD: NW202
652	VTD: NW204
653	VTD: NW205
654	VTD: NW206

HB 1

20

655	VTD: NW207
656	VTD: NW208
657	VTD: NW209
658	VTD: NW210
659	VTD: NW212
660	VTD: NW213
661	VTD: NW214
662	VTD: NW215
663	VTD: NW216
664	VTD: NW217
665	VTD: NW219
666	VTD: NW220
667	Block: 291892132031024
668	VTD NW220 Subtotal
669	VTD: NW224
670	VTD: NW225
671	VTD: NW226
672	VTD: NW227
673	VTD: NW229
674	VTD: SF001
675	VTD: SF002
676	VTD: SF003
677	VTD: SF004
678	VTD: SF005
679	VTD: SF006
680	VTD: SF007
681	VTD: SF008
682	VTD: SF009
683	VTD: SF010
684	VTD: SF011
685	VTD: SF012
686	VTD: SF013
687	VTD: SF014
688	VTD: SF015
689	VTD: SF016
690	VTD: SF017
691	VTD: SF018

HB 1

21

692	VTD: SF019
693	VTD: SF020
694	VTD: SF021
695	VTD: SF022
696	VTD: SF023
697	VTD: SF024
698	VTD: SF025
699	VTD: SF026
700	VTD: SF027
701	VTD: SF028
702	VTD: SF029
703	VTD: SF030
704	VTD: SF031
705	VTD: SF032
706	VTD: SF033
707	VTD: SF034
708	VTD: SF035
709	VTD: SF200
710	VTD: SPL001
711	VTD: SPL002
712	VTD: SPL003
713	VTD: SPL004
714	VTD: SPL005
715	VTD: SPL006
716	VTD: SPL007
717	VTD: SPL008
718	VTD: SPL009
719	VTD: SPL010
720	VTD: SPL011
721	VTD: SPL012
722	VTD: SPL013
723	VTD: SPL014
724	VTD: SPL015
725	VTD: SPL016
726	VTD: SPL017
727	VTD: SPL018
728	VTD: SPL019

HB 1

22

729	VTD: SPL020
730	VTD: SPL021
731	VTD: SPL022
732	VTD: SPL023
733	VTD: SPL024
734	VTD: SPL025
735	VTD: SPL026
736	VTD: SPL027
737	VTD: SPL028
738	VTD: SPL201
739	VTD: SPL202
740	VTD: SPL207
741	VTD: SPL208
742	VTD: UNV001
743	VTD: UNV002
744	VTD: UNV003
745	VTD: UNV004
746	VTD: UNV005
747	VTD: UNV006
748	VTD: UNV007
749	VTD: UNV008
750	VTD: UNV009
751	VTD: UNV010
752	VTD: UNV011
753	VTD: UNV012
754	VTD: UNV013
755	VTD: UNV014
756	VTD: UNV015
757	VTD: UNV016
758	VTD: UNV017
759	VTD: UNV018
760	VTD: UNV019
761	VTD: UNV020
762	VTD: UNV021
763	VTD: UNV022
764	VTD: UNV023
765	VTD: UNV024

HB 1

23

766 **VTD: UNV025**
 767 **VTD: UNV026**
 768 **VTD: UNV027**
 769 **VTD: UNV028**
 770 **VTD: UNV029**
 771 **VTD: UNV030**
 772 **VTD: UNV031**
 773 **VTD: UNV032**
 774 **VTD: UNV033**
 775 **VTD: UNV034**
 776 **VTD: UNV035**
 777 **VTD: UNV036**
 778 **VTD: UNV037**
 779 **VTD: UNV038**
 780 **VTD: UNV039**
 781 **VTD: UNV040**
 782 **VTD: UNV041**
 783 **VTD: UNV042**
 784 **VTD: UNV043**
 785 **VTD: UNV045**
 786 **VTD: UNV201**
 787 **VTD: UNV202**
 788 **VTD: UNV205**
 789 **VTD: UNV206**
 790 **VTD: UNV208**
 791 **County St. Louis MO Subtotal**
 792 **District 1 Total**

128.472. The second congressional district shall be composed of the following:

2 **County: Crawford MO**
 3 **County: Franklin MO**
 4 **County: Gasconade MO**
 5 **County: Jefferson MO**
 6 **VTD: Brennan**
 7 **Block: 290997002111020**
 8 **Block: 290997002111021**
 9 **Block: 290997003032017**
 10 **Block: 290997003051001**

HB 1

24

11 **Block: 290997003051003**
12 **Block: 290997003052001**
13 **Block: 290997003052002**
14 **Block: 290997003052003**
15 **Block: 290997003052004**
16 **Block: 290997003052005**
17 **Block: 290997003052025**
18 **VTD Brennan Subtotal**
19 **VTD: Byrnes Mill W-1**
20 **VTD: Byrnes Mill W-2**
21 **VTD: Byrnes Mill W-3**
22 **VTD: Byrnesville**
23 **VTD: Cedar Hill**
24 **VTD: Cedar Hill Lakes**
25 **VTD: De Soto W-1**
26 **VTD: De Soto W-2**
27 **VTD: De Soto W-3**
28 **VTD: De Soto W-4**
29 **VTD: Dulin Creek**
30 **VTD: Goldman**
31 **VTD: Grubville**
32 **VTD: Grubville 2**
33 **VTD: High Ridge**
34 **VTD: Hillsboro W-1**
35 **VTD: Hillsboro W-2**
36 **VTD: Hillsboro W-3**
37 **VTD: Hillsboro W-4**
38 **VTD: Hoene Springs**
39 **VTD: House Springs**
40 **VTD: Lake Tekawitha**
41 **VTD: Lake Tishomingo**
42 **VTD: Meramec Valley**
43 **VTD: North Jefferson**
44 **Block: 290997002062004**
45 **Block: 290997002062005**
46 **Block: 290997002072000**
47 **Block: 290997002072001**

HB 1

25

48 **Block: 290997002072002**
49 **Block: 290997002072003**
50 **Block: 290997002072004**
51 **Block: 290997002072005**
52 **Block: 290997002072006**
53 **Block: 290997002072007**
54 **Block: 290997002072008**
55 **Block: 290997002072009**
56 **Block: 290997002072010**
57 **Block: 290997002072011**
58 **Block: 290997002072012**
59 **Block: 290997002072013**
60 **Block: 290997002072014**
61 **Block: 290997002072017**
62 **Block: 290997002072018**
63 **Block: 290997002072019**
64 **Block: 290997002072020**
65 **Block: 290997002072021**
66 **Block: 290997002072022**
67 **Block: 290997002072023**
68 **Block: 290997002072024**
69 **Block: 290997002072025**
70 **Block: 290997002111019**
71 **Block: 290997002113004**
72 **Block: 290997002113005**
73 **Block: 290997002113006**
74 **Block: 290997002113007**
75 **Block: 290997002113008**
76 **Block: 290997002113009**
77 **Block: 290997002113012**
78 **Block: 290997002113013**
79 **Block: 290997002113014**
80 **Block: 290997002113015**
81 **Block: 290997002113016**
82 **Block: 290997002113017**
83 **Block: 290997002113019**
84 **Block: 290997003022000**

HB 1

26

85 **Block: 290997003022001**
86 **Block: 290997003022002**
87 **Block: 290997003022015**
88 **Block: 290997003023002**
89 **Block: 290997003063001**
90 **Block: 290997003063003**
91 **Block: 290997003063004**
92 **Block: 290997003063005**
93 **VTD North Jefferson Subtotal**
94 **VTD: Northwest**
95 **VTD: Parkdale**
96 **VTD: Peaceful Village**
97 **VTD: Raintree**
98 **VTD: Rockwood**
99 **VTD: Scotsdale**
100 **VTD: Valle**
101 **Block: 290997010023040**
102 **Block: 290997010023041**
103 **Block: 290997012006047**
104 **Block: 290997012006053**
105 **Block: 290997012006061**
106 **Block: 290997012006062**
107 **Block: 290997013001001**
108 **Block: 290997013001002**
109 **Block: 290997013001003**
110 **Block: 290997013001004**
111 **Block: 290997013001055**
112 **Block: 290997013001062**
113 **Block: 290997013001063**
114 **Block: 290997013001064**
115 **Block: 290997013001065**
116 **Block: 290997013001066**
117 **Block: 290997013001067**
118 **Block: 290997013001070**
119 **Block: 290997013001075**
120 **Block: 290997013001077**
121 **Block: 290997013003003**

HB 1

27

122	Block: 290997013003013
123	Block: 290997013003014
124	Block: 290997013003015
125	Block: 290997013003017
126	Block: 290997013003018
127	Block: 290997013003019
128	Block: 290997013003021
129	Block: 290997013003022
130	Block: 290997014012008
131	Block: 290997014012009
132	Block: 290997014012017
133	Block: 290997014012021
134	Block: 290997014012022
135	Block: 290997014012023
136	Block: 290997014012064
137	Block: 290997014012065
138	Block: 290997014012066
139	Block: 290997014012067
140	VTD Valle Subtotal
141	VTD: Victoria
142	Block: 290997010011036
143	Block: 290997010013008
144	Block: 290997010013032
145	Block: 290997010013033
146	Block: 290997010021020
147	Block: 290997010021022
148	Block: 290997010021023
149	Block: 290997010021024
150	Block: 290997010022000
151	Block: 290997010022001
152	Block: 290997010022002
153	Block: 290997010022003
154	Block: 290997010022004
155	Block: 290997010022005
156	Block: 290997010022006
157	Block: 290997010022007
158	Block: 290997010022010

HB 1

28

159 **Block: 290997010022011**
160 **Block: 290997010022012**
161 **Block: 290997010022017**
162 **Block: 290997010022018**
163 **Block: 290997010022020**
164 **Block: 290997010022021**
165 **Block: 290997010022022**
166 **Block: 290997010022024**
167 **Block: 290997010022025**
168 **Block: 290997010022026**
169 **Block: 290997010022027**
170 **Block: 290997010022029**
171 **Block: 290997010022030**
172 **Block: 290997010023007**
173 **Block: 290997010023008**
174 **Block: 290997010023009**
175 **Block: 290997010023010**
176 **Block: 290997010023011**
177 **Block: 290997010023014**
178 **Block: 290997010023015**
179 **Block: 290997010023016**
180 **Block: 290997010023017**
181 **Block: 290997010023018**
182 **Block: 290997010023022**
183 **Block: 290997010023023**
184 **Block: 290997010023024**
185 **Block: 290997010023025**
186 **Block: 290997010023026**
187 **Block: 290997010023027**
188 **Block: 290997010023028**
189 **Block: 290997010023032**
190 **Block: 290997010023033**
191 **Block: 290997010023034**
192 **Block: 290997010023036**
193 **Block: 290997010023037**
194 **Block: 290997012001000**
195 **Block: 290997012001028**

HB 1

29

196	Block: 290997012001029
197	Block: 290997012001030
198	VTD Victoria Subtotal
199	VTD: Vineland
200	VTD: Ware
201	County Jefferson MO Subtotal
202	County: St. Louis MO
203	VTD: AP032
204	VTD: AP041
205	VTD: AP201
206	VTD: AP202
207	VTD: BON001
208	VTD: BON002
209	VTD: BON003
210	VTD: BON004
211	VTD: BON005
212	VTD: BON006
213	VTD: BON007
214	VTD: BON008
215	VTD: BON009
216	VTD: BON010
217	VTD: BON011
218	VTD: BON012
219	VTD: BON013
220	VTD: BON014
221	VTD: BON015
222	VTD: BON016
223	VTD: BON017
224	VTD: BON018
225	VTD: BON019
226	VTD: BON020
227	VTD: BON021
228	VTD: BON022
229	VTD: BON023
230	VTD: BON024
231	VTD: BON025
232	VTD: BON026

HB 1

30

233	VTD: BON027
234	VTD: BON028
235	VTD: BON029
236	VTD: BON030
237	VTD: BON031
238	VTD: BON032
239	VTD: BON033
240	VTD: BON034
241	VTD: BON035
242	VTD: BON036
243	VTD: BON037
244	VTD: BON038
245	VTD: BON039
246	VTD: BON040
247	VTD: BON200
248	VTD: BON202
249	VTD: BON203
250	VTD: BON205
251	VTD: BON206
252	VTD: BON207
253	VTD: BON208
254	VTD: BON210
255	VTD: BON211
256	VTD: CC001
257	VTD: CC002
258	VTD: CC003
259	VTD: CC004
260	VTD: CC005
261	VTD: CC006
262	VTD: CC007
263	VTD: CC008
264	VTD: CC009
265	VTD: CC010
266	VTD: CC011
267	VTD: CC014
268	VTD: CC015
269	VTD: CC016

HB 1

31

270	VTD: CC017
271	VTD: CC018
272	VTD: CC019
273	VTD: CC020
274	VTD: CC021
275	VTD: CC023
276	VTD: CC024
277	VTD: CC025
278	VTD: CC026
279	VTD: CC027
280	VTD: CC028
281	VTD: CC029
282	VTD: CC030
283	VTD: CC031
284	VTD: CC032
285	VTD: CC033
286	VTD: CC034
287	VTD: CC035
288	VTD: CC036
289	VTD: CC037
290	VTD: CC038
291	VTD: CC039
292	VTD: CC040
293	VTD: CC041
294	VTD: CC042
295	VTD: CC044
296	VTD: CC045
297	VTD: CC046
298	VTD: CC047
299	VTD: CC048
300	Block: 291892155001007
301	Block: 291892155004013
302	Block: 291892155004014
303	Block: 291892155004015
304	Block: 291892155004016
305	Block: 291892155004017
306	VTD CC048 Subtotal

HB 1

32

307 **VTD: CC049**
308 **VTD: CC050**
309 **VTD: CC052**
310 **VTD: CC053**
311 **VTD: CC054**
312 **VTD: CC055**
313 **VTD: CC056**
314 **VTD: CC058**
315 **VTD: CC059**
316 **VTD: CC060**
317 **VTD: CC201**
318 **VTD: CC202**
319 **VTD: CC203**
320 **Block: 291892156001020**
321 **Block: 291892156001021**
322 **Block: 291892156001024**
323 **Block: 291892156001025**
324 **Block: 291892156001026**
325 **Block: 291892156001029**
326 **Block: 291892156001030**
327 **VTD CC203 Subtotal**
328 **VTD: CC208**
329 **VTD: CC214**
330 **VTD: CC221**
331 **VTD: CHE001**
332 **VTD: CHE002**
333 **VTD: CHE003**
334 **VTD: CHE004**
335 **VTD: CHE005**
336 **VTD: CHE006**
337 **VTD: CHE007**
338 **VTD: CHE008**
339 **VTD: CHE009**
340 **VTD: CHE010**
341 **VTD: CHE011**
342 **VTD: CHE012**
343 **VTD: CHE013**

HB 1

33

344 VTD: CHE014
345 VTD: CHE015
346 VTD: CHE016
347 VTD: CHE017
348 VTD: CHE018
349 VTD: CHE019
350 VTD: CHE020
351 VTD: CHE021
352 VTD: CHE022
353 VTD: CHE023
354 VTD: CHE024
355 VTD: CHE025
356 VTD: CHE026
357 VTD: CHE027
358 VTD: CHE028
359 VTD: CHE029
360 VTD: CHE030
361 VTD: CHE031
362 VTD: CHE032
363 VTD: CHE033
364 VTD: CHE034
365 VTD: CHE035
366 VTD: CHE036
367 VTD: CHE037
368 VTD: CHE038
369 VTD: CHE039
370 VTD: CHE040
371 VTD: CHE041
372 VTD: CHE042
373 VTD: CHE043
374 VTD: CHE044
375 VTD: CHE045
376 VTD: CHE046
377 VTD: CHE047
378 VTD: CHE048
379 VTD: CHE049
380 VTD: CHE050

HB 1

34

381 **VTD: CHE051**
382 **VTD: CHE052**
383 **VTD: CHE053**
384 **VTD: CHE054**
385 **VTD: CHE055**
386 **VTD: CHE057**
387 **VTD: CHE200**
388 **VTD: CHE203**
389 **VTD: CHE212**
390 **VTD: CHE214**
391 **VTD: CHE215**
392 **VTD: CLA004**
393 **Block: 291892154004014**
394 **VTD CLA004 Subtotal**
395 **VTD: CLA006**
396 **VTD: CLA007**
397 **VTD: CLA012**
398 **VTD: CLA013**
399 **Block: 291892154003013**
400 **Block: 291892154003014**
401 **Block: 291892154004000**
402 **Block: 291892154004001**
403 **Block: 291892154004002**
404 **Block: 291892154004003**
405 **Block: 291892154004004**
406 **Block: 291892154004008**
407 **Block: 291892154004012**
408 **Block: 291892154004013**
409 **Block: 291892154005001**
410 **Block: 291892154005002**
411 **Block: 291892154005003**
412 **VTD CLA013 Subtotal**
413 **VTD: CLA014**
414 **VTD: CLA015**
415 **VTD: CLA016**
416 **VTD: CLA024**
417 **VTD: CLA025**

HB 1

35

418	VTD: CLA026
419	VTD: CLA028
420	VTD: CLA033
421	VTD: CLA034
422	VTD: CLA036
423	VTD: CLA037
424	VTD: CLA040
425	VTD: CLA042
426	VTD: CLA045
427	VTD: CLA047
428	VTD: CLA049
429	VTD: CLA201
430	VTD: CLA202
431	VTD: CLA203
432	VTD: CLA205
433	VTD: CON001
434	VTD: CON002
435	VTD: CON003
436	VTD: CON004
437	VTD: CON005
438	VTD: CON006
439	VTD: CON007
440	VTD: CON008
441	VTD: CON009
442	VTD: CON010
443	VTD: CON011
444	VTD: CON012
445	VTD: CON013
446	VTD: CON014
447	VTD: CON015
448	VTD: CON016
449	VTD: CON017
450	VTD: CON018
451	VTD: CON019
452	VTD: CON020
453	VTD: CON021
454	VTD: CON022

HB 1

36

455 VTD: CON023
456 VTD: CON024
457 VTD: CON025
458 VTD: CON026
459 VTD: CON027
460 VTD: CON028
461 VTD: CON029
462 VTD: CON030
463 VTD: CON031
464 VTD: CON032
465 VTD: CON033
466 VTD: CON034
467 VTD: CON035
468 VTD: CON036
469 VTD: CON037
470 VTD: CON038
471 VTD: CON039
472 VTD: CON040
473 VTD: CON041
474 VTD: CON042
475 VTD: CON043
476 VTD: CON044
477 VTD: CON045
478 VTD: CON046
479 VTD: CON047
480 VTD: CON048
481 VTD: CON049
482 VTD: CON050
483 VTD: CON051
484 VTD: CON052
485 VTD: CON053
486 VTD: CON200
487 VTD: CON202
488 VTD: CON204
489 VTD: CON205
490 VTD: CON206
491 VTD: CON212

HB 1

37

492	VTD: CON213
493	VTD: GRA001
494	VTD: GRA002
495	VTD: GRA003
496	VTD: GRA004
497	VTD: GRA005
498	VTD: GRA006
499	VTD: GRA007
500	Block: 291892198011021
501	Block: 291892198012003
502	Block: 291892198012006
503	Block: 291892198012007
504	Block: 291892198012008
505	Block: 291892198012009
506	Block: 291892198012010
507	Block: 291892198012011
508	Block: 291892198012012
509	VTD GRA007 Subtotal
510	VTD: GRA008
511	VTD: GRA009
512	VTD: GRA010
513	VTD: GRA011
514	VTD: GRA012
515	VTD: GRA013
516	VTD: GRA014
517	VTD: GRA015
518	Block: 291892197004003
519	Block: 291892197004004
520	Block: 291892197004005
521	Block: 291892197004006
522	Block: 291892197004007
523	Block: 291892197004008
524	Block: 291892197004009
525	Block: 291892208013000
526	Block: 291892208013001
527	Block: 291892208013002
528	Block: 291892208013003

HB 1

38

529 **Block: 291892208013004**
530 **Block: 291892208013005**
531 **Block: 291892208013006**
532 **Block: 291892208013007**
533 **Block: 291892208013008**
534 **Block: 291892208013009**
535 **VTD GRA015 Subtotal**
536 **VTD: GRA017**
537 **VTD: GRA019**
538 **Block: 291892197004000**
539 **Block: 291892197004001**
540 **Block: 291892197004002**
541 **Block: 291892197004010**
542 **Block: 291892197004011**
543 **Block: 291892197004012**
544 **Block: 291892198012004**
545 **Block: 291892198012005**
546 **VTD GRA019 Subtotal**
547 **VTD: GRA020**
548 **VTD: GRA023**
549 **VTD: GRA024**
550 **VTD: GRA026**
551 **VTD: GRA027**
552 **VTD: GRA028**
553 **VTD: GRA029**
554 **VTD: GRA030**
555 **VTD: GRA031**
556 **VTD: GRA032**
557 **VTD: GRA033**
558 **Block: 291892199001007**
559 **Block: 291892199004000**
560 **Block: 291892199004001**
561 **Block: 291892199004002**
562 **Block: 291892199004003**
563 **Block: 291892199004004**
564 **VTD GRA033 Subtotal**
565 **VTD: GRA034**

HB 1

39

566 **VTD: GRA036**
567 **VTD: GRA037**
568 **VTD: GRA038**
569 **VTD: GRA040**
570 **VTD: GRA041**
571 **VTD: GRA042**
572 **VTD: GRA043**
573 **VTD: GRA044**
574 **VTD: GRA045**
575 **Block: 291892208011022**
576 **VTD GRA045 Subtotal**
577 **VTD: GRA046**
578 **VTD: GRA047**
579 **VTD: GRA048**
580 **VTD: GRA201**
581 **VTD: GRA202**
582 **Block: 291892208011017**
583 **VTD GRA202 Subtotal**
584 **VTD: GRA206**
585 **VTD: GRA209**
586 **VTD: GRA210**
587 **VTD: JEF001**
588 **VTD: JEF002**
589 **VTD: JEF003**
590 **VTD: JEF004**
591 **VTD: JEF010**
592 **Block: 291892219001008**
593 **VTD JEF010 Subtotal**
594 **VTD: JEF032**
595 **VTD: JEF033**
596 **VTD: JEF034**
597 **VTD: JEF035**
598 **VTD: JEF036**
599 **VTD: JEF037**
600 **VTD: JEF200**
601 **VTD: LAF001**
602 **VTD: LAF002**

HB 1

40

603	VTD: LAF003
604	VTD: LAF004
605	VTD: LAF005
606	VTD: LAF006
607	VTD: LAF007
608	VTD: LAF008
609	VTD: LAF009
610	VTD: LAF010
611	VTD: LAF011
612	VTD: LAF012
613	VTD: LAF013
614	VTD: LAF014
615	VTD: LAF015
616	VTD: LAF016
617	VTD: LAF017
618	VTD: LAF018
619	VTD: LAF019
620	VTD: LAF020
621	VTD: LAF022
622	VTD: LAF023
623	VTD: LAF024
624	VTD: LAF025
625	VTD: LAF026
626	VTD: LAF027
627	VTD: LAF028
628	VTD: LAF029
629	VTD: LAF030
630	VTD: LAF031
631	VTD: LAF032
632	VTD: LAF033
633	VTD: LAF034
634	VTD: LAF035
635	VTD: LAF036
636	VTD: LAF037
637	VTD: LAF038
638	VTD: LAF039
639	VTD: LAF040

HB 1

41

640 **VTD: LAF041**
641 **VTD: LAF042**
642 **VTD: LAF043**
643 **VTD: LAF044**
644 **VTD: LAF045**
645 **VTD: LAF046**
646 **VTD: LAF200**
647 **VTD: LAF205**
648 **VTD: LAF207**
649 **VTD: LEM001**
650 **VTD: LEM002**
651 **VTD: LEM003**
652 **VTD: LEM004**
653 **VTD: LEM005**
654 **VTD: LEM006**
655 **VTD: LEM007**
656 **VTD: LEM008**
657 **VTD: LEM009**
658 **VTD: LEM010**
659 **VTD: LEM011**
660 **VTD: LEM012**
661 **VTD: LEM013**
662 **VTD: LEM014**
663 **VTD: LEM015**
664 **VTD: LEM016**
665 **VTD: LEM017**
666 **VTD: LEM018**
667 **VTD: LEM019**
668 **VTD: LEM020**
669 **VTD: LEM021**
670 **VTD: LEM022**
671 **VTD: LEM023**
672 **VTD: LEM024**
673 **VTD: LEM025**
674 **VTD: LEM026**
675 **VTD: LEM027**
676 **VTD: LEM028**

HB 1

42

677 **VTD: LEM029**
678 **VTD: LEM030**
679 **VTD: LEM031**
680 **VTD: LEM032**
681 **VTD: LEM033**
682 **VTD: LEM200**
683 **VTD: LEM201**
684 **VTD: LEM202**
685 **VTD: LEM204**
686 **VTD: LEM205**
687 **VTD: LEM208**
688 **VTD: MER001**
689 **VTD: MER002**
690 **VTD: MER003**
691 **VTD: MER004**
692 **VTD: MER005**
693 **VTD: MER006**
694 **VTD: MER007**
695 **VTD: MER008**
696 **VTD: MER009**
697 **VTD: MER010**
698 **VTD: MER011**
699 **VTD: MER012**
700 **VTD: MER013**
701 **VTD: MER014**
702 **VTD: MER015**
703 **VTD: MER016**
704 **VTD: MER017**
705 **VTD: MER018**
706 **VTD: MER019**
707 **VTD: MER020**
708 **VTD: MER021**
709 **VTD: MER022**
710 **VTD: MER023**
711 **VTD: MER024**
712 **VTD: MER025**
713 **VTD: MER026**

HB 1

43

714	VTD: MER027
715	VTD: MER028
716	VTD: MER029
717	VTD: MER030
718	VTD: MER031
719	VTD: MER032
720	VTD: MER033
721	VTD: MER034
722	VTD: MER035
723	VTD: MER036
724	VTD: MER037
725	VTD: MER038
726	VTD: MER039
727	VTD: MER040
728	VTD: MER041
729	VTD: MER042
730	VTD: MER043
731	VTD: MER044
732	VTD: MER045
733	VTD: MER046
734	VTD: MER047
735	VTD: MER048
736	VTD: MER200
737	VTD: MER202
738	VTD: MER204
739	VTD: MER207
740	VTD: MER209
741	VTD: MER210
742	VTD: MER213
743	VTD: MER214
744	VTD: MER215
745	VTD: MER219
746	VTD: MHT001
747	VTD: MHT002
748	VTD: MHT003
749	VTD: MHT004
750	VTD: MHT005

HB 1

44

751 **VTD: MHT006**
752 **VTD: MHT007**
753 **VTD: MHT008**
754 **VTD: MHT009**
755 **VTD: MHT010**
756 **VTD: MHT011**
757 **VTD: MHT012**
758 **VTD: MHT013**
759 **VTD: MHT014**
760 **VTD: MHT015**
761 **VTD: MHT016**
762 **VTD: MHT017**
763 **VTD: MHT018**
764 **VTD: MHT019**
765 **VTD: MHT020**
766 **VTD: MHT021**
767 **VTD: MHT022**
768 **VTD: MHT023**
769 **VTD: MHT024**
770 **VTD: MHT025**
771 **VTD: MHT026**
772 **VTD: MHT027**
773 **VTD: MHT028**
774 **VTD: MHT029**
775 **VTD: MHT030**
776 **VTD: MHT031**
777 **VTD: MHT032**
778 **VTD: MHT033**
779 **VTD: MHT034**
780 **VTD: MHT035**
781 **VTD: MHT036**
782 **VTD: MHT037**
783 **VTD: MHT038**
784 **VTD: MHT039**
785 **VTD: MHT040**
786 **VTD: MHT041**
787 **VTD: MHT042**

HB 1

45

788	VTD: MHT043
789	VTD: MHT044
790	VTD: MHT045
791	VTD: MHT046
792	VTD: MHT047
793	VTD: MHT048
794	VTD: MHT049
795	VTD: MHT050
796	VTD: MHT051
797	VTD: MHT052
798	VTD: MHT053
799	VTD: MHT054
800	VTD: MHT055
801	VTD: MHT056
802	VTD: MHT057
803	VTD: MHT058
804	VTD: MHT059
805	VTD: MHT200
806	VTD: MHT203
807	VTD: MHT206
808	VTD: MHT207
809	VTD: MHT208
810	VTD: MHT211
811	VTD: MHT212
812	VTD: MHT213
813	VTD: MHT214
814	VTD: MHT216
815	VTD: MHT219
816	VTD: MHT220
817	VTD: MHT222
818	VTD: MHT223
819	VTD: MR001
820	VTD: MR002
821	VTD: MR003
822	VTD: MR004
823	VTD: MR005
824	VTD: MR006

HB 1

46

825	VTD: MR007
826	VTD: MR008
827	VTD: MR009
828	VTD: MR010
829	VTD: MR011
830	VTD: MR012
831	VTD: MR013
832	VTD: MR014
833	VTD: MR015
834	VTD: MR016
835	VTD: MR017
836	VTD: MR018
837	VTD: MR019
838	VTD: MR020
839	VTD: MR021
840	VTD: MR022
841	VTD: MR023
842	VTD: MR024
843	VTD: MR025
844	VTD: MR026
845	VTD: MR027
846	VTD: MR028
847	VTD: MR029
848	VTD: MR030
849	VTD: MR031
850	VTD: MR032
851	VTD: MR033
852	VTD: MR034
853	VTD: MR035
854	VTD: MR036
855	VTD: MR037
856	VTD: MR038
857	VTD: MR039
858	VTD: MR040
859	VTD: MR041
860	VTD: MR042
861	VTD: MR043

HB 1

47

862 **VTD: MR044**
863 **VTD: MR045**
864 **VTD: MR046**
865 **VTD: MR047**
866 **VTD: MR048**
867 **VTD: MR049**
868 **VTD: MR050**
869 **VTD: MR051**
870 **VTD: MR052**
871 **VTD: MR053**
872 **VTD: MR054**
873 **VTD: MR055**
874 **VTD: MR056**
875 **VTD: MR057**
876 **VTD: MR058**
877 **VTD: MR059**
878 **VTD: MR200**
879 **VTD: MR202**
880 **VTD: MR203**
881 **VTD: MR204**
882 **VTD: MR205**
883 **VTD: MR209**
884 **VTD: MR210**
885 **VTD: MR212**
886 **VTD: MR213**
887 **VTD: NW001**
888 **Block: 291892132023003**
889 **Block: 291892132023004**
890 **Block: 291892132023005**
891 **Block: 291892132023006**
892 **Block: 291892132023007**
893 **Block: 291892132023008**
894 **Block: 291892132023009**
895 **Block: 291892132025008**
896 **Block: 291892132025009**
897 **Block: 291892132025010**
898 **Block: 291892132025011**

HB 1

48

899 **Block: 291892132025012**
900 **Block: 291892132025013**
901 **Block: 291892132025014**
902 **Block: 291892132025015**
903 **VTD NW001 Subtotal**
904 **VTD: NW013**
905 **Block: 291892151431031**
906 **Block: 291892151431044**
907 **Block: 291892151431045**
908 **Block: 291892151431046**
909 **Block: 291892151431047**
910 **Block: 291892151431049**
911 **Block: 291892151431050**
912 **Block: 291892151431052**
913 **Block: 291892151431055**
914 **Block: 291892151431056**
915 **Block: 291892151431057**
916 **Block: 291892151431063**
917 **VTD NW013 Subtotal**
918 **VTD: NW019**
919 **VTD: NW020**
920 **VTD: NW029**
921 **VTD: NW033**
922 **VTD: NW035**
923 **Block: 291892151432000**
924 **Block: 291892151432011**
925 **Block: 291892151432012**
926 **Block: 291892151432013**
927 **Block: 291892151432017**
928 **Block: 291892151432018**
929 **Block: 291892151432019**
930 **Block: 291892151432020**
931 **Block: 291892151432021**
932 **Block: 291892151432022**
933 **Block: 291892151432023**
934 **VTD NW035 Subtotal**
935 **VTD: NW038**

HB 1

49

936	VTD: NW047
937	VTD: NW049
938	VTD: NW052
939	VTD: NW201
940	VTD: NW211
941	VTD: OAK001
942	VTD: OAK002
943	VTD: OAK003
944	VTD: OAK004
945	VTD: OAK005
946	VTD: OAK006
947	VTD: OAK007
948	VTD: OAK008
949	VTD: OAK009
950	VTD: OAK010
951	VTD: OAK011
952	VTD: OAK012
953	VTD: OAK013
954	VTD: OAK014
955	VTD: OAK015
956	VTD: OAK016
957	VTD: OAK017
958	VTD: OAK018
959	VTD: OAK019
960	VTD: OAK020
961	VTD: OAK021
962	VTD: OAK022
963	VTD: OAK023
964	VTD: OAK024
965	VTD: OAK025
966	VTD: OAK026
967	VTD: OAK027
968	VTD: OAK028
969	VTD: OAK029
970	VTD: QUE001
971	VTD: QUE002
972	VTD: QUE003

HB 1

50

973	VTD: QUE004
974	VTD: QUE005
975	VTD: QUE006
976	VTD: QUE007
977	VTD: QUE008
978	VTD: QUE009
979	VTD: QUE010
980	VTD: QUE011
981	VTD: QUE012
982	VTD: QUE013
983	VTD: QUE014
984	VTD: QUE015
985	VTD: QUE016
986	VTD: QUE017
987	VTD: QUE018
988	VTD: QUE019
989	VTD: QUE020
990	VTD: QUE021
991	VTD: QUE022
992	VTD: QUE023
993	VTD: QUE024
994	VTD: QUE025
995	VTD: QUE026
996	VTD: QUE027
997	VTD: QUE028
998	VTD: QUE029
999	VTD: QUE030
1000	VTD: QUE031
1001	VTD: QUE032
1002	VTD: QUE033
1003	VTD: QUE034
1004	VTD: QUE035
1005	VTD: QUE036
1006	VTD: QUE037
1007	VTD: QUE038
1008	VTD: QUE039
1009	VTD: QUE040

HB 1

51

1010	VTD: QUE041
1011	VTD: QUE042
1012	VTD: QUE043
1013	VTD: QUE044
1014	VTD: QUE045
1015	VTD: QUE046
1016	VTD: QUE047
1017	VTD: QUE048
1018	VTD: QUE049
1019	VTD: QUE200
1020	VTD: QUE201
1021	VTD: QUE202
1022	VTD: QUE203
1023	VTD: QUE204
1024	VTD: QUE205
1025	VTD: QUE207
1026	VTD: QUE208
1027	VTD: QUE209
1028	VTD: QUE210
1029	VTD: QUE211
1030	VTD: QUE213
1031	VTD: TSF001
1032	VTD: TSF002
1033	VTD: TSF003
1034	VTD: TSF004
1035	VTD: TSF005
1036	VTD: TSF006
1037	VTD: TSF007
1038	VTD: TSF008
1039	VTD: TSF009
1040	VTD: TSF010
1041	VTD: TSF011
1042	VTD: TSF012
1043	VTD: TSF013
1044	VTD: TSF014
1045	VTD: TSF015
1046	VTD: TSF016

HB 1

52

1047	VTD: TSF017
1048	VTD: TSF018
1049	VTD: TSF019
1050	VTD: TSF020
1051	VTD: TSF021
1052	VTD: TSF022
1053	VTD: TSF023
1054	VTD: TSF024
1055	VTD: TSF025
1056	VTD: TSF026
1057	VTD: TSF027
1058	VTD: TSF201
1059	VTD: WH001
1060	VTD: WH002
1061	VTD: WH003
1062	VTD: WH004
1063	VTD: WH005
1064	VTD: WH006
1065	VTD: WH007
1066	VTD: WH008
1067	VTD: WH009
1068	VTD: WH010
1069	VTD: WH011
1070	VTD: WH012
1071	VTD: WH013
1072	VTD: WH014
1073	VTD: WH015
1074	VTD: WH016
1075	VTD: WH017
1076	VTD: WH018
1077	VTD: WH019
1078	VTD: WH020
1079	VTD: WH021
1080	VTD: WH022
1081	VTD: WH023
1082	VTD: WH024
1083	VTD: WH025

HB 1

53

1084	VTD: WH026
1085	VTD: WH027
1086	VTD: WH028
1087	VTD: WH029
1088	VTD: WH030
1089	VTD: WH031
1090	VTD: WH032
1091	VTD: WH033
1092	VTD: WH034
1093	VTD: WH035
1094	VTD: WH036
1095	VTD: WH037
1096	VTD: WH038
1097	VTD: WH039
1098	VTD: WH040
1099	VTD: WH041
1100	VTD: WH042
1101	VTD: WH043
1102	VTD: WH044
1103	VTD: WH045
1104	VTD: WH046
1105	VTD: WH047
1106	VTD: WH200
1107	VTD: WH201
1108	VTD: WH202
1109	VTD: WH203
1110	VTD: WH208
1111	County St. Louis MO Subtotal
1112	County: Washington MO
1113	District 2 Total
	128.473. The third congressional district shall be composed of the following:
2	District 3
3	County: Audrain MO
4	County: Boone MO
5	VTD: 17
6	Block: 290190015062014
7	Block: 290190015062023

HB 1

54

8 **Block: 290190015062031**
9 **VTD 17 Subtotal**
10 **VTD: 1A**
11 **VTD: 1B**
12 **VTD: 1C**
13 **VTD: 1D**
14 **VTD: 1E**
15 **VTD: 1F**
16 **VTD: 1G**
17 **VTD: 1I**
18 **VTD: 1J**
19 **VTD: 1K**
20 **VTD: 1L**
21 **VTD: 1M**
22 **VTD: 20**
23 **Block: 290190014024009**
24 **Block: 290190014024010**
25 **VTD 20 Subtotal**
26 **VTD: 21**
27 **Block: 290190013003006**
28 **Block: 290190013003008**
29 **Block: 290190013003009**
30 **Block: 290190013003023**
31 **Block: 290190018061001**
32 **Block: 290190018061002**
33 **Block: 290190018061003**
34 **Block: 290190018061004**
35 **Block: 290190018061008**
36 **Block: 290190018061009**
37 **Block: 290190018061010**
38 **Block: 290190018061011**
39 **Block: 290190018061012**
40 **Block: 290190018061016**
41 **Block: 290190018061017**
42 **VTD 21 Subtotal**
43 **VTD: 22**
44 **Block: 290190014013035**

HB 1

55

45 **Block: 290190014013036**
46 **Block: 290190014013041**
47 **Block: 290190014013045**
48 **Block: 290190014013046**
49 **VTD 22 Subtotal**
50 **VTD: 23**
51 **VTD: 24**
52 **VTD: 25**
53 **VTD: 26**
54 **VTD: 27**
55 **VTD: 28**
56 **VTD: 29**
57 **VTD: 2A**
58 **VTD: 2B**
59 **VTD: 2C**
60 **VTD: 2D**
61 **VTD: 2F**
62 **VTD: 2G**
63 **VTD: 2H**
64 **VTD: 2I**
65 **Block: 290190014011007**
66 **Block: 290190014011008**
67 **Block: 290190014011009**
68 **Block: 290190014011010**
69 **Block: 290190014011011**
70 **Block: 290190014011012**
71 **Block: 290190014011013**
72 **Block: 290190014011014**
73 **Block: 290190014011015**
74 **Block: 290190014011016**
75 **Block: 290190014011017**
76 **Block: 290190014011018**
77 **Block: 290190014011019**
78 **Block: 290190014011020**
79 **Block: 290190014012014**
80 **Block: 290190014012017**
81 **Block: 290190014012022**

HB 1

56

82	Block: 290190014012023
83	Block: 290190014012024
84	Block: 290190014012025
85	Block: 290190014012026
86	Block: 290190014012029
87	Block: 290190014012030
88	Block: 290190014013007
89	Block: 290190014013008
90	Block: 290190014013009
91	Block: 290190014013010
92	Block: 290190014013011
93	Block: 290190014013013
94	Block: 290190014013014
95	Block: 290190014013015
96	Block: 290190014013016
97	Block: 290190014013018
98	Block: 290190014013019
99	Block: 290190014013020
100	Block: 290190014013021
101	Block: 290190014013022
102	Block: 290190014013023
103	Block: 290190014013024
104	Block: 290190014013034
105	Block: 290190014013037
106	Block: 290190014013038
107	Block: 290190014013039
108	Block: 290190014013040
109	Block: 290190014013042
110	Block: 290190014013043
111	Block: 290190014013044
112	Block: 290190014013047
113	Block: 290190014013052
114	Block: 290190014013058
115	Block: 290190015033022
116	VTD 2I Subtotal
117	VTD: 2J
118	VTD: 2K

HB 1

57

119 **Block: 290190013003002**
120 **Block: 290190013003005**
121 **Block: 290190013003007**
122 **Block: 290190013003010**
123 **Block: 290190013003024**
124 **Block: 290190013003025**
125 **Block: 290190013003026**
126 **Block: 290190013003027**
127 **VTD 2K Subtotal**
128 **VTD: 2L**
129 **VTD: 30**
130 **VTD: 31**
131 **VTD: 32**
132 **VTD: 33**
133 **VTD: 34**
134 **VTD: 35**
135 **VTD: 36**
136 **VTD: 37**
137 **Block: 290190018062044**
138 **Block: 290190018062048**
139 **Block: 290190018062049**
140 **Block: 290190018062053**
141 **VTD 37 Subtotal**
142 **VTD: 3A**
143 **Block: 290190015031010**
144 **Block: 290190015031011**
145 **Block: 290190015031014**
146 **Block: 290190015031015**
147 **Block: 290190015031016**
148 **Block: 290190015031017**
149 **Block: 290190015031018**
150 **Block: 290190015031019**
151 **Block: 290190015031020**
152 **Block: 290190015032000**
153 **Block: 290190015032003**
154 **Block: 290190015032004**
155 **Block: 290190015032005**

HB 1

58

156	Block: 290190015032006
157	Block: 290190015032007
158	Block: 290190015032008
159	Block: 290190015032009
160	Block: 290190015032010
161	Block: 290190015032011
162	Block: 290190015032012
163	Block: 290190015032013
164	Block: 290190015032014
165	Block: 290190015062027
166	Block: 290190015062028
167	Block: 290190015062032
168	Block: 290190015073001
169	Block: 290190015073002
170	Block: 290190015073003
171	Block: 290190015073006
172	Block: 290190015073007
173	Block: 290190015073008
174	Block: 290190015073009
175	Block: 290190015073010
176	Block: 290190015073011
177	Block: 290190015081002
178	Block: 290190015081003
179	Block: 290190015081017
180	Block: 290190015081018
181	Block: 290190015081019
182	Block: 290190015081020
183	Block: 290190015081024
184	Block: 290190015081025
185	Block: 290190015081026
186	Block: 290190015081027
187	Block: 290190015081028
188	Block: 290190015081029
189	Block: 290190015081030
190	VTD 3A Subtotal
191	VTD: 3B
192	Block: 290190015032001

HB 1

59

193 **Block: 290190015032002**
194 **Block: 290190015052002**
195 **Block: 290190015052003**
196 **Block: 290190015061000**
197 **Block: 290190015061001**
198 **Block: 290190015061002**
199 **Block: 290190015061003**
200 **Block: 290190015061004**
201 **Block: 290190015061005**
202 **Block: 290190015061006**
203 **Block: 290190015061007**
204 **Block: 290190015061008**
205 **Block: 290190015061009**
206 **Block: 290190015061010**
207 **Block: 290190015061011**
208 **Block: 290190015061012**
209 **Block: 290190015061013**
210 **Block: 290190015061014**
211 **Block: 290190015061015**
212 **Block: 290190015061016**
213 **Block: 290190015061017**
214 **Block: 290190015061018**
215 **Block: 290190015061019**
216 **Block: 290190015061020**
217 **Block: 290190015061021**
218 **Block: 290190015061022**
219 **Block: 290190015061023**
220 **Block: 290190015061027**
221 **Block: 290190015061030**
222 **Block: 290190015062005**
223 **Block: 290190015062013**
224 **Block: 290190015062015**
225 **Block: 290190015062016**
226 **Block: 290190015062022**
227 **Block: 290190015062024**
228 **Block: 290190015062026**
229 **Block: 290190015062029**

HB 1

60

230 **Block: 290190015062033**
231 **Block: 290190015062034**
232 **Block: 290190015062035**
233 **Block: 290190015062036**
234 **Block: 290190015062037**
235 **Block: 290190015062038**
236 **Block: 290190015062039**
237 **Block: 290190015062040**
238 **Block: 290190015062041**
239 **Block: 290190015062042**
240 **Block: 290190015062043**
241 **Block: 290190015062044**
242 **Block: 290190015062045**
243 **Block: 290190015062046**
244 **Block: 290190015071022**
245 **Block: 290190015071023**
246 **Block: 290190015071024**
247 **Block: 290190015073004**
248 **Block: 290190015073005**
249 **Block: 290190015073012**
250 **Block: 290190016031015**
251 **Block: 290190016031016**
252 **VTD 3B Subtotal**
253 **VTD: 3C**
254 **VTD: 3D**
255 **VTD: 3E**
256 **VTD: 3F**
257 **VTD: 3G**
258 **VTD: 3H**
259 **VTD: 3I**
260 **VTD: 3J**
261 **VTD: 3L**
262 **VTD: 3M**
263 **VTD: 3N**
264 **VTD: 40**
265 **Block: 290190015081004**
266 **Block: 290190015081005**

HB 1

61

267 **Block: 290190015083016**
268 **Block: 290190015083024**
269 **VTD 40 Subtotal**
270 **VTD: 41**
271 **VTD: 42**
272 **VTD: 43**
273 **VTD: 44**
274 **VTD: 45**
275 **Block: 290190015033036**
276 **Block: 290190015033037**
277 **Block: 290190015083007**
278 **Block: 290190015083008**
279 **VTD 45 Subtotal**
280 **VTD: 4A**
281 **VTD: 4B**
282 **Block: 290190012013004**
283 **Block: 290190012013005**
284 **Block: 290190012013006**
285 **Block: 290190012013007**
286 **Block: 290190012013008**
287 **Block: 290190012013034**
288 **Block: 290190012014018**
289 **VTD 4B Subtotal**
290 **VTD: 4C**
291 **VTD: 4D**
292 **VTD: 4E**
293 **VTD: 4F**
294 **VTD: 4G**
295 **VTD: 4H**
296 **VTD: 4I**
297 **VTD: 4J**
298 **VTD: 4K**
299 **Block: 290190018061000**
300 **Block: 290190018061005**
301 **Block: 290190018061006**
302 **Block: 290190018061013**
303 **Block: 290190018063001**

HB 1

62

304 **Block: 290190018071017**
305 **Block: 290190018071018**
306 **Block: 290190018071021**
307 **Block: 290190018071029**
308 **Block: 290190018071030**
309 **Block: 290190018071031**
310 **Block: 290190018072024**
311 **Block: 290190018072025**
312 **Block: 290190018072028**
313 **Block: 290190018072029**
314 **Block: 290190018072030**
315 **Block: 290190018072031**
316 **Block: 290190018072032**
317 **Block: 290190018072033**
318 **Block: 290190018072034**
319 **Block: 290190018072035**
320 **Block: 290190018072036**
321 **Block: 290190018072037**
322 **VTD 4K Subtotal**
323 **VTD: 4L**
324 **Block: 290190012013009**
325 **Block: 290190012013010**
326 **Block: 290190012013011**
327 **Block: 290190012014002**
328 **Block: 290190012014003**
329 **Block: 290190012014004**
330 **Block: 290190012014005**
331 **Block: 290190012014006**
332 **Block: 290190012014007**
333 **Block: 290190012014008**
334 **Block: 290190012014009**
335 **Block: 290190012014010**
336 **Block: 290190012014011**
337 **Block: 290190012014012**
338 **Block: 290190012014013**
339 **Block: 290190012014014**
340 **Block: 290190012014019**

HB 1

63

341 **Block: 290190012014020**
342 **Block: 290190012014021**
343 **Block: 290190012014022**
344 **Block: 290190012014023**
345 **Block: 290190012014024**
346 **Block: 290190012014025**
347 **Block: 290190012014026**
348 **VTD 4L Subtotal**
349 **VTD: 4M**
350 **VTD: 5A**
351 **VTD: 5B**
352 **VTD: 5C**
353 **VTD: 5D**
354 **VTD: 5E**
355 **VTD: 5F**
356 **VTD: 5G**
357 **VTD: 5H**
358 **VTD: 5I**
359 **VTD: 5J**
360 **VTD: 5K**
361 **VTD: 5L**
362 **VTD: 5M**
363 **VTD: 5N**
364 **VTD: 5P**
365 **VTD: 6A**
366 **VTD: 6B**
367 **VTD: 6C**
368 **VTD: 6D**
369 **VTD: 6E**
370 **VTD: 6F**
371 **VTD: 6G**
372 **VTD: 6H**
373 **VTD: 6I**
374 **VTD: 6J**
375 **VTD: 6K**
376 **VTD: 6L**
377 **VTD: 6M**

HB 1

64

378 **County Boone MO Subtotal**
379 **County: Callaway MO**
380 **County: Lincoln MO**
381 **County: Monroe MO**
382 **County: Montgomery MO**
383 **County: Pike MO**
384 **County: Ralls MO**
385 **County: St. Charles MO**
386 **County: St. Louis MO**
387 **VTD: NW013**
388 **Block: 291892151431003**
389 **Block: 291892151431005**
390 **Block: 291892151431006**
391 **Block: 291892151431007**
392 **Block: 291892151431008**
393 **Block: 291892151431009**
394 **Block: 291892151431010**
395 **Block: 291892151431011**
396 **Block: 291892151431012**
397 **Block: 291892151431013**
398 **Block: 291892151431014**
399 **Block: 291892151431015**
400 **Block: 291892151431016**
401 **Block: 291892151431019**
402 **Block: 291892151431020**
403 **Block: 291892151431021**
404 **Block: 291892151431024**
405 **Block: 291892151431025**
406 **Block: 291892151431026**
407 **Block: 291892151431027**
408 **Block: 291892151431029**
409 **Block: 291892151431030**
410 **Block: 291892151431033**
411 **Block: 291892151431048**
412 **Block: 291892151431051**
413 **Block: 291892151431053**
414 **Block: 291892151431054**

HB 1

65

415 **Block: 291892151431064**
 416 **VTD NW013 Subtotal**
 417 **VTD: NW021**
 418 **VTD: NW035**
 419 **Block: 291892151432001**
 420 **Block: 291892151432002**
 421 **Block: 291892151432003**
 422 **Block: 291892151432004**
 423 **Block: 291892151432005**
 424 **Block: 291892151432006**
 425 **Block: 291892151432007**
 426 **Block: 291892151432008**
 427 **Block: 291892151432009**
 428 **Block: 291892151432010**
 429 **Block: 291892151432014**
 430 **Block: 291892151432015**
 431 **Block: 291892151432016**
 432 **VTD NW035 Subtotal**
 433 **VTD: NW203**
 434 **VTD: NW220**
 435 **Block: 291892132031027**
 436 **VTD NW220 Subtotal**
 437 **County St. Louis MO Subtotal**
 438 **County: Warren MO**
 439 **District 3 Total**

128.474. The fourth congressional district shall be composed of the following:

2 **County: Barton MO**
 3 **County: Bates MO**
 4 **County: Benton MO**
 5 **County: Camden MO**
 6 **County: Cass MO**
 7 **County: Cedar MO**
 8 **County: Dade MO**
 9 **County: Dallas MO**
 10 **County: Henry MO**
 11 **County: Hickory MO**
 12 **County: Jackson MO**

HB 1

66

13 **VTD: 412**
14 **VTD: 413**
15 **VTD: 414**
16 **VTD: 415**
17 **VTD: 616**
18 **VTD: 617**
19 **VTD: 618**
20 **VTD: 619**
21 **VTD: KC 1001**
22 **VTD: KC 1002**
23 **VTD: KC 1003**
24 **VTD: KC 1004**
25 **Block: 290950100021002**
26 **Block: 290950100021008**
27 **Block: 290950100021014**
28 **VTD KC 1004 Subtotal**
29 **VTD: KC 1005**
30 **VTD: KC 1006**
31 **VTD: KC 1007**
32 **VTD: KC 1008**
33 **Block: 290950100022004**
34 **Block: 290950100022008**
35 **Block: 290950100022011**
36 **VTD KC 1008 Subtotal**
37 **VTD: KC 1009**
38 **Block: 290950100022002**
39 **Block: 290950100022003**
40 **Block: 290950100023000**
41 **Block: 290950100023001**
42 **Block: 290950100023002**
43 **Block: 290950100023003**
44 **Block: 290950100023004**
45 **Block: 290950100023005**
46 **Block: 290950100023006**
47 **VTD KC 1009 Subtotal**
48 **VTD: KC 101**
49 **VTD: KC 1010**

HB 1

67

50 **VTD: KC 1011**
51 **VTD: KC 1012**
52 **VTD: KC 102**
53 **VTD: KC 103**
54 **VTD: KC 104**
55 **VTD: KC 105**
56 **VTD: KC 106**
57 **VTD: KC 107**
58 **VTD: KC 1101**
59 **Block: 290950003001011**
60 **Block: 290950003001012**
61 **Block: 290950003001013**
62 **Block: 290950003001014**
63 **Block: 290950003001017**
64 **Block: 290950003001018**
65 **Block: 290950003001019**
66 **Block: 290950003001020**
67 **Block: 290950003001022**
68 **Block: 290950003001024**
69 **Block: 290950003001025**
70 **Block: 290950003001026**
71 **Block: 290950003003016**
72 **Block: 290950003003020**
73 **Block: 290950003003021**
74 **Block: 290950003003022**
75 **Block: 290950003003024**
76 **Block: 290950003003025**
77 **VTD KC 1101 Subtotal**
78 **VTD: KC 1108**
79 **Block: 290950018002001**
80 **Block: 290950018002002**
81 **Block: 290950018002003**
82 **Block: 290950018002004**
83 **Block: 290950018002005**
84 **Block: 290950018002006**
85 **Block: 290950018002007**
86 **Block: 290950018002008**

HB 1

68

87 **Block: 290950018002009**
88 **Block: 290950018002010**
89 **Block: 290950018002011**
90 **VTD KC 1108 Subtotal**
91 **VTD: KC 1112**
92 **VTD: KC 1916**
93 **VTD: KC 1919**
94 **Block: 290950102031001**
95 **Block: 290950102031002**
96 **Block: 290950102031003**
97 **Block: 290950102031004**
98 **Block: 290950102031006**
99 **Block: 290950102031007**
100 **Block: 290950102031008**
101 **Block: 290950102031009**
102 **Block: 290950102031010**
103 **Block: 290950102031011**
104 **Block: 290950102031012**
105 **Block: 290950102031013**
106 **Block: 290950102031014**
107 **Block: 290950102031015**
108 **Block: 290950102031016**
109 **Block: 290950102031017**
110 **Block: 290950102031018**
111 **Block: 290950102031019**
112 **Block: 290950102031020**
113 **Block: 290950102031021**
114 **Block: 290950102031024**
115 **Block: 290950102034010**
116 **Block: 290950102034011**
117 **Block: 290950130032033**
118 **Block: 290950130032037**
119 **Block: 290950131003014**
120 **Block: 290950131003015**
121 **VTD KC 1919 Subtotal**
122 **VTD: KC 2001**
123 **Block: 290950131002011**

HB 1

69

124	Block: 290950131002012
125	Block: 290950131002013
126	Block: 290950131002016
127	Block: 290950131002017
128	Block: 290950132082006
129	Block: 290950132082007
130	Block: 290950132082008
131	Block: 290950132082009
132	Block: 290950132082010
133	Block: 290950132082011
134	Block: 290950132082012
135	Block: 290950132082013
136	Block: 290950132082016
137	VTD KC 2001 Subtotal
138	VTD: KC 2002
139	VTD: KC 2003
140	VTD: KC 2004
141	Block: 290950102032000
142	Block: 290950102032001
143	Block: 290950102032002
144	Block: 290950102032003
145	Block: 290950102032004
146	Block: 290950102032005
147	Block: 290950102032006
148	Block: 290950102032007
149	Block: 290950102032008
150	Block: 290950102032009
151	Block: 290950102032010
152	Block: 290950102032011
153	Block: 290950102032012
154	Block: 290950102032013
155	Block: 290950102032014
156	Block: 290950102032015
157	Block: 290950102034000
158	VTD KC 2004 Subtotal
159	VTD: KC 2005
160	Block: 290950102032021

HB 1

70

161	Block: 290950102032022
162	Block: 290950102032023
163	Block: 290950102032024
164	Block: 290950102033001
165	Block: 290950102033002
166	Block: 290950102033003
167	Block: 290950102033004
168	Block: 290950102034001
169	Block: 290950102034002
170	Block: 290950102034004
171	Block: 290950102034006
172	Block: 290950102034007
173	Block: 290950102034008
174	Block: 290950102034009
175	VTD KC 2005 Subtotal
176	VTD: KC 2006
177	Block: 290950102033000
178	Block: 290950102034003
179	Block: 290950102034005
180	Block: 290950173001000
181	Block: 290950173001001
182	Block: 290950173001002
183	Block: 290950173001003
184	Block: 290950173001004
185	Block: 290950173001005
186	Block: 290950173001006
187	Block: 290950173001007
188	Block: 290950173001008
189	Block: 290950173001010
190	Block: 290950173001011
191	Block: 290950173001012
192	VTD KC 2006 Subtotal
193	VTD: KC 2007
194	VTD: KC 2008
195	VTD: KC 2009
196	VTD: KC 201
197	VTD: KC 2010

HB 1

71

198 **VTD: KC 202**
199 **VTD: KC 203**
200 **Block: 290950154012001**
201 **Block: 290950154012002**
202 **Block: 290950154012003**
203 **Block: 290950154012004**
204 **Block: 290950154012013**
205 **Block: 290950154012014**
206 **Block: 290950154012015**
207 **Block: 290950154012016**
208 **Block: 290950154012017**
209 **Block: 290950154012020**
210 **Block: 290950154012021**
211 **Block: 290950154012022**
212 **Block: 290950154012023**
213 **Block: 290950154012024**
214 **VTD KC 203 Subtotal**
215 **VTD: KC 208**
216 **VTD: KC 212**
217 **Block: 290950043001000**
218 **Block: 290950043001001**
219 **Block: 290950043001007**
220 **Block: 290950043001009**
221 **Block: 290950043001010**
222 **Block: 290950043001019**
223 **Block: 290950043001020**
224 **Block: 290950043001021**
225 **Block: 290950154012037**
226 **Block: 290950154012058**
227 **Block: 290950158001000**
228 **Block: 290950158001027**
229 **Block: 290950158001029**
230 **Block: 290950158001030**
231 **Block: 290950158001064**
232 **Block: 290950158002026**
233 **Block: 290950159002028**
234 **Block: 290950159002029**

HB 1

72

235 **Block: 290950161001032**
236 **Block: 290950161002033**
237 **Block: 290950161002034**
238 **Block: 290950161002068**
239 **VTD KC 212 Subtotal**
240 **VTD: KC 217**
241 **Block: 290950154011015**
242 **Block: 290950154011016**
243 **Block: 290950154011026**
244 **Block: 290950154011027**
245 **Block: 290950154011028**
246 **Block: 290950154011029**
247 **Block: 290950154012006**
248 **Block: 290950154012007**
249 **Block: 290950154012008**
250 **Block: 290950154012009**
251 **Block: 290950154012010**
252 **Block: 290950154012011**
253 **Block: 290950154012026**
254 **Block: 290950154012027**
255 **Block: 290950154012028**
256 **Block: 290950154012029**
257 **Block: 290950154012036**
258 **Block: 290950154012038**
259 **VTD KC 217 Subtotal**
260 **VTD: KC 218**
261 **Block: 290950154011002**
262 **Block: 290950154011003**
263 **Block: 290950154011004**
264 **Block: 290950154011005**
265 **Block: 290950154011006**
266 **Block: 290950154011008**
267 **Block: 290950154011013**
268 **Block: 290950154011014**
269 **Block: 290950154011017**
270 **Block: 290950154011018**
271 **Block: 290950154011019**

HB 1

73

272 **Block: 290950154011020**
273 **Block: 290950154011024**
274 **Block: 290950154011025**
275 **Block: 290950154012005**
276 **Block: 290950154012012**
277 **Block: 290950154012025**
278 **VTD KC 218 Subtotal**
279 **VTD: KC 2201**
280 **VTD: KC 2202**
281 **VTD: KC 2203**
282 **VTD: KC 2204**
283 **VTD: KC 2205**
284 **VTD: KC 2206**
285 **VTD: KC 2207**
286 **VTD: KC 2208**
287 **VTD: KC 2209**
288 **VTD: KC 2210**
289 **VTD: KC 2211**
290 **VTD: KC 2212**
291 **VTD: KC 2213**
292 **VTD: KC 2502**
293 **VTD: KC 2503**
294 **Block: 290950136124000**
295 **Block: 290950136124002**
296 **Block: 290959883001007**
297 **Block: 290959883001011**
298 **Block: 290959883001012**
299 **Block: 290959883001013**
300 **Block: 290959883001014**
301 **Block: 290959883001015**
302 **Block: 290959883001016**
303 **Block: 290959883001017**
304 **VTD KC 2503 Subtotal**
305 **VTD: KC 2508**
306 **Block: 290950132082014**
307 **VTD KC 2508 Subtotal**
308 **VTD: KC 2510**

HB 1

74

309 **VTD: KC 2511**
310 **VTD: KC 2512**
311 **VTD: KC 401**
312 **VTD: KC 402**
313 **VTD: KC 403**
314 **VTD: KC 404**
315 **VTD: KC 405**
316 **VTD: KC 406**
317 **VTD: KC 407**
318 **VTD: KC 408**
319 **VTD: KC 409**
320 **VTD: KC 410**
321 **VTD: KC 411**
322 **VTD: KC 501**
323 **VTD: KC 502**
324 **VTD: KC 503**
325 **VTD: KC 504**
326 **VTD: KC 505**
327 **VTD: KC 506**
328 **VTD: KC 507**
329 **VTD: KC 508**
330 **VTD: KC 509**
331 **VTD: KC 510**
332 **VTD: KC 511**
333 **VTD: KC 512**
334 **VTD: KC 513**
335 **VTD: KC 601**
336 **VTD: KC 602**
337 **VTD: KC 603**
338 **VTD: KC 604**
339 **VTD: KC 605**
340 **VTD: KC 606**
341 **VTD: KC 607**
342 **VTD: KC 608**
343 **VTD: KC 609**
344 **VTD: KC 610**
345 **VTD: KC 611**

HB 1

75

346 VTD: KC 612
347 VTD: KC 613
348 VTD: KC 614
349 VTD: KC 615
350 VTD: KC 801
351 VTD: KC 802
352 VTD: KC 803
353 VTD: KC 804
354 VTD: KC 805
355 VTD: KC 806
356 VTD: KC 807
357 VTD: KC 808
358 VTD: KC 809
359 Block: 290950086001004
360 Block: 290950086001005
361 Block: 290950086001006
362 Block: 290950086001007
363 Block: 290950086001008
364 Block: 290950086001009
365 Block: 290950086001011
366 Block: 290950086001013
367 Block: 290950086002006
368 Block: 290950086002007
369 Block: 290950086002008
370 Block: 290950086002009
371 Block: 290950086002010
372 Block: 290950086002011
373 Block: 290950086002012
374 Block: 290950086002013
375 Block: 290950086002014
376 Block: 290950086002015
377 Block: 290950086002016
378 Block: 290950086002017
379 Block: 290950086002018
380 Block: 290950086002019
381 Block: 290950086002020
382 Block: 290950086002021

HB 1

76

383 **Block: 290950086002022**
384 **Block: 290950086002023**
385 **Block: 290950086002024**
386 **Block: 290950086002025**
387 **Block: 290950086002026**
388 **Block: 290950086002027**
389 **Block: 290950086002028**
390 **VTD KC 809 Subtotal**
391 **VTD: KC 811**
392 **VTD: KC 812**
393 **VTD: KC 813**
394 **VTD: KC 814**
395 **VTD: KC 815**
396 **VTD: KC 901**
397 **VTD: KC 902**
398 **VTD: KC 903**
399 **VTD: KC 904**
400 **VTD: KC 906**
401 **VTD: KC 907**
402 **VTD: KC 908**
403 **VTD: KC 909**
404 **VTD: KC 910**
405 **VTD: KC 911**
406 **VTD: KC WD2 PCT211**
407 **Block: 290950018003000**
408 **Block: 290950018003001**
409 **Block: 290950018003002**
410 **Block: 290950018003003**
411 **Block: 290950018003004**
412 **Block: 290950018003005**
413 **Block: 290950018003006**
414 **Block: 290950018003007**
415 **Block: 290950018003008**
416 **Block: 290950018003009**
417 **Block: 290950018003010**
418 **Block: 290950018003011**
419 **Block: 290950018003012**

HB 1

77

420 **Block: 290950018003013**
421 **Block: 290950018003014**
422 **Block: 290950018003015**
423 **Block: 290950018003016**
424 **Block: 290950018003017**
425 **Block: 290950018003018**
426 **Block: 290950018003019**
427 **Block: 290950018004004**
428 **VTD KC WD2 PCT211 Subtotal**
429 **VTD: KC WD8 PCT810**
430 **VTD: Prairie 03**
431 **VTD: Prairie 04**
432 **VTD: Prairie 05**
433 **VTD: Prairie 06**
434 **VTD: Prairie 07**
435 **VTD: Prairie 08**
436 **VTD: Prairie 09**
437 **VTD: Prairie 11**
438 **VTD: Prairie 12**
439 **VTD: Prairie 13**
440 **VTD: Prairie 14**
441 **VTD: Prairie 15**
442 **VTD: Prairie 16**
443 **VTD: Prairie 17**
444 **VTD: Prairie 18**
445 **VTD: Prairie 19**
446 **VTD: Prairie 20**
447 **VTD: Prairie 21**
448 **VTD: Prairie 22**
449 **VTD: Prairie 23**
450 **VTD: Prairie 24**
451 **VTD: Prairie 26**
452 **VTD: Prairie 27**
453 **Block: 290950142031000**
454 **Block: 290950142031001**
455 **Block: 290950142031002**
456 **Block: 290950142031003**

HB 1

78

457 **Block: 290950142031015**
458 **Block: 290950142031016**
459 **Block: 290950142031017**
460 **Block: 290950142031019**
461 **Block: 290950142031020**
462 **Block: 290950142031021**
463 **Block: 290950142032000**
464 **Block: 290950142032001**
465 **Block: 290950142032002**
466 **Block: 290950142032003**
467 **Block: 290950142032004**
468 **Block: 290950142032005**
469 **Block: 290950142032006**
470 **Block: 290950142033000**
471 **Block: 290950142033001**
472 **Block: 290950142033002**
473 **Block: 290950142033003**
474 **Block: 290950142033004**
475 **Block: 290950142033005**
476 **Block: 290950142033006**
477 **Block: 290950142033007**
478 **Block: 290950185003005**
479 **Block: 290950185003007**
480 **VTD Prairie 27 Subtotal**
481 **VTD: Prairie 28**
482 **VTD: Prairie 29**
483 **Block: 290950142061000**
484 **Block: 290950185002000**
485 **Block: 290950185002001**
486 **Block: 290950185002002**
487 **Block: 290950185002006**
488 **Block: 290950185003006**
489 **Block: 290950185003008**
490 **Block: 290950185003009**
491 **Block: 290950185003010**
492 **Block: 290950185003011**
493 **Block: 290950185003012**

HB 1

79

494	Block: 290950185003013
495	Block: 290950185003014
496	Block: 290950185003015
497	Block: 290950185003016
498	Block: 290950185003017
499	Block: 290950185003018
500	Block: 290950193022015
501	Block: 290950193022016
502	Block: 290959891001001
503	Block: 290959891001002
504	Block: 290959891001003
505	Block: 290959891001011
506	VTD Prairie 29 Subtotal
507	VTD: Prairie 30
508	VTD: Prairie 31
509	VTD: Prairie 32
510	VTD: Prairie 33
511	VTD: Prairie 34
512	VTD: Prairie 35
513	VTD: Prairie 36
514	VTD: Prairie 37
515	VTD: Prairie 38
516	VTD: Prairie 39
517	VTD: Prairie 40
518	VTD: Prairie 41
519	VTD: Prairie 42
520	VTD: Prairie 43
521	VTD: Prairie 44
522	VTD: Prairie 45
523	VTD: Prairie 46
524	VTD: Prairie 47
525	VTD: Prairie 48
526	VTD: Prairie 49
527	VTD: Prairie 50
528	VTD: Prairie 51
529	VTD: Prairie 52
530	VTD: Prairie 56

HB 1

80

531	VTD: Prairie 59
532	VTD: Prairie 60
533	VTD: Prairie 62
534	VTD: Prarie 02
535	VTD: Prarie 10
536	VTD: Prarie 25
537	VTD: Prarie 53
538	VTD: Prarie 54
539	VTD: Prarie 55
540	VTD: Prarie 57
541	VTD: Prarie 58
542	VTD: Prarie 61
543	VTD: Prarie 63
544	VTD: Sni-A-Bar 02
545	Block: 290950193022001
546	Block: 290950193022003
547	Block: 290950193022004
548	Block: 290950193022005
549	VTD Sni-A-Bar 02 Subtotal
550	VTD: Sni-A-Bar 03
551	Block: 290950193022017
552	VTD Sni-A-Bar 03 Subtotal
553	VTD: Sni-A-Bar 07
554	Block: 290950148061000
555	Block: 290950148061001
556	Block: 290950149041002
557	Block: 290950149041003
558	Block: 290950149041005
559	Block: 290950149041006
560	Block: 290950149041007
561	Block: 290950149041008
562	Block: 290950149041009
563	Block: 290950149041013
564	Block: 290950149041014
565	Block: 290950149041015
566	Block: 290950149041017
567	Block: 290950149041018

HB 1

81

568	Block: 290950149041019
569	Block: 290950149041020
570	Block: 290950149041021
571	Block: 290950149041022
572	Block: 290950149041028
573	Block: 290950149041029
574	Block: 290950149041030
575	Block: 290950149041031
576	VTD Sni-A-Bar 07 Subtotal
577	VTD: Sni-A-Bar 08
578	Block: 290950148061015
579	Block: 290950148061016
580	Block: 290950148061017
581	Block: 290950148061018
582	Block: 290950148062000
583	Block: 290950148062001
584	Block: 290950148062002
585	Block: 290950148062003
586	Block: 290950148062004
587	Block: 290950148062005
588	Block: 290950148062006
589	Block: 290950148062007
590	Block: 290950148062008
591	Block: 290950148062009
592	Block: 290950148062010
593	Block: 290950148062011
594	Block: 290950148062012
595	Block: 290950148062013
596	Block: 290950148062014
597	Block: 290950148062015
598	Block: 290950148063000
599	Block: 290950148063001
600	Block: 290950148063002
601	Block: 290950148063003
602	Block: 290950148063004
603	Block: 290950148063005
604	Block: 290950148063006

HB 1

82

605 **Block: 290950148063007**
606 **Block: 290950148063008**
607 **Block: 290950148063009**
608 **Block: 290950148063010**
609 **Block: 290959892001002**
610 **Block: 290959892001003**
611 **Block: 290959892001004**
612 **Block: 290959892001005**
613 **VTD Sni-A-Bar 08 Subtotal**
614 **VTD: Sni-A-Bar 09**
615 **VTD: Sni-A-Bar 10**
616 **VTD: Sni-A-Bar 11**
617 **VTD: Sni-A-Bar 12**
618 **VTD: Sni-A-Bar 13**
619 **VTD: Sni-A-Bar 14**
620 **Block: 290950149051001**
621 **Block: 290950149051016**
622 **Block: 290950149051017**
623 **Block: 290950149051018**
624 **Block: 290950149051019**
625 **Block: 290950149051020**
626 **Block: 290950149051021**
627 **Block: 290950149051022**
628 **Block: 290950149051025**
629 **Block: 290950149052003**
630 **Block: 290950149052016**
631 **Block: 290950149052017**
632 **Block: 290950149052018**
633 **Block: 290950149052019**
634 **Block: 290950149052020**
635 **Block: 290950149052021**
636 **Block: 290950149052022**
637 **Block: 290950149052025**
638 **Block: 290950149052029**
639 **Block: 290950149052030**
640 **Block: 290950149052031**
641 **Block: 290950149052032**

HB 1

83

642 **Block: 290950149052033**
643 **VTD Sni-A-Bar 14 Subtotal**
644 **VTD: Sni-A-Bar 15**
645 **VTD: Sni-A-Bar 16**
646 **Block: 290950141221006**
647 **Block: 290950141221007**
648 **Block: 290950141281001**
649 **Block: 290950141281002**
650 **Block: 290950141281003**
651 **Block: 290950141281004**
652 **Block: 290950141281005**
653 **Block: 290950141281008**
654 **Block: 290950141281009**
655 **Block: 290950141281010**
656 **Block: 290950141281017**
657 **Block: 290950141281018**
658 **Block: 290950141281019**
659 **Block: 290950141281020**
660 **Block: 290950141281024**
661 **Block: 290950141281025**
662 **Block: 290950141283000**
663 **VTD Sni-A-Bar 16 Subtotal**
664 **VTD: Sni-A-Bar 17**
665 **VTD: Sni-A-Bar 18**
666 **VTD: Sni-A-Bar 19**
667 **VTD: Sni-A-Bar 20**
668 **VTD: Sni-A-Bar 21**
669 **VTD: Sni-A-Bar 22**
670 **VTD: Sni-A-Bar 23**
671 **VTD: Sni-A-Bar 24**
672 **VTD: Sni-A-Bar 25**
673 **VTD: Sni-A-Bar 26**
674 **VTD: Sni-A-Bar 27**
675 **VTD: Sni-A-Bar 28**
676 **VTD: Sni-A-Bar 29**
677 **VTD: Sni-A-Bar 30**
678 **VTD: Sni-A-Bar 31**

HB 1

84

679 **VTD: Sni-A-Bar 32**
680 **VTD: Sni-A-Bar 33**
681 **VTD: Sni-A-Bar 34**
682 **VTD: Sni-A-Bar 35**
683 **VTD: Sni-A-Bar 36**
684 **VTD: Sni-A-Bar 37**
685 **Block: 290950140021009**
686 **Block: 290950140021011**
687 **Block: 290950140021014**
688 **Block: 290950140021015**
689 **Block: 290950140021026**
690 **Block: 290950140021027**
691 **Block: 290950140021028**
692 **Block: 290950140021029**
693 **Block: 290950140021030**
694 **Block: 290950140021031**
695 **Block: 290950140021032**
696 **Block: 290950140021035**
697 **Block: 290950140021036**
698 **Block: 290950140022006**
699 **Block: 290950140022007**
700 **Block: 290950140022008**
701 **Block: 290950140022009**
702 **Block: 290950140022010**
703 **Block: 290950140022011**
704 **Block: 290950140022012**
705 **Block: 290950140022013**
706 **Block: 290950140022016**
707 **Block: 290950140022017**
708 **Block: 290950140022018**
709 **Block: 290950140022040**
710 **Block: 290950140022041**
711 **Block: 290950140051019**
712 **Block: 290950140063021**
713 **Block: 290950140063022**
714 **Block: 290950140063023**
715 **Block: 290950140063024**

HB 1

85

716	Block: 290950140063025
717	Block: 290950141112001
718	Block: 290950141112007
719	Block: 290950141112008
720	Block: 290950141121000
721	Block: 290950141121001
722	Block: 290950141121002
723	Block: 290950141121003
724	Block: 290950141121004
725	Block: 290950141121015
726	VTD Sni-A-Bar 37 Subtotal
727	VTD: Sni-A-Bar 41
728	Block: 290950141281000
729	VTD Sni-A-Bar 41 Subtotal
730	VTD: Sni-A-Bar 45
731	Block: 290950140021019
732	Block: 290950140021020
733	Block: 290950140021022
734	Block: 290950140021023
735	Block: 290950140021024
736	Block: 290950140021025
737	Block: 290950140021033
738	Block: 290950140021034
739	Block: 290950140022003
740	Block: 290950140022004
741	Block: 290950140022005
742	Block: 290950140022024
743	Block: 290950140051035
744	Block: 290950140051036
745	Block: 290950140051037
746	Block: 290950140051039
747	Block: 290950140051040
748	Block: 290950140051041
749	Block: 290950140051042
750	Block: 290950140054015
751	Block: 290950140054016
752	Block: 290950140054018

HB 1

86

753 **VTD Sni-A-Bar 45 Subtotal**
754 **VTD: Sni-A-Bar 83**
755 **VTD: Van Buren 01**
756 **VTD: Van Buren 02**
757 **VTD: Van Buren 03**
758 **VTD: Van Buren 04**
759 **VTD: Van Buren 06**
760 **VTD: Van Buren 07**
761 **VTD: Van Buren 08**
762 **VTD: Van Buren 09**
763 **VTD: Van Buren 10**
764 **VTD: Van Buren 11**
765 **VTD: Van Buren 12**
766 **VTD: Van Buren 13**
767 **VTD: Van Buren 14**
768 **VTD: Van Buren 15**
769 **VTD: Van Buren 16**
770 **VTD: Van Buren 17**
771 **VTD: Van Buren 18**
772 **VTD: Van Buren 19**
773 **VTD: Washington 01**
774 **VTD: Washington 02**
775 **VTD: Washington 03**
776 **VTD: Washington 04**
777 **VTD: Washington 05**
778 **VTD: Washington 06**
779 **VTD: Washington 07**
780 **VTD: Washington 08**
781 **VTD: Washington 09**
782 **VTD: Washington 10**
783 **VTD: Washington 11**
784 **VTD: Washington 12**
785 **County Jackson MO Subtotal**
786 **County: Laclede MO**
787 **County: Polk MO**
788 **County: Pulaski MO**
789 **County: St. Clair MO**

HB 1

87

790 **County: Vernon MO**
791 **County: Webster MO**
792 **VTD: East Ozark**
793 **VTD: Grant**
794 **Block: 292254701021041**
795 **Block: 292254701021042**
796 **Block: 292254701022000**
797 **Block: 292254701022001**
798 **Block: 292254701022002**
799 **Block: 292254701022003**
800 **Block: 292254701022004**
801 **Block: 292254701022005**
802 **Block: 292254701022006**
803 **Block: 292254701022007**
804 **Block: 292254701022008**
805 **Block: 292254701022009**
806 **Block: 292254701022010**
807 **Block: 292254701022011**
808 **Block: 292254701022012**
809 **Block: 292254701022013**
810 **Block: 292254701022014**
811 **Block: 292254701022015**
812 **Block: 292254701022019**
813 **Block: 292254701022020**
814 **Block: 292254701022021**
815 **Block: 292254701022022**
816 **Block: 292254701022023**
817 **Block: 292254701022024**
818 **Block: 292254701022025**
819 **Block: 292254701022026**
820 **Block: 292254701022027**
821 **Block: 292254701022028**
822 **Block: 292254701022029**
823 **Block: 292254701022030**
824 **Block: 292254701022031**
825 **Block: 292254701022032**
826 **Block: 292254701022033**

HB 1

88

827	Block: 292254701022034
828	Block: 292254701022035
829	Block: 292254701022036
830	Block: 292254701022037
831	Block: 292254701022038
832	Block: 292254701022039
833	Block: 292254701022040
834	Block: 292254701022041
835	Block: 292254701022042
836	Block: 292254701022043
837	Block: 292254701022044
838	Block: 292254701022045
839	Block: 292254701022046
840	Block: 292254701022047
841	Block: 292254701022048
842	Block: 292254701022049
843	Block: 292254701022050
844	Block: 292254701022051
845	Block: 292254701022052
846	Block: 292254701022053
847	Block: 292254701022054
848	Block: 292254701022055
849	Block: 292254701022056
850	Block: 292254701022057
851	Block: 292254701022058
852	Block: 292254701022059
853	Block: 292254701022061
854	Block: 292254701023081
855	Block: 292254701023082
856	Block: 292254701023085
857	Block: 292254701023086
858	VTD Grant Subtotal
859	VTD: High Prairie
860	VTD: Jackson
861	VTD: Marshfield East
862	VTD: Marshfield West
863	VTD: Niangua

HB 1

89

864 VTD: Northview A
865 VTD: Northview B
866 Block: 292254702022011
867 Block: 292254702022012
868 Block: 292254702022013
869 Block: 292254702022016
870 Block: 292254702022019
871 Block: 292254702022020
872 Block: 292254702022021
873 Block: 292254702022022
874 Block: 292254702022023
875 Block: 292254702022024
876 Block: 292254702022025
877 Block: 292254702022037
878 Block: 292254702022038
879 Block: 292254702022039
880 Block: 292254702022040
881 Block: 292254703022009
882 Block: 292254703022011
883 Block: 292254703023000
884 Block: 292254703023001
885 Block: 292254703023002
886 Block: 292254703023003
887 Block: 292254703023004
888 Block: 292254703023005
889 Block: 292254703023006
890 Block: 292254703023014
891 Block: 292254703023015
892 Block: 292254703023016
893 Block: 292254703023017
894 Block: 292254703023018
895 Block: 292254703023019
896 Block: 292254703023020
897 Block: 292254703023021
898 Block: 292254703023022
899 Block: 292254703023023
900 Block: 292254703023024

HB 1

90

901 **Block: 292254703023025**902 **Block: 292254703023026**903 **Block: 292254703023027**904 **Block: 292254703023034**905 **VTD Northview B Subtotal**906 **VTD: Union**907 **VTD: Washington**908 **County Webster MO Subtotal**909 **District 4 Total****128.475. The fifth congressional district shall be composed of the following:**2 **County: Boone MO**3 **VTD: 07**4 **VTD: 08**5 **VTD: 09**6 **VTD: 10**7 **VTD: 11**8 **VTD: 12**9 **VTD: 15**10 **VTD: 16**11 **VTD: 17**12 **Block: 290190015031004**13 **Block: 290190015031013**14 **Block: 290190015062000**15 **Block: 290190015062001**16 **Block: 290190015062002**17 **Block: 290190015062003**18 **Block: 290190015062004**19 **Block: 290190015062006**20 **Block: 290190015062007**21 **Block: 290190015062012**22 **Block: 290190015062018**23 **Block: 290190015062019**24 **Block: 290190015062021**25 **Block: 290190016031001**26 **Block: 290190016031005**27 **Block: 290190016031006**28 **Block: 290190016031007**

HB 1

91

29 **Block: 290190016031012**
30 **Block: 290190016031017**
31 **Block: 290190019031003**
32 **Block: 290190019031004**
33 **Block: 290190019031005**
34 **Block: 290190019031006**
35 **Block: 290190019031007**
36 **Block: 290190019031008**
37 **Block: 290190019031009**
38 **Block: 290190019031010**
39 **Block: 290190019031011**
40 **Block: 290190019031012**
41 **Block: 290190019031013**
42 **Block: 290190019031014**
43 **Block: 290190019031015**
44 **Block: 290190019031016**
45 **Block: 290190019031017**
46 **Block: 290190019031018**
47 **Block: 290190019031019**
48 **Block: 290190019031020**
49 **Block: 290190019031021**
50 **Block: 290190019031022**
51 **Block: 290190019031023**
52 **Block: 290190019031024**
53 **Block: 290190019032037**
54 **Block: 290190019032038**
55 **Block: 290190019032044**
56 **Block: 290190019032045**
57 **Block: 290190019032046**
58 **Block: 290190019032047**
59 **Block: 290190019032049**
60 **Block: 290190019033053**
61 **Block: 290190019033054**
62 **Block: 290190019033055**
63 **Block: 290190019033056**
64 **Block: 290190019033057**
65 **Block: 290190019033059**

HB 1

92

66 **Block: 290190019033060**
67 **VTD 17 Subtotal**
68 **VTD: 18**
69 **VTD: 19**
70 **VTD: 20**
71 **Block: 290190014013030**
72 **Block: 290190014013031**
73 **Block: 290190014013032**
74 **Block: 290190014013048**
75 **Block: 290190014013051**
76 **Block: 290190014024000**
77 **Block: 290190014024004**
78 **Block: 290190014024005**
79 **Block: 290190014024006**
80 **Block: 290190014024007**
81 **Block: 290190014024008**
82 **Block: 290190014024011**
83 **Block: 290190014024012**
84 **Block: 290190018031003**
85 **Block: 290190018031004**
86 **Block: 290190018031005**
87 **Block: 290190018031006**
88 **Block: 290190018031007**
89 **Block: 290190018031008**
90 **Block: 290190018031010**
91 **Block: 290190018031011**
92 **Block: 290190018031019**
93 **Block: 290190018031020**
94 **Block: 290190018031021**
95 **Block: 290190018031022**
96 **Block: 290190018031023**
97 **Block: 290190018031024**
98 **Block: 290190018031025**
99 **Block: 290190018031026**
100 **Block: 290190018031027**
101 **Block: 290190018031028**
102 **Block: 290190018032000**

HB 1

93

103	Block: 290190018032001
104	Block: 290190018032007
105	Block: 290190019012028
106	Block: 290190019012029
107	Block: 290190019012030
108	Block: 290190019012031
109	Block: 290190019012032
110	Block: 290190019012037
111	Block: 290190019012038
112	Block: 290190019012046
113	Block: 290190019012047
114	Block: 290190019012049
115	Block: 290190019012051
116	Block: 290190019013050
117	VTD 20 Subtotal
118	VTD: 21
119	Block: 290190013003003
120	Block: 290190013003004
121	Block: 290190018061007
122	Block: 290190018071011
123	Block: 290190018071012
124	Block: 290190018071013
125	Block: 290190018071014
126	Block: 290190018071015
127	Block: 290190018071016
128	Block: 290190018071022
129	Block: 290190018071023
130	Block: 290190018071024
131	Block: 290190018071025
132	Block: 290190018071026
133	Block: 290190018071027
134	Block: 290190018071028
135	Block: 290190018072000
136	Block: 290190018072012
137	Block: 290190018072014
138	Block: 290190018072017
139	Block: 290190018072018

HB 1

94

140 **Block: 290190018072022**
141 **Block: 290190018072023**
142 **VTD 21 Subtotal**
143 **VTD: 22**
144 **Block: 290190014012004**
145 **Block: 290190014012005**
146 **Block: 290190014012006**
147 **Block: 290190014012007**
148 **Block: 290190014012008**
149 **Block: 290190014012009**
150 **Block: 290190014012010**
151 **Block: 290190014012011**
152 **Block: 290190014012012**
153 **Block: 290190014012013**
154 **Block: 290190014012015**
155 **Block: 290190014012016**
156 **Block: 290190014012019**
157 **Block: 290190014012020**
158 **Block: 290190014012021**
159 **Block: 290190014012027**
160 **Block: 290190014012028**
161 **Block: 290190014012031**
162 **Block: 290190014013000**
163 **Block: 290190014013001**
164 **Block: 290190014013002**
165 **Block: 290190014013003**
166 **Block: 290190014013004**
167 **Block: 290190014013005**
168 **Block: 290190014013006**
169 **Block: 290190014013012**
170 **Block: 290190014013017**
171 **Block: 290190014013025**
172 **Block: 290190014013026**
173 **Block: 290190014013027**
174 **Block: 290190014013028**
175 **Block: 290190014013029**
176 **Block: 290190014013033**

HB 1

95

177 **Block: 290190014013055**
178 **Block: 290190018031012**
179 **Block: 290190018031013**
180 **Block: 290190018031014**
181 **Block: 290190018031029**
182 **Block: 290190018031030**
183 **VTD 22 Subtotal**
184 **VTD: 2I**
185 **Block: 290190014013053**
186 **VTD 2I Subtotal**
187 **VTD: 2K**
188 **Block: 290190018072001**
189 **Block: 290190018072002**
190 **Block: 290190018072003**
191 **Block: 290190018072004**
192 **Block: 290190018072005**
193 **Block: 290190018072006**
194 **Block: 290190018072007**
195 **Block: 290190018072008**
196 **Block: 290190018072010**
197 **VTD 2K Subtotal**
198 **VTD: 37**
199 **Block: 290190017021039**
200 **Block: 290190017021040**
201 **Block: 290190018062032**
202 **Block: 290190018062034**
203 **Block: 290190018062039**
204 **Block: 290190018062040**
205 **Block: 290190018062041**
206 **Block: 290190018062042**
207 **Block: 290190018062043**
208 **Block: 290190018062045**
209 **VTD 37 Subtotal**
210 **VTD: 38**
211 **VTD: 39**
212 **VTD: 3A**
213 **Block: 290190015062030**

HB 1

96

214 **VTD 3A Subtotal**
215 **VTD: 3B**
216 **Block: 290190015062017**
217 **VTD 3B Subtotal**
218 **VTD: 40**
219 **Block: 290190015031005**
220 **Block: 290190015031006**
221 **Block: 290190015031007**
222 **Block: 290190015031008**
223 **Block: 290190015031009**
224 **Block: 290190015031021**
225 **Block: 290190015031022**
226 **Block: 290190015031026**
227 **Block: 290190015033000**
228 **Block: 290190015033001**
229 **Block: 290190015033002**
230 **Block: 290190015033003**
231 **Block: 290190015033004**
232 **Block: 290190015033005**
233 **Block: 290190015033009**
234 **Block: 290190015033010**
235 **Block: 290190015033011**
236 **Block: 290190015033013**
237 **Block: 290190015033015**
238 **Block: 290190015033017**
239 **Block: 290190015033018**
240 **Block: 290190015033019**
241 **Block: 290190015033020**
242 **Block: 290190015033021**
243 **Block: 290190015033023**
244 **Block: 290190015033024**
245 **Block: 290190015033031**
246 **Block: 290190015033053**
247 **Block: 290190015033054**
248 **Block: 290190015033055**
249 **Block: 290190019032050**
250 **Block: 290190019032051**

HB 1

97

251 **Block: 290190019032054**
252 **VTD 40 Subtotal**
253 **VTD: 45**
254 **Block: 290190015031023**
255 **Block: 290190015031024**
256 **Block: 290190015031025**
257 **Block: 290190015031027**
258 **Block: 290190015031028**
259 **Block: 290190015031029**
260 **Block: 290190015031030**
261 **Block: 290190015031031**
262 **Block: 290190015032015**
263 **Block: 290190015033027**
264 **Block: 290190015033029**
265 **Block: 290190015033032**
266 **Block: 290190015033049**
267 **Block: 290190015033050**
268 **Block: 290190015033051**
269 **Block: 290190015033056**
270 **Block: 290190015033057**
271 **Block: 290190015033058**
272 **Block: 290190015081000**
273 **Block: 290190015081001**
274 **VTD 45 Subtotal**
275 **VTD: 4B**
276 **Block: 290190018071000**
277 **Block: 290190018071001**
278 **Block: 290190018071002**
279 **Block: 290190018071003**
280 **Block: 290190018071004**
281 **Block: 290190018071005**
282 **Block: 290190018071006**
283 **Block: 290190018071007**
284 **Block: 290190018071008**
285 **Block: 290190018071009**
286 **Block: 290190018071010**
287 **Block: 290190018072009**

HB 1

98

288 **Block: 290190018072011**
289 **Block: 290190018072013**
290 **Block: 290190018072016**
291 **Block: 290190018072019**
292 **Block: 290190018072020**
293 **Block: 290190018072021**
294 **Block: 290190018072026**
295 **VTD 4B Subtotal**
296 **VTD: 4K**
297 **Block: 290190018072027**
298 **VTD 4K Subtotal**
299 **VTD: 4L**
300 **Block: 290190018072015**
301 **VTD 4L Subtotal**
302 **County Boone MO Subtotal**
303 **County: Cole MO**
304 **County: Cooper MO**
305 **County: Howard MO**
306 **County: Jackson MO**
307 **VTD: 1603**
308 **VTD: Blue 01-01**
309 **VTD: Blue 01-02**
310 **VTD: Blue 01-03**
311 **VTD: Blue 01-04**
312 **VTD: Blue 01-05**
313 **VTD: Blue 01-06**
314 **VTD: Blue 01-07**
315 **VTD: Blue 01-08**
316 **VTD: Blue 01-09**
317 **VTD: Blue 02-01**
318 **VTD: Blue 02-02**
319 **VTD: Blue 02-03**
320 **VTD: Blue 02-04**
321 **VTD: Blue 02-05**
322 **VTD: Blue 02-06**
323 **VTD: Blue 02-07**
324 **VTD: Blue 03-01**

HB 1

99

325 VTD: Blue 03-02
326 VTD: Blue 03-03
327 VTD: Blue 03-04
328 VTD: Blue 03-05
329 VTD: Blue 03-06
330 VTD: Blue 03-07
331 VTD: Blue 03-08
332 VTD: Blue 03-09
333 VTD: Blue 04-01
334 VTD: Blue 04-02
335 VTD: Blue 04-03
336 VTD: Blue 04-04
337 VTD: Blue 04-05
338 VTD: Blue 04-06
339 VTD: Blue 04-07
340 VTD: Blue 04-08
341 VTD: Blue 04-09
342 VTD: Blue 04-10
343 VTD: Blue 05-01
344 VTD: Blue 05-02
345 VTD: Blue 05-03
346 VTD: Blue 05-04
347 VTD: Blue 05-05
348 VTD: Blue 05-06
349 VTD: Blue 05-07
350 VTD: Blue 05-08
351 VTD: Blue 05-09
352 VTD: Blue 06-01
353 VTD: Blue 06-02
354 VTD: Blue 06-03
355 VTD: Blue 06-04
356 VTD: Blue 06-05
357 VTD: Blue 06-06
358 VTD: Blue 06-07
359 VTD: Blue 07-01
360 VTD: Blue 07-02
361 VTD: Blue 07-03

HB 1

100

362 VTD: Blue 07-04
363 VTD: Blue 07-05
364 VTD: Blue 07-06
365 VTD: Blue 07-07
366 VTD: Blue 07-08
367 VTD: Blue 07-09
368 VTD: Blue 08-01
369 VTD: Blue 08-02
370 VTD: Blue 08-03
371 VTD: Blue 08-04
372 VTD: Blue 08-05
373 VTD: Blue 08-06
374 VTD: Blue 08-07
375 VTD: Blue 08-08
376 VTD: Brooking No. 1
377 VTD: Brooking No. 10
378 VTD: Brooking No. 11
379 VTD: Brooking No. 12
380 VTD: Brooking No. 13
381 VTD: Brooking No. 14
382 VTD: Brooking No. 15
383 VTD: Brooking No. 16
384 VTD: Brooking No. 17
385 VTD: Brooking No. 18
386 VTD: Brooking No. 19
387 VTD: Brooking No. 2
388 VTD: Brooking No. 20
389 VTD: Brooking No. 3
390 VTD: Brooking No. 4
391 VTD: Brooking No. 5
392 VTD: Brooking No. 6
393 VTD: Brooking No. 7
394 VTD: Brooking No. 8
395 VTD: Brooking No. 9
396 VTD: Fort Osage 01
397 VTD: Fort Osage 02
398 VTD: Fort Osage 03

HB 1

101

399 **VTD: Fort Osage 04**
400 **VTD: Fort Osage 05**
401 **VTD: Fort Osage 06**
402 **VTD: Fort Osage 07**
403 **VTD: Fort Osage 08**
404 **VTD: Fort Osage 09**
405 **VTD: Fort Osage 10**
406 **VTD: KC 1004**
407 **Block: 290950100021000**
408 **Block: 290950100021001**
409 **Block: 290950100021009**
410 **Block: 290950100021010**
411 **Block: 290950100021011**
412 **VTD KC 1004 Subtotal**
413 **VTD: KC 1008**
414 **Block: 290950100022005**
415 **Block: 290950100022006**
416 **Block: 290950100022007**
417 **Block: 290950100022009**
418 **Block: 290950100022010**
419 **VTD KC 1008 Subtotal**
420 **VTD: KC 1009**
421 **Block: 290950100022000**
422 **Block: 290950100022001**
423 **VTD KC 1009 Subtotal**
424 **VTD: KC 1108**
425 **Block: 290950018002000**
426 **VTD KC 1108 Subtotal**
427 **VTD: KC 1201**
428 **Block: 290950007003001**
429 **Block: 290950007003002**
430 **Block: 290950007003003**
431 **Block: 290950007003004**
432 **Block: 290950007003007**
433 **Block: 290950007003008**
434 **Block: 290950008002000**
435 **Block: 290950008002001**

HB 1

102

436	VTD KC 1201 Subtotal
437	VTD: KC 1205
438	VTD: KC 1206
439	VTD: KC 1207
440	VTD: KC 1208
441	VTD: KC 1209
442	VTD: KC 1210
443	VTD: KC 1211
444	VTD: KC 1212
445	VTD: KC 1301
446	VTD: KC 1303
447	VTD: KC 1304
448	VTD: KC 1305
449	VTD: KC 1306
450	VTD: KC 1307
451	VTD: KC 1308
452	VTD: KC 1309
453	VTD: KC 1310
454	VTD: KC 1311
455	VTD: KC 1313
456	VTD: KC 1401
457	VTD: KC 1402
458	VTD: KC 1403
459	VTD: KC 1404
460	VTD: KC 1405
461	VTD: KC 1406
462	VTD: KC 1407
463	VTD: KC 1408
464	VTD: KC 1409
465	VTD: KC 1410
466	VTD: KC 1411
467	VTD: KC 1412
468	VTD: KC 1413
469	VTD: KC 1414
470	VTD: KC 1415
471	VTD: KC 1501
472	VTD: KC 1502

HB 1

103

473 VTD: KC 1503
474 VTD: KC 1504
475 VTD: KC 1505
476 VTD: KC 1506
477 VTD: KC 1507
478 VTD: KC 1508
479 VTD: KC 1509
480 VTD: KC 1510
481 VTD: KC 1511
482 VTD: KC 1512
483 VTD: KC 1513
484 VTD: KC 1514
485 VTD: KC 1515
486 VTD: KC 1516
487 VTD: KC 1517
488 VTD: KC 1518
489 VTD: KC 1519
490 VTD: KC 1520
491 VTD: KC 1521
492 VTD: KC 1522
493 VTD: KC 1523
494 VTD: KC 1524
495 VTD: KC 1601
496 VTD: KC 1602
497 VTD: KC 1604
498 VTD: KC 1605
499 VTD: KC 1606
500 VTD: KC 1607
501 VTD: KC 1608
502 VTD: KC 1609
503 VTD: KC 1610
504 VTD: KC 1611
505 VTD: KC 1612
506 VTD: KC 1613
507 VTD: KC 1614
508 VTD: KC 1615
509 VTD: KC 1701

HB 1

104

510	VTD: KC 1702
511	VTD: KC 1703
512	VTD: KC 1704
513	VTD: KC 1705
514	VTD: KC 1706
515	VTD: KC 1707
516	VTD: KC 1708
517	VTD: KC 1709
518	VTD: KC 1710
519	VTD: KC 1711
520	VTD: KC 1712
521	VTD: KC 1713
522	VTD: KC 1714
523	VTD: KC 1801
524	VTD: KC 1802
525	VTD: KC 1803
526	VTD: KC 1804
527	VTD: KC 1805
528	VTD: KC 1806
529	VTD: KC 1807
530	VTD: KC 1808
531	VTD: KC 1809
532	VTD: KC 1810
533	VTD: KC 1811
534	VTD: KC 1812
535	VTD: KC 1813
536	VTD: KC 1814
537	VTD: KC 1815
538	VTD: KC 1816
539	VTD: KC 1901
540	VTD: KC 1902
541	VTD: KC 1903
542	VTD: KC 1904
543	VTD: KC 1905
544	VTD: KC 1906
545	VTD: KC 1907
546	VTD: KC 1908

HB 1

105

547 **VTD: KC 1909**
548 **VTD: KC 1910**
549 **VTD: KC 1911**
550 **VTD: KC 1912**
551 **VTD: KC 1913**
552 **VTD: KC 1914**
553 **VTD: KC 1915**
554 **VTD: KC 1917**
555 **VTD: KC 1918**
556 **VTD: KC 1919**
557 **Block: 290950102011013**
558 **Block: 290950130032034**
559 **VTD KC 1919 Subtotal**
560 **VTD: KC 1920**
561 **VTD: KC 1921**
562 **VTD: KC 1922**
563 **VTD: KC 1923**
564 **VTD: KC 2001**
565 **Block: 290950132082004**
566 **Block: 290950132082005**
567 **VTD KC 2001 Subtotal**
568 **VTD: KC 2004**
569 **Block: 290950102011012**
570 **VTD KC 2004 Subtotal**
571 **VTD: KC 2005**
572 **Block: 290950102011011**
573 **VTD KC 2005 Subtotal**
574 **VTD: KC 2006**
575 **Block: 290950101031016**
576 **Block: 290950101032004**
577 **Block: 290950101032005**
578 **Block: 290950101033007**
579 **VTD KC 2006 Subtotal**
580 **VTD: KC 203**
581 **Block: 290950154012030**
582 **Block: 290950154012031**
583 **Block: 290950154012032**

HB 1

106

584	Block: 290950154012033
585	Block: 290950154012034
586	Block: 290950154012039
587	Block: 290950154012040
588	Block: 290950154012041
589	Block: 290950154012042
590	Block: 290950154012046
591	Block: 290950154012047
592	Block: 290950154012054
593	Block: 290950154012055
594	Block: 290950154012056
595	Block: 290950154012057
596	Block: 290950154013011
597	Block: 290950154013012
598	Block: 290950154013013
599	Block: 290950154013014
600	Block: 290950154013015
601	Block: 290950161002000
602	Block: 290950161002001
603	Block: 290950161002002
604	Block: 290950161002003
605	Block: 290950161002004
606	Block: 290950161002005
607	Block: 290950161002006
608	Block: 290950161002007
609	Block: 290950161002008
610	Block: 290950161002009
611	Block: 290950161002010
612	Block: 290950161002011
613	Block: 290950161002012
614	Block: 290950161002013
615	Block: 290950161002014
616	Block: 290950161002015
617	Block: 290950161002016
618	Block: 290950161002017
619	VTD KC 203 Subtotal
620	VTD: KC 204

HB 1

107

621 **VTD: KC 207**
622 **VTD: KC 209**
623 **VTD: KC 210**
624 **VTD: KC 212**
625 **Block: 290950154012059**
626 **Block: 290950161001012**
627 **Block: 290950161001013**
628 **Block: 290950161001014**
629 **Block: 290950161001015**
630 **Block: 290950161001028**
631 **Block: 290950161001029**
632 **Block: 290950161002032**
633 **Block: 290950161002035**
634 **Block: 290950161002038**
635 **Block: 290950161002039**
636 **VTD KC 212 Subtotal**
637 **VTD: KC 213**
638 **VTD: KC 214**
639 **VTD: KC 215**
640 **VTD: KC 217**
641 **Block: 290950154012035**
642 **Block: 290950154012044**
643 **Block: 290950154012045**
644 **Block: 290950154012049**
645 **Block: 290950154012050**
646 **VTD KC 217 Subtotal**
647 **VTD: KC 218**
648 **Block: 290950154012043**
649 **Block: 290950154012048**
650 **Block: 290950154012051**
651 **Block: 290950154012052**
652 **Block: 290950154012053**
653 **Block: 290950161002031**
654 **Block: 290950161002036**
655 **Block: 290950161002037**
656 **Block: 290950161002041**
657 **VTD KC 218 Subtotal**

HB 1

108

658 VTD: KC 2301
659 VTD: KC 2302
660 VTD: KC 2303
661 VTD: KC 2304
662 VTD: KC 2305
663 VTD: KC 2306
664 VTD: KC 2307
665 VTD: KC 2308
666 VTD: KC 2309
667 VTD: KC 2310
668 VTD: KC 2311
669 VTD: KC 2312
670 VTD: KC 2313
671 VTD: KC 2314
672 VTD: KC 2315
673 VTD: KC 2316
674 VTD: KC 2401
675 VTD: KC 2402
676 VTD: KC 2403
677 VTD: KC 2404
678 VTD: KC 2405
679 VTD: KC 2406
680 VTD: KC 2407
681 VTD: KC 2408
682 VTD: KC 2409
683 VTD: KC 2410
684 VTD: KC 2411
685 VTD: KC 2412
686 VTD: KC 2413
687 VTD: KC 2414
688 VTD: KC 2415
689 VTD: KC 2416
690 VTD: KC 2417
691 VTD: KC 2418
692 VTD: KC 2419
693 VTD: KC 2420
694 VTD: KC 2421

HB 1

109

695 **VTD: KC 2422**
696 **VTD: KC 2423**
697 **VTD: KC 2424**
698 **VTD: KC 2425**
699 **VTD: KC 2426**
700 **VTD: KC 2427**
701 **VTD: KC 2428**
702 **VTD: KC 2429**
703 **VTD: KC 2430**
704 **VTD: KC 2431**
705 **VTD: KC 2501**
706 **VTD: KC 2503**
707 **Block: 290950129064013**
708 **Block: 290950129064014**
709 **Block: 290950132081009**
710 **Block: 290950132101000**
711 **Block: 290950132101001**
712 **Block: 290950132101004**
713 **Block: 290950132101005**
714 **Block: 290950132101008**
715 **Block: 290950132101009**
716 **Block: 290950132101010**
717 **Block: 290950144001046**
718 **Block: 290950144001047**
719 **Block: 290950144001048**
720 **Block: 290950144001049**
721 **Block: 290950144001050**
722 **Block: 290950144001051**
723 **Block: 290950144001054**
724 **Block: 290959883001000**
725 **Block: 290959883001001**
726 **Block: 290959883001002**
727 **Block: 290959883001003**
728 **Block: 290959883001005**
729 **Block: 290959883001006**
730 **Block: 290959883001008**
731 **Block: 290959883001009**

HB 1

110

732 **Block: 290959883001010**
733 **Block: 290959883001033**
734 **VTD KC 2503 Subtotal**
735 **VTD: KC 2504**
736 **VTD: KC 2505**
737 **VTD: KC 2506**
738 **VTD: KC 2507**
739 **VTD: KC 2508**
740 **Block: 290950131001010**
741 **Block: 290950132033004**
742 **Block: 290950132033005**
743 **Block: 290950132034003**
744 **Block: 290950132034004**
745 **Block: 290950132034005**
746 **Block: 290950132034006**
747 **Block: 290950132034007**
748 **Block: 290950132034008**
749 **Block: 290950132034009**
750 **Block: 290950132034010**
751 **Block: 290950132034011**
752 **Block: 290950132034012**
753 **Block: 290950132034013**
754 **Block: 290950132034014**
755 **Block: 290950132082000**
756 **Block: 290950132082001**
757 **Block: 290950132082002**
758 **Block: 290950132082003**
759 **Block: 290950132082015**
760 **Block: 290950132082017**
761 **VTD KC 2508 Subtotal**
762 **VTD: KC 2509**
763 **VTD: KC 2513**
764 **VTD: KC 2514**
765 **VTD: KC 2601**
766 **VTD: KC 2602**
767 **VTD: KC 2603**
768 **VTD: KC 2604**

HB 1

111

769 **VTD: KC 2605**
770 **VTD: KC 2606**
771 **VTD: KC 2607**
772 **VTD: KC 2608**
773 **VTD: KC 2609**
774 **VTD: KC 2610**
775 **VTD: KC 2611**
776 **VTD: KC 2612**
777 **VTD: KC 2613**
778 **VTD: KC 301**
779 **VTD: KC 302**
780 **VTD: KC 303**
781 **VTD: KC 304**
782 **VTD: KC 305**
783 **VTD: KC 306**
784 **VTD: KC 307**
785 **VTD: KC 308**
786 **VTD: KC 309**
787 **VTD: KC 310**
788 **VTD: KC 311**
789 **VTD: KC 312**
790 **VTD: KC 313**
791 **VTD: KC 314**
792 **VTD: KC 315**
793 **VTD: KC 316**
794 **VTD: KC 317**
795 **VTD: KC 318**
796 **VTD: KC 701**
797 **VTD: KC 702**
798 **VTD: KC 703**
799 **VTD: KC 704**
800 **VTD: KC 705**
801 **VTD: KC 706**
802 **VTD: KC 707**
803 **VTD: KC 708**
804 **VTD: KC 709**
805 **VTD: KC 710**

HB 1

112

806 VTD: KC 711
807 VTD: KC 712
808 VTD: KC 713
809 VTD: KC 714
810 VTD: KC 715
811 VTD: KC 716
812 VTD: KC 717
813 VTD: KC 718
814 VTD: KC 809
815 Block: 290950086001010
816 Block: 290950086001012
817 VTD KC 809 Subtotal
818 VTD: KC 811
819 VTD: KC 905
820 VTD: KC 913
821 VTD: KC WD13 PCT1302
822 VTD: KC WD2 PCT205
823 VTD: KC WD2 PCT206
824 VTD: KC WD2 PCT211
825 Block: 290950018004000
826 Block: 290950018004001
827 Block: 290950018004002
828 Block: 290950018004003
829 Block: 290950018004005
830 Block: 290950018004006
831 Block: 290950018004007
832 Block: 290950018004008
833 Block: 290950018004009
834 Block: 290950018004010
835 Block: 290950018004011
836 Block: 290950018004012
837 Block: 290950018004013
838 Block: 290950018004014
839 Block: 290950018004015
840 Block: 290950160001000
841 Block: 290950160001001
842 Block: 290950160001002

HB 1

113

843	Block: 290950160001003
844	Block: 290950160001004
845	Block: 290950160001005
846	Block: 290950160001006
847	Block: 290950160001007
848	Block: 290950160001008
849	Block: 290950160001009
850	Block: 290950160001010
851	Block: 290950160001011
852	Block: 290950160001012
853	Block: 290950160001013
854	Block: 290950160001014
855	Block: 290950160001015
856	Block: 290950160001016
857	Block: 290950160001017
858	Block: 290950160001018
859	Block: 290950160001019
860	Block: 290950160001020
861	Block: 290950160001021
862	Block: 290950160001022
863	Block: 290950160001023
864	Block: 290950160001024
865	Block: 290950160001025
866	Block: 290950160001028
867	Block: 290950160001029
868	Block: 290950160001030
869	Block: 290950160001032
870	Block: 290950160001033
871	Block: 290950160001034
872	Block: 290950160001035
873	Block: 290950160001036
874	Block: 290950160001037
875	Block: 290950160001038
876	Block: 290950160001039
877	Block: 290950160001051
878	Block: 290950160001052
879	VTD KC WD2 PCT211 Subtotal

HB 1

114

880 **VTD: KC1314**
 881 **VTD: Prairie 27**
 882 **Block: 290950185003004**
 883 **VTD Prairie 27 Subtotal**
 884 **VTD: Prairie 29**
 885 **Block: 290950185003000**
 886 **Block: 290950185003001**
 887 **Block: 290950185003002**
 888 **Block: 290950185003003**
 889 **Block: 290950193022014**
 890 **VTD Prairie 29 Subtotal**
 891 **VTD: Prarie 01**
 892 **VTD: Sni-A-Bar 01**
 893 **VTD: Sni-A-Bar 02**
 894 **Block: 290950145031003**
 895 **Block: 290950145031004**
 896 **Block: 290950145031013**
 897 **Block: 290950145031014**
 898 **Block: 290950193012014**
 899 **Block: 290950193022000**
 900 **Block: 290950193022009**
 901 **Block: 290950193022010**
 902 **Block: 290950193022011**
 903 **Block: 290950193022019**
 904 **VTD Sni-A-Bar 02 Subtotal**
 905 **VTD: Sni-A-Bar 03**
 906 **Block: 290950193022006**
 907 **Block: 290950193022007**
 908 **Block: 290950193022008**
 909 **VTD Sni-A-Bar 03 Subtotal**
 910 **VTD: Sni-A-Bar 04**
 911 **VTD: Sni-A-Bar 05**
 912 **VTD: Sni-A-Bar 06**
 913 **VTD: Sni-A-Bar 07**
 914 **Block: 290950148041042**
 915 **Block: 290950148041043**
 916 **Block: 290950148041044**

HB 1

115

917 **Block: 290950149033024**
918 **Block: 290950149033025**
919 **Block: 290950149033026**
920 **Block: 290950149033027**
921 **Block: 290950149033028**
922 **Block: 290950149041000**
923 **Block: 290950149041001**
924 **Block: 290950149041004**
925 **Block: 290950149041010**
926 **Block: 290950149041011**
927 **Block: 290950149041012**
928 **Block: 290950149052005**
929 **Block: 290950149052006**
930 **Block: 290950149054000**
931 **Block: 290950149054001**
932 **Block: 290950149054011**
933 **VTD Sni-A-Bar 07 Subtotal**
934 **VTD: Sni-A-Bar 08**
935 **Block: 290950148042027**
936 **Block: 290950148042028**
937 **Block: 290959892001006**
938 **VTD Sni-A-Bar 08 Subtotal**
939 **VTD: Sni-A-Bar 14**
940 **Block: 290950140091012**
941 **Block: 290950149051000**
942 **Block: 290950149052014**
943 **Block: 290950149052015**
944 **Block: 290950149052026**
945 **VTD Sni-A-Bar 14 Subtotal**
946 **VTD: Sni-A-Bar 16**
947 **Block: 290950140083002**
948 **Block: 290950141221004**
949 **Block: 290950141221005**
950 **Block: 290950141221010**
951 **Block: 290950141221021**
952 **Block: 290950141281026**
953 **Block: 290950141281027**

HB 1

116

954 **Block: 290950141281029**
955 **VTD Sni-A-Bar 16 Subtotal**
956 **VTD: Sni-A-Bar 37**
957 **Block: 290950140021004**
958 **Block: 290950140021005**
959 **Block: 290950140021008**
960 **Block: 290950140021010**
961 **Block: 290950140021012**
962 **Block: 290950140021013**
963 **Block: 290950140021016**
964 **Block: 290950140063005**
965 **Block: 290950140063007**
966 **Block: 290950140063013**
967 **Block: 290950140063019**
968 **Block: 290950140063020**
969 **VTD Sni-A-Bar 37 Subtotal**
970 **VTD: Sni-A-Bar 38**
971 **VTD: Sni-A-Bar 39**
972 **VTD: Sni-A-Bar 40**
973 **VTD: Sni-A-Bar 41**
974 **Block: 290950140081000**
975 **Block: 290950140081001**
976 **Block: 290950140081002**
977 **Block: 290950140081003**
978 **Block: 290950140081004**
979 **Block: 290950140081005**
980 **Block: 290950140081006**
981 **Block: 290950140081007**
982 **Block: 290950140081008**
983 **Block: 290950140081009**
984 **Block: 290950140081010**
985 **Block: 290950140081011**
986 **Block: 290950140081012**
987 **Block: 290950140081013**
988 **Block: 290950140081014**
989 **Block: 290950140081015**
990 **Block: 290950140081016**

HB 1

117

991	Block: 290950140081017
992	Block: 290950140081018
993	Block: 290950140081019
994	Block: 290950140082004
995	Block: 290950140082005
996	Block: 290950141281023
997	Block: 290950141281030
998	VTD Sni-A-Bar 41 Subtotal
999	VTD: Sni-A-Bar 42
1000	VTD: Sni-A-Bar 43
1001	VTD: Sni-A-Bar 44
1002	VTD: Sni-A-Bar 45
1003	Block: 290950140021021
1004	Block: 290950140051020
1005	Block: 290950140051021
1006	Block: 290950140051022
1007	Block: 290950140051023
1008	Block: 290950140051024
1009	Block: 290950140051025
1010	Block: 290950140051026
1011	Block: 290950140051029
1012	Block: 290950140051030
1013	Block: 290950140051031
1014	Block: 290950140051032
1015	Block: 290950140051033
1016	Block: 290950140051034
1017	Block: 290950140051038
1018	Block: 290950140051043
1019	Block: 290950140051044
1020	Block: 290950140054011
1021	Block: 290950140054012
1022	Block: 290950140054013
1023	Block: 290950140054014
1024	Block: 290950140054017
1025	VTD Sni-A-Bar 45 Subtotal
1026	VTD: Sni-A-Bar 46
1027	VTD: Sni-A-Bar 47

HB 1

118

1028 **VTD: Sni-A-Bar 48**
 1029 **VTD: Sni-A-Bar 49**
 1030 **VTD: Sni-A-Bar 50**
 1031 **VTD: Sni-A-Bar 51**
 1032 **VTD: Sni-A-Bar 52**
 1033 **County Jackson MO Subtotal**
 1034 **County: Johnson MO**
 1035 **County: Lafayette MO**
 1036 **County: Maries MO**
 1037 **County: Miller MO**
 1038 **County: Moniteau MO**
 1039 **County: Morgan MO**
 1040 **County: Osage MO**
 1041 **County: Pettis MO**
 1042 **County: Randolph MO**
 1043 **County: Saline MO**
 1044 **District 5 Total**

128.476. The sixth congressional district shall be composed of the following:

2 **County: Adair MO**
 3 **County: Andrew MO**
 4 **County: Atchison MO**
 5 **County: Buchanan MO**
 6 **County: Caldwell MO**
 7 **County: Carroll MO**
 8 **County: Chariton MO**
 9 **County: Clark MO**
 10 **County: Clay MO**
 11 **County: Clinton MO**
 12 **County: Daviess MO**
 13 **County: DeKalb MO**
 14 **County: Gentry MO**
 15 **County: Grundy MO**
 16 **County: Harrison MO**
 17 **County: Holt MO**
 18 **County: Jackson MO**
 19 **VTD: KC 1101**
 20 **Block: 290950003001001**

HB 1

119

21	Block: 290950003001002
22	Block: 290950003001003
23	Block: 290950003001004
24	Block: 290950003001005
25	Block: 290950003001006
26	Block: 290950003001007
27	Block: 290950003001008
28	Block: 290950003001009
29	Block: 290950003001010
30	Block: 290950003001021
31	Block: 290950003002001
32	Block: 290950003002002
33	Block: 290950003002006
34	Block: 290950003002007
35	Block: 290950003002008
36	Block: 290950003002009
37	Block: 290950003002010
38	Block: 290950003002011
39	Block: 290950003003000
40	Block: 290950003003001
41	Block: 290950003003002
42	Block: 290950003003003
43	Block: 290950003003004
44	Block: 290950003003005
45	Block: 290950003003006
46	Block: 290950003003007
47	Block: 290950003003008
48	Block: 290950003003009
49	Block: 290950003003012
50	Block: 290950003003013
51	Block: 290950003003014
52	Block: 290950003003017
53	Block: 290950003003018
54	Block: 290950003003019
55	Block: 290950003003023
56	Block: 290950003003027
57	VTD KC 1101 Subtotal

HB 1

120

58 **VTD: KC 1102**
 59 **VTD: KC 1103**
 60 **VTD: KC 1104**
 61 **VTD: KC 1105**
 62 **VTD: KC 1106**
 63 **VTD: KC 1107**
 64 **VTD: KC 1109**
 65 **VTD: KC 1110**
 66 **VTD: KC 1111**
 67 **VTD: KC 1113**
 68 **VTD: KC 1114**
 69 **VTD: KC 1201**
 70 **Block: 290950007002002**
 71 **Block: 290950007002003**
 72 **Block: 290950007002010**
 73 **Block: 290950007002011**
 74 **Block: 290950008001000**
 75 **Block: 290950008001001**
 76 **Block: 290950008001002**
 77 **Block: 290950008001003**
 78 **Block: 290950008001004**
 79 **Block: 290950008001006**
 80 **Block: 290950008001007**
 81 **Block: 290950008003000**
 82 **Block: 290950008003001**
 83 **Block: 290950008003002**
 84 **Block: 290950008003003**
 85 **Block: 290950008003004**
 86 **VTD KC 1201 Subtotal**
 87 **VTD: KC 1202**
 88 **VTD: KC 1203**
 89 **VTD: KC 1204**
 90 **VTD: KC 1312**
 91 **VTD: KC 216**
 92 **County Jackson MO Subtotal**
 93 **County: Knox MO**
 94 **County: Lewis MO**

HB 1

121

95 **County: Linn MO**
 96 **County: Livingston MO**
 97 **County: Macon MO**
 98 **County: Marion MO**
 99 **County: Mercer MO**
 100 **County: Nodaway MO**
 101 **County: Platte MO**
 102 **County: Putnam MO**
 103 **County: Ray MO**
 104 **County: Schuyler MO**
 105 **County: Scotland MO**
 106 **County: Shelby MO**
 107 **County: Sullivan MO**
 108 **County: Worth MO**
 109 **District 6 Total**

128.477. The seventh congressional district shall be composed of the following:

2 **County: Barry MO**
 3 **County: Christian MO**
 4 **County: Greene MO**
 5 **County: Jasper MO**
 6 **County: Lawrence MO**
 7 **County: McDonald MO**
 8 **County: Newton MO**
 9 **County: Stone MO**
 10 **County: Taney MO**
 11 **County: Webster MO**
 12 **VTD: Benton**
 13 **VTD: Diggins**
 14 **VTD: Finley**
 15 **VTD: Fordland**
 16 **VTD: Grant**
 17 **Block: 292254701022060**
 18 **Block: 292254701022062**
 19 **VTD Grant Subtotal**
 20 **VTD: Hazelwood**
 21 **VTD: Northview B**
 22 **Block: 292254703022008**

HB 1

122

23 **Block: 292254703022012**
24 **Block: 292254703022013**
25 **Block: 292254703022014**
26 **Block: 292254703022030**
27 **Block: 292254703022031**
28 **Block: 292254703022032**
29 **Block: 292254703022033**
30 **Block: 292254703022034**
31 **Block: 292254703022035**
32 **Block: 292254703023007**
33 **Block: 292254703023008**
34 **Block: 292254703023009**
35 **Block: 292254703023010**
36 **Block: 292254703023011**
37 **Block: 292254703023012**
38 **Block: 292254703023013**
39 **Block: 292254703023028**
40 **Block: 292254703023029**
41 **Block: 292254703023030**
42 **Block: 292254703023031**
43 **Block: 292254703023032**
44 **Block: 292254703023035**
45 **Block: 292254703023036**
46 **Block: 292254703023037**
47 **Block: 292254703023038**
48 **Block: 292254703023039**
49 **Block: 292254703023040**
50 **Block: 292254703023041**
51 **Block: 292254703023042**
52 **Block: 292254703023046**
53 **Block: 292254703023047**
54 **Block: 292254703023048**
55 **Block: 292254703023049**
56 **Block: 292254703023050**
57 **Block: 292254703023051**
58 **Block: 292254703023052**
59 **Block: 292254703023053**

HB 1

123

60 **Block: 292254703023054**61 **Block: 292254703023055**62 **Block: 292254703023062**63 **Block: 292254703023063**64 **Block: 292254703023069**65 **Block: 292254703023074**66 **Block: 292254703023079**67 **VTD Northview B Subtotal**68 **County Webster MO Subtotal**69 **District 7 Total****128.478. The eighth congressional district shall be composed of the following:**2 **County: Bollinger MO**3 **County: Butler MO**4 **County: Cape Girardeau MO**5 **County: Carter MO**6 **County: Dent MO**7 **County: Douglas MO**8 **County: Dunklin MO**9 **County: Howell MO**10 **County: Iron MO**11 **County: Jefferson MO**12 **VTD: Airport**13 **VTD: American Legion**14 **VTD: Antonia**15 **VTD: Arnold W-1**16 **VTD: Arnold W-2**17 **VTD: Arnold W-3**18 **VTD: Arnold W-4**19 **VTD: Athena**20 **VTD: Barnhart**21 **VTD: Brennan**22 **Block: 290997002101000**23 **Block: 290997002101015**24 **Block: 290997002111000**25 **Block: 290997002111001**26 **Block: 290997002111002**27 **Block: 290997002111005**

HB 1

124

28 **Block: 290997002111006**
29 **Block: 290997002111007**
30 **Block: 290997002111008**
31 **Block: 290997002111010**
32 **Block: 290997002111011**
33 **Block: 290997003031000**
34 **Block: 290997003031001**
35 **Block: 290997003031002**
36 **Block: 290997003031003**
37 **Block: 290997003031004**
38 **Block: 290997003031005**
39 **Block: 290997003031006**
40 **Block: 290997003031007**
41 **Block: 290997003031008**
42 **Block: 290997003031009**
43 **Block: 290997003031010**
44 **Block: 290997003031011**
45 **Block: 290997003031012**
46 **Block: 290997003031013**
47 **Block: 290997003031014**
48 **Block: 290997003031015**
49 **Block: 290997003031016**
50 **Block: 290997003032000**
51 **Block: 290997003032001**
52 **Block: 290997003032002**
53 **Block: 290997003032003**
54 **Block: 290997003032004**
55 **Block: 290997003032005**
56 **Block: 290997003032006**
57 **Block: 290997003032007**
58 **Block: 290997003032008**
59 **Block: 290997003032009**
60 **Block: 290997003032010**
61 **Block: 290997003032011**
62 **Block: 290997003032012**
63 **Block: 290997003032013**
64 **Block: 290997003032014**

HB 1

125

65	Block: 290997003032015
66	Block: 290997003033000
67	Block: 290997003033001
68	Block: 290997003033002
69	Block: 290997003033003
70	Block: 290997003033004
71	Block: 290997003033005
72	Block: 290997003033006
73	Block: 290997003033007
74	Block: 290997003033008
75	Block: 290997003033009
76	Block: 290997003033010
77	Block: 290997003033011
78	Block: 290997003033012
79	Block: 290997003033013
80	Block: 290997003033014
81	Block: 290997003033015
82	Block: 290997003033016
83	Block: 290997003033017
84	Block: 290997003033018
85	Block: 290997003033019
86	Block: 290997003051000
87	Block: 290997003052000
88	Block: 290997003052026
89	VTD Brennan Subtotal
90	VTD: Crystal City W-1
91	VTD: Crystal City W-2
92	VTD: Crystal City W-3
93	VTD: Crystal City W-4
94	VTD: Festus Outside
95	VTD: Festus W-1
96	VTD: Festus W-2
97	VTD: Festus W-3
98	VTD: Festus W-4
99	VTD: Flamm City
100	VTD: Hematite
101	VTD: Herculaneum

HB 1

126

102 **VTD: Herculaneum W-2**
 103 **VTD: Herculaneum W-3**
 104 **VTD: Imperial**
 105 **VTD: Imperial 2**
 106 **VTD: Jefferson Heights**
 107 **VTD: Jefferson R7**
 108 **VTD: Kimmswick W-1**
 109 **VTD: Lonedell**
 110 **VTD: Mapaville**
 111 **VTD: Marble Springs**
 112 **VTD: Mastodon**
 113 **VTD: Maxville**
 114 **VTD: Meramec Heights**
 115 **VTD: Miller**
 116 **VTD: Murphy**
 117 **VTD: North Jefferson**
 118 **Block: 290997002112008**
 119 **Block: 290997002112009**
 120 **Block: 290997002112010**
 121 **Block: 290997002112011**
 122 **Block: 290997002112012**
 123 **Block: 290997002112013**
 124 **Block: 290997002112014**
 125 **Block: 290997002112015**
 126 **Block: 290997002112016**
 127 **VTD North Jefferson Subtotal**
 128 **VTD: Oakvale**
 129 **VTD: Olympian Village**
 130 **VTD: Otto**
 131 **VTD: Pevely W-1**
 132 **VTD: Pevely W-2**
 133 **VTD: Pevely W-3**
 134 **VTD: Pevely W-4**
 135 **VTD: Plattin**
 136 **VTD: Riverview**
 137 **VTD: Rock Creek**
 138 **VTD: Rock Creek 1**

HB 1

127

139 **VTD: Romaine Creek**
 140 **VTD: Saline**
 141 **VTD: Springdale**
 142 **VTD: Sunrise**
 143 **VTD: Valle**
 144 **Block: 290997012006056**
 145 **Block: 290997013002004**
 146 **Block: 290997013002005**
 147 **Block: 290997013002006**
 148 **Block: 290997013003000**
 149 **Block: 290997013003001**
 150 **Block: 290997013003002**
 151 **Block: 290997013003012**
 152 **Block: 290997013003026**
 153 **Block: 290997014012007**
 154 **Block: 290997014012012**
 155 **VTD Valle Subtotal**
 156 **VTD: Victoria**
 157 **Block: 290997010021006**
 158 **Block: 290997010021008**
 159 **Block: 290997010021019**
 160 **Block: 290997010021021**
 161 **Block: 290997010023004**
 162 **Block: 290997010023005**
 163 **Block: 290997010023006**
 164 **Block: 290997010023012**
 165 **Block: 290997010023013**
 166 **Block: 290997010023029**
 167 **Block: 290997010023030**
 168 **Block: 290997010023035**
 169 **VTD Victoria Subtotal**
 170 **VTD: Windsor**
 171 **County Jefferson MO Subtotal**
 172 **County: Madison MO**
 173 **County: Mississippi MO**
 174 **County: New Madrid MO**
 175 **County: Oregon MO**

HB 1

128

176 **County: Ozark MO**
 177 **County: Pemiscot MO**
 178 **County: Perry MO**
 179 **County: Phelps MO**
 180 **County: Reynolds MO**
 181 **County: Ripley MO**
 182 **County: Scott MO**
 183 **County: Shannon MO**
 184 **County: St. Francois MO**
 185 **County: Ste. Genevieve MO**
 186 **County: Stoddard MO**
 187 **County: Texas MO**
 188 **County: Wayne MO**
 189 **County: Wright MO**
 190 **District 8 Total**

128.479. Upon the passage and enactment of sections 128.471 to 128.478, and as
 2 provided to the revisor of statutes, the revisor of statutes shall publish the graphical map
 3 representation of the official congressional district boundaries as an appendix of the
 4 Revised Statutes of Missouri.

✓

26AC-CC00440

Exhibit 5



DENNY HOSKINS, CPA
SECRETARY OF STATE
STATE OF MISSOURI

August 4, 2026

Richard von Glahn
9 Wilshire Terrace
Webster Groves, MO 63119

Re: Referendum Petition circulated by Richard von Glahn (2026-R004)

Dear Mr. von Glahn:

Please find enclosed the certificate of insufficiency of your referendum petition.

If we can be of further assistance, please feel free to contact our office at (573) 751-2301.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Chris J. Beller".

Director of Elections

Enclosures



STATE OF MISSOURI
Office of
Secretary of State

CERTIFICATE OF INSUFFICIENCY OF PETITION

STATE OF MISSOURI

ss.

SECRETARY OF STATE

I, Denny L. Hoskins, Secretary of State of Missouri, do hereby certify that my office has examined for compliance with the Missouri Constitution and Chapter 116, RSMo, Referendum Petition 2026-R004 submitted by Richard Von Glahn and People Not Politicians. I find the referendum petition is insufficient under the Missouri Constitution because the Missouri Constitution does not authorize a referendum on congressional redistricting plans passed by the General Assembly. The grounds for insufficiency are more fully articulated in the attached opinion by Missouri Attorney General Catherine Hanaway, which is incorporated by reference into this certificate. For the reasons more fully discussed in the attached opinion, Referendum Petition 2026-R004 shall not be placed on the ballot at the November 3, 2026 General Election.

IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I hereunto set my hand and affix the seal of my office in the City of Jefferson, State of Missouri, on this 4th day of August 2026.



Denny Hoskins

Secretary of State

Page 1



ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MISSOURI
CATHERINE L. HANAWAY

August 4, 2026

Honorable Denny Hoskins, CPA
Missouri Secretary of State
James C. Kirkpatrick State Information Center
600 West Main Street
Jefferson City, MO 65101

Dear Secretary Hoskins:

To assist in your determination about the sufficiency of People Not Politicians's ("PNP") referendum petition, you asked whether the Missouri Constitution permits referenda of congressional maps. You also asked whether the U.S. Constitution allows a referendum petition to void a congressional map until the referendum vote. The answer, to both questions, is "no."

Especially when read to avoid conflicts with the U.S. Constitution, the Missouri Constitution does not allow referenda against congressional redistricting plans. Also, allowing a small minority of Missouri voters to void a duly enacted congressional map—before a majority vote disapproving a map—would violate the U.S. Constitution. Federal law also requires Missouri to use the House Bill 1 ("HB 1") map during the November 2026 General Election.

I.

PNP's referendum petition challenging HB 1 is insufficient because the Missouri Constitution does not authorize referenda on congressional maps. In order to authorize such referenda, the Missouri Constitution would need to speak through a clear statement divesting the legislature of its authority under the U.S. Constitution's Election Clause. But the Missouri Constitution includes no such clear statement. *See* Mo. Const. art. III, §§ 49, 52(a), 52(b).

A.

The Elections Clause of the U.S. Constitution provides that "[t]he Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the *Legislature* thereof." U.S. Const. art. I, § 4 (emphasis

Page 2

added). Thus, U.S. Constitution seems to prohibit divesting the General Assembly of its federal redistricting authority. See *Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Indep. Redistricting Comm’n*, 576 U.S. 787, 824–27 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). If the Missouri Constitution permitted a referendum on congressional redistricting plans passed by the General Assembly, the Missouri Constitution would likely be preempted by the U.S. Constitution on that point.

However, I need not reach that question because the Missouri Constitution itself cannot be read to authorize a referendum on congressional redistricting plans passed by the General Assembly. The U.S. Constitution informs this analysis. Federal law makes clear that the Missouri Constitution cannot be interpreted to strip the General Assembly of its authority over redistricting absent a clear statement. See *United States v. Gradwell*, 243 U.S. 476, 485 (1917).

Courts have long looked for a clear statement before finding a state legislature’s redistricting authority abrogated under the Elections Clause. For example, if Congress wishes to displace state legislative authority, it must “do[] so by positive and clear statutes.” *Gradwell*, 243 U.S. at 485. If Congress—the body with textual authority to override state legislatures under the Elections Clause—must act with clear statements, then so too must other actors. The purpose of a clear statement rule is to ensure lawmakers made the intentional choice to depart from the default rules set by the U.S. Constitution. See *Gregory v. Ashcroft*, 501 U.S. 452, 460–61 (1991). If Missouri is going to make the radical choice to subject congressional redistricting plans to referenda, there must be evidence that Missourians *knowingly* made this choice. It is not enough to point to broad, vague language that might *accidentally* depart from the U.S. Constitution’s design.

The U.S. Constitution’s framers made a deliberate choice to vest redistricting power in state legislatures. The vagaries of broad language in state law cannot transfer that power in ways that the framers of state law did not intend.

B.

Although the Elections Clause requires a clear statement to divest the General Assembly of its redistricting authority, no such clear statement exists in the Missouri Constitution. “Article III, section 45 is the only provision of the Missouri Constitution directly addressing congressional redistricting.” *Luther v. Hoskins*, 730 S.W.3d 567, 571 (Mo. banc 2026). And Article III, Section 45 contemplates only that “the *general assembly* shall by law divide the state into [congressional] districts.” Mo. Const. art. III, § 45 (emphasis added). Article III, Section 45 makes no mention of redistricting by initiative or referendum. The Missouri Constitution also contains three referendum provisions, Mo. Const. art. III, §§ 49, 52(a), 52(b), and not one of these provisions mentions congressional redistricting.

Page 3

The lack of a clear statement is illustrated by the statutory procedures that the General Assembly enacted in Chapter 116, RSMo. As the Missouri Supreme Court has recognized, Chapter 116 is the General Assembly's "framework for exercising the right of referendum" in Missouri. *No Bans on Choice v. Ashcroft*, 638 S.W.3d 484, 487 (Mo. banc 2022). But Chapter 116 is not designed for referenda on congressional maps—which reinforces the lack of a clear statement in the Missouri Constitution. This is observed in at least three ways.

First, Chapter 116 limits a referendum's summary statement in a manner that makes it impossible to meaningfully apprise voters about the referendum's effect. "Electoral districting is a most difficult subject for legislatures," *Miller v. Johnson*, 515 U.S. 900, 915 (1995), and it involves "a number of sensitive considerations" that are extremely complex, *Pearson v. Koster*, 359 S.W.3d 35, 39 (Mo. banc 2012). Chapter 116, however, requires referendum summary statements to contain just 50 words, § 116.334, RSMo, and there is no provision for photographs to accompany summary statements, *id.* Thus, Chapter 116 is obviously not designed for referenda on congressional maps. Indeed, under Chapter 116, many voters would vote on competing congressional maps without even viewing the maps themselves. The fifty-word limit would also produce impossibly vague summary statements—as seen in the summary statement that the Western District Court of Appeals recently approved for PNP's referendum here:

Do the people of the state of Missouri approve the act of the General Assembly entitled "House Bill No. 1 (2025 Second Extraordinary Session)," which repeals Missouri's existing congressional plan, and replaces it with new congressional boundaries that keep more counties intact?

People Not Politicians v. Hoskins, 736 S.W.3d 518, 535 (Mo. App. W.D. 2026). No voter can make an adequately informed decision based on so little language.

Second, Chapter 116's timeline for the review of referendum petitions makes little sense in the context of a congressional map. Chapter 116 dictates that the Secretary must complete review of a referendum petition for sufficiency or insufficiency no later than "the thirteenth Tuesday prior to the general election." § 116.150.3, RSMo. But that deadline is on the same day as primary day for congressional candidates in Missouri. § 115.121.1–2, RSMo. If the General Assembly believed that referenda could apply to congressional maps, it would not set the deadline for certification under Chapter 116 on the same day as primary day.

Third, the suspension of legislation upon the filing of a referendum petition makes no sense in the context of congressional redistricting. The General Assembly must redistrict Missouri's congressional map at least every ten years. Mo. Const. art. III, § 45. The prior decade's map is discarded, and Article III, Section 45 requires the General Assembly to enact a new map in its place. *Luther*, 730 S.W.3d at 571. A

Page 4

referendum is especially ill-suited to this context. Indeed, if a referendum can freeze duly enacted law on a certification of sufficiency for the referendum, *see Maggard v. State*, 733 S.W.3d 411, 420 (Mo. banc 2026), then that means that Missouri elections might have *no* lawful congressional map. The prior decade's map would be unlawful, Mo. Const. art. III, § 45, and the new congressional map would be suspended through the filing of an adequate referendum petition, *Maggard*, 733 S.W.3d at 420. Neither the framers of the Missouri Constitution nor the drafters of Chapter 116 ever envisioned this result.

Moreover, if a referendum petition can suspend a congressional map for an election cycle, then Missouri's operative congressional map will *not* be decided according to democratic principles. Rather, each time a congressional map is enacted by the General Assembly, a small, well-funded group with signatures from a small fraction of Missouri's voters could suspend Missouri's congressional map for an entire election. In this age of out-of-state, dark-money donors, one could easily expect this to happen every time the General Assembly passes a congressional map. That is not self-government; it is tyranny of the minority. Neither the Missouri Constitution's framers nor the General Assembly anticipated this bizarre result. That all goes to the lack of a clear statement in Missouri law.

II.

Even without considering the U.S. Constitution's requirements, the Missouri Constitution does not subject congressional redistricting to the referendum. The Missouri Supreme Court has never addressed this question directly. Yet in *Maggard v. State*, the Supreme Court carefully noted that its decision should *not* be read to permit referenda of congressional maps. *See* 733 S.W.3d at 414 n.7.

The Missouri Supreme Court was right to reserve that question: Congressional maps are not subject to the referendum under Sections 49, 52(a), and 52(b) of Article III. If it were otherwise, fulfilling the General Assembly's duties under Article III, Section 45 would be impossible. "Article III, section 45 is the only provision of the Missouri Constitution directly addressing congressional redistricting." *Luther*, 730 S.W.3d at 571. Article III, section 45 provides that after "each census," "the *general assembly shall* by law divide the state into districts corresponding with the number of representatives to which it is entitled." Mo. Const. art. III, § 45 (emphasis added). Fulfilling this obligation would be impossible, however, if all redistricting legislation could be suspended by a mere referendum petition. *Maggard* held that if a referendum petition's "filing is ultimately determined to be sufficient," then the challenged legislation never went into effect under Article III, Section 52(b). 733 S.W.3d at 420. This would have disastrous consequences in the context of a congressional map. And it would be particularly problematic after each decennial census, when the Missouri Constitution nullifies the

Page 5

prior decade's congressional map and *requires* the General Assembly to enact a new map. *See* Mo. Const. art. III, § 45.

Thus, reading the Missouri Constitution's referendum provisions to apply to the congressional-redistricting provision necessarily creates a collision. *Compare* Mo. Const. art. III, § 45, *with* art. III, §§ 49, 52(a), 52(b). In these circumstances, a faithful interpreter of the law must prioritize the specific provision over the more general provision. *See City of Aurora v. Spectra Commc'ns Grp., LLC*, 592 S.W.3d 764, 788 (Mo. banc 2019); Scalia & Garner, *Reading Law* 184–85 (2012) (citing *McCallister v. McCallister*, 809 S.W.2d 423 (Mo. App. S.D. 1991)). Here, the more specific provision is Article III, Section 45.

Additionally, even setting aside the general/specific canon, congressional-redistricting legislation falls under exceptions to referenda outlined in Article III, Section 52(a). That section excepts “laws necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety, and laws making appropriations for the current expenses of the state government, for the maintenance of state institutions and for the support of public schools.” Mo. Const. art. III, § 52(a). Congressional redistricting falls under these exceptions. As an example, suffrage is a fundamental state institution, and congressional redistricting is necessary to maintain the suffrage right as populations shift over time. Furthermore, post-census redistricting is not only required by the Missouri Constitution, Mo. Const. art. III, § 45; it is also functionally required by virtue of the U.S. Constitution's “one person, one vote” rule, *Wesberry v. Sanders*, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); *Reynolds v. Sims*, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). Thus, redistricting legislation also falls under the exceptions outlined in Article III, § 52(a).

III.

Even if the Missouri Constitution authorizes referenda on congressional maps, the Elections Clause and the Guarantee Clause of the U.S. Constitution would nonetheless require Missouri to implement the HB 1 map for the 2026 election.

The U.S. Constitution's Elections Clause expressly vests redistricting authority in Missouri's General Assembly. U.S. Const. art. I, § 4. And the U.S. Supreme Court has *never* suggested that a small percentage of a state's population can usurp this authority. It is one thing to say that a *majority* of voters can overrule the General Assembly. *See Arizona Indep. Redistricting Comm'n*, 576 U.S. at 819–20. But allowing a small fraction of Missourians to override the General Assembly and force a vote under a different congressional map is profoundly at odds with the Elections Clause. “The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof,” U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, and a small band of citizens cannot rip that power away merely by filing a referendum petition.

Page 6

Holding otherwise would also violate the U.S. Constitution's Guarantee Clause, which provides that "[t]he United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government." U.S. Const. art. IV, § 4. The Guarantee Clause is also a mandate for state governments because "[t]he guaranty necessarily implies a duty on the part of the States themselves to provide such a government." *Minor v. Happersett*, 88 U.S. 162, 175 (1874).

There is no mystery about what is a "Republican Form of Government." See U.S. Const. art. IV, § 4. "All the States had governments when the Constitution was adopted. In all the people participated to some extent, through their representatives elected in the manner specially provided." *Minor*, 88 U.S. at 175. "Thus we have unmistakable evidence of what was republican in form, within the meaning of that term as employed in the Constitution." *Id.* at 176. The right of the people to enact legislation through elected representatives is bedrock in our Republic.

As to HB 1, Missourians have spoken overwhelmingly. HB1 passed 21 to 11 in the Senate and 90 to 65 in the House of Representatives. See Mo. S. Journal, 2d Extra. Sess., 103d Gen. Assembly, 25–26 (Sept. 12, 2025); Mo. H. Journal, 2d Extra. Sess., 103d Gen. Assembly, 37–38 (Sept. 9, 2025). Even if "five percent of the legal voters in each of two-thirds of the congressional districts" signed PNP's referendum petition, Mo. Const. art. III, § 52(a), the Guarantee Clause forbids the State of Missouri from allowing that fraction of five percent to override the People's representatives before a majority vote. Until a majority of Missourians vote against the HB 1 map, the will of the People must remain in effect.

IV.

Finally, throwing out the HB 1 map before the imminent 2026 General Election is impracticable and prohibited by federal law.

Today, Missouri completed its Primary Election for selecting congressional candidates. See § 115.121.2, RSMo. The General Election is now thirteen weeks (or 91 days) away. See § 115.121.1, RSMo. The 2026 General Election therefore must proceed under the same maps created for the Primary. As just one example, consider the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act ("UOCAVA"). See 52 U.S.C. §§ 20301, 20302; §§ 115.900–.936, RSMo (implementing UOCAVA into state election chapter). UOCAVA requires local election authorities to transmit ballots "not later than forty-five days before the election" to military and overseas voters, § 115.914, RSMo; 52 U.S.C. § 20302(a)(8), and prevents the certification of election results for three days after an election, see §§ 115.920.1, 115.508, RSMo. These requirements apply to both primary and general elections for congressional seats. § 115.904(1), RSMo. Thus, to satisfy UOCAVA in the event of a newly-ordered primary, there would need to be a minimum 93 days required to rerun the primary and then host a general election. This is greater than the 91 days between August 4

Page 7

and November 3, 2026. And that is assuming that local election officials could instantly transmit a new congressional map into the Missouri Centralized Voter Registration system; instantly print and test the requisite absentee ballots; and instantly transmit all the necessary absentee ballots to military and overseas voters. These tasks would be impossible.


Missouri also cannot discard the HB 1 map for the November General Election now that the HB 1 map was used for the August Primary Election. Doing so would violate Article I, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution, which provides: “The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year *by the People of the several States*, and the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 2 (emphasis added). If Missouri forced hundreds of thousands of Missourians to consider a slate of candidates that they never voted on in the primary, the State would deprive “the People” of the right to choose their representatives under Article I, Section 2. Rather, millions of Missourians would consider a slate of candidates in the General Election that they never considered in the Primary Election.

Thus, even if it is ultimately determined that a referendum on congressional redistricting is constitutionally permissible, the 2026 general election must go forward under the HB 1 map.

V.

PNP’s referendum petition is unconstitutional. Additionally, setting aside the petition’s unconstitutionality, the U.S. Constitution and federal law require Missouri election officials to enforce House Bill 1 during the November 2026 election. The filing of a referendum petition, signed by only five percent of the State’s voters, cannot displace the will of the people.

Very truly yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Catherine L. Hanaway".

CATHERINE L. HANAWAY
Missouri Attorney General

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COLE COUNTY, MISSOURI

RICHARD VON GLAHN,	)	
	)	
Plaintiff,	)	
	)	
v.	)	Case No. 26AC-CC00440
	)	
DENNY HOSKINS, in his official	)	
capacity,	)	
	)	
Defendant.	)	

**ORDER GRANTING AMENDED MOTION TO INTERVENE OF
REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE,
NATIONAL REPUBLICAN CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE,
AND MISSOURI REPUBLICAN STATE COMMITTEE**

This matter comes before the Court on the Amended Motion to Intervene filed by Republican National Committee, National Republican Congressional Committee, and Missouri Republican State Committee (collectively, “Intervenors”). The Court has reviewed the Motion and the accompanying Answer and heard oral argument on the same.

**I. INTERVENTION AS OF RIGHT IS ESTABLISHED UNDER
RULE 52.12(A)(2)**

A. Standard of review.

Intervention “generally should be allowed with considerable liberality.” *Johnson v. State*, 366 S.W.3d 11, 20 (Mo. banc 2012). Where an applicant satisfies all three elements of Rule 52.12(a)(2), “the right to intervene is absolute and the motion to intervene may not be denied.” *State ex rel. Nixon v. American Tobacco Co.*, 34 S.W.3d 122, 127 (Mo. banc 2000). The three required elements are: (1) an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action; (2) that the applicant’s ability to protect that interest is

impaired or impeded; and (3) that existing parties are inadequately representing the applicant's interest. *Id.* The Court finds that Intervenorors have established all three elements.

B. Intervenorors have a direct interest in this litigation.

An interest sufficient to support intervention “means a concern which is more than a mere curiosity, or academic or sentimental desire” and requires “a direct claim upon the subject matter such that the intervenor will either gain or lose by direct operation of judgment.” *In the Matter of Trapp*, 593 S.W.2d 193, 204 (Mo. banc 1980); *Allred v. Carnahan*, 372 S.W.3d 477, 484–85 (Mo. App. W.D. 2012). Each Intervenor has established such an interest here.

Intervenor Republican National Committee (“RNC”) is the national committee of the Republican Party as defined by 52 U.S.C. § 30101. It manages the Republican Party's business at the national level, including development and promotion of the Party's national platform and fundraising and election strategies; supports Republican candidates for public office across the country, including those seeking election to Congress from Missouri; and assists state parties throughout the country, including Intervenor Missouri Republican State Committee, to educate, mobilize, assist, and turn out voters.

RNC regularly encourages registered Republicans to vote in Missouri. RNC has made significant contributions and expenditures in support of Republican candidates for Congress and in mobilizing and educating voters in Missouri in the past many election cycles, is doing so in 2026, and will do so in future election cycles.

Intervenor National Republican Congressional Committee (NRCC) is the national congressional committee of the Republican Party as defined by 52 U.S.C. § 30101(14). NRCC's mission is to elect Republican candidates to

Congress from across the United States, including from Missouri's eight congressional districts. NRCC has an interest in ensuring Republican candidates win election to Congress from Missouri. NRCC works to accomplish this mission in Missouri by, among other things, providing direct and indirect financial support to candidates and other Republican Party organizations; providing technical and research assistance to Republican candidates and Party organizations; engaging in voter registration, voter education, and voter turnout programs; and other Republican party-building activities. NRCC has made significant contributions and expenditures in support of Republican candidates for Congress and in mobilizing and educating voters in Missouri in the past many election cycles, is doing so in 2026, and will do so in future election cycles.

Intervenor Missouri Republican State Committee ("State Committee") is the duly established state committee for the Missouri Republican Party under Section 115.603, RSMo. The State Committee has been selected and serves in the role of representing and acting for the Missouri Republican Party in the interim between party conventions under Section 115.605, RSMo. The Missouri Republican Party is composed of numerous organizations and committees that work toward the common goal of electing Republicans in all corners of our state. The Missouri Republican Party maintains "a congressional district committee for each congressional district in the state." Section 115.603, RSMo. The State Committee, on behalf of itself, its committees, its voters, and its candidates, has an interest in ensuring Republican candidates win elections to offices across the State, including to Congress. The State Committee has expended substantial resources to support the election of Republican candidates to Congress, and to educate and turnout Republican

voters, in the past several election cycles, is doing so again in the 2026 elections, and will do so in future election cycles.

Intervenors thus have an interest in ensuring that Missouri elections are conducted in a safe and secure manner and in accordance with law. Missouri will have a Republican on the 2026 midterm election ballots for each of Missouri's Congressional seats. Each Intervenor has a substantial interest in the implementation of House Bill 1 ("HB1") and the outcome of this litigation, as the congressional districts established by HB1 directly affect their respective ability to support and elect Republican candidates in Missouri to the United States House of Representatives. These interests are not abstract or ideological, but immediate and concrete. Accordingly, Intervenors have "a direct claim upon the subject matter such that the intervenor will either gain or lose by direct operation of judgment." *State ex rel. Nixon*, 34 S.W.3d at 128.

C. Intervenors' motion is timely.

Intervenors filed their Motion to Intervene on August 7, 2026 – three days after Plaintiff initiated this action, thus the Motion is timely. *See Robinson v. Mo. Dept. of Health & Senior Servs.*, 672 S.W.3d 224, 233 (Mo. banc 2023) (timeliness for a Motion to Intervene considers "how far the litigation has progressed when intervention is sought, the reason for the delay, and prejudice that other parties will suffer as a result of additional delay") (quoting *McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp.*, 550 F.2d 1115, 1120 (8th Cir. 1977)).¹

¹ No party has argued Intervenors' motion was untimely or will prejudice this process, except Plaintiff's concern raised at oral argument that Intervenors might invoke their right to a change of judge under Rule 51.05. Plaintiff offered no authority to support his position that a party's potential invocation of a Supreme Court Rule has any place in the Rule 52.12 intervention analysis.

The Court further notes that the Chief Justice has, by letter dated August 10, directed this

D. Intervenor’s ability to protect their interests will be impaired absent intervention.

In this litigation, Intervenor’s support and seek to uphold HB1 under which they, their candidates, and their voters exercise their right to vote and to participate in congressional elections in Missouri and expend time, money, and other resources seeking election of Republican candidates to Congress. Intervenor’s therefore have an obvious interest in opposing Plaintiff’s requested relief prohibiting implementation of HB1. See Petition 8. Intervenor’s also support the Secretary’s rejection of Plaintiff’s petition and would oppose Plaintiff’s proposed referendum seeking repeal of HB1 if it is placed on the ballot.

Intervenor’s interest in the subject matter of this litigation is direct, immediate, and concrete. The Secretary of State’s determination that the petition is insufficient – and this Court’s approval or rejection of that determination – directly governs the maps under which the November 2026 elections will be held, potentially altering the terms on which Intervenor’s must engage in statewide campaign operations. Given their inherent and intense interest in elections, usually “[n]o one disputes” that political parties “meet the impaired interest requirement for intervention as of right.” *Citizens United v. Gessler*, No. 14-cv-2266, 2014 WL 4549001, *2 (D. Col. 2014) (unpublished opinion). Both the Democratic and Republican Parties have successfully

Court to “ensur[e] a timely resolution of this matter.” Plaintiff argued at the hearing on this motion that this directive should lead the Court to exclude Intervenor’s as parties and instead include them as *amici curiae*. The Court finds that the expedited nature of this process and need for sufficient time for appellate review counsels in *favor* of granting intervention, not against it. The risk of proceeding without a party with a right to participate in this case could lead to reversal and retrial on that basis alone, which far exceeds any cost of proceeding with parties whom Plaintiff concedes at least merit inclusion as *amici*.

intervened in numerous election cases. See, e.g., *La Union del Pueblo Entero v. Abbott*, 29 F.4th 299, 306 (5th Cir. 2022); *Bost v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections*, 75 F.4th 682, 687 (7th Cir. 2023); *Mi Familia Vota v. Hobbs*, No. 2:21-cv-1423, 2021 WL 5217875 (D. Ariz. 2021) (unpublished opinion). Intervenorors have a “direct and substantial interest” in this case because the outcome will “affect” their “ability to participate in and maintain the integrity of the election process” in Missouri. *La Union del Pueblo*, 29 F.4th at 306. Further, voter confidence has “independent significance,” *Crawford*, 553 U.S. at 197, because it “is essential to the functioning of our participatory democracy,” *Purcell v. Gonzalez*, 549 U.S. 1, 4, 127 S. Ct. 5, 166 L.Ed.2d 1 (2006). Voter confidence has a direct effect on voter turnout, *see id.*, which is key to Intervenorors’ mission to elect Republican candidates. Intervenorors’ interests are not abstract or ideological, but immediate and concrete.²

If any court grants Plaintiff’s requested relief of an order enjoining implementation of HB1 for the 2026 election cycle or any future election cycle, Intervenorors would be required to deploy substantial financial and organizational resources to supporting and seeking election of Republican candidates, educating and turning out voters, and otherwise exercising their constitutional rights in congressional districts other than those the General Assembly enacted in HB1. If ordered, that relief also could affect the likelihood of whether Republican candidates are elected to Congress from Missouri.

Moreover, if the Court grants Plaintiff’s requested relief of an order requiring placement of Plaintiff’s proposed referendum on the ballot,

² Plaintiff claims that intervention is not permitted because Intervenorors’ interests are not “unique.” However, the rule does not require uniqueness but rather that their interest be both “direct” and distinct from those of the existing parties. *State ex rel. Nixon*, 34 S.W.3d at 127. Intervenorors have met this burden.

Intervenors would be required deploy their limited financial and organizational resources to opposing Plaintiff's proposed referendum, educating voters regarding Plaintiff's proposed referendum, turning out voters to vote in opposition to Plaintiff's proposed referendum, and informing the public regarding the legal and policy defects in Plaintiff's proposed referendum. Conversely, Intervenors would not be required to deploy their resources in either manner if the Secretary's determination is upheld.

Therefore, the outcome of this litigation directly determines the extent of Intervenors' financial and operational expenditures and whether their preferred Republican candidates are elected to Congress. Intervenors have no other avenue to protect those interests aside from joining this litigation.

E. Existing parties are inadequate to protect Intervenors' interests.

Intervenors are not aligned with either Plaintiff – who seeks to invalidate HB1 – or with Defendant, whose role is limited to ensuring that its procedures were lawful, that its officials acted within their statutory authority, and that the integrity of the election process is maintained. The Secretary of State and Attorney General are defending the validity of the Secretary's action through their institutional obligation to represent the interests of the State as a sovereign – not the interests of private citizens or organizations that support the outcome of that determination. By contrast, Intervenors' interests are political, operational, and mission-specific: seeking election of Republican candidates to Congress under HB1 and preventing the referendum from appearing on the ballot because its adoption would adversely affect the political, electoral, and policy environment Intervenors seek to preserve.

Intervenors' opposition to Plaintiff's suit and request for relief stems not merely from procedural concerns, but from substantive policy consequences of

the referendum's passage. The State neither shares nor represents that substantive objective. Therefore, there is "a divergence of interest between the proposed intervenor and the party" sufficient to show inadequate representation may exist. *Merchant v. Grand Lodge of Ancient Free & Accepted Masons*, 685 S.W.3d 455, 464 (Mo. App. W.D. 2024).

In this action, the State's primary objective is to demonstrate that the Secretary's review of the referendum petition complied with statutory requirements and administrative rules. Even if the State prevails, its arguments will likely focus on process integrity, i.e., how the review was conducted, what standards were applied, and whether sufficient evidence supports the decision. Intervenors, by contrast, have a direct and practical interest in ensuring the referendum does not advance for any reason, including the political reason of preserving HB1's district lines under which Intervenors support election of Republican candidates to Congress. This is because its passage would undermine political and electoral interests that Intervenors have in HB1.

The Court finds this issue dispositive.

The State may choose not to raise arguments concerning the substantive harm of the referendum, the costs of reversal to interested parties, or the broader electoral implications – all of which are central to Intervenors' mission and interests.

Because the State's defense does not encompass those substantive dimensions, its representation cannot be deemed adequate under Rule 52.12(a)(2). *Ainsworth v. Old Sec. Life Ins. Co.*, 694 S.W.2d 838, 841 (Mo. App. W.D. 1985) (holding inadequate representation exists where a party may come short of an Intervenor's single-minded purpose in litigation).

The State must balance competing interests, including neutrality toward referendum proponents and adherence to statutory duties. It cannot, for instance, engage in advocacy that could be perceived as partisan or policy driven. Intervenorors are under no such constraint. As such, Intervenorors can assert positions, marshal evidence, and pursue arguments that the State – due to its governmental neutrality – may decline to advance. Furthermore, if the litigation proceeds to appeal or settlement discussions, the State might elect to narrow its defense, stipulate to certain facts, or refrain from further review for institutional reasons unrelated to Intervenorors’ objectives and interests. This is especially true in a case such as this, where all parties are on an extremely expedited timeline and divergences in strategy may only appear at a moment’s notice.

Because a different approach to the conduct of litigation is present between the State and Intervenorors, the State cannot adequately protect Intervenorors’ interests. *Trbovich v. United Mine Workers of Am.*, 404 U.S. 528, 539, 92 S. Ct. 630, 637, 30 L. Ed. 2d 686 (1972) (holding inadequate representation existed when a differing approach to litigation between a party and Intervenor exists).

II. PERMISSIVE INTERVENTION IS ALTERNATIVELY WARRANTED UNDER RULE 52.12(b)

Even if intervention as of right were not established, the Court would grant permissive intervention under Rule 52.12(b). The Motion is timely. Intervenorors’ claims and defenses share substantial questions of law and fact with the existing litigation. Intervenorors’ defenses have questions of fact and law in common with this case. Their Amended Motion contains dozens of factual statements related to the questions of law and fact in common with this case. Intervenorors have dedicated and will continue to dedicate resources to


Congressional campaigns impacted by the HB1 map, which is the underlying matter in this case. The result of this case will thus directly impact Intervenor and will impose additional expenses and reporting requirements on Intervenor if Plaintiff or Defendant prevails. The underlying dispute concerns the fairness and sufficiency of HB1 – issues as to which Intervenor have directly invested resources and intend to assert legal positions. This Court has broad discretion to grant permissive intervention where the claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in common, and permissive intervention is granted in the alternative.

III. ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the Amended Motion to Intervene of Republican National Committee, National Republican Congressional Committee, and Missouri Republican State Committee is hereby granted as a matter of right and, in the alternative, permissively. Intervenor are granted intervention as Intervenor in this action pursuant to Missouri Rule of Civil Procedure 52.12. The Answer filed contemporaneously with the Motion is deemed properly filed as of the date of this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date:

8/13/20


Honorable Daniel R. Green
Judge

**IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COLE COUNTY
STATE OF MISSOURI**

RICHARD VON GLAHN,	)	
	)	
Plaintiff,	)	
	)	
v.	)	Case No. 26AC-CC00440
	)	
DENNY HOSKINS, in his official	)	
capacity as Missouri Secretary of	)	
State,	)	
	)	
Defendant.	)	

**SECRETARY OF STATE'S ANSWER TO THE PETITION AND
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES**

Defendant Denny Hoskins, in his official capacity as Missouri Secretary of State, hereby answers the allegations in Plaintiff's Petition and asserts affirmative defenses as follows:

1. Admit.

2. Admit.

3. Admit.

4. Admit that paragraph 4 quotes from Missouri Constitution Article III, Section 49. That constitutional provision speaks for itself. Defendant denies any remaining allegations in paragraph 4.

5. Admit that paragraph 5 quotes from Missouri Constitution Article III, Section 52(a). That constitutional provision speaks for itself. Defendant denies any remaining allegations in paragraph 5.

6. Admit that paragraph 6 quotes from Missouri Constitution Article III, Section 52(a). That constitutional provision speaks for itself. Defendant denies any remaining allegations in paragraph 6.

7. Admit that paragraph 7 cites a document prepared by the Secretary of State's Office. That document speaks for itself. Defendant denies any remaining allegations in paragraph 7.

8. Admit.

9. Deny.

10. Admit.

11. Deny.

12. Admit.

13. Deny.

14. Admit.

15. Admit that Defendant's lawsuit discussed in paragraph 15 related to Plaintiff's referendum petition. Defendant's papers in that lawsuit speak for themselves. Defendant denies any remaining allegation in paragraph 15.

16. Deny.

17. Paragraph 17 purports to make a direct quotation to Exhibit 3 of the Petition. That Exhibit speaks for itself. Defendant denies any remaining allegations in paragraph 17.

18. Admit that Defendant's lawsuit discussed in paragraph 18 related to Plaintiff's referendum petition. Defendant's papers in that lawsuit speak for themselves. Defendant denies any remaining allegation in paragraph 18.

19. Admit that Defendant's lawsuit discussed in paragraph 19 related to Plaintiff's referendum petition. Defendant's papers in that lawsuit speak for themselves. Defendant denies any remaining allegation in paragraph 19.

20. Admit.

21. Admit.

22. Admit.

23. Admit.

24. Admit.

25. Deny.

26. Deny.

27. Admit that paragraph 27 quotes § 116.120.1, RSMo. That provision speaks for itself. Defendant denies any remaining allegations in paragraph 27.

28. Paragraph 28 appears to quote from *Maggard v. State*, 733 S.W.3d 411, 416 (Mo. banc 2026). That decision speaks for itself. Defendant denies any remaining allegations in paragraph 28.

29. Paragraph 29 appears to quote from *Maggard v. State*, 733 S.W.3d 411, 416 (Mo. banc 2026). That decision speaks for itself. Defendant denies any remaining allegations in paragraph 29.

30. Paragraph 30 appears to quote from *Maggard v. State*, 733 S.W.3d 411, 416 (Mo. banc 2026). That decision speaks for itself. Defendant denies any remaining allegations in paragraph 30.

31. Deny because Chapter 116 authorizes requires review of the “referendum petition,” §§ 116.120, 116.150, not “the Referendum.”

32. The deadline in § 116.150.3, RSMo speaks for itself. To the extent that paragraph 32 is inconsistent with § 116.150.3, RSMo, paragraph 32 is denied.

33. Admit to the extent that Plaintiff uses the term “the Referendum” to refer to his referendum petition. Paragraph 33 is otherwise denied.

34. Admit.

35. Admit that paragraph 35 quotes § 116.150.2, RSMo. That provision speaks for itself. Defendant denies any remaining allegations in paragraph 35.

36. Admit that paragraph 36 makes a representation about Exhibit 5. Exhibit 5 speaks for itself. Defendant denies any remaining allegations in paragraph 36.

37. Admit that paragraph 37 makes a representation about § 115.125.3, RSMo. That provision speaks for itself. Defendant denies any remaining allegations in paragraph 37.

38. Admit.

39. Admit.

40. Deny.

41. Deny.

42. Deny.

43. Deny.

44. Admit that the Secretary's duty is to follow the law. Paragraph 44 is otherwise denied.

45. Deny.

46. Defendant incorporates the preceding answers as if set forth fully herein.

47. Admit that paragraph 47 quotes Missouri Constitution Article III, Section 52(a). That provision speaks for itself. Defendant denies any remaining allegations in paragraph 47.

48. To the extent that Plaintiff uses the term "the Referendum" to refer to his referendum petition, admit the referendum petition was signed by at least 5% of registered voters in two-thirds of Missouri's congressional districts. Deny that any of these signatures are valid because the referendum petition is itself unconstitutional.

49. Admit to the extent that Plaintiff uses the term "the Referendum" to refer to his referendum petition.

50. Defendant's certificate of insufficiency speaks for itself. Defendant denies any allegation in paragraph 50 to the extent it conflicts with the certificate.

51. Deny.

52. Admit that paragraph 52 makes a representation about Missouri Constitution Article III, Section 52(a). That provision speaks for itself. Defendant denies any remaining allegations in paragraph 52.

53. Deny.

54. Deny.

55. Deny.

56. Admit that paragraph 56 quotes *Moore v. Harper*, 600 U.S. 1 (2023). That decision speaks for itself. Paragraph 56 is otherwise denied.

57. Admit that paragraph 57 quotes *Moore v. Harper*, 600 U.S. 1 (2023). That decision speaks for itself. Paragraph 57 is otherwise denied.

58. Admit that paragraph 58 quotes *Moore v. Harper*, 600 U.S. 1 (2023). That decision speaks for itself. Paragraph 58 is otherwise denied.

59. Deny.

60. Deny.

61. Deny.

Deny that Plaintiffs are entitled to any of the relief requested in the “WHEREFORE” clause following paragraph 61, including the relief requested in paragraphs a–c, or any relief whatsoever.

AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

1. Plaintiff’s claims are foreclosed by the U.S. Constitution’s Elections Clause. *See* U.S. Const. art. I, § 4.

2. Plaintiff’s claims are foreclosed by the Missouri Constitution, including but not limited to Article III, Sections 1, 45, 49, and 52(a).

3. The U.S. Constitution’s Elections Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, invalidates Article III, Section 52(b) of the Missouri Constitution as applied.

4. The U.S. Constitution's Guarantee Clause, U.S. Const. art. IV, § 4, invalidates Article III, Section 52(b) of the Missouri Constitution as applied.

5. Plaintiff's demanded relief is unlawful under the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, 52 U.S.C. § 20302.

6. Plaintiff's demanded relief is unlawful under Article I, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution.

7. Plaintiff's demanded relief is unlawful under the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution.

8. Plaintiff's demanded relief is foreclosed by the *Purcell-Hadley* principle. See *Purcell v. Gonzalez*, 549 U.S. 1 (2006); *Hadley v. Junior Coll. Dist. of Metro. Kansas City*, 460 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. banc 1970).

Date: August 18, 2026

Respectfully submitted,

CATHERINE L. HANAWAY
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Counsel for Secretary Hoskins

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on August 18, 2026, the foregoing was served on counsel for Plaintiffs via the Court's electronic filing service.

/s/J. Michael Patton

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COLE COUNTY, MISSOURI

RICHARD VON GLAHN	)	
	)	
Plaintiff,	)	
	)	
v.	)	Case No. 26AC-CC00440
	)	
DENNY HOSKINS, in his official	)	
capacity,	)	
	)	
Defendant,	)	
	)	
and	)	
	)	
PUT MISSOURI FIRST,	)	
	)	
Intervenor-Defendant.	)	

**ANSWER TO PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT AND
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF UNDER SECTION 116.200 OF INTERVENORS
REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, NATIONAL REPUBLICAN
CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE, AND MISSOURI REPUBLICAN
STATE COMMITTEE**

Intervenors Republican National Committee, National Republican Congressional Committee, and Missouri Republican State Committee hereby state for their Answer to Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief under Section 116.200 as follows:

1. Plaintiff Richard von Glahn is a Missouri citizen, resident of St. Louis County, a taxpayer, and qualified voter in the State of Missouri.

ANSWER: Intervenors are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of Paragraph 1 and, therefore, deny the same.

2. Plaintiff von Glahn is the proponent of the referendum that is the

subject of this action.

ANSWER: Intervenors are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of Paragraph 2 and, therefore, deny the same.

3. Defendant Denny Hoskins is the Secretary of State for the State of Missouri. His principal office is in Cole County, Missouri.

ANSWER: Intervenors admit the allegations of Paragraph 3.

4. Missourians reserved to themselves the “power to approve or reject by referendum any act of the general assembly, except as hereinafter provided.” Mo. Const. art. III, § 49.

ANSWER: Mo. Const. art. III, § 49 speaks for itself. To the extent a response is required, Intervenors deny the allegations in Paragraph 4.

5. Article III, Section 52(a) of the Constitution identifies the sole exceptions to the people’s referendum right: (i) “laws necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety” and (ii) “laws making appropriations for the current expenses of the state government, for the maintenance of state institutions and for support of public schools.” Mo. Const. art. III, § 52(a).

ANSWER: Mo. Const. art. III, § 52(a) speaks for itself. To the extent a response is required, Intervenors deny the allegations in Paragraph 5.

6. To place a referendum petition before voters, a proponent must gather signatures of “five percent of the legal voters in each of two-thirds of the congressional districts in the state[.]” Mo. Const. art. III, § 52(a).

ANSWER: Mo. Const. art. III, § 52(a) speaks for itself. To the extent a response is required, Intervenors deny the allegations in Paragraph 6.

7. For an election taking place in 2026, a proponent must gather 106,384 signatures across six congressional districts.

ANSWER: Intervenors admit the allegations of Paragraph 7.

8. On September 12, 2025, the General Assembly truly agreed and finally passed—during a special session—House Bill 1 (“HB 1”) titled: “An Act To repeal sections 128.345, and 128.348, RSMo, and to enact in lieu thereof twelve new sections relating to the composition of congressional districts.”

ANSWER: House Bill 1 speaks for itself. To the extent a response is required, Intervenors admit the allegations in Paragraph 8.

9. Attached as Exhibit 1 is a true and correct copy of HB 1.

ANSWER: Exhibit 1 speaks for itself. To the extent a response is required, Intervenors admit the allegations in Paragraph 9.

10. HB 1 is an act of the General Assembly.

ANSWER: Intervenors admit the allegations of Paragraph 10.

11. HB 1 is not a law necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, or safety.

ANSWER: HB 1 speaks for itself. To the extent a response is required, Intervenors deny the allegations of Paragraph 11.

12. The General Assembly did not attach an emergency clause to HB 1.

ANSWER: HB 1 speaks for itself. To the extent a response is required, Intervenors deny the allegations of Paragraph 12.

13. HB 1 is not a law making appropriations for the current expenses of the state government, for the maintenance of state institutions, or for support of public schools.

ANSWER: HB 1 speaks for itself. To the extent a response is required, Intervenor deny the allegations of Paragraph 13.

14. On October 15, 2025, Defendant Hoskins, the “General Assembly” and the State of Missouri filed a lawsuit against Plaintiff in federal court, denominated Missouri General Assembly v. von Glahn, No. 25-cv-01535 (E.D. Mo.).

ANSWER: Intervenor admit the allegations of Paragraph 14.

15. That lawsuit sought to prevent Plaintiff from turning in signatures on the Referendum.

ANSWER: Defendant’s lawsuit speaks for itself. To the extent a response is required, Intervenor deny the allegations of Paragraph 15.

16. Attached as Exhibit 2 is a copy of the Complaint filed in the federal action.

ANSWER: Intervenor admit the allegations of Paragraph 16.

17. Defendant claimed Plaintiff should not be permitted to turn in signatures because initiating a referendum on a redistricting bill would “violate[] both the U.S. and Missouri Constitutions.” Ex. 3 at 2.

ANSWER: Defendant’s lawsuit speaks for itself. To the extent a response is required, Intervenor admit the allegations of Paragraph 17.

18. Defendant Hoskins’ position in his filings was that the referendum would violate the Missouri Constitution regardless of the number of signatures submitted.

ANSWER: Defendant’s lawsuit speaks for itself. To the extent a response is required, Intervenor admit the allegations of Paragraph 18.

19. Defendant Hoskins' position in his filings was that the referendum would violate the U.S. Constitution regardless of the number of signatures submitted.

ANSWER: Defendant's lawsuit speaks for itself. To the extent a response is required, Intervenor's admit the allegations of Paragraph 19.

20. Following expedited litigation, including Defendant seeking a preliminary injunction, the federal court issued a decision dismissing the federal lawsuit on December 8, 2025.

ANSWER: Intervenor's admit the allegations of Paragraph 20.

21. Attached as Exhibit 3 is a copy of the decision in the federal action.

ANSWER: Intervenor's admit the allegations of Paragraph 21.

22. On December 9, 2025, Plaintiff submitted more than 300,000 signatures in support of the Referendum to the Secretary's Office.

ANSWER: Intervenor's are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of Paragraph 22 and, therefore, deny the same.

23. The Secretary accepted the Referendum for filing and issued a receipt for 691 boxes of signatures.

ANSWER: Intervenor's admit the allegations of Paragraph 23.

24. Each referendum petition page Plaintiff submitted to Defendant Hoskins was identical to the form approved by his office on October 14, 2025.

ANSWER: Intervenor's are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of Paragraph 24 and, therefore, deny the same.

25. Attached hereto as Exhibit 4 is a true and correct copy of the

October 14, 2025 approval of the referendum petition as to form.

ANSWER: Intervenors are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of Paragraph 25 and, therefore, deny the same.

26. Each referendum petition page submitted to Defendant Hoskins included a completed and signed circulator's affidavit.

ANSWER: Intervenors are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of Paragraph 26 and, therefore, deny the same.

27. By statute, Defendant Hoskins is required to "examine the [Referendum] to determine whether it complies with the Constitution of Missouri and with this chapter [116]." § 116.120.1, RSMo.

ANSWER: The statute speaks for itself. To the extent a response is required, Intervenors admit the allegations in Paragraph 27.

28. In doing so, Defendant Hoskins "may rely on the circulator's affidavit found on each page of the petition as required by section 116.080 and 116.130.1, or [he] may verify the petition signatures by use of random sampling."

ANSWER: The statute speaks for itself. To the extent a response is required, Intervenors admit the allegations in Paragraph 28.

29. "Based on this sampling, [Defendant Hoskins] can approve or reject the petition signatures or proceed to a verification of all the signatures."

ANSWER: The statute speaks for itself. To the extent a response is required, Intervenors admit the allegations in Paragraph 29.

30. "With or without sampling, [Defendant Hoskins] has discretion to order the local election authorities to verify all the signatures."

ANSWER: The statute speaks for itself. To the extent a response

is required, Intervenorors admit the allegations in Paragraph 30.

31. Chapter 116 requires Defendant Hoskins to issue a certificate deeming the Referendum sufficient or insufficient, which decision is subject to review by the courts.

ANSWER: The statute speaks for itself. To the extent a response is required, Intervenorors deny the allegations in Paragraph 31.

32. Chapter 116 gave Defendant Hoskins until August 4, 2026 to issue such certificate.

ANSWER: The statute speaks for itself. To the extent a response is required, Intervenorors admit the allegations in Paragraph 32.

33. On August 4, 2026, Defendant issued a certificate of insufficiency for the Referendum pursuant to § 116.150, RSMo.

ANSWER: Intervenorors admit the allegations of Paragraph 33.

34. Attached as Exhibit 5 is a copy of Defendant Hoskins' certificate of insufficiency.

ANSWER: Intervenorors admit the allegations of Paragraph 34.

35. Defendant Hoskins is required to "stat[e] the reason for the insufficiency." § 116.150.2, RSMo.

ANSWER: The statute speaks for itself. To the extent a response is required, Intervenorors admit the allegations in Paragraph 35.

36. The only reason for insufficiency identified in Defendant Hoskins' certificate is his assertion that the referendum violates the Missouri and U.S. Constitutions. See Ex. 5.

ANSWER: Exhibit 5 speaks for itself. To the extent a response is required, Intervenorors deny the allegations in Paragraph 36.

37. By law, no changes can be made to the November general election

ballots after September 8, 2026. See § 115.125.3, RSMo.

ANSWER: The statute speaks for itself. To the extent a response is required, Intervenorors admit the allegations in Paragraph 37.

38. Plaintiff filed this Petition within 10 days of Defendant Hoskins issuing the certificate of insufficiency.

ANSWER: Intervenorors admit the allegations of Paragraph 38.

39. Plaintiff's challenge to that certificate is therefore timely. § 116.200.1, RSMo.

ANSWER: Paragraph 39 is a legal conclusion to which no answer is required. To the extent an answer is required, Intervenorors deny the allegations of Paragraph 39.

PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO AN INJUNCTION

40. Plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law.

ANSWER: Intervenorors deny the allegations of Paragraph 40.

41. Plaintiff will face irreparable harm absent an order enjoining the Secretary of State from further implementing or using the congressional districts contained in HB 1.

ANSWER: Intervenorors deny the allegations of Paragraph 41.

42. Plaintiff is the proponent of the referendum petition and he is entitled to the immediate suspension of the use and implementation of HB 1.

ANSWER: Intervenorors deny the allegations of Paragraph 42.

43. Plaintiff's referendum right will be undermined if the Secretary is allowed to further implement or make use of HB 1.

ANSWER: Intervenorors deny the allegations of Paragraph 43.

44. The Secretary faces no harm because the his duty is to carry out

the election laws of Missouri and he should have no preference for which congressional districts are used.

ANSWER: Intervenors deny the allegations of Paragraph 44.

45. The public interest is served by restraining the Secretary from taking further steps to implement or use the congressional districts in HB 1 to ensure that the referendum right is fully realized and that the correct congressional districts are utilized to conduct the 2026 general congressional election.

ANSWER: Intervenors deny the allegations of Paragraph 45.

**COUNT I:
THE REFERENDUM IS SUFFICIENT**

46. Plaintiff incorporates the preceding allegations as if set forth fully herein.

ANSWER: In response to Paragraph 46, Intervenors adopt and incorporate its answers to preceding paragraphs as fully stated herein.

47. The Missouri Constitution requires that referendum petitions be “signed by five percent of the legal voters in each of two-thirds of the congressional districts in the state.” Mo. Const. art. III, § 52(a).

ANSWER: Mo. Const. art. III, § 52(a) speaks for itself. To the extent a response is required, Intervenors deny the allegations in Paragraph 47.

48. The Referendum was signed by the constitutionally required number of legal voters in each of two-thirds of Missouri’s congressional districts.

ANSWER: Intervenors are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of Paragraph 26 and,

therefore, deny the same.

49. Defendant Hoskins did not identify the number of signatures gathered as a reason for deeming the Referendum insufficient. See Ex. 5.

ANSWER: Intervenors are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of Paragraph 26 and, therefore, deny the same.

50. Defendant Hoskins instead contends the Missouri and U.S. Constitutions prohibit subjecting a redistricting bill to the referendum.

ANSWER: Intervenors deny the allegations of Paragraph 50.

51. They do not.

ANSWER: Intervenors deny the allegations of Paragraph 51.

52. The Missouri Constitution identifies only two categories of bills exempt from the referendum: (1) bills addressing specified emergencies and (2) specified appropriations bills. Mo. Const. art. III, § 52(a).

ANSWER: Mo. Const. art. III, § 52(a) speaks for itself. To the extent a response is required, Intervenors deny the allegations in Paragraph 52.

53. HB 1 falls into neither of those categories.

ANSWER: HB 1 speaks for itself. To the extent a response is required, Intervenors deny the allegations in Paragraph 53.

54. The Referendum does not violate the Missouri Constitution and it is sufficient.

ANSWER: Intervenors deny the allegations of Paragraph 54.

55. Like the Missouri Constitution, the U.S. Constitution does not prohibit a state from subjecting a redistricting bill to the referendum.

ANSWER: Intervenors deny the allegations of Paragraph 55.

56. Just three years ago, the Supreme Court “embraced the core principle espoused in *Hildebrant* and *Smiley* that redistricting is a legislative function, to be performed in accordance with the State’s prescriptions for lawmaking, which may include the referendum and the Governor’s veto.” *Moore v. Harper*, 600 U.S. 1, 25 (2023) (quotations omitted).

ANSWER: *Moore v. Harper* speaks for itself. To the extent a response is required, Intervenor deny the allegations in Paragraph 56.

57. The Court squarely “rejected the contention that the Elections Clause vests state legislatures with exclusive and independent authority when setting the rules governing federal elections.” *Id.* at 26.

ANSWER: *Moore v. Harper* speaks for itself. To the extent a response is required, Intervenor deny the allegations in Paragraph 57.

58. Put simply: “A state legislature may not create congressional districts independently of requirements imposed by the state constitution with respect to the enactment of laws.” *Id.* at 26 (quotations omitted).

ANSWER: *Moore v. Harper* speaks for itself. To the extent a response is required, Intervenor deny the allegations in Paragraph 58.

59. All laws, except for emergency laws and appropriations, are subject to the referendum under the Missouri Constitution.

ANSWER: Intervenor deny the allegations of Paragraph 59.

60. The Referendum does not violate the U.S. Constitution and it is sufficient.

ANSWER: Intervenor deny the allegations of Paragraph 60.

61. Plaintiff is entitled to an order reversing Defendant Hoskins’

certification decision.

ANSWER: Intervenors deny the allegations of Paragraph 61.

WHEREFORE, having fully answered, Intervenors Republican National Committee, National Republican Congressional Committee, the Missouri Republican State Committee move the Court for dismissal of the Petition, that Plaintiff takes nothing thereby, and that Intervenors be awarded the costs and expenses incurred in the action, including attorney fees, and for such other and further relief as is just and proper.

DEFENSES AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

The Petition fails to state a claim as a matter of law.

Plaintiff has shown no individual harm and thus has no interest, aside from a purely conjectural interest, in the claims and therefore has no standing to bring the action.

Plaintiff's claims are purely speculative as to the effect of the Defendant's actions with respect to the referendum petition and thus such claims are not ripe for adjudication.

The Petition raises nonjusticiable political questions that this Court has no jurisdiction to address.

The Petition rests on erroneous statements of law and/or fact.

The Petition seeks relief foreclosed by Missouri and/or federal law.

The Petition seeks relief foreclosed *Purcell v. Gonzalez*, 549 U.S. 1 (2006).

Respectfully submitted,

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Attorneys for Intervenors

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the foregoing was served via the Court's electronic filing system on August 9, 2026 on all parties of record.

/s/ Marc H. Ellinger

**IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COLE COUNTY
STATE OF MISSOURI**

RICHARD VON GLAHN,	)	
	)	
Plaintiff,	)	
	)	
v.	)	Case No. 26AC-CC00440
	)	
DENNY HOSKINS, in his official	)	
capacity as Missouri Secretary of	)	
State,	)	
	)	
Defendant.	)	

SECRETARY OF STATE’S PRE-TRIAL BRIEF

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii

INTRODUCTION 1

BACKGROUND 6

LEGAL STANDARDS 12

I. The State’s Authority to Enact and Enforce HB 1. 12

II. Section 116.200, RSMo. 12

III. Supremacy of Federal Law. 13

ARGUMENT 14

I. Congressional maps are not subject to the Missouri Constitution’s referendum provisions..... 14

 A. The U.S. Constitution’s Elections Clause requires a clear statement to divest the Missouri General Assembly of its redistricting authority... 14

 B. The Missouri Constitution contains no clear statement divesting the General Assembly of redistricting authority..... 20

 C. Even read without reference to the U.S. Constitution’s Elections Clause, the Missouri Constitution does not authorize referenda on congressional maps..... 27

II. The U.S. Constitution renders Article III, Section 52(b) of Missouri Constitution invalid as applied to HB 1..... 31

III. Changing the congressional map at this hour is impossible. Thus, the *Hadley-Purcell* principle forbids von Glahn’s impossible demand..... 36

IV. The U.S. Constitution and federal law forbid changing Missouri’s congressional map during an election..... 43

 A. An order requiring the State to host a new Primary Election would force a violation of 52 U.S.C. § 20302 (“UOCAVA”)..... 44

 B. An order requiring a General Election under a different map would violate the U.S. Constitution. 45

CONCLUSION..... 49

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Abbott v. LULAC,
146 S. Ct. 418 (2025) 4, 38

Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons,
552 U.S. 214 (2008) 20

Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n,
576 U.S. 787 (2015) 2, 19, 24

Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc.,
575 U.S. 320 (2015) 27

Carson v. Simon,
978 F.3d 1051 (8th Cir. 2020) 16

Collins v. Yellen,
594 U.S. 220 (2021) 15

Covington v. North Carolina,
316 F.R.D. 117 (M.D.N.C. 2016) 43

Duncan v. McCall,
139 U.S. 449 (1891) 35

Edmond v. United States,
520 U.S. 651 (1997) 15

FDA v. Brown & Williamson,
529 U.S. 120 (2000) 15

Felker v. Turpin,
518 U.S. 651 (1996) 15

Foster v. Love,
522 U.S. 67 (1997) 44

Gray v. Sanders,
372 U.S. 368 (1963) 47

Gregory v. Ashcroft,
501 U.S. 452 (1991) 15

Hadley v. Junior Coll. Dist. of Metro. Kansas City,
460 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. banc 1970) 4, 37

Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections,
383 U.S. 663 (1966)..... 30

Hawke v. Smith,
253 U.S. 221 (1920) 14

Healey v. State,
732 S.W.3d 827 (Mo. banc 2026) 1, 12, 23

Luther v. Hoskins,
730 S.W.3d 567 (Mo. banc 2026) *passim*

Madden v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co.,
192 S.W. 455 (Mo. banc 1917) 35

Maggard v. State,
733 S.W.3d 411 (Mo. banc 2026) *passim*

Mejia Olalde v. Noem,
No. 1:25-CV-00168-JMD, 2025 WL 3131942 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 10, 2025) 27

Merrill v. Milligan,
142 S. Ct. 879 (2022) 39

Minor v. Happersett,
88 U.S. 162 (1874) 33, 34

Missouri Gen. Assembly v. von Glahn,
No. 4:25-CV-1535-ZMB, 2025 WL 3514277 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 8, 2025)..... 8, 26

Missouri Gen. Assembly v. von Glahn,
No. 4:25-CV-1535-ZMB, 2026 WL 1290477 (E.D. Mo. May 11, 2026)..... 26

Moore v. Harper,
600 U.S. 1 (2023) 19

No Bans on Choice v. Ashcroft,
638 S.W.3d 484 (Mo. banc 2022) 23, 26

Page v. Va. State Bd. of Elections,
58 F. Supp. 3d 533 (E.D. Va. 2014)..... 43

People Not Politicians v. Hoskins,
736 S.W.3d 518 (Mo. App. W.D. 2026)..... 3, 23

Priorities USA v. State,
591 S.W.3d 448 (Mo. banc 2020) 29, 30

Purcell v. Gonzalez,
549 U.S. 1 (2006) 38

Reynolds v. Sims,
377 U.S. 533 (1964) 30

Robinson v. Missouri Dept. of Health and Sr. Services,
No. 20AC-CC00515, 2021 WL 7441868 (Mo.Cir. Nov. 26, 2021)..... 34

Smiley v. Holm,
285 U.S. 355 (1932) 32

Smith v. Allwright,
321 U.S. 649 (1944) 46

Sossamon v. Texas,
563 U.S. 277 (2011) 15

St. Louis Cnty. Bd. of Election Commissioners v. McShane,
492 S.W.3d 177 (Mo. App. E.D. 2016)..... 29

State ex rel. Gordon v. Becker,
49 S.W.2d 146 (Mo. banc 1932) 22

State ex rel. Jones v. Atterbury,
300 S.W.2d 806 (Mo. banc 1957) 29

State ex rel. Kemper v. Carter,
165 S.W. 773 (Mo. banc 1914) 26

State ex rel. McClellan v. Kirkpatrick,
504 S.W.2d 83 (Mo. banc 1974) 46

State ex rel. Moore v. Toberman,
250 S.W.2d 701 (Mo. banc 1952) 21

State of Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrandt,
241 U.S. 565 (1916) 19, 32

State v. Liberty,
370 S.W.3d 537 (Mo. banc 2012) 21

Terrazas v. Slagle,
821 F. Supp. 1154 (W.D. Tex. 1992) 43

United States v. Caldwell,
No. CV 26-2025 (ZNQ) (JTQ), 2026 WL 2186515 (D.N.J. July 29, 2026) 16, 19

United States v. Classic,
313 U.S. 299 (1941) 46, 48

United States v. Gradwell,
243 U.S. 476 (1917) *passim*

United States v. Missouri,
114 F.4th 980 (8th Cir. 2024) 13

United States v. Mosley,
238 U.S. 383 (1915) 45

United States v. Oregon,
828 F. Supp. 3d 1092 (D. Or. 2026)..... 16, 19

Vera v. Richards,
861 F. Supp. 1304 (S.D. Tex. 1994)..... 43

Wesberry v. Sanders,
376 U.S. 1 (1964) 25, 30

West Virginia v. EPA,
597 U.S. 697 (2022) 15

Statutes

§ 115.121, RSMo *passim*

§ 115.339, RSMo 46

§ 115.341, RSMo 2, 37, 38

§ 115.343, RSMo 46, 48

§ 115.349, RSMo 5, 36, 38

§ 115.363, RSMo	48
§ 115.508, RSMo	44
§ 115.920, RSMo	44
§ 116.120, RSMo	8, 11
§ 116.140, RSMo	8
§ 116.150, RSMo	2, 9, 24
§ 116.200, RSMo	8, 11, 12
§ 116.334, RSMo	2, 23
2 U.S.C. § 7.....	6
52 U.S.C. § 20302.....	6, 41, 44
52 U.S.C. § 20307.....	45
Mo. Const. art. I, § 4	13, 31
Mo. Const. art. III, § 45	10, 20, 27, 30
Mo. Const. art. III, § 49	7, 15, 20, 25
Mo. Const. art. III, § 52(a).....	<i>passim</i>
Mo. Const. art. III, § 52(b).....	<i>passim</i>
Mo. Const. art. III, § 7	22
Mo. Const. art. V, § 3	13
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1	6, 47
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 2	14
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 3.....	14
U.S. Const. amend. XVII	14

U.S. Const. amend. XVIII, § 3	14
U.S. Const. amend. XX, § 6	15
U.S. Const. amend. XXII, § 2.....	15
U.S. Const. art. I, § 2	6, 14, 29, 45
U.S. Const. art. I, § 3	14
U.S. Const. art. I, § 4	2, 7, 14
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8	14
U.S. Const. art. II, § 1.....	14
U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3.....	14
U.S. Const. art. IV, § 4.....	2, 14, 33, 35
U.S. Const. art. V.....	14
U.S. Const. art. VI	13, 14, 31
 Other Authorities	
<i>Federalist No. 10</i> (Madison)	34
<i>Institution</i> , CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY	29
<i>Institution</i> , MERRIAM WEBSTER DICTIONARY.....	29
Jason Hancock, <i>Referendum campaign asks court to block new Missouri map from November election</i> , MISSOURI INDEPENDENT (Aug. 5, 2026).....	45
Jen Rice & Yunion Rivas, <i>Missouri blocks anti-gerrymander referendum from November ballot</i> , DEMOCRACY DOCKET (Aug. 4, 2026)	1
Jen Rice, <i>GOP derails bid to stop Missouri gerrymander for 2026</i> , DEMOCRACY DOCKET (Mar. 27, 2026)	1
Letter from George Washington to Charles Mynn Thruston (Aug. 10, 1794).....	33
Mo. Att’y Gen., Op. Letter 03-2026 (May 13, 2026)	9

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Richard von Glahn’s Petition is, frankly, crazy. Von Glahn says he cares about democracy. But then, his Petition alleges that approximately 3.3% of Missouri voters can temporarily repeal a duly enacted congressional map—even before the People vote. Pet. ¶¶ 6–7, 42–43, 45; *id.* at 8. That is why von Glahn thinks “he is entitled to the immediate suspension” of Missouri’s duly-enacted congressional map—even though the Primary Election already occurred. *See id.* This is unthinkable. Von Glahn cites no judicial precedent that has ever awarded such a drastic remedy (and the State is unaware of any). Moreover, von Glahn is flatly incorrect to argue that the Missouri Constitution permits referenda on congressional maps like House Bill 1.

Even *Democracy Docket*, a leftwing media entity founded by the Democratic Party’s leading lawyer, Marc Elias,¹ calls von Glahn’s legal challenge “a long shot.” *See* Ex. 33, Jen Rice & Yunior Rivas, *Missouri blocks anti-gerrymander referendum from November ballot*, DEMOCRACY DOCKET (Aug. 4, 2026).² In fact, *Democracy Docket* admitted *last March* that this Court’s ruling in *Maggard* “ha[d] likely killed attempts to stop Republicans from imposing the new map” because of the candidate-filing deadline “rapidly approaching” on March 31, 2026. Ex. 34, Jen Rice, *GOP derails bid*

¹ Elias’s firm, the Elias Law Group, represented plaintiffs in *Healey v. State*, 732 S.W.3d 827 (Mo. banc 2026)—another unsuccessful challenge to HB 1.

² <https://archive.is/FHSfJ>

to stop *Missouri gerrymander for 2026*, DEMOCRACY DOCKET (Mar. 27, 2026).³ Five months later, von Glahn somehow still insists this Court should alter Missouri's congressional map.

The Court should reject von Glahn's claims for at least four reasons. *First*, the U.S. and Missouri Constitutions vest authority over federal redistricting solely with the people's elected representatives in the General Assembly. U.S. Const. art. I, § 4; *id.* art. IV, § 4. Even assuming the U.S. Constitution allows States to permit referenda against federal election maps, *but see Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm'n*, 576 U.S. 787, 824–50 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting), longstanding precedent requires a “positive and clear” statement in any law or state constitutional provision purporting to divest a state legislature of its redistricting authority, *United States v. Gradwell*, 243 U.S. 476, 485 (1917). Von Glahn simply cannot identify any language in the Missouri Constitution showing that Missourians made a conscious choice to depart from the U.S. Constitution's default rule and subject congressional redistricting to referenda. *See Maggard v. State*, 733 S.W.3d 411, 414 n.7 (Mo. banc 2026) (reserving the question of whether the Missouri Constitution permits referenda on congressional maps).

Indeed, Missouri law obviously does not envision referenda on redistricting. If it did, why would local election officials and the Secretary of State have until *the day of the primary election* to make a certification decision? *See* §§ 115.341, 116.150.3, RSMo. And why would voters be expected to vote on redistricting plans, which are

³ <https://archive.ph/pUnQs>

enormously complex, with only a 100-word summary statement and no images of the competing maps? *See* § 116.334, RSMo. The idea of holding a referendum on a congressional map under such conditions is absurd. This reinforces that Missouri never made a “positive and clear” choice to allow such votes. *See Gradwell*, 243 U.S. at 485.

Second, even if the Missouri Constitution does envision referenda on federal congressional maps, the U.S. Constitution preempts Article III, Section 52(b) of the Missouri Constitution—which would freeze an enacted congressional map *before* the People vote. In von Glahn’s view, a small minority of Missourians—five percent of voters in two-thirds of Missouri’s congressional districts (or about 3.3%)—have the right to force the use of their preferred congressional map for an election cycle. *See* Pet. ¶¶ 6–7, 42–43, 45; *id.* at 8. The U.S. Supreme Court has *never* suggested such an arrangement is consistent with the U.S. Constitution’s Elections Clause. And frankly, von Glahn’s proposed regime would be absurd. *Every* time redistricting occurs, the minority political party could easily gather the signatures needed to freeze a congressional map for one election cycle—a small price to pay for one or more congressional seats. And imagine if this maneuver occurred after the decennial Census, when Missouri could gain or lose a seat. A referendum campaign could force Missouri to use an outdated congressional map with the wrong number of seats. Also, if von Glahn can demand a referendum on a congressional map, what’s to stop him—or anyone else—from attempting to enact a congressional map via initiative petition? In that world, voters would need to select from six or seven competing maps based on

a 100-word summary statement. Von Glahn cannot cite any State that has ever permitted such an outrageous arrangement for redistricting. And the U.S. Constitution’s Elections Clause prohibits these absurd possibilities—which would annihilate the General Assembly’s authority over redistricting and give small political minorities an uncheckable power over the majority.

Third, even if referendum campaigns can freeze congressional maps by submitting a sufficient number of signatures, it is far too late for this Court to order the use of a new congressional map for the 2026 General Election. Missouri courts, federal courts, and other state courts refuse to change election rules in the middle of an ongoing election cycle. *See Hadley v. Junior Coll. Dist. of Metro. Kansas City*, 460 S.W.2d 1, 2–3 (Mo. banc 1970); *Abbott v. LULAC*, 146 S. Ct. 418, 419 (2025). Indeed, the Missouri Supreme Court already applied this rule and held that it was too late to change election district lines *close to the end of candidate filing*. *Hadley*, 460 S.W.2d at 2–3. Here, candidate filing ended last March and the Primary Election is already over. Trying to change congressional maps *now* would be catastrophically disruptive and technically “impossible”—as Missouri’s election administration system will be locked and cannot be altered. *See Ex. 28, Brown Aff.* ¶¶ 6–19.⁴

⁴ *Accord* Ex. 32, Letter of Missouri Association of County Clerks and Election Authorities; Ex. 29, Amicus Br. of Brianna Lennon at 11–14, *Maggard v. State*, No. SC101581 (Mo. banc, filed April 10, 2026); *see also* Ex. 30, Amicus Br. of Kurt Bahr at 13–16, *Maggard v. State*, No. SC101581 (Mo. banc, filed April 28, 2026); Ex. 31, Trial Testimony of Shawn Kieffer at 109:1–17, *Healey v. State*, No. 2516-CV31273 (Mo. Cir. Ct., Feb. 19, 2026).

Indeed, litigants challenging the HB 1 map since September 2025 recognized that the window to change the congressional map for Missouri’s 2026 elections closed long ago. Von Glahn and People Not Politicians (“PNP”) characterized prior lawsuits as “time-sensitive election case[s]” because of their “impact” on “the 2026 election” and the need to avoid “chaos in August.” Ex. 22, Mot. to Expedite at 1–2, *State ex rel. People Not Politicians v. Limbaugh*, No. WD88821 (Mo. App. W.D., filed April 1, 2026). In other cases, opponents of HB 1—including opponents represented by von Glahn’s counsel—all stated that they needed judicial resolution of HB 1’s status before the candidate-filing period opened *last February*.⁵ Many of these plaintiffs acknowledged that equitable principles would eventually require Missouri courts “to favor the status quo in a legal dispute during the lead-up to an election.” *See, e.g.*, Ex. 26, SIS Mot. for Prelim. Inj. at 16, *Maggard v. State*, No. 25AC-CC09120 (Mo. Cir. Ct., filed Jan. 14, 2026) (quotation omitted). Likewise, the Boone County Clerk—who is now testifying for Plaintiff—previously argued that any change to Missouri’s congressional map (even “*before the August primary*”) “will result in chaos, confusion, and unnecessary expense.” *Compare* Ex. 29, Amicus Br. of Brianna Lennon, *supra*, at 6–7, 11–14, *with* Ex. 21, Lennon Aff. Missouri has now completed the August primary, § 115.121.2, RSMo, Missouri’s candidate filing period closed many months

⁵ *See* Ex. 24, Mot. to Expedite at 2, *Luther v. Hoskins*, No. SC101412 (Mo. banc, filed Dec. 31, 2025); Ex. 25, Pltfs.’ Opp. to a Continuance at 1–3, *Wise v. State* and *Healey v. State*, Nos. 2516-CV29597, 2516-CV31273 (Mo. Cir. Ct., filed Dec. 15, 2025); Ex. 26, SIS Mot. for Prelim. Inj. at 16, *Maggard v. State*, No. 25AC-CC09120 (Mo. Cir. Ct., filed Jan. 14, 2026).

ago, § 115.349.1, RSMo, and Missouri's General Election is just a few weeks away, *id.* § 115.121.1, RSMo. Von Glahn cannot now ignore these previous representations.

Finally, granting von Glahn's request for an injunction against using the HB 1 congressional map for the 2026 General Election would violate federal law. Federal law prohibits holding a new primary election because there simply is not enough time—under the federal election calendar—to do so. *See* 2 U.S.C. § 7; 52 U.S.C. § 20302(a)(8). And while von Glahn's counsel has publicly suggested just forcing the winners of the Primary Election to run in his preferred congressional districts, that would violate the U.S. Constitution's right to equal voting by rendering pointless hundreds of thousands of votes in the Primary Election. *See* U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, amend. XIV, § 1. To avoid violating federal law, this Court should hold that the 2026 General Election must be conducted under the same map that governed the Primary Election.

The Court should reject von Glahn's claims, and enter judgment for the State.

BACKGROUND

On September 12, 2025, the General Assembly enacted House Bill 1, which provided for the boundaries of Missouri's eight congressional districts. HB 1 passed by a margin of 21 to 11 in the Senate and 90 to 65 in the House of Representatives. *See* Mo. Senate J. 25–26 (2d Extra. Sess., 103d Gen. Assembly, Sept. 12, 2025); Mo. House J. 37–38 (2d Extra. Sess., 103d Gen. Assembly, Sept. 9, 2025). Governor Kehoe signed HB 1 into law on September 28, 2025.

In response, a group known as People Not Politicians (“PNP”) initiated a referendum campaign to challenge the HB 1 map. However, the Missouri General

Assembly, the Secretary of State, and the Attorney General perceived a problem with PNP's undertaking: A referendum on the HB1 congressional map is in tension with the U.S. Constitution's Elections Clause. *See* U.S. Const. art. I, § 4. The Elections Clause provides that "[t]he Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the *Legislature* thereof." *Id.* (emphasis added). Yet a referendum on a congressional map divests the General Assembly of legislative authority and relies instead on a statewide vote.

Almost ten months ago, to help clarify this disparity before PNP submitted its referendum petition, the Secretary of State (alongside the General Assembly) sued PNP and its executive director, Richard von Glahn. Among other things, the Secretary sought a declaratory judgment resolving the validity of PNP's referendum petition. *See* Complaint at 22, *Missouri Gen. Assembly v. von Glahn*, No. 4:25-cv-1535 (E.D. Mo., filed Oct. 15, 2026), ECF No. 1. He argued that the U.S. Constitution's Elections Clause forbids subjecting congressional maps to referenda absent a clear statement in the Missouri Constitution. *Id.* ¶¶ 67–69. The Secretary also noted that the Missouri Constitution includes no such clear statement. *Id.* ¶¶ 72–74. Indeed, Article III, Section 45 only recognizes the General Assembly's legislative authority over redistricting. And Missouri's referendum provisions are silent about referenda on congressional districts. *See* Mo. Const. art. III, §§ 49, 52(a), 52(b).

Despite the Secretary's effort to obtain clarity last fall, the federal district court dismissed his lawsuit as premature. It explained that under Chapter 116, RSMo, the

Secretary of State has “both the authority and duty” to assess “the constitutionality of [PNP’s] final petition” before courts may consider the question. *Missouri Gen. Assembly v. von Glahn*, No. 4:25-CV-1535-ZMB, 2025 WL 3514277, at *4 n.4 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 8, 2025) (citing § 116.120, RSMo). The court also expressly recognized the Secretary’s authority to “declare [PNP’s] petition unconstitutional.” *Id.* * 4. Even PNP agreed that Secretary Hoskins has “authority as Secretary of State to reject [PNP’s] petition as unconstitutional during post-submission review and to defend that decision based on the very same constitutional arguments” that the State “advance[d]” in its lawsuit. *Id.* at *1, 4 n.4 (citing §§ 116.120, 116.200, RSMo).

PNP then submitted its referendum petition on December 9, 2025. PNP’s submission triggered the Secretary’s duty to review the referendum petition for timeliness, legality, and sufficiency under Chapter 116. *See Maggard*, 733 S.W.3d at 416 (“Section 116.120.1 provides the secretary “*shall* examine the petition to determine whether it complies with the Constitution of Missouri and with this chapter [116].” (emphasis added)). Section 116.150.3 required the Secretary to complete this review process by August 4, 2026—the same day as Missouri’s Primary Election. Chapter 116 provided an extensive timeline for reviewing the referendum petition because it vested the Secretary and local election officials with substantial duties. It required Missouri’s 116 local election officials to painstakingly check submitted signatures. *See* §§ 116.120–116.140, RSMo. Chapter 116 also empowers the Secretary to independently check the validity of signatures. § 116.140, RSMo. At the end of the exhaustive signature-review process, Chapter 116 provides that, “if the

secretary of state finds it sufficient, the secretary of state shall issue a certificate setting forth that the petition contains a sufficient number of valid signatures to comply with the Constitution of Missouri and with this chapter.” § 116.150.1, RSMo. But “[i]f the secretary of state finds the petition insufficient, the secretary of state shall issue a certificate stating the reason for the insufficiency.” § 116.150.2, RSMo.

While the Secretary and Missouri’s 116 local election authorities were busy reviewing the signatures on PNP’s referendum petition, the Secretary of State and the Attorney General recognized that HB 1 would become effective pending the Secretary’s ultimate certification decision under Chapter 116. Yet in late December 2025, two plaintiffs challenged HB 1’s statewide effectiveness. *Maggard*, 733 S.W.3d at 413. They sought a declaratory judgment and “an injunction preventing use of HB 1’s congressional map until voters approve the map through the referendum process.” *Id.* However, this Court and the Missouri Supreme Court unanimously rejected their claims, holding that “the December 9 referendum petition filing did not automatically suspend HB 1 under article III, sections 49, 52(a), or 52(b) of the Missouri Constitution.” *Id.* at 421.

After the Supreme Court’s ruling, the Attorney General released an opinion letter requiring “State and local election officials” to “take all appropriate steps to ensure the HB 1 map is fully implemented in advance of the 2026 primary elections.” Mo. Att’y Gen., Op. Letter 03-2026 (May 13, 2026). Then, under the Supreme Court’s and the Attorney General’s opinions, Missouri’s local election officials implemented the HB 1 map in Missouri’s Centralized Voter Registration system. *See* Ex. 28,

Brown Aff. ¶¶ 4, 18. After implementing the HB 1 map, State and local election officials also prepared ballots under the new map and then completed the August Primary Election. *Id.* at ¶ 4. Roughly 1.2 million voters participated in the August 4 congressional primaries, and they selected Republican and Democratic nominees in each of Missouri’s eight congressional districts.

On August 4, 2026, the Secretary of State released his certificate of insufficiency as to PNP’s referendum petition. *See* Ex. 5. The Secretary’s certificate identified “the reason for the insufficiency” as the fact that the Missouri Constitution does not permit referenda on congressional maps. *Id.* at 3. The Secretary’s certificate relied on a letter from the Attorney General, which was attached to the certificate, explaining that a referendum on a congressional map would be in tension with the U.S. Constitution’s Elections Clause. *Id.* at 4–10. Thus, to divest the General Assembly of its redistricting authority, in contravention of the Elections Clause’s plain text, the Missouri Constitution would need to speak with a clear statement. *Id.* However, the Missouri Constitution includes no such clear statement. *Id.* Rather, “Article III, section 45 is the only provision of the Missouri Constitution directly addressing congressional redistricting.” *Luther v. Hoskins*, 730 S.W.3d 567, 571 (Mo. banc 2026). And Article III, Section 45 contemplates only that “the *general assembly* shall by law divide the state into [congressional] districts.” Mo. Const. art. III, § 45 (emphasis added). The Attorney General’s letter also noted that, even if the Missouri Constitution *did* authorize referenda on congressional maps, the HB 1 map could not be displaced absent a majority vote in light of the U.S. Constitution’s Elections Clause

and the Guarantee Clause. Ex. 5 at 8–9. Moreover, the Attorney General noted that a last-minute alteration to Missouri’s congressional map would likely force violations of UOCAVA and Article I, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution. *Id.* at 9–10.

A couple hours after the Secretary’s decision, von Glahn filed suit under § 116.200.1, which provides that “[a]fter the secretary of state certifies a petition as sufficient or insufficient, any citizen may apply to the circuit court of Cole County to compel him to reverse his decision.” § 116.200.1, RSMo. Yet von Glahn’s challenge is not just limited to the Secretary’s decision to certify PNP’s referendum petition as insufficient for the ballot in November 2026. He also alleges that “he is entitled to the immediate suspension of the use and implementation of HB 1.” Pet. ¶¶ 42–43; *id.* at 8. Elsewhere, he alleges that the Court should “restrain[] the Secretary from taking further steps to implement or use the congressional districts in HB 1 to ensure that ... the correct congressional districts are utilized to conduct the 2026 general congressional election.” *Id.* ¶ 45. Von Glahn’s Petition lacks further clarity on precisely what he means—which is particularly confusing since Missouri completed the Primary Election about two weeks ago. *See* § 115.121.2, RSMo. The Court and the State are left to guess, for example, whether von Glahn envisions a new Primary Election under “the correct congressional districts,” Pet. ¶ 45, or whether he demands a General Election that proceeds under a different congressional map than the HB 1 map used for the Primary. *Id.*

As explained below, von Glahn’s demand fails in either event.

LEGAL STANDARDS

I. The State’s Authority to Enact and Enforce HB 1.

Plaintiffs demand an injunction against any enforcement of the General Assembly’s HB 1 map. Pet. ¶¶ 42–43, 45; *id.* at 8. But “the General Assembly has the power to do whatever is necessary to perform its functions except as expressly restrained by the Constitution.” *Luther*, 730 S.W.3d at 571 (quoting *Liberty Oil Co. v. Dir. of Revenue*, 813 S.W.2d 296, 297 (Mo. banc 1991)). And “[c]onstitutional limitations on the legislative power are ‘strictly construed in favor of the power of the General Assembly.’” *Id.* (quoting *Bd. of Educ. of City of St. Louis v. City of St. Louis*, 879 S.W.2d 530, 533 (Mo. banc 1994)). The Missouri Supreme Court has also instructed that courts may “not hold HB 1 unconstitutional ‘unless it clearly contravenes a constitutional provision.’” *Id.* (quoting *City of St. Louis v. State*, 682 S.W.3d 387, 396 (Mo. banc 2024)); *accord Healey*, 732 S.W.3d at 837 (“The [HB 1] map will be upheld unless it plainly and palpably affronts fundamental law embodied in the constitution, and doubts will be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of the map.” (cleaned up)).

II. Section 116.200, RSMo.

Section 116.200.1, RSMo, provides that “[a]fter the secretary of state certifies a [referendum] petition as sufficient or insufficient, any citizen may apply to the circuit court of Cole County to compel him to reverse his decision.” Subsection 2 then instructs that “[i]f the court decides the petition is sufficient, the secretary of state shall certify it as sufficient and attach a copy of the judgment.” § 116.200.2, RSMo. But “[i]f the court decides the petition is insufficient, the court shall enjoin the

secretary of state from certifying the measure and all other officers from printing the measure on the ballot.” *Id.* Moreover, “[w]ithin ten days after a decision is rendered, any party may appeal it to the supreme court.” § 116.200.3, RSMo.⁶

III. Supremacy of Federal Law.

This action includes several questions that involve overlapping federal and state laws. The U.S. Constitution and the Missouri Constitution establish the supremacy of federal law in the event of a conflict. Article VI of the U.S. Constitution provides:

This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.

U.S. Const. art. VI; *United States v. Missouri*, 114 F.4th 980, 986 (8th Cir. 2024) (“[T]he states are prohibited from passing any acts which shall be repugnant to a law of the United States.” (quotation omitted)). The first Article of the Missouri Constitution also enforces the federal Supremacy Clause, providing that “Missouri is a free and independent state, subject only to the Constitution of the United States.” Mo. Const. art. I, § 4. Thus, the U.S. Constitution and federal law are ultimately dispositive in this action—“any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of [Missouri] to the Contrary notwithstanding.” U.S. Const. art. VI.

⁶ The Missouri Constitution creates an independent basis for the Missouri Supreme Court’s exclusive jurisdiction in this case. This action involves the validity of Article III, Section 52(b) as applied under the U.S. Constitution’s Elections Clause and the Guarantee Clause. *See infra* 31–36. And “[t]he supreme court shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction in all cases involving the validity ... of the constitution of this state.” Mo. Const. art. V, § 3.

ARGUMENT

The Court should reject von Glahn’s claims. Congressional maps are not subject to the Missouri Constitution’s referendum provisions. Even if they were, the U.S. Constitution would invalidate Article III, Section 52(b)—which freezes referred laws pending a statewide vote—as-applied to congressional maps. Missouri’s *Hadley-Purcell* principle also prohibits a last-minute alterations to a congressional map after the Primary Election and mere weeks before the General Election. Finally, the U.S. Constitution and federal law forbid changes to Missouri’s congressional map at this late hour.

I. Congressional maps are not subject to the Missouri Constitution’s referendum provisions.

A. The U.S. Constitution’s Elections Clause requires a clear statement to divest the Missouri General Assembly of its redistricting authority.

The Elections Clause of the U.S. Constitution provides that “[t]he Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the *Legislature* thereof.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 4 (emphasis added). The term “Legislature” was “not . . . of uncertain meaning when incorporated into the Constitution”: It referred to “the representative body which made the laws of the people.” *Hawke v. Smith*, 253 U.S. 221, 227 (1920). The term “Legislature” maintains this same meaning throughout the U.S. Constitution. Elsewhere, the Constitution consistently and unequivocally uses the term “Legislature” in reference to State legislative bodies. *See* U.S. Const. art. I, §§ 2, 3, 8; art. II, § 1; art. IV, §§ 3, 4; art. V; art. VI; amend. XIV, §§ 2, 3; amend. XVII; amend. XVIII, § 3; amend. XX,

§ 6; amend. XXII, § 2. Likewise, when the Elections Clause uses the term “Legislature” “in each State,” the Clause expressly vests the Missouri General Assembly with authority over redistricting.

Here, as in several other contexts where the U.S. Constitution bestows a specific authority on a designated body, that power cannot be taken away absent a clear statement. *See, e.g., Edmond v. United States*, 520 U.S. 651, 658 (1997) (rule guarding President’s authority over appointments); *FDA v. Brown & Williamson*, 529 U.S. 120, 159–60 (2000) (major questions); *Felker v. Turpin*, 518 U.S. 651, 660 (1996) (jurisdiction stripping statutes); *Gregory v. Ashcroft*, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991) (in the federalism context, “[i]f Congress intends to alter the usual constitutional balance ..., it must make its intention to do so unmistakably clear ...” (internal quotation omitted)); *Sossamon v. Texas*, 563 U.S. 277, 285 (2011) (abrogation of sovereign immunity must be “unmistakably clear”). For example, courts require clear statements before finding that Congress gave away its powers, *see West Virginia v. EPA*, 597 U.S. 697, 723 (2022), before finding that Congress infringed the President’s authority to remove federal officials, *see Collins v. Yellen*, 594 U.S. 220, 250 (2021), or before concluding that the courts were stripped of jurisdiction, *see Felker v. Turpin*, 518 U.S. 651, 660–61 (1996).

In the same way, in reading the Missouri Constitution’s referendum provisions, Mo. Const. art. III, §§ 49, 52(a), 52(b), courts cannot presume a major reordering of the delicate balances struck by the framers of the Elections Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 4. Just as all other parts of American government are protected by

clear statement rules before courts find their power stripped, state legislatures are treated no differently under the Elections Clause. *See, e.g., United States v. Gradwell*, 243 U.S. 476, 485 (1917) (Congress may abrogate a state legislature’s Elections Clause authority only “by positive and clear statutes”); *United States v. Oregon*, 828 F. Supp. 3d 1092, 1095–96 (D. Or. 2026) (same, citing *Gradwell*, 243 U.S. at 485); *United States v. Caldwell*, No. CV 26-2025 (ZNQ) (JTQ), 2026 WL 2186515, at *3 (D.N.J. July 29, 2026) (same, citing *Gradwell*, 243 U.S. at 485); *see also Carson v. Simon*, 978 F.3d 1051, 1059–60 (8th Cir. 2020) (“By its plain terms, the Electors Clause vests the power to determine the manner of selecting electors exclusively in the ‘Legislature’ of each state,” and this power is not divested “by means of a general statute in the [state] election code.”).

United States v. Gradwell, 243 U.S. 476, is instructive. That case involved federal prosecutions of defendants in Rhode Island and West Virginia for election fraud. *Id.* at 477–78. In Rhode Island, fourteen defendants had bribed voters during the congressional election in 1914. *Id.* at 478. In West Virginia, twenty defendants participated in an extensive conspiracy to influence a U.S. Senate election in 1916. *Id.* The defendants incited and facilitated voting by “a large number of persons who had not resided in the state a sufficient length of time to entitle them to vote under the state law.” *Id.* The defendants also procured 400 of these individuals “to vote more than once.” *Id.*

The United States indicted these thirty-four defendants under the U.S. Criminal Code, citing statutes with general language that were facially broad enough

prohibit the plainly unlawful acts of the defendants. *Id.* at 478–79. Specifically, the Rhode Island defendants were indicted on “the charge that the defendants conspired ‘to defraud the United States,’ in violation of § 37 of the [federal] Criminal Code.” *Id.* at 479. Section 37 contained broad language prohibiting conspiracy “to defraud the United States in *any* manner for *any* purpose.” *Id.* (quoting U.S. Criminal Code § 37) (emphasis added). The West Virginia defendants were likewise indicted on “the charge that three candidates for the nomination for Senator of the United States were ‘injured and oppressed,’ within the meaning of § 19 of the [U.S.] Criminal Code, by a conspiracy on the part of the defendants to compass their defeat by causing illegal voting for an opposing party candidate at the primary election.” *Id.* Section 19 prohibited conspiracy “to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate *any* citizen in the free exercise of enjoyment of *any* right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having so exercised the same ...” *Id.* at 479–80 (quoting U.S. Criminal Code § 19) (emphasis added).

Despite the broad language of Sections 37 and 19, federal district courts in Rhode Island and West Virginia both dismissed the indictments. *Id.* at 479. The courts held that the indictments “fail[ed] to set forth any offense under the laws of the United States.” *Id.* at 479.

On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed in an opinion applying the Elections Clause’s clear statement rule. *See id.* at 480–89. In interpreting Sections 37 and 19, the Court’s opinion begins with the premise that the Elections Clause presumptively vests regulatory authority over elections “in each state by the

legislature thereof.” *Gradwell*, 243 U.S. at 482 (quoting U.S. Const. art. I, § 4) (emphasis added). The Court then surveyed the history of the Elections Clause since the founding, noting Congress’s extremely limited intrusions on the authority presumptively vested in state legislatures. *Id.* at 482–85; *see also id.* at 484 (quoting James Madison’s prediction that the authority of “state legislatures” to regulate elections “will probably never” be impinged). The Court also emphasized that whenever Congress has displaced state legislative authority, “it has done so by *positive and clear statutes*”—such as election laws in effect from 1870 until 1894. *See id.* at 483–85 (emphasis added). Comparatively, Section 37’s broad language—prohibiting “defraud[ing] the United States in any manner for any purpose,” *id.* at 479—was still not a “positive and clear” statement because its text did not explicitly reference election fraud, *id.* at 485.

The Court also adopted a strict reading of Section 19, finding no application to fraud and repeat voting in West Virginia’s primary election. *Id.* at 486–89. The Court explained that Congress, through Section 19, “has shown no disposition to assume control of such primaries or to participate in them in any way, and that it is not for the courts, in the absence of such legislation, to attempt to supply it by stretching old statutes to new uses, to which they are not adapted and for which they were not intended.” *Id.* at 488–89. The Supreme Court then affirmed dismissal of all the indictments. *Id.* at 489.

In light of *Gradwell*, multiple courts—even just this year—have invoked the Elections Clause’s clear statement rule. *See, e.g., United States v. Oregon*, 828 F.

Supp. 3d at 1095–96; *United States v. Caldwell*, 2026 WL 2186515, at *3. This case is even easier than *Gradwell*. *Gradwell* dealt with Congress’s authority—expressly vested by the Elections Clause—to “at any time by Law make or alter such [Election] Regulations” “prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 4. If Congress—the body with textual authority to override state legislatures under the Elections Clause—must act with clear statements, then so too must other actors. This is observed in other cases involving state-level alterations to the Elections Clause’s assignment of powers. For example, in *State of Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrandt*, a “conclusive” decision by the state supreme court “ma[d]e[] it clear that ... the referendum constituted a part of the state Constitution and laws.” 241 U.S. 565, 568 (1916). Likewise, in *Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission* (“AIRC”), Arizonians had specifically “amended the Arizona Constitution to remove congressional redistricting authority from the State Legislature.” 576 U.S., 787, 796–97 (2015).

Assuming that the Elections Clause “does not preclude” a State from delegating redistricting authority to a referendum, changes to Elections Clause authority must at least be specific to “safeguard limits imposed by the Federal Constitution.” *Moore v. Harper*, 600 U.S. 1, 25, 35 (2023). The U.S. Constitution’s framers made “a deliberate choice” to vest redistricting power in state legislatures, and this Court cannot permit the vagaries of broad language in state law to transfer that power in ways that the framers of state law did not intend. *Id.* at 34. The Elections Clause requires “positive and clear” statements to displace state legislative

authority, and it forbids “stretching old statutes to new uses, to which they are not adapted and for which they were not intended.” *Gradwell*, 243 U.S. at 485, 488–89.

B. The Missouri Constitution contains no clear statement divesting the General Assembly of redistricting authority.

Although the Elections Clause requires a “positive and clear” statement to divest the General Assembly of its redistricting authority, *Gradwell*, 243 U.S. at 485, no such clear statement exists in the Missouri Constitution or Missouri law. “Article III, section 45 is the only provision of the Missouri Constitution directly addressing congressional redistricting.” *Luther*, 730 S.W.3d at 571. And Article III, Section 45 contemplates only that “the *general assembly* shall by law divide the state into [congressional] districts.” Mo. Const. art. III, § 45 (emphasis added). Also, the Missouri Supreme Court has never endorsed referenda on congressional maps. *See Maggard v. State*, 733 S.W.3d 411, 414 n.7 (Mo. banc 2026). Instead, the Court has repeatedly affirmed the General Assembly’s “plenary legislative power” to redistrict under Article III, Section 1 and Article III, Section 45. *Luther*, 730 S.W.3d at 571–74. Moreover, none of the Missouri Constitution’s referendum provisions mentions election laws or congressional redistricting. *See* Mo. Const. art. III, §§ 49, 52(a), 52(b).

To be sure, the language of Article III, Section 49 is broad, “reserv[ing] power to approve or reject by referendum any act of the general assembly.” Mo. Const. art. III, § 49. But broad language—including the word “any”—is insufficient to overcome a clear statement rule. *See Gradwell*, 243 U.S. at 479–90; *Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons*, 552 U.S. 214, 221 n.4 (2008) (noting that clear statement rules “may counteract the effect of expansive modifiers,” such as terms like “any” and “all civil

actions”) (collecting cases); *see also State v. Liberty*, 370 S.W.3d 537, 548 (Mo. banc 2012) (adopting a narrow reading of “any” because the term was “ambiguous”).

In *Gradwell*, for example, Section 37 of the U.S. Criminal Code prohibited conspiracy “to defraud the United States in *any* manner for *any* purpose.” 243 U.S. at 479 (quoting U.S. Criminal Code § 37) (emphasis added). Yet despite the broad language in Section 37, the U.S. Supreme Court applied the Elections Clause’s clear statement rule, and held that “it would be a strained and unreasonable construction to apply” Section 37 to election fraud. *Id.* at 485; *see also id.* at 489–90 (“[I]t is not for the courts, in the absence of such legislation, to attempt to supply [election regulations] by stretching old statutes to new uses, to which they are not adapted and for which they were not intended.”). Likewise, Article III, Section 49’s use of the word “any” cannot serve as a “positive and clear” statement sufficient to rip redistricting authority away from the General Assembly. *Gradwell*, 243 U.S. at 485.

Unsurprisingly, since the Missouri Constitution was ratified in 1945, no court has endorsed a referendum challenging a congressional map. One group sought a referendum on a congressional map in 1952, but its referendum petition was discarded because the group’s petition lacked sufficient signatures in any event. *See State ex rel. Moore v. Toberman*, 250 S.W.2d 701, 702 (Mo. banc 1952). There, the Missouri Supreme Court affirmed a circuit court judgment that “[t]he filing of petitions for referendum prior to April 24, 1952, which said petitions have been proved to be legally insufficient, did not suspend the effective date of” Missouri’s congressional map. *Id.* at 703, 707. Then, most recently in *Maggard v. State*, the

Missouri Supreme Court underscored that its opinion should not be understood to endorse referenda against congressional maps. *See* 733 S.W.3d at 414 n.7 (“[T]his opinion presupposes without deciding HB 1 is subject to the right of referendum.”). *Maggard* went out of its way to note this point even though “[n]o party contend[ed]” that HB 1 was “excepted from the right of referendum.” *Id.* Thus, the Missouri Supreme Court has never endorsed referenda against congressional maps, cementing the absence of a clear statement.⁷

What’s more, the 1945 Constitution explicitly abrogated the only Missouri Supreme Court decision that has ever approved of a referendum on legislative redistricting of any kind. *See* Mo. Const. art. III, § 7. In *State ex rel. Gordon v. Becker*, 49 S.W.2d 146 (Mo. banc 1932), the Missouri Supreme Court—in a fractured decision—held that referenda could be used to challenge legislative districting for the Missouri Senate. To reverse this decision, the 1943–1944 Constitutional Convention included language in Article III, Section 7 providing that “[n]o redistricting plan shall be subject to the referendum.” Mo. Const. art. III, § 7 (1945). The delegates at the Missouri Constitutional Convention specifically cited the *Gordon* decision as warranting adoption of the amendments to prohibit such referenda. *See* Debates of the 1943–1944 Constitutional Convention of Missouri 7016 (2008). The Convention

⁷ Plaintiff will undoubtedly cite unreasoned dicta from *Preisler v. Hearnese*, 362 S.W.2d 552, 557 (Mo. banc 1962). But “an unexplained aside” in an opinion is entitled to little weight. *See Kisor v. Wilkie*, 588 U.S. 558, 597–98 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring). And *Maggard* vitiated any persuasive value that *Preisler* holds by expressly noting that the availability of referenda on congressional maps is an open question. *See Maggard*, 733 S.W.3d at 414 n.7.

thus ensured that legislative districting for the Missouri Senate conformed with all other legislative districting. And because the Missouri Supreme Court had never upheld the referendum's use for congressional redistricting, the Convention had no need to address referenda in the context of congressional redistricting.

It is also obvious that the General Assembly has never contemplated a referendum on a congressional map since the enactment of Chapter 116, RSMo. Chapter 116 was enacted in 1980, and it is the General Assembly's "framework for exercising the right of referendum" in Missouri. *No Bans on Choice v. Ashcroft*, 638 S.W.3d 484, 487 (Mo. banc 2022); *Maggard*, 733 S.W.3d at 415–16 ("The General Assembly enacted the statutory initiative and referendum certification process in chapter 116 in 1980 ... after then secretary of state, James Kirkpatrick, proposed a statutory certification process."). Chapter 116 establishes detailed procedures for referenda and ballot initiatives. But those procedures are obviously incompatible with referenda on congressional maps.

For example, Chapter 116 limits a referendum's summary statement to just 100 words. § 116.334, RSMo. Chapter 116 also contains no provision for photographs to accompany a summary statement. *See* § 116.334, RSMo. Redistricting is an enormously complicated endeavor—where legislators consider legal issues like compactness, geography, population, communities of interest, and countless other factors. *See Healey*, 732 S.W.3d at 839–52. Because redistricting takes expertise, the line-drawing power in other States is consistently vested in state legislatures or plainly transferred to expert commissions. *See Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm'n*, 576

U.S. at 798. If the General Assembly had the slightest inkling that Chapter 116 would facilitate referenda and initiatives on congressional maps, it would not force average people to consider competing maps with virtually no information. In von Glahn’s world, most voters would select a competing congressional map without viewing either of the maps at issue. They could not possibly know—to give just one obvious example—where counties would be placed under the competing maps. Voters would not even know which districts *they* would be placed in under the competing maps. That is absurd.

As another example, Chapter 116 sets the presumptive deadline for the Secretary’s certification decision on the same day as the August Primary Election. *Compare* § 116.150.3, RSMo, *with* § 115.121.1–2, RSMo. Sometimes, Chapter 116 imposes a deadline even *after* the August Primary if local election authorities return their signature verifications to the Secretary less than two weeks before the Primary. *See* § 116.150.3, RSMo.⁸ The General Assembly would have never imposed this timeframe if it believed that referenda on congressional maps are possible. Von Glahn criticizes the Secretary for rendering a certification decision according to Chapter 116’s deadline. But the Secretary followed the law perfectly. *See* § 116.150.3, RSMo. The problem is with von Glahn’s project, not with Chapter 116. Chapter 116 simply illustrates the obvious: The Missouri Constitution lacks any

⁸ “The secretary of state shall issue a certificate pursuant to this section not later than 5:00 p.m. on the thirteenth Tuesday prior to the general election *or* two weeks after the date the election authority certifies the results of a petition verification pursuant to subsection 2 of section 116.130, *whichever is later.*” § 116.150.3, RSMo (emphasis added).

“positive and clear” statement authorizing referenda on congressional maps. *Gradwell*, 243 U.S. at 485.

The potential harm does not end with referenda. The Missouri Constitution provides for initiative measures in the same provision where it provides for referenda. *See* Mo. Const. art. III, § 49. So if a referendum were permitted, virtually any group could use the initiative process to propose congressional maps. This could lead to a host of consequences, including inviting violations of the “one person, one vote” rule, *see Wesberry v. Sanders*, 376 U.S. 1, 18 (1964), or the Voting Rights Act. In von Glahn’s brave new world, map-drawing would be left not to deliberative and democratically accountable legislators or given to expert independent commissions. Instead, various special interests groups could easily force their maps before voters through the State’s initiative process. Voters would be “educated” on the competing maps via dark-money-funded advertising and 100-word summary statements about each proposal. And if the General Assembly tries its hand at redistricting, dark-money-funded groups could easily gather signatures for a referendum, thus freezing implementation of a new map until the next election. That, in turn, will predictably lead to apportionment paralysis and invite one-person, one-vote violations if the State is forced to use an old map in the interim. The potential for chaos is endless—which goes to the lack of a clear statement in the Missouri Constitution and Missouri law. If the framers and the General Assembly had even considered the possibility that referenda and ballot initiatives could apply to congressional redistricting, they would have devised a different (and more sensible) system.

Without any clear statement, von Glahn merely cites one example of a 1922 referendum on a congressional map. *See* Ex. 17. This referendum was held over two decades before the 1945 Constitution, and nearly six decades before the General Assembly enacted Chapter 116—the modern “framework for exercising the right of referendum” in Missouri. *No Bans*, 638 S.W.3d at 487; *Maggard*, 733 S.W.3d at 415–16. The 1922 referendum was never the subject of litigation, and no Missouri court has ever endorsed it. Moreover, in 1922, Missouri statutory law (unlike Chapter 116 today) forbade the Secretary of State from analyzing the substantive constitutionality of referenda. *Compare State ex rel. Kemper v. Carter*, 165 S.W. 773, 780 (Mo. banc 1914), *with Maggard*, 733 S.W.3d at 418 (“chapter 116 went into effect in January 1981” and is “a statutory process that did not exist when *Kemper* was decided”).⁹ Thus, in 1922 (unlike today), the Secretary of State had no occasion to weigh the constitutionality of a referendum on a congressional map. The 1922 referendum thus lacks even an implicit endorsement from any Missouri official—legislative, executive, or judicial.

At best, the 1922 referendum shows the practice of one group of private citizens over a century ago. Decades later, a new Missouri Constitution was adopted in 1945. And notably, no congressional plan has subsequently been subjected to a referendum vote—a fact that should surprise the Court if Plaintiff’s legal theory is right, given

⁹ *Accord von Glahn*, 2025 WL 3514277, at *1, 4 n.4 (recognizing the Chapter 116 “authority” of the “Secretary of State to reject [PNP’s] petition as unconstitutional during post-submission review”); *Missouri Gen. Assembly v. von Glahn*, No. 4:25-CV-1535-ZMB, 2026 WL 1290477, at *4 (E.D. Mo. May 11, 2026) (same).

the strong incentives of the minority party to challenge redistricting plans adopted by the majority party. Thus, the 1922 example is hardly a line of established, unbroken practice about the meaning of the Missouri Constitution’s referendum provisions. Moreover, *even if* such practice existed, it would not be sufficient to overcome the Elections Clause’s clear statement rule. *See Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc.*, 575 U.S. 320, 329 (2015) (even “long-established practice” cannot overcome a clear statement rule); *Mejia Olalde v. Noem*, No. 1:25-CV-00168-JMD, 2025 WL 3131942, at *5 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 10, 2025) (same).

Von Glahn has thus failed to provide a “positive and clear” statement in the Missouri Constitution authorizing referenda on congressional maps. *Gradwell*, 243 U.S. at 485.

C. Even read without reference to the U.S. Constitution’s Elections Clause, the Missouri Constitution does not authorize referenda on congressional maps.

Even if the Elections Clause did not impose a clear statement rule (it does), the Missouri Constitution—properly read—does not sanction referenda on congressional maps. “Article III, section 45 is the only provision of the Missouri Constitution directly addressing congressional redistricting.” *Luther*, 730 S.W.3d at 571. And Article III, Section 45 provides that after “each census,” “the general assembly *shall* by law divide the state into districts corresponding with the number of representatives to which it is entitled.” Mo. Const. art. III, § 45 (emphasis added). In other words, Section 45 invalidates the pre-Census map and *obligates* the General Assembly to redistrict after each decennial Census. Section 45 also makes no mention of a referendum being available for congressional redistricting plans. This is for good

reason: If the Missouri Constitution's referendum provisions apply to redistricting, fulfilling the General Assembly's duty under Article III, Section 45 could be impossible—and Missouri could be left with no congressional map after the decennial Census.

The Court must also keep in mind that all “[c]onstitutional limitations on the legislative power are ‘strictly construed in favor of the power of the General Assembly.’” *Luther*, 730 S.W.3d at 571 (quoting *Bd. of Educ. of City of St. Louis*, 879 S.W.2d at 533). And “the General Assembly has the power to do whatever is necessary to perform its functions except as *expressly restrained* by the Constitution.” *Id.* (emphasis added) (quoting *Liberty Oil*, 813 S.W.2d at 297). In light of these standards, Article III, Section 45 makes this a straightforward case. Section 45 *expressly obligates* the General Assembly to use its legislative powers to redistrict. *Luther*, 730 S.W.3d at 571–73. Thus, the Missouri Constitution only bolsters the General Assembly's already expansive legislative power in the redistricting context.

Moreover, the referendum provision itself can be read to exempt congressional maps from its coverage. *Maggard*, 733 S.W.3d at 414 n.7. Article III, Section 52(a) specifically excepts from the referendum “laws necessary for the immediate *preservation of the public peace, health or safety*, and laws making appropriations for the current expenses of the state government, *for the maintenance of state institutions* and for the support of public schools.” Mo. Const. art. III, § 52(a) (emphasis added). Any apparent conflict in the Constitution could be harmonized through at least two of these exceptions. *See State ex rel. Jones v. Atterbury*, 300 S.W.2d 806, 810 (Mo.

banc 1957) (“The constitution must be read as a whole and seemingly conflicting provisions should be harmonized so as to give effect to the whole.” (citing *Toberman*, 250 S.W.2d at 705)).

First, congressional maps are excepted from referenda because they are necessary “for the maintenance of state institutions.” Mo. Const. art. III, § 52(a). The term “institution” can refer to “a custom or practice that has existed for a long time and is accepted as an important part of a society,” such as “the institution of marriage.” *Institution*, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY;¹⁰ see also *Institution*, MERRIAM WEBSTER DICTIONARY (similar).¹¹ Laws necessary “for the maintenance of state institutions,” Mo. Const. art. III, § 52(a), can thus refer to laws necessary to preserve the most basic norms and practices of Missouri. That principle applies here because suffrage is certainly a fundamental Missouri institution. See Mo. Const. art. I, § 25; *Priorities USA v. State*, 591 S.W.3d 448, 452 (Mo. banc 2020). “The right to vote freely for the candidate of one’s choice is of the essence of a democratic society.” *St. Louis Cnty. Bd. of Election Commissioners v. McShane*, 492 S.W.3d 177, 180 (Mo. App. E.D. 2016) (internal quotation omitted). The U.S. Constitution also guards the fundamental right of Missourians to select their representatives in Congress every two years. U.S. Const. art. I, § 2.

Perhaps no institution could be more fundamental to a free society than elections. To maintain that State institution, the Missouri Constitution specifically

¹⁰<https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/institution?q=Institution>

¹¹ <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/institution>

obligates the General Assembly to redistrict (at least) after each Census. Mo. Const. art. III, § 45. The General Assembly also holds plenary legislative authority to redistrict even more often if necessary. *See Luther*, 730 S.W.3d at 571–74. Post-Census redistricting is also functionally required by virtue of the U.S. Constitution’s “one person, one vote” rule. *See Wesberry*, 376 U.S. at 18. “Legislators are elected by voters, not farms or cities or economic interests. As long as ours is a representative form of government, and our legislatures are those instruments of government elected directly by and directly representative of the people ...” *Reynolds v. Sims*, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964). Fulfilling these requirements would be impossible without redistricting. *See* Mo. Const. art. III, § 45. Thus, redistricting legislation is squarely excepted from referenda because it is necessary “for the maintenance” of suffrage—which is a fundamental “state institution[].” *Id.* art. III, § 52(a).

Second, redistricting legislation is excepted from the referendum because it is “necessary” for “preservation of the public peace, health or safety.” Mo. Const. art. III, § 52(a). Again, facilitating elections is impossible without redistricting legislation. And “the political franchise of voting” is “preservative of all rights.” *Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections*, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966) (quoting *Yick Wo v. Hopkins*, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886)). That is why the Missouri Constitution speaks “‘with unmistakable clarity’ that Missouri citizens have a fundamental right to vote.” *Priorities USA*, 591 S.W.3d at 452 (citation omitted); Mo. Const. art. I, § 25 (“[A]ll elections shall be free and open; and no power, civil or military, shall at any time interfere to prevent the free exercise of the right of suffrage.”). Regular and fair

elections are a fundamental component of a free society. Article III, Section 52(a) thus exempts election laws, such as the HB 1 map, from referendum challenges. Miniscule fractions of Missouri's population (3.3% of voters) cannot demand referenda on legislation that is so essential to the "preservation of the public peace." Mo. Const. art. III, § 52(a).

The Court should therefore conclude that the Missouri Constitution does not authorize referenda against congressional maps and enter judgment for the Secretary.

II. The U.S. Constitution renders Article III, Section 52(b) of Missouri Constitution invalid as applied to HB 1.

In the alternative, *even if* the Court believes that the Missouri Constitution permits referenda on congressional maps, the U.S. Constitution would invalidate Article III, Section 52(b)—which freezes referred laws pending a statewide vote—as applied to HB 1. And, in the event of a conflict, the U.S. Constitution supersedes. *See* U.S. Const. art. VI ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land ... any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."); Mo. Const. art. I, § 4 ("Missouri is a free and independent state, subject only to the Constitution of the United States").

Two provisions of the U.S. Constitution are relevant. First, the Elections Clause provides that "[t]he Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof." U.S. Const. art. I, § 4. This Clause is rooted in a republican theory of government, and it was essential to securing ratification of the U.S. Constitution.

The founders settled on vesting regulatory authority over elections in state legislatures—as “the *representative* body which ma[kes] the laws of *the people*.” *Smiley v. Holm*, 285 U.S. 355, 365 (1932) (emphasis added, internal quotation omitted).

But in von Glahn’s proposed world, about 3.3% of Missourians can temporarily suspend a duly-enacted congressional map. Pet. ¶¶ 6–7, 42–43, 45; *id.* at 8. That would flagrantly violates the Elections Clause. HB 1 passed overwhelmingly in both houses of the General Assembly and was signed by the Governor. *See* Mo. Senate J. 25–26 (2d Extra. Sess., 103d Gen. Assembly, Sept. 12, 2025); Mo. House J. 37–38 (2d Extra. Sess., 103d Gen. Assembly, Sept. 9, 2025). Yet according to von Glahn, the Article III, Section 52(b) of the Missouri Constitution mandates that HB 1 cannot take effect (and is thus temporarily repealed) *until* voters weigh in. *See* Pet. ¶¶ 6–7, 42–43, 45; *id.* at 8.

That would violate the U.S. Constitution and basic democratic principles. If von Glahn is right, just 3.3% of registered voters could suspend Missouri’s congressional map for an entire election cycle. *See* Mo. Const. art. III, § 52(a); Pet. ¶ 42 (von Glahn alleging that “he is entitled to the immediate suspension of the use and implementation of HB 1”). To the extent that the U.S. Constitution’s Elections Clause means *anything*, it certainly prohibits 3.3% of voters from voiding a congressional map enacted by the General Assembly.

Of course, 110 years ago in *Hildebrandt*, 241 U.S. 565, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the U.S. Constitution’s Guarantee Clause did not prevent Ohio from

subjecting congressional maps to a referendum. But neither *Hildebrant* nor any other Supreme Court decision suggested that just 3.3% of a State’s voters can displace a lawfully-enacted congressional map for an entire election cycle. To allow that result here would defy the Elections Clause, and *would* “introduce a virus which destroys that [legislative] power, which in effect annihilates representative government.” *Id.* at 569.

Such a scheme would also violate the U.S. Constitution’s Guarantee Clause. The Guarantee Clause provides that “[t]he United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government.” U.S. Const. art. IV, § 4. There is no mystery about what constitutes a “Republican Form of Government.” *Id.* “All the States had governments when the Constitution was adopted. In all the people participated to some extent, through their representatives elected in the manner specially provided.” *Minor v. Happersett*, 88 U.S. 162, 175 (1874). Von Glahn’s proposed remedy—nullification of HB 1 *without* a majority vote, Pet. ¶¶ 42–43, 45; *id.* at 8—would allow a small, unelected fraction of Missourians to control the State’s congressional map for an entire election cycle. This palpably affronts the Guarantee Clause. In George Washington’s words, “[I]f the Laws are to be so trampled upon—with impunity—and a minority (a small one too) is to dictate to the majority,” then “there is an end put, at one stroke, to republican government.” See Letter from George Washington to Charles Mynn Thruston (Aug. 10, 1794).¹²

¹² <https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-16-02-0376>

The Guarantee Clause “necessarily implies a duty on the part of the States themselves to provide” a republican form of government. *Minor*, 88 U.S. at 175. Thus, the State of Missouri cannot permit just 3.3% of the State’s voting population to suspend a duly-enacted congressional map. *See* Mo. Const. art. III, §§ 52(a), 52(b). To permit this would blatantly violate the separation of powers, which is essential to republican government. Surely, if the legislative authority and the Governor’s veto authority cannot be broadly delegated to “unelected administrative official[s],” then it would violate basic republican principles to vest legislative and veto authority in a small band of voters seeking to temporarily suspend a congressional map. *See Robinson v. Missouri Dept. of Health and Sr. Services*, No. 20AC-CC00515, 2021 WL 7441868, at *1 (Mo.Cir. Nov. 26, 2021) (Green, J.). Indeed, “[o]ne of the settled maxims in constitutional law is that the power conferred upon the legislature to make laws cannot be delegated by that department to any other body or authority.” *Id.* (quoting Cooley, *Constitutional Limitations* (1886), pp. 116–117). But that is exactly what von Glahn tries to do here. Even “a middle school civics student would recognize” a problem with this. *Id.*

History and tradition also confirm this understanding. As to history, the founding generation clearly understood “a republic” to refer to “a government in which the scheme of representation takes place.” *Federalist No. 10* (Madison). James Madison explained that a “republic” involves “the delegation of the government ... to a small number of citizens elected by the rest.” *Id.* Post-enactment tradition also

confirms the founders' understanding of a "Republican Form of Government." U.S. Const. art. IV, § 4. In *Duncan v. McCall*, the U.S. Supreme Court opined:

By the constitution, a republican form of government is guarantied to every state in the Union, and the distinguishing feature of that form is the right of the people to choose their own officers for governmental administration, and pass their own laws in virtue of the legislative power reposed in representative bodies, whose legitimate acts may be said to be those of the people themselves ...

139 U.S. 449, 461 (1891).

Members of the Missouri Supreme Court have also agreed that a "Republican Form of Government" refers to the fundamental right of Missourians to enact laws through their elected representatives. In a 1917 case, Judge Archelus Woodson articulated this understanding clearly:

Under a republican form of government (and all of the states of the Union are such, Section 4, art. 4, of the Constitution of the United States), I know of no mode by which a state can put in force and operation a statute, except by the lawmaking body thereof, and, when properly enacted, it is designated and commonly called a statute, and, of course, is a statute of the state enacting it.

Madden v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 192 S.W. 455, 458 (Mo. banc 1917) (Woodson, J., concurring in the judgment).

Together, these sources show that the right of the people to enact legislation through elected representatives is the defining feature of a "Republican Form of Government." U.S. Const. art. IV, § 4. As to HB 1, Missourians have spoken overwhelmingly. HB 1 passed 21 to 11 in the Senate and 90 to 65 in the House of Representatives. See Mo. Senate J. 25–26 (2d Extra. Sess., 103d Gen. Assembly, Sept. 12, 2025); Mo. House J. 37–38 (2d Extra. Sess., 103d Gen. Assembly, Sept. 9, 2025). Even if a small percentage of Missouri's registered voters signed a referendum

petition, Mo. Const. art. III, § 52(a), the Guarantee Clause forbids the State of Missouri from allowing a small fraction to override the People's elected representatives. This is especially true in the context of a congressional map, where this years' election will control Missouri's representation in Congress for the next two years. Until a majority of Missourians vote against the HB 1 map, the will of the People must remain in effect. Any other result would violate the Guarantee Clause.

III. Changing the congressional map at this hour is impossible. Thus, the *Hadley-Purcell* principle forbids von Glahn's impossible demand.

Even if von Glahn is correct that 3.3% of Missouri voters can freeze duly enacted congressional maps, changing the congressional map is “literally impossible” after the 2026 Primary Election. Ex. 28, Brown Aff. ¶ 6. Von Glahn pretends that the Court can award relief simply by enjoining “the use and implementation of HB 1.” Pet. ¶¶ 42–43, 45; *id.* at 8. But having demanded this extraordinary remedy, von Glahn's Petition offers *zero* explanation as to *how* the Court can provide it. Indeed, it is unclear whether von Glahn envisions an injunction ordering a new Primary under the so-called “correct congressional districts,” *id.* ¶ 45, or whether he demands an injunction that would simply change Missouri's map as to the General Election alone. In the latter case, it is unclear whether von Glahn intends to throw out the results of the Primary Election before proceeding to the General Election under a completely different congressional map.

No matter what von Glahn envisions, basic principles of equity mandate rejection of von Glahn's claims. It is far, *far* too late to change the map governing the 2026 elections. Candidate filing ended in late March. § 115.349.1, RSMo. Missouri

finished its Primary Election—in which 1.2 million people voted—roughly two weeks ago. §§ 115.121.2, 115.341, RSMo. On the date of trial, the General Election will be less than eleven weeks away. § 115.121.1, RSMo. At this point, changing the HB 1 map is unthinkable—even if von Glahn proves a constitutional violation.

The Missouri Supreme Court’s decision in *Hadley* is dispositive. See *Hadley v. Junior Coll. Dist. of Metro. Kansas City*, 460 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. banc 1970). There, the Missouri Supreme Court confronted a remand after the U.S. Supreme Court found that districts for electing school officials were unconstitutionally apportioned. 460 S.W.2d at 2. On the date that the Missouri Supreme Court rendered its decision, the candidate filing period was scheduled to end in a few days. *Id.* at 2. The Court noted that “[f]ive candidates have filed for the office, and the election machinery already is in operation.” *Id.* at 3. Furthermore, “[a]bsentee ballots for that election are now being printed and other preparations, including necessary adjustments of voting machines, are in progress. Substantial expense has been incurred and substantial additional expense would be involved if the election of trustees is postponed and such election is held at a later date.” *Id.* The Court thus concluded that “it would be wholly inequitable and impracticable to attempt at this late date to” order an adjustment to the unconstitutionally apportioned districts. *Id.* In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted the U.S. Supreme Court’s own precedent that “a court is entitled to *and should* consider the proximity of a forthcoming election and the mechanics and complexities of state election laws, and should act and rely upon general equitable principles.” *Id.* at 2 (emphasis added) (quoting *Reynolds*, 377 U.S. at 585).

Today, the U.S. Supreme Court still applies this equitable principle—known as the *Purcell* principle in federal court. See *Purcell v. Gonzalez*, 549 U.S. 1, 4–5 (2006). In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court applied the *Purcell* principle to foreclose challenges to Texas’s congressional map for the 2026 elections *nine* months ago—during Texas’s candidate filing period. See *Abbott v. LULAC*, 146 S. Ct. 418, 419 (2025). If this case were in federal court, von Glahn’s request for an injunction would be deemed frivolous.

Undeterred, von Glahn soldiers on—demanding a change to Missouri’s congressional map two weeks *after* the August Primary. The State is not aware of any court that has ever awarded such a drastic remedy. And *Hadley* certainly requires rejection of von Glahn’s claims here. Missouri’s candidate-filing period closed over four months ago. § 115.349.1, RSMo. The Primary Election finished over a week ago. §§ 115.121.2, 115.341, RSMo. For almost a year, candidates have built their campaigns based on the assumption that the HB 1 map would govern. Money has been raised; voters have adjusted to new districts; and 1.2 million Missourians voted under those districts. Candidates are now campaigning for Missouri’s General Election in November. Candidates advancing to the General Election have collectively raised about \$20,000,000 for the contest in November.¹³ Candidates and

¹³ See Fed. Elec. Comm’n, *Campaign Finance Data: Missouri - House District 01*, <https://archive.is/6vnQU>; *id.* *Missouri - House District 02*, <https://archive.is/e7DxI>; *id.* *Missouri - House District 03*, <https://archive.is/Dx3FE>; *id.* *Missouri - House District 04*, <https://archive.is/WLaJ7>; *id.* *Missouri - House District 05*, <https://archive.is/D5YSA>; *id.* *Missouri - House District 06*, <https://archive.is/HuVvv>; *id.* *Missouri - House District 07*, <https://archive.is/Sveh3>; *id.* *Missouri - House District 08*, <https://archive.ph/HzSmW>.

voters have overwhelming reliance interests in maintaining the current map. *See* Ex. 35; Ex. 36; Ex. 37; *Merrill v. Milligan*, 142 S. Ct. 879, 880–81 (2022) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“Late judicial tinkering with election laws can lead to disruption and to unanticipated and unfair consequences for candidates, political parties, and voters, among others.”).

Also, changing the map before the General Election is “literally impossible”—as Tammy Brown’s testimony establishes. Ex. 28, Brown Aff. ¶¶ 6, 19. Brown has twenty-five years of experience as a Jackson County election official. *Id.* ¶ 1. She has facilitated over a hundred elections in Jackson County, and she helped manage Jackson County’s efforts to implement redrawn congressional maps in 2012, 2022, and 2026. *Id.* ¶¶ 1, 3. Brown has never heard of Missouri—or any other State—ever changing their congressional map between a primary election and a general election. *Id.* ¶ 5.

As Brown explains in her affidavit, to implement a new congressional map, local election officials must transfer voters in Missouri’s Centralized Voter Registration (“MCVR”) system. This is a slow, meticulous process that involves manually moving individual voters from one congressional district to another. *Id.* ¶ 7. It involves careful analysis of printed maps, and several rounds of proofreading. *Id.* This arduous process usually takes 2 – 2 ½ weeks, and requires *at least* 7–10 days

if election officials worked overtime and weekends in order to quickly implement a new map. *Id.*¹⁴

Critically, the MCVR system locks shortly before absentee ballots are distributed and remains locked until an election is certified two weeks after election day. *Id.* ¶ 8.¹⁵ This year, the MCVR system will remain locked until (at least) mid-November because of a Jackson County special election in September 2026. *Id.* ¶ 9. Thus, changing the map in the MCVR system is “literally impossible” until after the November General Election. *Id.* ¶¶ 6, 19.¹⁶

¹⁴ *Accord* Ex. 32, Letter of Missouri Association of County Clerks and Election Authorities; Ex. 29, Amicus Br. of Brianna Lennon at 11–14, *supra*; Ex. 30, Amicus Br. of Kurt Bahr at 13–16, *supra*; Ex. 31, Trial Testimony of Shawn Kieffer at 109:1–17, *supra*.

¹⁵ In light of MCVR’s locking function, the Missouri Association of County Clerks and Election Authorities feared that there would not be any window available after January 2026 to change Missouri’s congressional map. *See* Ex. 32, Letter of Missouri Association of County Clerks and Election Authorities (“Redistricting complicates this process because MCVR ‘locks’ current district boundaries during any active election so that new districts cannot be created, and voters subsequently cannot be assigned to new districts.”); *see also* Ex. 29, Amicus Br. of Brianna Lennon at 11–14, *supra* (“Typically, the last possible time for a local election official to establish new districts for an election is the ninth Tuesday before an election.”); Ex. 30, Amicus Br. of Kurt Bahr at 13–16, *supra* (“[L]ocal election authorities cannot access MCVR to enter new district lines at just any time of year. For lengthy stretches of time, MCVR is necessarily ‘locked’ to protect against structural districting changes. This lockout lasts for a period before and after each election while ballots are printed and mailed, poll lists are compiled, voting occurs, votes are canvassed, and returns are certified.”).

¹⁶ Brown also address the affidavit of Brianna Lennon, explaining: “Ms. Lennon’s representation is wrong [at least] as to Jackson County. In Jackson County, we exclusively implemented the HB 1 congressional map in the MCVR database for the 2026 congressional election. Reverting to the 2022 map would require us to reopen the MCVR database and to manually adjust each precinct’s and each voter’s

Further, to comply with UOCAVA, Missouri local election officials must send ballots to military and overseas voters no later than September 19, 2026. *See* 52 U.S.C. § 20302(a)(8). This requires printing ballots no later than eight weeks before the election (September 8, 2026). Ex. 28, Brown Aff. ¶ 11. Election officials also need at least two weeks before printing (August 25, 2026) to design and test ballots. *Id.*¹⁷ And all of this can occur only after Missouri election officials implement the congressional map in the MCVR database. *Id.*¹⁸ But again, changing the congressional map in MCVR is impossible while an election is ongoing. *Id.* ¶ 8.¹⁹ And Missouri currently has several ongoing elections—between the August Primary Election and the September Special Election in Jackson County. *Id.* ¶ 9.

In other words, von Glahn’s proposed remedy is impossible. Von Glahn surely knows this. That is why, many months ago, PNP and von Glahn repeatedly characterized their lawsuits as “time-sensitive election case[s]” because of their “impact” on “the 2026 election” and the need to avoid “chaos in August.” Ex. 22, Mot.

congressional district back to the 2022 map. As far as I am aware, there is no ‘magic button’ that would suddenly allow us to revert to the 2022 congressional districts.”

¹⁷ *Accord* Ex. 31, Trial Testimony of Shawn Kieffer at 105:25–108:21.

¹⁸ *Accord* Ex. 32, Letter of Missouri Association of County Clerks and Election Authorities (“The lack of decided boundary lines [implemented in MCVR] effectively prohibits election authorities from preparing ballot types that accurately represent the correct political subdivisions for each residential address, which means ballots will not be ready for voters.”).

¹⁹ *Accord* Ex. 32, Letter of Missouri Association of County Clerks and Election Authorities; Ex. 29, Amicus Br. of Brianna Lennon at 11–14, *supra*; Ex. 30, Amicus Br. of Kurt Bahr at 13–16, *supra*.

to Expedite at 1–2, *State ex rel. People Not Politicians v. Limbaugh*, No. WD88821 (Mo. App. W.D., filed April 1, 2026); *see also* Ex. 23, SIS Pet. for Writ of Prohibition at 5–6, *Limbaugh*, No. WD88821. That is also why opponents of HB 1—including opponents represented by von Glahn’s counsel—repeatedly stated that they needed judicial resolution of HB 1’s status before the candidate-filing period *opened last February*.²⁰ Many of these plaintiffs acknowledged that equitable principles would eventually require Missouri courts “to favor the status quo in a legal dispute during the lead-up to an election.” *See, e.g.*, Ex. 26, SIS Mot. for Prelim. Inj. at 16, *Maggard v. State*, No. 25AC-CC09120 (Mo. Cir. Ct., filed Jan. 14, 2026) (quotation omitted). The State *never* contested that point; in fact, it started asserting the *Hadley-Purcell* principle in February 2026. *See* Respondent’s Br. at 54, *Luther v. Hoskins*, No. SC101412 (Mo., filed Feb. 9, 2026). And even *Democracy Docket* admitted in March 2026 that Judge Stumpe’s ruling in *Maggard* “likely killed attempts to stop Republicans from imposing the new map” because of the candidate-filing deadline “rapidly approaching on Mar. 31,” 2026. Ex. 34, Jen Rice, *GOP derails bid to stop Missouri gerrymander for 2026*, *Democracy Docket* (Mar. 27, 2026).²¹ Now, two weeks after the Primary Election, it is certainly too late to enjoin “any further steps to implement or mandate the use of HB 1.” Pet. at 8.

²⁰ *See* Ex. 24, Mot. to Expedite at 2, *Luther v. Hoskins*, No. SC101412 (Mo. banc, filed Dec. 31, 2025); Ex. 25, Pltfs.’ Opp. to a Continuance at 1–3, *Wise v. State* and *Healey v. State*, Nos. 2516-CV29597, 2516-CV31273 (Mo. Cir. Ct., filed Dec. 15, 2025); Ex. 26, SIS Mot. for Prelim. Inj. at 16, *Maggard v. State*, No. 25AC-CC09120 (Mo. Cir. Ct., filed Jan. 14, 2026).

²¹ <https://archive.ph/pUnQs>

Other cases also corroborate why Missouri must conduct its general election under the HB 1 map. As far as the State is aware, every time a redistricting plan is invalidated after a primary election, courts have stayed their remedy as to the upcoming general election. *See, e.g., Covington v. North Carolina*, 316 F.R.D. 117, 176–77 (M.D.N.C. 2016) (allowing general election “to proceed as scheduled under the challenged plans” despite being determined unconstitutional after the primary); *Page v. Va. State Bd. of Elections*, 58 F. Supp. 3d 533, 554 (E.D. Va. 2014) (“[G]eneral principles of equity dictate that Virginia’s 2014 elections should proceed as scheduled under the challenged districting plans” after plan found invalid one month before general election.), *vacated on other grounds sub nom., Cantor v. Personhuballah*, 135 S. Ct. 1699 (2015); *Vera v. Richards*, 861 F. Supp. 1304, 1351 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (ordering election held on unconstitutional map after primary had already been held), *aff’d sub nom., Bush v. Vera*, 517 U.S. 952 (1996); *see also Terrazas v. Slagle*, 821 F. Supp. 1154, 1159 (W.D. Tex. 1992) (“Primary elections for offices chosen by the electorate in separate geographical districts obviously make no sense unless the districts are the same for the ensuing general election as for the primary.”). This Court must similarly reject von Glahn’s request for such a drastic remedy here.

IV. The U.S. Constitution and federal law forbid changing Missouri’s congressional map during an election.

Finally, von Glahn’s proposed remedy—an injunction against “the use and implementation of HB 1,” Pet. ¶¶ 42–43, 45; *id.* at 8—would violate the U.S. Constitution and federal law. It is unclear precisely what remedy von Glahn envisions, especially because the Primary Election finished on August 4. But

regardless, any potential remedy would violate federal law and the U.S. Constitution. Hosting another primary would be impossible in light of deadlines prescribed by UOCAVA, 52 U.S.C. § 20302. And holding a General Election under a *different* congressional map would violate the U.S. Constitution's Article I, Section 2 and its Equal Protection Clause. Thus, the Court must reject von Glahn's proposed remedy.

A. An order requiring the State to host a new Primary Election would force a violation of 52 U.S.C. § 20302 (“UOCAVA”).

Von Glahn's first potential remedy—an order invalidating the Primary Election altogether and requiring a new primary—would force Missouri to violate UOCAVA, 52 U.S.C. § 20302.

UOCAVA requires local election authorities to transmit ballots “not later than 45 days before the election” to military and overseas voters, 52 U.S.C. § 20302(a)(8), § 115.914, RSMo, and Missouri statutes implementing UOCAVA prevent the certification of election results for three days after an election, *see* §§ 115.920.1, 115.508, RSMo. Mathematically, that requires *at least* 93 days to run a primary and general election by the federally-imposed deadline on November 3, 2026. *See Foster v. Love*, 522 U.S. 67, 73–74 (1997) (holding that State may not run federal election in conflict with federal timing of 2 U.S.C. § 7). Yet, on the day of trial, Missouri will be 76 days away from the November General Election. Thus, as a matter of federal law, it is already too late to order Missouri to re-run its Primary Election.

UOCAVA is also enforceable by the U.S. Attorney General in federal district court. 52 U.S.C. § 20307(a). Any failure to comply with UOCAVA by Missouri would

likely subject the State to an adverse federal injunction contradicting any potential state order that conflicts with UOCAVA. *See id.*

The Court should comply with federal law and reject von Glahn's claim.

B. An order requiring a General Election under a different map would violate the U.S. Constitution.

To the press, Plaintiff's counsel has floated an alternative proposal: having the winners of the Primary Election held under the HB 1 map simply run in different congressional districts in the General Election. *See, e.g., Jason Hancock, Referendum campaign asks court to block new Missouri map from November election, MISSOURI INDEPENDENT* (Aug. 5, 2026);²² *see also* Pet. ¶ 45. In other words, hundreds of thousands of voters would vote for candidates in the General Election that they had no role in choosing in the Primary Election. Cole County voters, for example, chose Rick Brattin and Emanuel Cleaver as the candidates for Congressional District 5, but Plaintiff apparently thinks Cole County voters should be forced to choose between Bob Onder and Bethany Mann—who were chosen by entirely different voters in Congressional District 3.

This idea is not just profoundly antidemocratic; it violates federal law. The U.S. Constitution protects the right to vote and prohibits States from nullifying votes cast in federal congressional elections. *See* U.S. Const. art. I, §2; *United States v. Mosley*, 238 U.S. 383, 386 (1915) (recognizing that the constitutional right to vote includes “right to have one’s vote counted”). But that is exactly what von Glahn

²² <https://archive.is/Sb26p>

seemingly proposes here—a plan that would render hundreds of thousands of votes in the Primary Election effectively null and void.

Nor does the fact that von Glahn proposes to nullify a primary election—as opposed to a general election—change anything. U.S. Supreme Court precedent establishes that “[w]here the state law has made the primary an integral part of the procedure of choice . . . the right of the elector to have his ballot counted at the primary, is likewise included in the right protected by” the Constitution’s right to vote. *United States v. Classic*, 313 U.S. 299, 318 (1941). Said another way, the primary and general elections are “fus[ed]” into a “single instrumentality” such that they possess a “unitary character.” *Smith v. Allwright*, 321 U.S. 649, 660–61 (1944).

This is certainly true in Missouri, where the State Supreme Court has held that “[n]ominating or primary elections have constitutional stature in Missouri” and serve an “integral part of [the State’s] election machinery.” *State ex rel. McClellan v. Kirkpatrick*, 504 S.W.2d 83, 86 (Mo. banc 1974) (citing Mo. Const. art. VIII, § 3). Missouri law also provides that “all candidates for elective office shall be nominated at a primary election,” §§ 115.339, 115.343, RSMo. Thus, the primary “exclud[es] from the ballot on the general election the names of candidates rejected at the primary” such that it “impose[s] restrictions upon the choice of candidates by the voters save by voting at the primary election.” *Classic*, 313 U.S. at 313. This makes the primary “integral” “as a matter of law.” *Id.* at 314; *McClellan*, 504 S.W.2d at 86.

Von Glahn’s proposed scheme also violates the U.S. Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause for an additional reason. *See* U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Once

again, von Glahn envisions requiring hundreds of thousands of Missourians to consider a slate of candidates that they never considered in the Primary Election. These voters would possess less voting power than those who participated in a Primary and General Election in the same congressional district. That disparity in voting power would violate the Equal Protection Clause.

For example, in *Gray v. Sanders*, the U.S. Supreme Court confronted Georgia primary-election procedures that “weight[ed] the rural vote more heavily than the urban vote and weight[ed] some small rural counties heavier than other larger rural counties.” *Gray v. Sanders*, 372 U.S. 368, 379 (1963). The Court held that this disparity violated the Equal Protection Clause, explaining: “Once the geographical unit for which a representative is to be chosen is designated, all who participate in the election are to have an equal vote—whatever their race, whatever their sex, whatever their occupation, whatever their income, and *wherever their home may be* in that geographical unit.” *Id.* (emphasis added). “This is required by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The concept of ‘we the people’ under the Constitution visualizes no preferred class of voters but equality among those who meet the basic qualifications.” *Id.* at 379–80.

The remedy that von Glahn suggests—changing the congressional map in the middle of an election—would flagrantly violate this standard. It would diminish the voice of many Missourians (including every voter in Cole County) who would be forced to vote for different slates of candidates in the Primary and General Elections. This would be particularly problematic in districts where primaries are more competitive

than the general election. In those districts, the primary election is *the* contest where voters effectively select their representative.

Thus, even if a referendum on HB 1 is constitutional, the General Election must go forward under the existing map. The Primary Election is now complete. And because “this right of participation [in the Primary Election] is protected just as is the right to vote at the [General] election,” *Classic*, 313 U.S. at 318, invalidating the Primary Election result would undermine the voters’ “ultimate choice of the representative” under Article I, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution, *id.*²³

* * *

In seeking an injunction against HB 1 before the General Election, von Glahn appears naïve about the blast radius of his demand. Regardless of how the Court

²³ Von Glahn could theoretically argue at trial that Missouri’s political parties could simply nominate new candidates to run in a General Election with different congressional map. But nothing in Missouri law allows this Court to throw out 1.2 million votes cast in the *completed* Primary Election. Indeed Section 115.343 provides:

The person receiving the greatest number of votes at a primary election as a party candidate for an office ***shall*** be the ***only*** candidate of that party for the office at the general election. The name of such candidate ***shall*** be placed on the official ballot at the general election unless he is removed or replaced as provided by law.

§ 115.343, RSMo (emphasis added). The law provides for removal or replacement of the nominated candidate for only three reasons: The nominee (1) “die[s],” (2) “is disqualified,” or (3) voluntarily “withdraw[s].” § 115.363.3(1)–(3), .4. In those three cases, “the party nominating committee for any established political party may select a party candidate.” *Id.* But here, if the HB 1 map is invalidated, none of the nominees that voters selected would have died, disqualified themselves, or withdrawn.

reads the Missouri Constitution, it cannot order the State to violate federal law by using a different congressional map than the one used in the 2026 Primary Election.

CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, the Court should reject von Glahn's claims and enter judgment in favor of the Secretary.

Date: August 18, 2026

Respectfully submitted,

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on August 18, 2026, a true and accurate copy of the above was electronically filed by using the Court's CM/ECF system to be served via operation of the Court's electronic filing system upon all counsel of record.

Louis J. Capozzi, III

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COLE COUNTY, MISSOURI

RICHARD VON GLAHN,	)	
	)	
Plaintiff,	)	
	)	
v.	)	Case No. 26AC-CC00440
	)	
DENNY HOSKINS, in his official	)	
capacity,	)	
	)	
Defendant.	)	

INTERVENORS' TRIAL BRIEF

Plaintiff asks this Court to read silence in the Missouri Constitution as overriding its plain text to empower a small minority of voters to nullify the results of Missouri's recent congressional primary elections, suspend the General Assembly's duly enacted congressional districting plan for the ongoing 2026 election, and unleash chaos upon the State's democratic and electoral machinery. On Plaintiff's reading, a mere "five percent of the legal voters in each of two-thirds of the congressional districts in the state," Mo. Const. art. III, § 52(a), can suspend the General Assembly's congressional redistricting plan even *after more than 1.2 million Missourians voted in primary elections* under the plan. Plaintiff, moreover, asks the Court to set aside the General Assembly's plan and order placement of hundreds of thousands of voters into *different districts for the imminent 2026 general election* than the districts they voted in barely two weeks ago during the primary elections.

It is difficult to imagine a judicial action that would sow more confusion among the State's electorate or inflict more damage to the public's confidence in the integrity of the State's elections than the relief Plaintiff seeks. Fortunately—and unsurprisingly—both Missouri and federal law foreclose Plaintiff's claim. The Missouri Constitution's sole provision addressing

congressional redistricting vests authority to conduct it in “*the general assembly*.” *Id.* art. III, § 45 (emphasis added); *see also* U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (vesting in state legislatures authority to “prescribe[]” the “Times, Places, and Manner of holding Elections for . . . Representatives,” “but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations”). The Missouri Constitution’s referendum provisions say precisely nothing about congressional redistricting, *see* Mo. Const. art. III, §§ 49, 52(a)-(b), so they lack the clear statement required to oust the General Assembly’s redistricting authority. And even if this dispositive defect in Plaintiff’s legal theory were not enough, Plaintiff’s requested relief violates state and federal law. The Court should dismiss the Petition and enter judgment for Defendant.

BACKGROUND

The General Assembly enacted House Bill 1 (HB 1) on September 12, 2025. HB 1 repealed Missouri’s prior congressional districting plan and established new boundaries for Missouri’s eight congressional districts. HB 1 passed by a margin of 21 to 11 in the Senate and 90 to 65 in the House of Representatives. *See* Mo. Senate J. 25–26 (2d Extra. Sess., 103d Gen. Assembly, Sept. 12, 2025); Mo. House J. 37–38 (2d Extra. Sess., 103d Gen. Assembly, Sept. 9, 2025). Governor Michael L. Kehoe signed HB 1 into law on September 28, 2025.

A group called People Not Politicians (“PNP”) launched a referendum campaign to challenge the HB 1 map. PNP eventually submitted a referendum petition to the Secretary of State on December 9, 2025, invoking the referendum provisions in Article III of the Missouri Constitution. Under Article III, Section 52(a), “[a] referendum may be ordered . . . by petitions signed by five percent of the legal voters in each of two-thirds of the congressional districts in the state.” Mo. Const. art. III, § 52(a). Article III’s

referendum provisions are silent regarding congressional redistricting. *See id.* art. III, §§ 49, 52(a)-(b).

PNP's submission triggered the Secretary's statutory duty to review the referendum petition. *See Maggard v. State*, 733 S.W.3d 411, 416 (Mo. banc 2026). That review encompasses the timeliness, legality, and sufficiency of the petition, as well as the sufficiency of the signatures offered in support of the petition. *See* §§ 116.120–116.140, RSMo. "After" review, "if the secretary of state finds [the petition] sufficient, the secretary of state shall issue a certificate setting forth that the petition contains a sufficient number of valid signatures to comply with the Constitution of Missouri and with this chapter." § 116.150.1, RSMo. But "[i]f the secretary of state finds the petition insufficient, the secretary of state shall issue a certificate stating the reason for the insufficiency." § 116.150.2, RSMo.

The Secretary was required to complete this extensive review "not later than 5:00 p.m. on the thirteenth Tuesday prior to the general election or two weeks after the date the election authority certifies the results of a petition verification pursuant to subsection 2 of section 116.130, whichever is later." § 116.150.3, RSMo. The thirteenth Tuesday prior to this year's general election fell on Tuesday, August 4, the date of the State's primary elections.

While the Secretary and Missouri's local election officials were reviewing PNP's submission, two plaintiffs separately challenged HB 1's effectiveness, seeking a declaratory judgment and an injunction preventing use of the HB 1 map until voters approved it through the referendum process. *See Maggard*, 733 S.W.3d at 413. The Missouri Supreme Court unanimously rejected their claims, holding that "the December 9 referendum petition filing did not automatically suspend HB 1 under article III, sections 49, 52(a), or 52(b) of the Missouri Constitution." *Id.* at 421. The Missouri Supreme Court also went out

of its way to emphasize that its decision should not be read as endorsing referenda on congressional maps. *See id.* at 414 n.7 (“[T]his opinion presupposes without deciding HB 1 is subject to the right of referendum.”).

Following the Supreme Court’s ruling, the Attorney General released an opinion letter requiring “State and local election officials” to “take all appropriate steps to ensure the HB 1 map is fully implemented in advance of the 2026 primary elections.” Mo. Att’y Gen., Op. Letter 03-2026 (May 13, 2026). Local election officials then implemented the HB 1 map in Missouri’s Centralized Voter Registration (“MCVR”) system, transferring hundreds of thousands of voters to the new districts. Stipulated Ex. 26 ¶ 7; Stipulated Ex. 29 at 109. After implementation, state and local officials prepared ballots and conducted the August 4 primary elections under the HB 1 map.

A total of 1,206,871 Missourians voted in the State’s congressional primary elections under the HB 1 map. *See* State Of Missouri Election Results – Primary Election August 4, 2026, *available at* <https://enr.sos.mo.gov/> (last visited Aug. 17, 2026). Prior to 5 p.m. on August 4, the last day to vote in the primary elections, Secretary Hoskins announced that he was issuing a certificate finding PNP’s petition insufficient. *See* Stipulated Ex. 5. The Secretary’s certificate identified as “the reason for the insufficiency,” § 116.150.2, RSMo., that the Missouri Constitution does not permit referenda on congressional maps, *id.* The Secretary’s certificate relied upon a letter from the Attorney General explaining that insufficiency. *See id.*

Plaintiff filed this suit later that evening. Plaintiff alleges that “he is entitled to the immediate suspension of the use and implementation of HB 1.” Pet. ¶¶ 42-43; *see also id.* at 8. He also alleges that the Court should “restrain[] the Secretary from taking further steps to implement or use the congressional districts in HB 1 to ensure that . . . the correct congressional districts are

utilized to conduct the 2026 general congressional election.” *Id.* ¶ 45; *see also id.* at 8. Plaintiff’s Petition does not identify what he believes to be “the correct congressional districts . . . to conduct the 2026 general congressional election.” *Id.* ¶ 45. To the extent Plaintiff asks the Court to revert Missouri to the plan the General Assembly repealed in HB 1, such an action would move hundreds of thousands of voters into different districts for the imminent 2026 general election compared to the districts in which they cast their ballots in the August primary elections just two weeks ago. *See, e.g.*, Order and Judgment, Findings 27, 30, 40-46, *Wise v. State*, No. 2516-CV29597 (Jackson Cty. Cir. Ct. Mar. 12, 2026); Stipulated Ex. 26 ¶ 7; Stipulated Ex. 29 at 109.

LEGAL STANDARDS

The General Assembly “has the power to do whatever is necessary to perform its functions *except as expressly restrained by the Constitution.*” *Luther v. Hoskins*, 730 S.W.3d 567, 571 (Mo. banc 2026) (quotations omitted) (emphasis added). “Deference due the General Assembly requires that doubt be resolved against nullifying its action if it is possible to do so by . . . any reasonable construction of the Constitution.” *State v. Clay*, 481 S.W.3d 531, 537 (Mo. banc 2016) (quotations omitted).

This case also implicates federal law. The U.S. Constitution provides that “[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” U.S. Const. art. VI. The Missouri Constitution enforces this principle, declaring that “Missouri is a free and independent state, subject only to the Constitution of the United States.” Mo. Const. art. I, § 4. Thus, federal law controls over any contrary provision of the Missouri Constitution or law.

ARGUMENT

Plaintiff asks this Court to nullify the General Assembly's duly enacted congressional map based on nothing more than constitutional silence. Even in an ordinary case, that gambit would fail because the General Assembly has power to legislate "*except as expressly restrained by the Constitution.*" *Clay*, 481 S.W.3d at 537 (quotations omitted). But this is no ordinary case. The General Assembly enacted HB 1 under *both* an express state constitutional command, Mo. Const. art. III, § 45, and an express federal constitutional grant, *see* U.S. Const. art. I, § 4. If there were ever a context demanding a clear statement before the General Assembly's authority could be displaced, this is it. But there is nothing—not a word—in Missouri's referendum provisions addressing congressional redistricting. Plaintiff's claim therefore fails.

If more were somehow needed, Plaintiff's claim fails on at least three more independent grounds. *First*, even if the referendum provisions' silence could be read to extend them to congressional redistricting, the U.S. Constitution invalidates Article III, Section 52(b) as applied to a congressional map enacted by the General Assembly. *Second*, federal law forecloses any alteration to Missouri's congressional map for the ongoing 2026 election. *Third*, equitable principles previously applied by the Missouri Supreme Court and the U.S. Supreme Court likewise bar any changes to the General Assembly's duly enacted map at this late juncture. This Court should dismiss the Petition.

I. Missouri's Referendum Provisions Do Not Apply To Congressional Redistricting.

The Court should dismiss Plaintiff's Petition because the referendum provisions in Article III of the Missouri Constitution do not apply to congressional redistricting.

A. Article III Does Not Subject Congressional Redistricting To The Referendum.

This Court need not look beyond Missouri principles of constitutional interpretation to reject Plaintiff's claim. Article III expressly directs that "the general assembly shall by law divide the state into [congressional] districts." Mo. Const. art. III, § 45. As the Missouri Supreme Court has recognized, this is the *only* constitutional provision addressing congressional redistricting—and it recognizes the General Assembly's authority and mandate over that task. *Luther*, 730 S.W.3d at 571.

When the General Assembly conducts congressional redistricting, it acts not only under this express state constitutional command but also under an express federal constitutional grant of authority. The Elections Clause provides that the "Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof," subject to laws enacted by Congress. U.S. Const. art. I, § 4. The General Assembly's power to conduct congressional redistricting, therefore, is a uniquely robust legislative authority—emanating from a dual mandate prescribed by both the state and federal constitutions—layered on top of its plenary power to do whatever is necessary to perform its functions "except as expressly restrained by the Constitution." *Luther*, 730 S.W.3d at 571 (quotations omitted).

Given the General Assembly's unique authority over congressional redistricting, this Court should not lightly infer that the Missouri Constitution elsewhere divested that authority absent a clear statement. Missouri courts interpret the Constitution to effectuate its "plain, ordinary, and natural meaning," and any provision must be "considered as a whole with the primary objectives of the provision in issue in mind." *Id.* (quotations omitted); *see also Mo. Prosecuting Att'ys v. Barton Cty.*, 311 S.W.3d 737, 741 (Mo. banc 2010)

(explaining that “due regard is given to the primary objectives of the provision at issue as viewed in harmony with all related provisions, considered as a whole”) (quotations omitted). Applying those principles here, the Missouri Constitution could not be more explicit that congressional redistricting belongs to the General Assembly. *See* Mo. Const. art. III, § 45. And this is no ordinary authority; it is a significant power stemming from the U.S. Constitution over the very structure of democratic representation in Missouri. A reasonable reader, understanding this context, would expect the Missouri Constitution to speak clearly before concluding that authority had been limited or taken away.

This expectation of clarity is not novel in Missouri law. Missouri courts apply it across multiple doctrinal areas, each reflecting that where the law establishes a settled default, courts do not presume it has been silently displaced. For example, Missouri courts presume that statutes apply only within the State’s borders unless the General Assembly clearly says otherwise. *Tuttle v. Dobbs Tire & Auto Centers, Inc.*, 590 S.W.3d 307, 311 (Mo. banc 2019). In addition, Missouri courts presume the State cannot be sued unless the General Assembly expressly waives the State’s immunity. *Ramirez v. Mo. Prosecuting Att’ys*, 694 S.W.3d 432, 436 (Mo. banc 2024). And Missouri courts presume that statutes operate prospectively unless the legislature’s intent for retroactive application “clearly appears from the express language of the act or by necessary or unavoidable implication.” *Lincoln Credit Co. v. Peach*, 636 S.W.2d 31, 34 (Mo. banc 1982).

In each context, the principle is the same: A reasonable reader knows the baseline under Missouri law and expects clarity before concluding it has been changed. That principle also animates the Missouri Supreme Court’s substantial deference to the General Assembly’s exercise of its plenary legislative power recognized by the Missouri Constitution. Missouri law’s

baseline expectation that the General Assembly can exercise any and all legislative power is so strong that the Missouri Supreme Court refuses to nullify legislative acts under the Missouri Constitution if “it is possible to do so by . . . any reasonable construction of the Constitution” or by resolving any “doubt . . . against nullifying its action.” *Clay*, 481 S.W.3d at 537. If anything, the expectation of clarity applies even more strongly here because congressional redistricting represents the rare circumstance where the General Assembly wields a dual mandate under the State and U.S. Constitutions. *See* Mo. Const. art. III, § 45; U.S. Const. art. I, § 4. In other words, because an express restraint is necessary to limit the General Assembly’s legislative authority recognized by the Missouri Constitution, such a restraint at a minimum is required to limit the General Assembly’s exercise of its congressional redistricting authority both recognized by the Missouri Constitution *and* granted by the U.S. Constitution. *See Luther*, 730 S.W.3d at 571.

Against that backdrop, Plaintiff points only to the generic referendum provision in Article III, Section 49, which provides that “[t]he people reserve power . . . to approve or reject by referendum any act of the general assembly.” Mo. Const. art. III, § 49; *see* Petition ¶ 4. But that provision at most merely *raises*, but does not *answer*, the question whether the referendum power extends to congressional redistricting, a domain Article III and the U.S. Constitution separately and specifically assign to the General Assembly. A generic provision that says nothing about congressional redistricting cannot do the work of divesting the General Assembly of the dual mandate the Missouri and U.S. Constitutions assign to it. Because Section 49 does not “expressly restrain[]” the General Assembly’s authority over congressional redistricting, it cannot limit, let alone oust, the General Assembly’s exercise of that

authority. *Luther*, 730 S.W.3d at 571 (quotations omitted). And any doubt on that score must be resolved in favor of the General Assembly, not against it. *See Clay*, 481 S.W.3d at 537.

B. Context Confirms That Congressional Redistricting Is Not Subject To The Referendum.

Context only confirms that a congressional redistricting statute duly enacted by the General Assembly cannot be subjected to the referendum process. Three features of Missouri's legal landscape reinforce this conclusion.

First, in the more than eighty years since Missouri ratified its current Constitution in 1945, no referendum petition directed at a congressional redistricting plan has ever reached the ballot. The lone attempt before *Maggard* occurred in 1952, when a group filed referendum petitions against the congressional map, but the petitions were held untimely because the statute had already taken effect. *See State ex rel. Moore v. Toberman*, 250 S.W.2d 701, 705-06 (Mo. banc 1952). The complete absence of any successful referendum on a congressional map over eight decades of practice underscores that Missouri never deliberately chose to extend the referendum power to this domain. Indeed, given the relative ease of collecting signatures of “five percent of the legal voters in each of two-thirds of the congressional districts in the state,” Mo. Const. art. III, § 52(a)—and the charged political stakes involved in redistricting—one would expect that political opponents of the majority party in the General Assembly would have forced a referendum on a congressional redistricting plan long ago if Missouri law provided a viable path to do so. But no such thing has occurred.

Second, the 1945 Constitution itself repudiated the only Missouri Supreme Court decision that had ever sanctioned a referendum on legislative redistricting of any kind. In *State ex rel. Gordon v. Becker*, 49 S.W.2d 146 (Mo.

banc 1932), a divided court permitted a referendum challenging state senate redistricting. The Constitutional Convention responded by inserting Article III, Section 7, which expressly declares that “[n]o redistricting plan shall be subject to the referendum.” Mo. Const. art. III, § 7(h) (1945). The Convention thus eliminated referenda in the only redistricting context in which any Missouri court had approved such a referendum. *See* Debates of the 1943–1944 Constitutional Convention of Missouri 7016 (2008). That deliberate rejection only confirms the Missouri Framers’ distrust of referenda in the redistricting sphere.

Third, Chapter 116, the statutory “framework for exercising the right of referendum” the General Assembly enacted in 1980, *see No Bans on Choice v. Ashcroft*, 638 S.W.3d 484, 487 (Mo. banc 2022), is incompatible with referenda on congressional maps. Two features are particularly telling. As an initial matter, Chapter 116 restricts the ballot summary for any referendum measure to a mere hundred words and makes no provisions for visual aids such as maps. *See* § 116.334, RSMo. Congressional redistricting is a uniquely complex undertaking involving considerations of population, compactness, geography, and communities of interest. *See generally Healey v. State*, 732 S.W.3d 827 (Mo. banc 2026). The notion that voters could meaningfully evaluate competing redistricting plans based solely on a hundred-word description defies reason. Had the General Assembly contemplated that Chapter 116 would govern referenda on congressional maps, it surely would have written it to furnish voters with far more information so they could make an informed choice regarding that complex issue.

Moreover, Chapter 116 sets the presumptive deadline for the Secretary’s certification decision on the very same day as the August primary elections. *See* § 116.150.3, RSMo. No rational legislature would impose a certification

timeline that extends to—or past—primary election day if it believed that a referendum could displace the congressional map under which the very primary was conducted.

These points confirm what the text already establishes: Missouri has never—by constitutional provision, by statute, or by practice—subjected congressional redistricting to the referendum. At every turn where the question might have been addressed, Missouri’s framers and legislators either remained silent or affirmatively rejected referenda on redistricting.

C. The Referendum Provisions Themselves Can Be Read To Exempt Congressional Maps From Their Coverage.

If that were not enough, the text of Article III’s referendum provisions themselves underscore that they exempt congressional redistricting from their reach. Article III, Section 52(a) carves out from the referendum process “laws necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety.” Mo. Const. art. III, § 52(a). Legislation qualifies for this exception when there is “a crisis or emergency which requires immediate or quick legislative action for the preservation of the public peace, property, health, safety, or morals.” *State ex rel. Tyler v. Davis*, 443 S.W.2d 625, 631 (Mo. banc 1969).

Missouri courts have explained that this standard is satisfied when federal law imposes a deadline that the State must meet through prompt legislation. For example, in *Osage Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. State Highway Commission*, 687 S.W.2d 566, 569-70 (Mo. App. 1984), the federal Highway Beautification Act required Missouri to enact effective billboard-control legislation before a set date or lose ten percent of its federal highway appropriation. After the General Assembly passed the required statute, the court upheld it as emergency legislation, explaining that “[t]his sequence of events demonstrates the necessity for immediate action by the legislature and

prompt enactment of the law.” *Id.* at 569.

The case for the exception is even stronger here. Federal law requires each State’s Legislature to prescribe the times, places, and manner of holding congressional elections. *See* U.S. Const. art. I, § 4. Federal law also imposes several constitutional and statutory mandates with which Missouri must comply, including a nationwide federal general election day on the first Tuesday in November of even-numbered years, 3 U.S.C. § 1; 2 U.S.C. §§ 1, 7, and a strict 45-day ballot transmission requirement prior to any federal primary or general election, 52 U.S.C. § 20302(a)(8); *see also infra* at 29-30. HB 1 is the legislation through which Missouri satisfies those federal requirements for congressional elections. Just as the billboard statute in *Osage* was necessary to avoid the loss of federal highway funds, HB 1 is necessary to avoid a far graver consequence: the inability to hold a constitutionally valid election. “[T]he political franchise of voting” has long been recognized as “preservative of all rights,” *Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections*, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966) (quotations omitted), and legislation that makes a federal election possible is plainly necessary to preserve the public peace. It cannot be held hostage by a small minority of voters who prefer a different redistricting plan—particularly when that minority seeks to impose on the public a different plan in the weeks between a primary and a general election.

This exception provides yet another textual basis to conclude that congressional redistricting legislation is not subject to the referendum. And even if this Court were not persuaded that this exception exempts congressional redistricting from the referendum, it at minimum creates doubt about whether the referendum power reaches this domain. Once again, the Court must resolve any such doubt in favor of the General Assembly’s enacted map. *Clay*, 481 S.W.3d at 537.

II. Federal Law Independently Confirms That Missouri Has Not Ousted The General Assembly's Redistricting Authority.

Although Missouri law alone requires dismissal of the Petition, federal law provides an independent basis for dismissal. As explained, when the General Assembly conducts congressional redistricting, it wields authority expressly granted it by the U.S. Constitution's Elections Clause. *See* U.S. Const. art. I, § 4. Federal law, in turn, imposes its own clear statement requirement before this federal legislative authority can be displaced. Missouri's referendum provisions do not satisfy that requirement for the same reasons they fail it under Missouri law: They say nothing about congressional redistricting.

A. Clear Statement Rules Protect and Uphold The U.S. Constitution's Express Delegations of Authority.

Enforcing constitutional boundaries ranks among courts' most vital duties. Given the tendency of institutions to encroach on each other's powers, *see* THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison) (C. Rossiter ed., 1961), courts must serve as a "bulwark[]" against those incursions, THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed., 1961). Consistent with that role, courts will not lightly infer a significant restructuring of a constitutional allocation of power. Where the Constitution assigns authority to a specific actor, that power cannot be divested absent a clear statement. *See West Virginia v. EPA*, 597 U.S. 697, 735 (2022) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (explaining that clear-statement rules "operate[] to protect foundational constitutional guarantees").

Courts deploy an array of clear statement rules to safeguard the prerogatives of each branch of the federal government in its proper sphere. For example, Article I of the Constitution delegates responsibility "to make the laws that govern us" to "the people's elected representatives." *Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. OSHA*, 595 U.S. 109, 124 (2022) (Gorsuch, J., concurring). To

protect Article I's grant of authority, courts will not infer that Congress delegated to executive agencies the power to resolve major policy questions absent a clear statement. *FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.*, 529 U.S. 120, 159-60 (2000). This expectation of clarity reflects and reinforces the constitutional structure. *See West Virginia*, 597 U.S. at 723 (explaining that the major questions doctrine rests on "both separation of powers principles and a practical understanding of legislative intent"). "Because the Constitution vests Congress with 'all legislative Powers,' a reasonable interpreter would expect it to make the big-time policy calls itself, rather than pawning them off to another branch." *Biden v. Nebraska*, 600 U.S. 477, 515 (2023) (Barrett, J., concurring) (citation omitted). Accordingly, the clear statement rule keeps the legislative power "where . . . it belongs." *Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus.*, 595 U.S. at 124 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).

Clear statement rules likewise protect the President's constitutional prerogatives in Article II. It is axiomatic that "[t]he President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations." *United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.*, 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) (quotations omitted). So "unless there is the affirmative intention of the Congress clearly expressed to give a statute extraterritorial effect," courts will presume it does not apply extraterritorially. *Morrison v. Nat'l Australia Bank Ltd.*, 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010) (cleaned up). In this context, the clear statement rule reflects the structural principle that Congress does not ordinarily intend to intrude on the President's authority to conduct foreign relations. *See RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community*, 579 U.S. 325, 348 (2016).

Underscoring the point, federal courts routinely employ clear statement rules to protect their Article III authority. Federal courts will not imply a repeal of their jurisdiction in "the absence of clear congressional language

mandating” that result. *McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc.*, 498 U.S. 479, 483-84 (1991); *see also Goncalves v. Reno*, 144 F.3d 110, 122 (1st Cir. 1998) (applying “the long standing rule disfavoring repeal of jurisdictional provisions by implication”). For example, the U.S. Supreme Court has long required that if Congress intends to make exceptions to the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction it must do so with unmistakable clarity, not “by mere implication.” *Ex parte Yerger*, 75 U.S. 85, 106 (1869). This principle ensures that any retrenchment of federal courts’ core functions occurs, if at all, only by Congress speaking with the clarity the Constitution’s separation of powers demands.

Clear statement rules also help police the “constitutional balance of federal and state powers.” *Gregory v. Ashcroft*, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991). The Constitution’s structure, including the Tenth Amendment’s reservation of powers, counsels restraint in inferring federal limitations on state authority. Hence, “if Congress intends to alter the usual constitutional balance between the States and the Federal Government, it must make its intention to do so unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.” *Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police*, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989) (cleaned up). This clear statement rule governs attempts to displace state sovereign immunity, *see Seminole Tribe v. Florida*, 517 U.S. 44, 55 (1996) (“unequivocal[] express[ion]” required “to abrogate the immunity”) (quotations omitted), to preempt state legislation, *Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.*, 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (courts will assume state police powers not superseded “unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress”), to impose conditions on states accepting federal funds, *see Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman*, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) (“unambiguous[]” language required to “impose a condition on the grant of federal moneys”), and to criminalize conduct traditionally regulated by the states, *Bond v. United States*, 572 U.S. 844, 857 (2014) (absent “clear

indication,” courts will not read statutes to “intrude[] upon traditional state criminal jurisdiction”) (quotations omitted).

In short, across multiple doctrinal settings, clear statement rules serve as a structural safeguard ensuring that only a deliberately expressed choice—not ambiguity or implication—can recalibrate the Constitution’s usual balance of shared authorities among competing actors.

B. The Elections Clause Requires A Clear Statement To Displace The State Legislature’s Redistricting Authority.

The Elections Clause, no less than other enumerated delegations, requires a clear statement before courts may determine that a state has reallocated power over redistricting from the state legislature. This clear statement rule flows from the Elections Clause itself, which expressly provides that “[t]he Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by *the Legislature* thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations” U.S. Const. art. I, § 4 (emphasis added).

This delegation reflects a reasoned constitutional settlement. The Framers recognized “electoral districting problems and considered what to do about them,” and they “settled on a characteristic approach, assigning the issue to the state legislatures, expressly checked and balanced by the Federal Congress.” *Rucho v. Common Cause*, 588 U.S. 684, 699 (2019). Courts “must respect” the Constitution’s “deliberate choice” to “expressly vest[] power” to conduct congressional redistricting “in ‘the Legislature’ of each State.” *Moore v. Harper*, 600 U.S. 1, 34 (2023).

As with other express delegations in the U.S. Constitution, courts require a clear statement before concluding that a state has displaced its legislature’s authority over congressional redistricting. It is well established

that Congress must employ “positive and clear statutes” in order to override a state legislature’s prerogative to regulate federal elections. *United States v. Gradwell*, 243 U.S. 476, 485 (1917); *see also United States v. Oregon*, 828 F. Supp. 3d 1092, 1095-96 (D. Or. 2026) (same, citing *Gradwell*, 243 U.S. at 485); *United States v. Caldwell*, No. CV 26-2025 (ZNQ) (JTQ), 2026 WL 2186515, at *3 (D.N.J. July 29, 2026) (same, citing *Gradwell*, 243 U.S. at 485). Because Congress—the sole actor the Elections Clause empowers to supersede state legislative regulations—may do so only through unmistakable, affirmative enactments, any contention that some state actor or process has displaced the state legislature’s redistricting role must at a minimum rest on equally explicit and unequivocal language.

The U.S. Supreme Court’s Elections Clause cases confirm the point. In *State of Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant*, the U.S. Supreme Court considered whether a constitutional referendum could displace the Ohio General Assembly’s authority to redistrict. 241 U.S. 565, 566-67 (1916). The U.S. Supreme Court concluded that it could only because state law “conclusive[ly]” “ma[d]e[] it clear that . . . the referendum constituted a part of the state Constitution and laws” applicable to congressional redistricting. *Id.* at 568.¹ More recently, in *Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission*, the U.S. Supreme Court weighed whether Arizona could create an independent commission to draw congressional districts. 576 U.S. 787, 792-93 (2015). The U.S. Supreme Court sustained that arrangement

¹ *Hildebrant* is also distinguishable because it pre-dated the U.S. Supreme Court’s one-person, one-vote jurisprudence and other subsequent legal developments that require states to conduct congressional elections in equipopulous single-member districts. *See, e.g., Kirkpatrick v. Preisler*, 394 U.S. 526 (1969). Thus, at the time of *Hildebrant*, extending a referendum process to a legislature’s duly enacted congressional districting plan did not place the state in peril of violating the one-person, one-vote mandate or other federal requirements that foreclose Plaintiff’s claim and requested relief here. *See, e.g., infra* Parts III-IV. Moreover, *Hildebrant* arose in a non-election year, not between a primary and general election in the same year. *See, e.g., infra* Parts IV-V.

because Arizona's Constitution expressly "remove[d] congressional redistricting authority from the State Legislature." *Id.* at 796-97. In both cases, no doubt existed that the state had deliberately overridden the legislature's authority.

C. Missouri's Referendum Provisions Do Not Provide A Clear Statement Displacing The General Assembly's Authority.

The Missouri Constitution does not supply *any* statement—let alone a clear one—reallocating authority over congressional redistricting away from the General Assembly to a referendum process. "Article III, section 45 is the only provision of the Missouri Constitution directly addressing congressional redistricting," *Luther*, 730 S.W.3d at 571, and it mandates that "the *general assembly* shall by law divide the state into [congressional] districts," Mo. Const. art. III, § 45 (emphasis added); *see supra* at 8-9.

In the face of this silence, Plaintiff points only to the generic referendum provision in Article III, Section 49, which provides that "[t]he people reserve power . . . to approve or reject by referendum any act of the general assembly." Mo. Const. art. III, § 49; *see* Petition ¶ 4. This is a textbook example of a broad, undifferentiated clause that does not provide a clear statement overriding the U.S. Constitution's express grant of authority over congressional redistricting to the General Assembly. *See Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd.*, 545 U.S. 119, 139 (2005) (plurality opinion) ("[C]lear statement rules ensure [the state] does not, by broad or general language, legislate on a sensitive topic inadvertently or without due deliberation."). Section 49 gives no indication that Missouri "specifically considered" whether to displace the General Assembly's federally assigned authority over redistricting and "intentionally legislated on the matter." *Sossamon v. Texas*, 563 U.S. 277, 290 (2011). Accordingly, it does not provide a "conclusive" statement divesting the General Assembly of its

Elections Clause authority over congressional redistricting, much less vesting that authority in the referendum process. *Hildebrant*, 241 U.S. at 568. Lacking any clear statement in Missouri law to support his claim, Plaintiff's Petition must fail.

III. The U.S. Constitution Invalidates Article III, Section 52(B) As Applied To A Congressional Map Enacted By The Legislature.

Plaintiff's claim fails for another reason. Even if Missouri's referendum provisions could somehow be read to encompass congressional redistricting, the U.S. Constitution would not permit it. *See* U.S. Const. art. VI; Mo. Const. art. I, § 4. Both the Elections Clause and the Guarantee Clause forbid the application of Article III, Section 52(b) to a congressional map enacted by the General Assembly.

As discussed, the Elections Clause vests redistricting authority squarely in the state legislature. *See* U.S. Const. art. I, § 4; *see supra* at 22. Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court recently cautioned that state law may not be wielded to “arrogate” the “power vested in state legislatures to regulate federal elections.” *Moore*, 600 U.S. at 29.

That is precisely what would happen if Article III, Section 52(b) applies to congressional maps. Section 52(b) provides that legislation subject to a referendum is suspended once a sufficient petition is filed. Mo. Const. art. III, § 52(b); *see also Maggard*, 733 S.W.3d at 418. A referendum petition is sufficient if signed by merely “five percent of the legal voters in each of two-thirds of the congressional districts in the state.” Mo. Const. art. III, § 52(a). On Plaintiff's theory, a small fraction of voters can freeze a congressional map duly enacted by the General Assembly before any majority of Missourians has voted for or against it—and even *after* that map has been used to conduct primary elections.

That theory inverts the constitutional design. The Elections Clause guarantees that the People’s elected representatives control the time, place, and manner of federal elections.² But according to Plaintiff, a small, unelected minority would wield effective veto power over the General Assembly’s redistricting decisions. This case illustrates the point. HB 1 passed overwhelmingly in both chambers of the General Assembly and was signed by the Governor. *See* Mo. Senate J. 25–26 (2d Extra. Sess., 103d Gen. Assembly, Sept. 12, 2025); Mo. House J. 37–38 (2d Extra. Sess., 103d Gen. Assembly, Sept. 9, 2025). Yet Plaintiff claims that a small minority of voters can suspend the map months before the election without any statewide vote. The Elections Clause forbids any arrangement that would so thoroughly “annihilate” the General Assembly’s redistricting authority. *Hildebrant*, 241 U.S. at 569.

The Guarantee Clause compels the same conclusion. That clause provides that “[t]he United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government.” U.S. Const. art. IV, § 4. It also “necessarily implies a duty on the part of the States themselves to provide” a republican form of government. *Minor v. Happersett*, 88 U.S. 162, 175 (1874). A republican government is one in which “the scheme of representation takes place”—that is, the people govern through elected representatives who enact laws on their behalf. *THE FEDERALIST* No. 10 (Madison) (C. Rossiter ed., 1961). “[T]he distinguishing feature of that form is the right of the people to choose their own officers for governmental administration, and pass their own laws in virtue of

² “Both the Constitution and our cases make clear that “the Legislature” in the Elections Clause is the representative body which makes the laws of the people.” *Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Indep. Redistricting Comm’n*, 576 U.S. 787, 827 (2015) (Roberts, CJ, dissenting). In *Arizona State Legislature*, the four members of the dissent strongly opposed the position that the “people” can be the “legislature” under the Elections Clause. That dissent, penned by Chief Justice Roberts and joined by Justices Alito, Thomas and Scalia, calls into question the entire validity of a referendum on a congressional district map and in light of the changed nature of the United States Supreme Court, seems likely to now consist of a majority view of the members of the current court.

the legislative power reposed in representative bodies, whose legitimate acts may be said to be those of the people themselves.” *Duncan v. McCall*, 139 U.S. 449, 461 (1891); accord *Madden v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co.*, 192 S.W. 455, 458 (Mo. banc 1917) (Woodson, J., concurring in the judgment).

Plaintiff’s proposed regime is the antithesis of a republican form of government. On his theory, a small minority of voters can nullify a congressional map enacted by the People’s elected representatives without any majority vote. See THE FEDERALIST No. 22 (Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed., 1961); THE FEDERALIST No. 58 (Madison) (C. Rossiter ed., 1961) (“it would no longer be the majority that would rule: the power would be transferred to the minority”). And Plaintiff’s requested remedy makes the affront even starker: he seeks the “immediate suspension” of HB 1, Pet. ¶¶ 42-43, which would leave Missouri with no congressional map whatsoever for the imminent general election (except, presumably, one ordered by the judiciary). Permitting a sliver of the electorate to void the “legitimate acts . . . of the people themselves” cannot be squared with Missouri’s constitutional duty to maintain a republican form of government. *Duncan*, 139 U.S. at 461.

IV. Federal Law Forecloses Any Alteration to Missouri’s Congressional Map At This Late Stage Of The Electoral Process.

Even if this Court were to conclude that the Missouri Constitution authorizes referenda on congressional maps and that the U.S. Constitution does not invalidate Section 52(b) as applied, federal law would still prohibit Plaintiff’s requested relief: “immediate suspension of the use and implementation of HB 1.” Pet. ¶¶ 42-43; see also *id.* at 8. More than 1.2 million Missourians have *already* voted under the HB 1 map in the primary elections. See State Of Missouri Election Results – Primary Election August 4, 2026, available at <https://enr.sos.mo.gov/> (last visited Aug. 17, 2026). Plaintiff asks

the Court to nullify those votes and adopt some other congressional map for the imminent general election. Doing so would violate federal law several times over.

First, UOCAVA protects the voting rights of military servicemembers and citizens living abroad by requiring state election officials to transmit absentee ballots no fewer than 45 days before any federal election. *See* 52 U.S.C. § 20302(a)(8); *see also* § 115.914, RSMo. That requirement applies independently to each federal election, including a primary. Accordingly, if this Court were to suspend the use of HB 1, UOCAVA would require ballot transmission to military and overseas voters 45 days before any primary under the new map. Missouri law would then require a three-day waiting period after the primary before the results could be certified. *See* §§ 115.920.1, 115.508, RSMo. And UOCAVA would again require ballot transmission 45 days before the subsequent general election on November 3, 2026. 3 U.S.C. § 1; 2 U.S.C. §§ 1, 7. The arithmetic is straightforward: The State needs 93 days minimum before the general election on November 3, 2026, to comply with the federal election day statute and UOCAVA.

That deadline has already passed. *See Foster v. Love*, 522 U.S. 67, 74 (1997) (holding that a State may not conduct federal elections in conflict with congressionally mandated timing under 2 U.S.C. § 7). An injunction against HB 1 would therefore require state officials to violate federal law. And UOCAVA is enforceable by the U.S. Attorney General in federal court, 52 U.S.C. § 20307(a), meaning that Plaintiff's requested relief would expose Missouri officials to an adverse federal injunction. The Secretary correctly avoided that result by declining to certify the referendum petition. *See* Stipulated Ex. 5 at 9-10.

Second, holding a general election under a different congressional map

than the one used in the August 4 primary would violate Article I, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution. That provision guarantees that “[t]he House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 2. The U.S. Supreme Court has long recognized that “[w]here the state law has made the primary an integral part of the procedure of choice,” then “the right of the elector to have his ballot counted at the primary[] is likewise included in the right protected by Article I, § 2.” *United States v. Classic*, 313 U.S. 299, 318 (1941).

Missouri law makes the primary integral: “all candidates for elective office shall be nominated at a primary election,” § 115.339, RSMo., and “[t]he person receiving the greatest number of votes at a primary election as a party candidate for an office shall be the only candidate of that party for the office at the general election,” § 115.343, RSMo. A candidate may be replaced only if he or she dies, is disqualified, or voluntarily withdraws. *See* § 115.363.3(1)-(3), .4 RSMo. The Missouri Supreme Court has thus confirmed that “primary elections have constitutional stature” and serve as an “*integral* part of [the State’s] election machinery.” *State ex rel. McClellan v. Kirkpatrick*, 504 S.W.2d 83, 86 (Mo. banc 1974) (emphasis added).

Plaintiff’s requested relief plainly violates the right of Missouri voters to have their ballot counted. More than 1.2 million Missourians voted in the August 4 congressional primaries under the HB 1 map and selected nominees in each of Missouri’s eight districts. Plaintiff asks this Court to ignore those votes, *see* Pet. ¶¶ 42-43; *see also id.* at 8, stripping the nominees of the mandate their voters conferred. Article I, Section 2 forbids this result.

Third, an order requiring a general election under a different congressional map than the one used in the primary would violate the Equal Protection Clause. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. The U.S. Supreme Court has

held that primary-election procedures constitute “‘state action’ within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment” and “must be exercised in a manner consistent with the Equal Protection Clause.” *Bullock v. Carter*, 405 U.S. 134, 140-41 (1972). The Supreme Court has also made clear that “[o]nce the geographical unit for which a representative is to be chosen is designated, all who participate in the election are to have an equal vote . . . wherever their home may be in that geographical unit.” *Gray v. Sanders*, 372 U.S. 368, 379 (1963).

Plaintiff’s proposed remedy would violate this standard. If the congressional map changes between the primary and general elections, it would force hundreds of thousands of Missourians to vote in a district different from the one in which they cast their primary ballots. Those voters would possess materially less voting power than voters whose district remained the same because the former group would have to select from candidates they never had the opportunity to evaluate, support, or oppose in the primary. They would thus be denied the right to choose their own representative through the integrated primary and general elections. Meanwhile, voters who happened to remain in the same district would retain the full benefit of their primary vote. An order changing the congressional map would thus create two classes of voters—those who had the opportunity to select their general election candidate and those who did not—in direct violation of the Equal Protection Clause.

In short, regardless of how this Court reads the Missouri Constitution, it cannot order the State to use a different congressional map than the one under which Missouri conducted the 2026 primary elections. Federal law precludes that result.

V. The Court Should Not Order Any Changes To The General Assembly's Duly Enacted Map For The Ongoing 2026 Election.

Finally, even setting aside the various insurmountable barriers to Plaintiff's claim, fundamental equitable principles applied by the Missouri Supreme Court and the U.S. Supreme Court in prior cases also foreclose any changes to the General Assembly's duly enacted map for the ongoing 2026 election. Missouri has already completed its August 4 primary elections, in which over 1.2 million Missourians selected nominees who are now the only candidates of their respective parties for the general election, *see* § 115.343, RSMo., which will be completed in only eleven weeks from now. Any judicially ordered changes to the map at this late juncture would "result in voter confusion and consequent incentive to remain away from the polls" and erode the "[c]onfidence in the integrity of our electoral processes . . . essential to the functioning of our participatory democracy." *Purcell v. Gonzalez*, 549 U.S. 1, 4-5 (2006); *accord Hadley v. Junior Coll. Dist. of Metro. Kansas City*, 460 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Mo. banc 1970).

Months ago, the U.S. Supreme Court stayed a three-judge federal district court's order enjoining use of Texas's 2025 congressional redistricting plan and requiring the State to revert to its 2022 plan. *Abbott v. League of United Latin American Citizens*, 607 U.S. ----, 146 S. Ct. 418, 419 (2025). The district court issued its injunction shortly after the opening of candidate filing, approximately four months before the primary, and eleven months before the November 2026 general election. *See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Abbott*, 809 F. Supp. 3d 502 (W.D. Tex. 2025). The U.S. Supreme Court issued the stay because the district court had "improperly inserted itself into an active primary campaign, causing much confusion" with its late-breaking injunction. *Abbott*, 146 S. Ct. at 419; *see Robinson v. Ardoin*, 37 F.4th 208, 228-29 (5th Cir. 2022) (per curiam), *stay issued sub nom., Ardoin v. Robinson*, 142 S. Ct. 2892,

2892-93 (June 28, 2022) (staying injunction of congressional redistricting plan issued five months before primary elections); *Callais v. Landry*, 732 F. Supp. 3d 574, 613-14 (W.D. La. Apr. 30, 2024), *stay issued sub nom.*, *Robinson v. Callais*, 144 S. Ct. 1171 (May 15, 2024) (staying injunction of congressional redistricting plan issued more than six months before the next election).

It is a “basic tenet of election law” that “[w]hen an election is close at hand, the rules of the road should be clear and settled.” *Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Wis. State Legislature*, 141 S. Ct. 28, 31 (2020) (mem.) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). “[L]ate-breaking, court-ordered rule changes can ‘result in voter confusion and consequent incentive to remain away from the polls,’ and thus undermine the ‘[c]onfidence in the integrity of our electoral processes . . . essential to the functioning of our participatory democracy.’” *Bost v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections*, 607 U.S. ----, 146 S. Ct. 513, 521 (2026) (quoting *Purcell*, 549 U.S. at 4-5); *see also Abbott*, 146 S. Ct. at 419. After all, “running a statewide election is a complicated endeavor,” involving “a host of difficult decisions about how best to structure and conduct the election.” *Democratic Nat’l Comm.*, 141 S. Ct. at 31 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). And those decisions must then be communicated to the “state and local officials” tasked with implementing them, who in turn “must communicate to voters how, when, and where they may cast their ballots through in-person voting on election day, absentee voting, or early voting.” *Id.* When a “court alters election laws near an election,” *id.*, candidates, voters, and even officials are left scrambling to understand the court-imposed alteration, “inviting confusion and chaos and eroding public confidence in electoral outcomes,” *id.* at 30 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).

These considerations counsel judicial restraint and deference to the democratic process on the eve of an election. The General Assembly is

responsible for redrawing the State's congressional districts. *See* Mo. Const., art. III, § 45; U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1; *see also* *Ariz. State Legis. v. Ariz. Ind. Redistricting Comm'n*, 576 U.S. 787, 808 (2015). This allocation makes practical sense. Legislatures “enjoy far greater resources for research and factfinding” than courts, and “make policy and bring to bear the collective wisdom of the whole people when they do, while courts dispense the judgment of only a single person or a handful.” *Democratic Nat’l Comm.*, 141 S. Ct. at 29 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). “It is one thing for state legislatures to alter their own election rules in the late innings and to bear the responsibility for any unintended consequences. It is quite another thing for a . . . court to swoop in and alter carefully considered and democratically enacted state election rules when an election is imminent.” *Id.* at 31 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).

Missouri's own precedent reinforces these principles. In *Hadley v. Junior College District of Metropolitan Kansas City*, the Missouri Supreme Court confronted a remand after the U.S. Supreme Court found that junior college trustee districts violated the one-person, one-vote principle. *See* 460 S.W.2d at 1. By the time the Missouri Supreme Court addressed the case, the State's election machinery was already in motion. Five candidates had filed for office, officials had begun printing absentee ballots and adjusting voting machines, and the State had already incurred substantial expense. *Id.* at 2-3. Moreover, the candidate-filing deadline fell just two days away and the election itself loomed one month out. *Id.* In light of these considerations, the Missouri Supreme Court held that “it would be wholly inequitable and impracticable to attempt at this late date to apply the principles enunciated” by the U.S. Supreme Court, and ordered the election to proceed under the existing apportionment. *Id.* In other words, even a *proven* violation of the U.S. Constitution could not justify disrupting an ongoing election. As the Missouri

Supreme Court explained, “a court is entitled to *and should* consider the proximity of a forthcoming election and the mechanics and complexities of state election laws, and should act and rely upon general equitable principles.” *Id.* at 2 (emphasis added) (quoting *Reynolds v. Sims*, 377 U.S. 533, 585 (1964)).

This case presents the exact scenario *Hadley* and *Purcell* were designed to prevent. If courts cannot change a congressional map four months before a primary, *see Abbott*, 146 S. Ct. at 419, they certainly cannot do so *after* the primary has already occurred and mere weeks before the general election. Candidate filing closed months ago. Over 1.2 million Missourians voted in the August 4 primary. Nominees have been selected. Campaigns for the general election are underway. Plaintiff does not even attempt to explain how State officials could reverse course and implement some entirely new map, how nominees selected by voters in one set of districts would campaign in different ones, or how voters would make sense of a last-minute overhaul of the districts they just voted in. The disruption Plaintiff seeks would dwarf anything contemplated in *Abbott*, *Ardoin*, or *Callais*—and the U.S. Supreme Court stayed all of those injunctions as impermissible.

In fact, changing the map at this stage is not merely inequitable, it is impossible. Missouri election officials are not aware of any precedent, in Missouri or any other State, in which a court has changed a congressional map between a State’s primary and general elections. Stipulated Ex. 26 ¶¶ 5, 16. And for good reason. As one election official explained, implementing a new congressional map requires local election officials to transfer hundreds of thousands of individual voters in the MCVR system. *Id.* ¶ 7; *see also* Stipulated Ex. 29 at 109. That is a meticulous process involving careful analysis of printed maps and multiple rounds of proofreading; it ordinarily takes more than two weeks, and at least 7-10 days even under emergency conditions. Stipulated Ex.

26 ¶ 7. But even that timeline is academic here, because the MCVR system locks shortly before absentee ballots are distributed and remains locked until an election is certified two weeks after election day. *Id.* ¶ 8. This year, the system will remain locked until at least mid-November because of a Jackson County special election in September 2026. *Id.* ¶¶ 9-10. The Court should not order an unprecedented remedy that is impossible to implement. *See Hadley*, 460 S.W.2d at 3 (refusing to alter districts where doing so would be “wholly inequitable and impracticable”).

Plaintiff’s own representations to Missouri courts confirm that the window for relief has long since closed. For months, PNP and von Glahn urged courts to resolve the status of HB 1 on an expedited basis, insisting that their challenges were “time-sensitive” given the approaching 2026 elections and the need to prevent “chaos in August.” Stipulated Ex. 21 at 1-2. Other challengers to HB 1 pressed for judicial resolution before candidate filing even opened, conceding that equity would “favor the status quo in a legal dispute during the lead-up to an election.” *See, e.g.*, Stipulated Ex. 25 at 16 (quotation omitted). Having told Missouri courts for months that time was running out, Plaintiff cannot now demand the very relief he previously admitted would come too late.

This Court should follow the settled approach of both the United States Supreme Court and the Missouri Supreme Court and decline to order any changes to the General Assembly’s duly enacted map after the primary has already occurred. *See Abbott*, 146 S. Ct. at 419; *Ardoyn*, 142 S. Ct. at 2892-93; *see also Hadley*, 460 S.W.2d at 2. Such an injunction would “lead to disruption and to unanticipated and unfair consequences for candidates, political parties, and voters, among others.” *Merrill v. Milligan*, 142 S. Ct. 879, 881 (2022) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). To “protec[t] the State’s interest in running an orderly, efficient election and in giving citizens (including the losing candidates

and their supporters) confidence in the fairness of the election,” *Democratic Nat’l Comm.*, 141 S. Ct. at 31 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring), this Court should decline to order any changes to HB 1 for the 2026 election.

CONCLUSION

The Court should dismiss the Petition.

Respectfully submitted,

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the foregoing was served via the Court’s electronic filing system on August 18, 2026 on all parties of record.

/s/ Marc H. Ellinger

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COLE COUNTY, MISSOURI

RICHARD VON GLAHN,	)	
	)	
Plaintiff,	)	
	)	
v.	)	Case No. 26AC-CC00440
	)	
DENNY HOSKINS, in his official	)	
capacity,	)	
	)	
Defendant.	)	
	)	

PLAINTIFF'S TRIAL BRIEF

This case is about whether the Secretary of State correctly decided not to certify the referendum petition on House Bill 1. He did not.

The Secretary claims a referendum is not available because House Bill 1 redraws Missouri's congressional districts. But House Bill 1 is an act of the General Assembly, and the Missouri Constitution reserves to the people the power to approve or reject by referendum "any act of the general assembly"—with two narrow exceptions, neither of which applies here.

Over a century ago, the United States Supreme Court held that redistricting bills may be subject to a state referendum without violating the Elections Clause. That's still the law. The Secretary's last-minute decision to reject this referendum—after months of deliberate delay—cannot be salvaged by meritless legal analysis. The Secretary complains of a crisis of his own making. The Court should ignore these complaints and reverse the Secretary's decision deeming the Referendum Petition insufficient.

I. The Right of Referendum is Inviolate and Reserved to the People

Despite the Secretary's apparent surprise that a sufficient referendum petition suspends a law, this is how referenda work. The referendum is a "means through which the public may have some say with regard to the laws which shall be enacted." 42 Am. Jur. 2d Initiative and Referendum § 1. One of the purposes of a referendum "is to suspend or annul laws which are not yet effective in order to provide the people a means of expressing their desire regarding a legislative proposition; a referendum amounts to a veto power over enactments of representative bodies." *Id.* The Missouri Supreme Court and courts across the country have recognized that's how referenda function. *See Maggard v. State*, 733 S.W.3d 411, 420 (Mo. banc 2026) ("If, however, the December 9 referendum petition filing is ultimately determined to be sufficient . . . HB 1 did not take effect on December 11, HB 1 was "referred to the people" as of December 9, and HB1 "shall take effect when approved by a majority of the votes cast thereon, and not otherwise."); *see e.g. State v. Mata*, 934 N.W.2d 475, 485 (2019) ("[W]e concluded that upon filing of a referendum petition appears to have a sufficient number of signatures, operation of the legislative act is suspended so long as the verification and certification process ultimately determines that the petition had the required number of valid signatures."); *Bernstein Bros., Inc., v. Dep't. of Revenue*, 661 P.2d 537 (1983) ("We concluded that the [referendum] power itself was created to benefit the majority of the people by suspending operation of a statute until the people have an opportunity to approve or reject legislation.");

Wilde v. City of Dunsmuir, 470 P.3d 590 (Cal. 2020) (“A referendum suspends operation of the law until it is approved by a majority of voters.”).

Missouri voters first reserved the legislative power to themselves adopted a constitutional amendment establishing the right of referendum in 1908. *No Bans on Choice v. Ashcroft*, 638 S.W.3d 484, 486 (Mo. banc 2022) (citing *Marsh v. Bartlett*, 121 S.W.2d 737, 742 (Mo. banc 1938)). This provision “served the one purpose, to recall all legislative power theretofore granted to the end that the whole power to be granted should be subject to the initiative and referendum.” *Marsh*, 121 S.W.2d at 742. When the people vested legislative authority in the General Assembly, they “reserve[d] to themselves power to propose laws and amendments to the Constitution and enact or reject the same at the polls, independently of the legislative assembly.” *Id.*

To make this power meaningful, courts have made clear that the provisions governing referendum “should be construed liberally to the end that [the people’s] right to determine all proper questions by free and open elections shall be secure.” *State ex rel. Voss v. Davis*, 418 S.W.2d 163, 167 (Mo. 1967); *see also Rekart v. Kirkpatrick*, 639 S.W.2d 606 (Mo. banc 1982). In other words, “[p]rovisions reserving to the people the powers of initiative and referendum are given a liberal construction to effectuate the policy thereby adopted.” *Voss*, 418 S.W.2d at 167.

II. The Missouri Constitution Authorizes Referendum on Acts of the General Assembly, Including Congressional Maps

The Secretary's Certificate rests on a fundamental misreading of the Missouri Constitution. His arguments—and the Attorney General's supplemental “opinion”—fail to account for the Constitution's plain language and the settled law interpreting it.

The Secretary's Certificate asserts the Referendum is “insufficient under the Missouri Constitution because the Missouri Constitution does not authorize a referendum on congressional redistricting plans passed by the General Assembly.” Stip. Ex. 5. The Attorney General's attached “opinion” adds a requirement: supposedly, the Constitution needs to contain a “clear statement” specifically authorizing referenda on redistricting bills. *Id.*

The Secretary's own words doom his analysis. It is true that the “congressional redistricting plans [were] passed by the General Assembly.” *Id.* That means the people have reserved the right to conduct a referendum. The plain language of Article III, Sections 49 and 52(a) provide the clearest statement possible that a referendum on House Bill 1 is available and appropriate.

A. The Plain Language of the Missouri Constitution Authorizes a Referendum on Redistricting Legislation

Courts interpret constitutional provisions to give effect to their “plain, ordinary, and natural meaning.” *Wright-Jones v. Nasheed*, 368 S.W.3d 157, 159 (Mo. banc 2012). The Supreme Court of Missouri “has repeatedly held, when the

language of a constitutional provision is clear and unambiguous, [the] Court has no other duty than to apply the language of the provision as written.” *Planned Parenthood of the St. Louis Region v. Dep’t of Social Services*, 602 S.W.3d 201, 214 (Mo. banc 2020). And when the language is clear and unambiguous, the Court must apply the language as written and “may not resort to canons of construction to arrive at a different result.” *State ex rel. Hillman v. Beger*, 566 S.W.3d 600, 605 (Mo. banc 2019).

Here, the words are clear and lead to only one conclusion. Article III, Section 49 reserves to the people the “power to approve or reject by referendum **any** act of the general assembly, **except as hereinafter provided.**” Mo. Const. art. III, § 49 (emphasis added). This language is unambiguous: if there is an act of the general assembly—*any* act—the people can (with a sufficient number of signatures) order a referendum.

There can be no doubt about what those words mean. “Any” means “one, no matter which, of more than two,” or—more simply—“without limit.” *Webster’s New World College Dictionary* at 64 (5th ed. 2014). The referendum power thus covers acts of the General Assembly without limit, except where the Constitution itself explicitly provides otherwise. The State’s position overlooks those words and attempts to arrive at a different result. The State asks the Court to insert the words “except an act of the general assembly that redraws congressional district lines” into the Constitution. The Court may not do so.

Congressional redistricting is accomplished by an act of the General Assembly. Mo. Const. art. III, § 45 (“[T]he general assembly shall by law divide the state into districts corresponding with the number of [congressional] representatives to which it is entitled[.]”). House Bill 1—the 2025 congressional redistricting map—was passed by an “act of the general assembly,” as the bill itself states. *See* Pet. Ex. 1; Stip. Ex. 1. It is therefore subject to the referendum unless it falls within one of the exceptions “hereinafter provided.” Mo. Const. art. III, § 49.

Article III, Section 52(a) provides only two exceptions to the referendum power: (1) “[L]aws necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety”; and (2) “[L]aws making appropriations for the current expenses of the state government, for the maintenance of state institutions and for the support of public schools.” Mo. Const. art. III, § 52(a).

House Bill 1 falls within neither exception. It is not a law “necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety”—indeed, the Missouri Supreme Court has already examined this measure and determined that “HB 1 has no emergency clause.” *Maggard v. State*, 733 S.W.3d 411, 421 n. 8 (Mo. banc 2026); *cf. ACLU v. Ashcroft*, 577 S.W.3d 881, 884 (Mo. App. 2019) (“The Secretary of State concluded that because HB 126 contained an emergency

clause, the act was constitutionally ineligible in its totality for the referendum process.”). Nor does House Bill 1 make any appropriations. *Id.*¹

Undeterred, the Attorney General attempts to fit congressional redistricting into the appropriations exception. Stip. Ex. 5. Her theory is that “suffrage is a fundamental state institution, and congressional redistricting is necessary to maintain the suffrage right as populations shift over time.” *Id.* This argument ignores both a key qualifier and basic grammar. Mo. Const. art. III, § 52(a). The exception relates only to appropriations bills, which HB 1 is not. Every item in the Attorney General’s list—“current expenses of the state government,” “maintenance of state institutions,” and “support of public schools”—is preceded by the word “for.” That word “for” links each item back to the qualifying phrase “laws making appropriations.” The exception applies only to appropriations bills, and House Bill 1 is not one. *See Doyle v. Tidball*, 625 S.W.3d 459, 466 (Mo. banc 2021) (“Appropriations [bills] consist of both a specific amount [appropriated] and a specific purpose.”).

¹ The exceptions in Section 52(a) cover legislation that is effective at a time other than “ninety days after the adjournment of the session . . . at which it was enacted.” Mo. Const. art. III, § 29. This makes sense, as the purpose of the referendum is to commit to the people the power to approve legislation that is not already in effect.

B. The Referendum is Encompassed Within Missouri's Legislative Power

The Secretary nonetheless contends constitutional restrictions on legislative authority are construed narrowly and the Court should rely on this principle to simply ignore the unambiguous language of the Constitution's referendum provisions. Def. Tr. Br. at 12. But that premise is flawed. The referendum is not a "limitation" on the legislature's power. It is simply *part* of Missouri's legislative process.

The United States Supreme Court agrees. Reaffirming a century of precedent, the Court said the following reasoning "commands our continued respect"—that the "state legislature may not create congressional districts independent of requirements imposed by the state constitution with respect to the enactment of the laws." 600 U.S. at 26.

And what might those requirements be? Those that are embraced by the state legislative power, including "the referendum and the Governor's veto." *Id.* This makes sense when you consider *how* the legislature gained its power in the first instance. The people, when framing the Constitution, vested legislative power "in a senate and house of representatives." Mo. Const. art. III, § 1. At the same time, the people reserved some of this power to themselves as a check on the legislature. But it is still legislative authority. This is what the Supreme Court of the United States recognized and what this Court must also conclude.

C. There Is No Clear Statement Doctrine in Missouri

Marching straight past the plain language of the Constitution without so much as a sideways glance of acknowledgement, the Attorney General's letter accompanying the Secretary's Certificate insists that there be a "clear statement" specifically identifying redistricting bills as subject to the referendum. Stip. Ex. 5.

Missouri courts have never required a "clear statement" to authorize a referendum on any issue, including the legislature's redistricting power. It is the other way around. Missouri's Constitution has a clear statement that authorizes the referendum on any act of the general assembly unless the State can point to a clear statement that the referendum is *not* available—such as the limitations on appropriations bills.

The Attorney General's "opinion"—which apparently took ten months to prepare—*cites no authority for this upside-down proposition*. That is because none exists. The Attorney General's invented "clear statement" rule has no basis in caselaw. Rather, when the Constitution reserves referendum authority for "any act of the general assembly," it simply means what it says—"any act." Mo. Const. art. III, § 49.

Unable to find legal support for her invented rule, the Attorney General argues that Chapter 116's procedures are incompatible with referenda on redistricting bills. Stip. Ex. 5. This argument fails on multiple levels.² But more

² Among other things, the Attorney General suggests Chapter 116 is incompatible with redistricting bills because it gives the Secretary *until* the time when primary

importantly, it is irrelevant. The Missouri Constitution controls, and statutes cannot override constitutional rights. There is no canon of constitutional construction that would allow a court to consider statutory schemes (created about 40 years after the Constitution was adopted) to understand what the drafters of the Constitution meant. It matters not what later legislatures may have thought; the words of the Constitution control.

The Attorney General's analysis of the statute also ignores the mandate on how to treat statutes related to the people's power. "Constitutional and statutory provisions relative to initiative are liberally construed to make effective the people's reservation of that power." *Missourians to Protect the Initiative v. Blunt*, 799 S.W.2d 824, 827 (1990). If the statutes impeded the referendum—they do not here—they would be unconstitutional. *See Id.* ("Statutes that place impediments on the initiative power that are inconsistent with the reservation found in the language of the constitution will be declared unconstitutional." *Id.*) These rules also apply to the referendum. *United Labor Comm. of Mo. v. Kirkpatrick*, 572 S.W.2d 449, 454-55 (Mo. banc 1978). The legislature does not have authority to "interfere with and impede' the right of referendum" by taking

elections occur to certify the sufficiency of a referendum. Stip. Ex. 5. She ignores that Chapter 116 does not *require* the Secretary to wait that long. And, as discussed below, the record overwhelmingly establishes the Secretary could and should have made his decision on the referendum many months ago. He intentionally delayed his decision so he could claim it was too late to undo his unlawful actions.

steps to “make any referendum effort untenable.” *No Bans on Choice*, 638 S.W.3d at 491.

The Attorney General’s arguments about Chapter 116 miss the point. If the Missouri Constitution subjects redistricting bills to the referendum power—and it does—no statute can take that power away, even if the timing in those statutes might make it awkward for state officials to comply with them.

D. There is No Clear Statement Rule Relevant to Redistricting in Federal Law

Straying even further from the plain language of the Missouri Constitution, the Attorney General invokes the federal Elections Clause, claiming that subjecting redistricting bills to the referendum power would violate federal law. Stip. Ex. 5. But over a century of unbroken Supreme Court precedent forecloses this argument entirely.

In *Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant*, 241 U.S. 565 (1916), the Court squarely addressed Ohio’s application of its referendum provision to a congressional redistricting bill. Ohio’s constitutional provision—materially identical to Missouri’s—applied to “any law enacted by the general assembly.” *Id.* at 566. It contained no express statement that the referendum applied specifically to congressional redistricting.

The people of Ohio used that power to reject a redistricting bill, and state officials sought to invalidate the people’s vote on the theory that it violated the Elections Clause. *Id.* at 566-67. The Court’s response was unequivocal:

To the extent that the contention urges that to include the referendum within state legislative power for the purpose of apportionment is repugnant to § 4 of article 1 of the Constitution and hence void . . . we again think ***the contention is plainly without substance . . .***

Id. at 569 (emphasis added).

Then, in *Smiley v. Holm*, 285 U.S. 355 (1932), the Court similarly upheld application of the gubernatorial veto to a congressional-redistricting act. It did not require an express reference to veto authority over congressional-election laws, or ask for any “clear statement.” *See generally id.* The Court expressly reaffirmed its holding in *Davis*: “[T]he referendum provision of the state Constitution, when applied to a law redistricting the state with a view to representation in Congress, [i]s not unconstitutional.” *Id.* at 372.

The Secretary and Attorney General may wish the law had changed in the past century. It has not. Just three years ago, in *Moore v. Harper*, the Supreme Court reviewed the above line of cases and *again* confirmed that states may subject redistricting bills to the referendum power and said nothing about any need for a “clear statement” to do so. 600 U.S. 1 (2023).

The Supreme Court reiterated that it had already rejected the very argument the Secretary is making here “as plainly without substance.” *Id.* at 23 (quotations omitted). The Court noted that “[n]owhere in the Federal Constitution could [it] find provision of an attempt to endow the legislature of [a] State with power to enact laws in any manner other than that in which the constitution of the State has provided that laws shall be enacted.” *Id.* at 24

(quotations omitted). “States . . . retain autonomy to establish their own governmental processes.” *Id.* at 25 (quotations omitted). The bottom line: “A state legislature may not create congressional districts independently of requirements imposed by the state constitution with respect to the enactment ***of laws.***” *Id.* at 26 (quotations omitted; emphasis added). This includes the referendum power. *Id.* at 26-27.

Where the United States Supreme Court *has* used a “clear statement rule,” it has done so to limit federal intrusion on state authority, not the other way around. In *Bond v. United States*, for example, the Court explained courts must make “certain of Congress’s intent before finding that federal law overrides the usual constitutional balance of federal and state powers.” 572 U.S. 844, 858 (2014) (quotations omitted). The Court required *Congress* to be explicit when it sought to interfere in “several areas of traditional state responsibility,” such as real estate, land use, and local crime. *Id.* The Court applied a similar requirement in *Sackett v. EPA*, 598 U.S. 651 (2023), to “preserve the States’ primary authority over land and water use.” *Id.* at 680 (quotations omitted).

What the Secretary and Attorney General propose is a complete reversal of this principle. They argue that Missourians, when adopting *their own* Constitution in 1945, should have used language clearer than the very same language the Supreme Court had already held—over thirty years earlier in *Davis*—was sufficient to subject redistricting bills to the referendum power. That is not how clear-statement rules work. This Court should decline to invent one

that would deprive Missouri courts of the power to interpret their own Constitution.

The only Supreme Court decision the Attorney General cites to support her desired “clear statement rule” is the particularly inapt *United States v. Gradwell*, 243 U.S. 476 (1917). That case involved several indictments charging conspiracies to defraud the United States by bribing voters during a congressional election. *Id.* The trial courts dismissed the indictments for failure to state a federal crime. *Id.* at 479. The issue for the Supreme Court was the scope of (i) Congress’s power over state elections and (ii) the particular statute in question. The Court explained: “it has been [Congress’s] policy to leave such regulations almost entirely to the states, whose representatives Congressmen are.” *Id.* at 482. The Court simply noted that Congress had historically left control over state elections to the states, and when it deviated from that policy, it did so clearly and unmistakably. The Court refused to read a revenue law to criminalize election activity:

With it thus clearly established that the policy of Congress for so great a part of our constitutional life has been, and now is, to leave the conduct of the election of its members to state laws, administered by state officers, and that whenever it has assumed to regulate such elections it has done so by positive and clear statutes, such as were enacted in 1870, it would be a strained and unreasonable construction to apply to such elections this § 37, originally a law for the protection of the revenue, and for now fifty years confined in its application to ‘Offenses against the Operations of the Government,’ as distinguished from the processes by which men are selected to conduct such operations.

Id. at 485. Far from supporting the Secretary’s position, *Gradwell* confirms that congressional elections remain subject to state control—including the referendum power where it exists.

E. Missourians Have Conducted Referenda on Congressional Redistricting Plans

The historical record confirms Missouri voters have exercised this referendum power over redistricting legislation—and Missouri courts have consistently upheld their right to do so, without any concern about the potential suspension of the legislation. Because the Constitution unambiguously subjects congressional redistricting bills to the referendum power, it is no surprise that Missouri voters have exercised this power before.

In 1922, Missouri voters blocked a congressional redistricting plan by petitioning for a referendum, then defeated the plan by a decisive margin of 62% to 38%. Stip Ex. 17; Stip Ex. 18. No one challenged this referendum in court.

Ten years later, in 1932, the Missouri Supreme Court cited the Supreme Court’s *Davis* opinion for the proposition that the congressional “redistricting in a state should be made by the laws of the state.” *State ex rel. Carroll v. Becker*, 45 S.W.2d 533, 536 (Mo. banc 1932), *aff’d*, 285 U.S. 380 (1932). The court noted with approval that, in Ohio, “the referendum was a part of the lawmaking power of the state, to be asserted in approving or disapproving a redistricting act by the Legislature.” *Id.*; *see also id.* at 537 (holding that dividing states into

congressional districts under the Elections Clause is a “legislative act” that must be “accomplished by the laws of such states”).

Then, in 1952, the Supreme Court of Missouri decided *State ex rel. Moore v. Toberman*, 250 S.W.2d 701 (Mo. banc 1952), concerning the timeliness of referendum petitions voters filed against a congressional redistricting act. The trial court concluded the act was “subject to the referendum provisions” in the Missouri Constitution, and the Supreme Court affirmed. *Id.* at 703 (quoting the trial court’s conclusions of law); *see id.* at 707. While that referendum effort failed due to proponents’ failure to collect a sufficient number of signatures, the Supreme Court did not remotely suggest redistricting acts are not subject to the referendum power and, indeed, affirmed the trial court’s determination that they are. *See* Stip. Ex. 19.

A decade later, in *Preisler v. Hearnese*, 362 S.W.2d 552 (Mo. banc 1962), the Missouri Supreme Court issued a unanimous opinion rejecting a one-person, one-vote challenge to a congressional redistricting act. Significantly, the Court observed that “the people of this state have a remedy for even valid redistricting, which they do not like, through our initiative and referendum provisions.” *Id.* at 557 (citing Mo. Const. art. III, § 49-53). This consistent line of authority confirms what is obvious from the Constitution’s text: redistricting bills are subject to the referendum.

III. The United States Constitution Does Not Bar Referendum on Redistricting Bills

The Secretary's federal constitutional arguments fail both on jurisdictional and substantive grounds. The Attorney General argues that subjecting House Bill 1 to the referendum would violate the Elections Clause and the Guarantee Clause of the United States Constitution. Stip. Ex. 5. Neither argument has merit. But more fundamentally, neither is properly before this Court, because the Secretary has no statutory authority to reject a referendum on these grounds.

A. The Secretary May Only Assess the Constitutionality of a Referendum for Compliance with the Missouri Constitutional Requirements of Referendum

Chapter 116 defines the Secretary's role in the referendum process. Once signatures are submitted, the Secretary is directed to "examine the petition to determine whether it complies with the Constitution of *Missouri* and with this chapter." § 116.120.1, RSMo. The statute gives no authority for either the Secretary or the Attorney General to review, much less deny, the referendum right on *federal* constitutional grounds.

The Courts have flatly rejected the idea. "The sufficiency determination the Secretary of State is required to conduct plainly does not include whether an initiative petition complies with the *Federal* Constitution." *Mo. Elec. Coops. v. Kander*, 497 S.W.3d 905, 920 (Mo. App. 2016). Indeed, "challenges to an initiative petition which go beyond determining compliance with constitutional

and statutory provisions pertaining to the required procedure and form of a ‘sufficient’ initiative petition are not ripe for pre-election judicial review.” *Id.*

This Court may not expand the powers in Chapter 116 any further than they expressly extend. Laws implementing the referendum process “must be subordinate to the constitutional provision and in furtherance of its purposes, and must not . . . attempt to narrow or embarrass it.” *No Bans on Choice*, 638 S.W.3d at 489 (cleaned up).

Any broader reading of Chapter 116 would let the Secretary put his thumb on the scale, blocking the people from voting on any measure he opposes. That is not how Missouri’s referendum process works. The Secretary may campaign against the referendum on his own time, but he may not use his office to prevent Missouri citizens from exercising their constitutional rights.

Anything less would be a perversion of the referendum process. As the Missouri Supreme Court has recognized:

[T]he initiative [and referendum] allows the public to bypass their elected representatives and reserves direct lawmaking power with the voters of the state. The initiative [and referendum] is a tool for everyday, ordinary citizens to override legislatures held in the thrall of wealthy patrons. Initiative and referendum make it possible for the people, by direct vote, to repeal bad laws or enact beneficial measures that their representatives refuse to consider.

Brown v. Carnahan, 370 S.W.3d 637, 673 (Mo. banc 2012). The Secretary’s effort to claim judicial power for himself threatens to nullify these principles.

Even setting aside this threshold problem, the Secretary's federal constitutional arguments fail on the merits. The United States Supreme Court has already rejected them, repeatedly.

B. The Elections Clause Does Not Bar Subjecting Redistricting Bills to the Referendum

If it were appropriate to conduct a pre-election review of compliance with the federal constitution, the analysis would be short. As explained in Section II.C, the Supreme Court has rejected this argument repeatedly and emphatically—in *Davis*, 241 U.S. at 569 (“plainly without substance”); *Hawke v. Smith*, 253 U.S. 221, 230 (1920); *Smiley*, 285 U.S. at 372; and *Moore*, 600 U.S. at 23-27. A century of unbroken precedent forecloses the Secretary's position.

The Attorney General's letter seems to accept this precedent. *See* Stip. Ex. 5. To get around it, she argues the Elections Clause does not authorize a subset of the electorate to vote to set aside congressional districts. This is, however, how referenda work. A referendum suspends a law from going into effect so that the voters of the state can decide whether to adopt the law or not. A referendum is the process of “referring a state legislative act . . . to the people for final approval.” *Black's Law Dictionary*. Because the people, not the legislature, have final approval, an act subject to the referendum is no law at all until the people vote on it. Nothing in the Elections Clause prohibits this principle from applying to congressional districts.

C. The Court Cannot Adjudicate Issues Concerning the Guarantee Clause

The Attorney General's invocation of the Guarantee Clause is equally meritless. She vaguely asserts that allowing citizens to exercise their reserved referendum power on redistricting bills would somehow cause Missouri to cease having a "republican form of government." Stip. Ex. 5. The implication is that the referendum power itself is incompatible with republican government—a proposition as remarkable as it is wrong.

In any event, the Supreme Court also rejected this argument more than a century ago in *Davis*. In explaining the reasons why the challenge based on Article I, Section 4 of the U.S. Constitution was "plainly without substance," the Court observed:

[That contention] must rest upon the assumption that to include the referendum in the scope of the legislative power is to introduce a virus which destroys that power, which in effect annihilates representative government, and causes a state where such condition exists to be not republican in form, in violation of the guaranty of the Constitution. Const. § 4, art. 4. But the proposition and the argument disregard the settled rule that the question of whether that guaranty of the Constitution has been disregarded **presents no justiciable controversy**, but involves the exercise by Congress of the authority vested in it by the Constitution.

241 U.S. at 569 (emphasis added). The question is not justiciable and it has not been for over a century.

The question of what best effectuates a “republican form of government” is committed to Congress, not the courts. *See, e.g., Deer Park Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Harris Cnty. Appraisal Dist.*, 132 F.3d 1095, 1099 (5th Cir. 1998) (“This claim is not only incorrect, it is absurd. First of all, the Supreme Court has held that challenges to Congressional action under the Guarantee Clause are not justiciable.” (citing *Baker v. Carr*, 369 U.S. 186, 224 (1962))); *Cnty. of Charles Mix v. U.S. Dep't of Interior*, 799 F. Supp. 2d 1027, 1037 (D.S.D. 2011), *aff'd*, 674 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2012) (“Claims under the Guarantee Clause usually are considered political questions, and courts rarely find them justiciable.”). The Supreme Court has also repeatedly made clear that redistricting is a legislative act subject to all state-law restrictions on the exercise of legislative power, including the referendum. *Moore*, 600 U.S. at 23-27. The Secretary’s Guarantee Clause argument fails on both justiciability and the merits.

IV. The Secretary’s Contention that it is Too Late for the Courts to Grant Relief is Meritless and Barred by the Secretary’s Unclean Hands

In the “opinion” attached to the Secretary’s Certificate, the Attorney General offers various reasons why—even if House Bill 1 is subject to the referendum (and it plainly is)—the Court should nonetheless require use of the House Bill 1 map for the November general election. Stip. Ex. 5. These arguments are meritless and, in any event, barred by the doctrine of unclean hands.

The Missouri Constitution provides that when a bill is referred to the people for referendum, it “shall take effect when approved by a majority of the votes cast thereon, and not otherwise.” Mo. Const. art. III, § 52(b). As the Supreme Court explained regarding *this very measure*:

If [] the December 9 referendum petition filing is ultimately determined to be sufficient, article III, section 52(b) applies. In that case, because a “legal, sufficient, and timely” referendum petition was filed on December 9—*before* HB 1 went into effect on December 11[, 2025]—HB 1 did not take effect on December 11, HB 1 was “referred to the people” as of December 9, [2025.] and HB 1 “shall take effect when approved by a majority of the votes cast thereon, and not otherwise.”

Maggard, 733 S.W.3d at 420. The Supreme Court could not have been clearer: because Plaintiff’s referendum was and is sufficient, House Bill 1 *has never been the law*. The Secretary’s wishful thinking cannot change this constitutional reality, and his present arguments are nothing more than an attempt to benefit from the “crisis” he created.

A. The Secretary’s Arguments Are Barred by Unclean Hands

Even if this Court somehow had the authority to ignore what the Supreme Court already said about the effect of sufficiency, the Court should reject all of the Secretary’s arguments on this subject because they represent an attempt to gain from his own wrongdoing. The Supreme Court told the Secretary *in May*—months before the primary—what the consequences would be if the referendum were deemed sufficient. *Maggard*, 733 S.W.3d at 420. Rather than faithfully

doing his job, the Secretary intentionally delayed his decision until the last minute to manufacture the very “exigency” he now invokes.

This is beyond dispute. The Secretary insisted for months that he intended to wait until the last possible moment to issue a certification decision. Stip. Ex. 14; Stip. Ex. 15; Stip. Ex. 16. He and the Attorney General began announcing this strategy *last October. Id.* They publicly acknowledged this was a deliberate tactic to force the House Bill 1 map on Missouri voters, observing that so long as the status quo was the House Bill 1 map, delay worked in their favor. *Id.*

At the same time, the Secretary and Attorney General sought to have a federal court bar Plaintiff from even turning in signatures. Stip. Ex. 6; Stip. Ex. 7. They made the *exact same* constitutional arguments set out in the Attorney General’s letter. *Id.* The federal court dismissed the case, observing that if the Secretary did not want to count signatures, he could immediately deem the referendum insufficient and the issue would be promptly resolved by Missouri courts. Stip. Ex. 8. The Secretary then sought reconsideration, insisting the federal court was egregiously wrong in its analysis. Stip. Ex. 9. When that motion was denied, Stip. Ex. 10. , the Secretary (and other plaintiffs) did not file an appeal.

The events in federal court show there was no legitimate reason for the Secretary to delay his certification decision. Later, he offered the excuse that he needed time to validate the number of signatures submitted in support of the referendum. Stip Ex. 10. Remarkably, the Secretary’s certification decision *does not even address* the number of signatures. Stip. Ex. 5. There was no reason for

the Secretary to have waited—other than his desire to later argue (as he is now doing) that House Bill 1 must be used, *even though it has never been the law*.

The Supreme Court has rejected these tactics before. In *Purcell v. Cape Girardeau County Commission*, 322 S.W.3d 522 (Mo. banc 2010), a county commissioner induced his colleagues to conduct a closed meeting. He then turned around and sued the Commission, claiming it violated the Sunshine Law for doing exactly what he suggested. *Id.* at 523. The trial court rejected the claim on the merits. *Id.*

The Supreme Court affirmed, but it skipped the merits and concluded the commissioner's requested relief was barred by his unclean hands. *Id.* at 524-25. "A litigant with unclean hands generally is not entitled to equitable relief such as an injunction or declaratory judgment." *Id.* at 524. This doctrine is meant to "prevent opportunistic behavior." *Id.* "A party who participates in inequitable activity regarding the very issue for which it seeks relief will be barred by its own misconduct from receiving relief." *Id.* (quotations omitted). The Court had no trouble concluding the commissioner's actions met the test. *Id.* "What is material is not that the plaintiff's hands are dirty, but that he dirties them in acquiring the right he now asserts." *Karpierz v. Easley*, 68 S.W.3d 565, 572 (Mo. App. W.D. 2002) (quotations omitted).

The Secretary's hands are dirty. He dirtied them *precisely* so he could make the arguments he is now advancing. Plaintiff seeks an injunction barring the Secretary from further use of House Bill 1 pending the people's vote. Pet. at 8.

The Secretary's arguments that it is "too late" for such relief are the product of his own misconduct and are barred by the doctrine of unclean hands.

B. The Fact that Redistricting Is Required in Response to a Census Has Nothing to Do with the Situation Here

The Attorney General suggests the Court should ignore Article III, Section 52(b)'s command that legislation be suspended pending the outcome of a referendum because it would interfere with the legislature's ability to redistrict in response to the decennial census. Stip. Ex. 5. She asserts that the Supreme Court's holding in *Maggard* "would have disastrous consequences." Stip Ex. 5. Setting aside that this Court lacks authority to change *Maggard* even if it *would* have disastrous consequences, the Attorney General is wrong. Her arguments might make sense if the legislature could redistrict *only* in response to a decennial census. But the Supreme Court concluded—at her office's urging—that this is not the case. *Luther v. Hoskins*, 730 S.W.3d 567 (Mo. banc 2026). Where, as here, the legislature draws new districts mid-cycle, there is no urgency to implement those districts. Federal law does not require it.

And, when the legislature *does* redistrict in response to the decennial census, it has tools at its disposal to ensure the new districts go into effect promptly and Missouri remains in compliance with federal law: it can put a valid emergency clause on the bill. That is exactly what the legislature did in 2022. *See* H.B 2909, 101st Gen. Assemb. 2nd Reg. Sess. (2022). If there is truly an emergency, the bill would not be subject to the referendum. *See* Mo. Const. art.

III, § 49. House Bill 1 did not address an emergency, and no one claims it did. Because House Bill 1 is simply a political exercise in mid-cycle redistricting and was unnecessary to comply with the one-person, one-vote requirement, there is no legal reason its districts must go into immediate effect. The Attorney General cites none. This is not a basis to withhold relief.

C. The Elections and Guarantee Clauses Are (Once Again) Irrelevant

Next, the Attorney General asserts the Elections Clause and Guarantee Clause somehow require House Bill 1 to go into immediate effect. Stip. Ex. 5. This is just a repackaging of her argument that those clauses prohibit subjecting a redistricting bill to the referendum. For the reasons discussed above, those arguments are meritless. The Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected them. And issues relating to the Guarantee Clause are not even justiciable.³

The Attorney General complains it would violate the U.S. Constitution to allow a referendum to suspend a law that has already been used to conduct the primary election. As explained below, however, there is no constitutional requirement to have a primary election in the first place. And the Secretary and Attorney General are the ones who created this situation.

³ Also, in one of the few cases the Attorney General cites, the Supreme Court made clear there is no single form of “republican government.” “No particular government is designated as republican, neither is the exact form to be guaranteed, in any manner especially designated.” *Minor v. Happersett*, 88 U.S. 162, 175 (1874).

The federal court told the Secretary to resolve this issue back in December. Stip. Ex. 8. The Supreme Court strongly encouraged him to do so in May. *Maggard*, 733 S.W.3d 411. The Secretary could certainly have had these issues resolved well before candidate filing even opened. And if the Secretary and his allies truly believe Missourians will approve House Bill 1, the legislature could have set a special election so that the map could be approved and then used in November. Mo. Const. art. III, § 52(b) (“All elections on measures referred to the people shall be had at the general state elections, except when the general assembly shall order a special election.”). Having done none of those things, the Secretary cannot now complain about the consequences of his own inaction.

Finally, the Attorney General asserts “Missourians have spoken overwhelmingly” on House Bill 1 because it was enacted by the legislature with comfortable margins. Stip. Ex. 5. The vote tally reflects nothing of the sort. Missouri voters overwhelmingly rejected two other measures (Amendments 4 and 5) proposed by the legislature on the very day the Attorney General wrote her letter. See <https://enr.sos.mo.gov/>.

D. Purcell Does Not Apply Here; Missouri Has a Statute on Ballot Changes

In his trial brief also raises the so-called “*Purcell* Principle” as an impediment to relief. The Court should reject this argument. The principle applies only in federal courts, and Missouri already has a statutory deadline for ballot changes.

The *Purcell* Principle is a rule that “**federal courts** ordinarily should not enjoin a state’s election laws in the period close to an election.” *Merrill v. Milligan*, 142 S. Ct. 879, 880 (2022) (Mem.) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (emphasis added). It has no bearing on “the authority of state courts to apply their own constitutions to election regulations,” but is instead limited to policing “federal intrusion on state lawmaking processes.” *Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Wis. State Legislature*, 141 S. Ct. 28, 28 (2020) (Mem.) (Roberts, C.J., concurring). State courts have recognized *Purcell* has no application to them. *See, e.g., Matter of Harkenrider v. Hochul*, 197 N.E.3d 437, 454 n.16 (N.Y. 2022); *Martin v. Simon*, 6 N.W.3d 443, 451-52 (Minn. 2024); *Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm. v. Pate*, 950 N.W.2d 1, 15 (Iowa 2020) (Appel, J., concurring).

Applying *Purcell* here is particularly inappropriate. The legislature has already decided when it is too late to make changes to ballots—there is a statute governing that issue. Under Section 115.125, courts can make changes to ballots until the eighth Tuesday before an election (here, September 8). Applying that statute, Missouri courts have ordered changes up until the very last minute.⁴ *See, e.g., Coleman v. Ashcroft*, 696 S.W.3d 347 (Mo. banc 2024) (placing abortion question on ballot on day of deadline and warning against delays of the sort the

⁴ Also, *Purcell* is often invoked by federal courts where affording relief would require a state legislature to draw new district boundaries when there is no time to do so. That isn’t an issue here, because the 2022 boundaries are already in legal effect and, indeed, have already been used to conduct congressional elections.

Secretary engaged in here). This case can and will be fully resolved before that deadline.

Finally, the Secretary has previously conceded *Purcell* is irrelevant. In trial court briefing in *Maggard*, the Secretary asserted: “The *Purcell* principle does not override the Secretary’s and local election authorities’ statutory obligations to review PNP’s referendum petition for legal sufficiency and to certify PNP’s petition if it is legally sufficient.” Resp. Tr. Br. at 14 n.6 (Feb. 9, 2026) (Case No. 25AC-CC009120). That admission is fatal. This is a statutorily authorized action for review of the very decision the Secretary concedes is not governed by *Purcell*.

E. Hadley is Similarly Irrelevant

Nor does *Hadley v. Junior College District of Metropolitan Kansas City*, 460 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. banc 1970), help the Secretary. In *Hadley*, the Missouri Supreme Court implemented a federal mandate after the U.S. Supreme Court found Missouri’s junior college trustee elections violated the one-person-one-vote requirement. *Id.* at 2. Because that mandate arrived mere days before the candidate filing deadline—with absentee ballots already being printed and voting machines being adjusted—the court allowed a single election to proceed under the invalidated statute. *Id.* at 2–3.

Hadley did not announce any sort of bright-line rule on making changes to boundaries close to an election. Rather, the Court balanced the equities based on the facts before it—which undoubtedly included the relative importance of the junior college trustee elections at issue—and concluded those facts did not

warrant changes 32 days before an election. *Id.* That narrow remedial decision is inapposite here.

Plaintiff asks this Court to exercise its statutory responsibility to review the Secretary's certification decision. See § 116.200, RSMo. If the Secretary's decision was improper, there is no prudential consideration prohibiting this Court from reversing. Indeed, reversal is the Court's statutory obligation. Further, *Hadley's* timing constraints arose from external judicial action—not from a litigant's own strategic delay. Here, the Secretary engineered the timing problem he now invokes, ignoring repeated judicial encouragement to resolve this matter months ago. See *Maggard*, 733 S.W.3d at 420 (warning that if Referendum was sufficient, HB 1 “can only go into effect when approved by a majority of the votes cast thereon”); see also Stip. Ex. 8.

Moreover, one-person-one-vote concerns required the court in *Hadley* to restructure electoral machinery on an emergency basis; here, the Court need only determine whether the referendum petition is sufficient and require the Secretary to operate the election under whichever map is in effect. If the referendum petition is deemed sufficient, the 2022 congressional map has always been in effect. See *Maggard*, 733 S.W.3d at 420. And unlike in *Hadley*, the General Assembly has already codified the relevant timing rule in Section 115.125, giving the Court and the Secretary plenty of time to implement whichever map applies. There will be no changes here the day before an election. The General Assembly ensured that would never be the case.

F. The Secretary's Contentions Regarding Article I, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution and UOCAVA Are Erroneous Because There Is No Need to Run Another Primary

The Secretary also claims the Court cannot grant relief because doing so would violate UOCAVA (52 U.S.C. §§ 20301, 20302) and Article I, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution. *See* Stip. Ex. 5. But both arguments rest on the same mistaken premise: that following the dictates of the Supreme Court's decision in *Maggard* requires Missouri to run new primaries.⁵ No one is asking for that. There is no party before the Court demanding such relief. And it is unnecessary.

There is no requirement that the same map that was used in the primary must be used for the general election. Indeed, despite his lengthy trial brief, the Secretary fails to identify a *single* case in which Missouri or federal courts have ever said it *is* required. Instead, the Secretary cites various cases standing for the unremarkable proposition that where primary elections are part of state election law, the government cannot deprive minorities of the right to participate in such elections. *See United States v. Classic*, 313 U.S.299 (1941); *Smith v. Allwright*, 321 U.S. 649 (1944). That makes sense, and is not at issue.

What does *not* make sense is the Secretary's implicit assumption that the same people who voted in primary elections must necessarily vote on the same

⁵ In the case of UOCAVA, the Secretary suggests that this could theoretically be done, were there enough time to send out military and overseas ballots for a new primary. Stip. Ex. 5.

candidates at the general election. That *never* happens. Voters die. People turn 18. People are convicted of crimes and lose their right to vote. People move to different districts. Some who did not vote in the primary choose to vote in the general (and vice versa). There is no requirement that the same people who voted in the primary must vote in the general election—such a requirement could not possibly work.

On occasion, the identity of candidates changes between the primary and the general election too. Because sometimes things happen, like a candidate dying between the primary and the general. Missouri law reflects this reality. Section 115.363 identifies circumstances under which a party nominating committee can select a candidate for the general election. They include: death of a candidate, disqualification of a candidate, and withdrawal of a candidate. § 115.363.3, RSMo. The law covers congressional districts. § 115.365.1(5), RSMo. These statutes reflect that not only does the composition of voters change after a primary, but sometimes candidates do as well. By the Secretary's logic, however, these common-sense solutions would all be unconstitutional because voters are now being presented with candidates they did not vote for during the primary.

Also, the law does not require a candidate for Congress to live in the district in which they seek to be elected. U.S. Const. art. I, § 2. No candidate will be disqualified from holding office by virtue of using the 2022 boundaries. The Secretary does not suggest otherwise. His insistence on using the House Bill 1

boundaries during the primary—knowing full well what would happen if the referendum was deemed sufficient—provides no basis to withhold relief now.

The Secretary also claims using different congressional boundaries during the general election would somehow violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. *See* Def. Tr. Br. at 46-48. But these arguments are even less developed than the Secretary's Election Clause arguments. He cites one case—*Gray v. Sanders*, 372 U.S. 368 (1963)—to support this assertion. But *Gray* simply held that when a state conducts primary elections it must comply with the one-person-one-vote principle and cannot create districts that weight some voters' votes more than others. *Id.* The Secretary wholly fails to explain how using the 2022 boundaries—which no one has ever claimed violate that legal requirement—would raise such an issue.

The Secretary simply asserts it would be *unfair* to require voters to consider different candidates at the general than they considered at the primary. He should have thought about that before engaging in intentional delay. And, in any event, that is not an equal protection issue. It isn't a constitutional violation of any sort. Again, voters are presented with different candidates than they considered at the primary on a not-infrequent basis due to candidate deaths, withdrawals, disqualifications, etc.

No one will be deprived of any rights if the 2022 boundaries are used. Voters who cared to participate in the primaries had their votes counted. That resulted in the nomination of a slate of candidates who may or may not appear on

the general election ballot, for a variety of reasons. Anyone who is eligible and wishes to vote in November will again have the opportunity to do so, and can help decide which of the candidates running in their district will represent them.

V. The Secretary Has Waived Any Argument that the Referendum Lacks a Sufficient Number of Signatures and, In Any Event, It Has More than Enough

Having addressed the Secretary's constitutional arguments, the Court should also note that the Secretary has waived any challenge to the sufficiency of the signatures—and, in any event, the petition contains far more signatures than required.

The Constitution requires that, for a referendum to be placed on the ballot, it must contain signatures of five percent of voters in two-thirds of the state's congressional districts. Mo. Const. art. III, § 52(a). The Secretary may choose the method by which to verify those signatures from the statutory options—random sampling or a count of every signature—or he may rely on circulator affidavits. *See Maggard*, 733 S.W. 3d at 416. Regardless of the method chosen, the people's referendum right cannot be defeated because the Secretary refuses to engage in the verification process.

The Secretary sent the petition pages to the local election authorities to verify the signatures. Progress reports of that verification process have been posted on the Secretary's website for months. On August 6, the Secretary produced a final (not preliminary) report of the signature verification. Stip. Ex. 4.

That report shows there are more than enough valid signatures supporting the referendum from six of Missouri's eight congressional districts. *Id.* Yet, remarkably, the Secretary said nothing about the signature count in his certificate of insufficiency—a telling omission.

To the extent the Secretary believed he could omit any signature count from his certificate and later claim the petition lacks sufficient signatures, he is mistaken. The statute requires signature verification and a certificate of sufficiency or insufficiency to be completed “not later than 5:00 p.m. on the thirteenth Tuesday prior to the general election or two weeks after the date the election authority certifies the results of a petition verification . . . whichever is later.” § 116.150.3, RSMo. That deadline has passed. The Secretary had his chance to challenge the number of signatures and declined to do so. He cannot take a second bite at the apple.

Any such challenge would also be futile. Based on the documentation released by the Secretary of State's office, the referendum petition contains more than 160,000 valid signatures, as determined by the local election authorities, spread across six of the state's eight congressional districts. Stip. Ex. 4. This is more than 45,000 signatures above the threshold necessary to qualify for the ballot—a margin that forecloses any serious challenge to sufficiency on signature grounds.

VI. Conclusion

The Secretary's (and Attorney General's) reasoning for declaring the Referendum Petition insufficient are without merit. They are foreclosed by the text of the Constitution, longstanding Missouri and U.S. Supreme Court precedent, and basic common sense. This Court should, pursuant to Section 116.200, order the Secretary to reverse his decision of insufficiency, issue a certificate of sufficiency, and place the Referendum Petition on the ballot for the people to vote on in November. In addition, the Court should issue an injunction barring the Secretary and anyone acting in concert with him from running the November congressional election using the congressional district boundaries found in House Bill 1.

Respectfully submitted,

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ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on August 18, 2026, I electronically filed the foregoing Plaintiff's Suggestions in Opposition to Motion to Intervene with the Clerk of Court using the Court's e-filing system.

/s/ Charles W. Hatfield

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COLE COUNTY, MISSOURI

RICHARD VON GLAHN,	)	
	)	
Plaintiff,	)	
	)	
v.	)	Case No. 26AC-CC00440
	)	
DENNY HOSKINS, in his official	)	
capacity,	)	
	)	
Defendant.	)	
	)	

JOINT STIPULATION OF FACTS AND EXHIBITS

The Parties stipulate to the admission of the following facts and exhibits. By stipulating to these facts and exhibits, the Parties do not concede that such facts and exhibits are relevant or necessary for the Court to resolve this matter. The Parties have agreed not to object to the entry of these facts and exhibits into the record, reserving objections to relevance only. Matters contained in exhibits but not expressly discussed in a stipulation are part of the record and may be cited by the Parties.

1. Plaintiff Richard von Glahn is a Missouri citizen, resident of St. Louis County, a taxpayer, and qualified voter in the State of Missouri.
2. Defendant Denny Hoskins is the Secretary of State for the State of Missouri.
3. Intervenor Republican National Committee is the national committee of the Republican Party as defined by 52 U.S.C. § 30101.

4. Intervenor National Republican Congressional Committee is the national congressional committee of the Republican Party as defined by 52 U.S.C. § 30101(14).

5. Intervenor Missouri Republican State Committee is the duly established state committee for the Missouri Republican Party under Section 115.603, RSMo., and has been selected and serves in the role of representing and acting for the Missouri Republican Party in the interim between party conventions under Section 115.605, RSMo.

6. Attached as **Stipulated Exhibit 1** is a true and correct copy of Referendum Petition 2026-R004.

7. Attached as **Stipulated Exhibit 2** is a true and correct copy of the October 14, 2025 letter approving Referendum Petition 2026-R004 as to form.

8. Attached as **Stipulated Exhibit 3** is a true and correct copy of the signature pages submitted to the local election authorities for Referendum Petition 2026-R004.

9. Attached as **Stipulated Exhibit 4** is a true and correct copy of Report PM-007 dated August 6, 2026 for Referendum Petition 2026-007.

10. Attached as **Stipulated Exhibit 5** is a true and correct copy of the Certificate of Insufficiency for Referendum Petition 2026-R004.

11. Attached as **Stipulated Exhibit 6** is a true and correct copy of the Complaint filed in *Missouri General Assembly, et al., v. von Glahn, et al.*, Case No. 4:25-cv-01535.

12. Attached as **Stipulated Exhibit 7** is a true and correct copy of the Motion for Preliminary Injunction filed in *Missouri General Assembly, et al., v. von Glahn, et al.*, Case No. 4:25-cv-01535.

13. Attached as **Stipulated Exhibit 8** is a true and correct copy of the Memorandum and Order (Dec. 8, 2025) issued in *Missouri General Assembly, et al., v. von Glahn, et al.*, Case No. 4:25-cv-01535.

14. Attached as **Stipulated Exhibit 9** is a true and correct copy of the State of Missouri's Motion to Alter the Judgment and Memorandum in Support filed in *Missouri General Assembly, et al., v. von Glahn, et al.*, Case No. 4:25-cv-01535.

15. Attached as **Stipulated Exhibit 10** is a true and correct copy of the Memorandum and Order (May 11, 2026) issued in *Missouri General Assembly, et al., v. von Glahn, et al.*, Case No. 4:25-cv-01535.

16. Attached as **Stipulated Exhibit 11** is a true and correct copy of Make Your Voice Heard: Missouri's Initiative Petition Process.

17. Attached as **Stipulated Exhibit 12** is a true and correct copy of an October 15, 2025 press release from the Secretary of State.

18. Attached as **Stipulated Exhibit 13** is a true and correct copy of an October 16, 2025 press release from the Secretary of State.

19. Attached as **Stipulated Exhibit 14** is a true and correct copy of an October 28, 2025 St. Louis Public Radio article titled "Missouri Republicans learn that redrawing congressional lines isn't so easy" by Jason Rosenbaum.

20. Attached as **Stipulated Exhibit 15** is a true and correct copy of a May 18, 2026 St. Louis Public Radio article titled “Group asks judge to force Missouri secretary of state to decide redistricting referendum” by Jason Rosenbaum.

21. Attached as **Stipulated Exhibit 16** is a true and correct copy of a January 8, 2026 Kansas City Star article titled “Is Missouri GOP dragging out redistricting cases? ‘Delay works in our favor’” by Kacen Bayless.

22. Attached as **Stipulated Exhibit 17** is a true and correct copy of the 1922 election results for Proposition 17.

23. Attached as **Stipulated Exhibit 18** are true and correct copies of newspaper articles regarding the 1922 election on Proposition 17.

24. Attached as **Stipulated Exhibit 19** are true and correct copies of newspaper articles regarding the attempted 1952 referendum election on congressional redistricting.

25. Attached as **Stipulated Exhibit 20** is a true and correct copy of House Bill 2909 (2022).

26. Attached as **Stipulated Exhibit 21** is a true and correct copy of the affidavit of Brianna Lennon, executed August 13, 2026.

27. Attached as **Stipulated Exhibit 22** is a true and correct copy of People Not Politicians’ and Richard von Glahn’s Motion to Expedite filed on April 1, 2026, in *State ex rel. People Not Politicians, et al., v. Limbaugh*, No. WD88821.

28. Attached as **Stipulated Exhibit 23** is a true and correct copy of People Not Politicians' and Richard von Glahn's Suggestions in Support of Petition for a Writ of Prohibition filed on April 1, 2026, in *State ex rel. People Not Politicians, et al., v. Limbaugh*, No. WD88821.

29. Attached as **Stipulated Exhibit 24** is a true and correct copy of Appellants' Motion to Expedite filed on December 31, 2025, in *Luther v. Hoskins*, No. SC101412.

30. Attached as **Stipulated Exhibit 25** is a true and correct copy of Plaintiffs' Suggestions in Opposition to a Continuance filed on December 15, 2025, in *Wise v. State*, No. 2516-CV29597, and in *Healey v. State*, No. 2516-CV31273.

31. Attached as **Stipulated Exhibit 26** is a true and correct copy of Plaintiffs' Suggestions in Support of a Preliminary Injunction filed on January 14, 2026, in *Maggard v. State*, No. 25AC-CC09120.

32. Attached as **Stipulated Exhibit 27** is a true and correct copy of Respondent's Brief filed on February 9, 2026, in *Luther v. Hoskins*, No. SC101412.

33. Attached as **Stipulated Exhibit 28** is a true and correct copy of the affidavit of Tammy Brown, executed August 13, 2026.

34. Attached as **Stipulated Exhibit 29** is a true and correct copy of the Amicus Brief of Brianna Lennon filed on April 10, 2026, in *Maggard v. State*, No. SC101581.

35. Attached as **Stipulated Exhibit 30** is a true and correct copy of the Amicus Brief of Kurt Bahr et al. filed on April 28, 2026, in *Maggard v. State*, No. SC101581.

36. Attached as **Stipulated Exhibit 31** is a true and correct copy of the transcript of the third day of trial, February 19, 2026, in *Wise v. State*, No. 2516-CV29597, and in *Healey v. State*, No. 2516-CV31273.

37. Attached as **Stipulated Exhibit 32** is a true and correct copy of a September 15, 2025 article by Mathew Pilger in the *Missouri Independent* titled “Missouri’s New Congressional Map Could Complicate Midterm Voting Clerks Warn.” Within **Stipulated Exhibit 32** is a true, correct, and complete transcription of an August 27, 2025 letter sent by Sherry Parks on behalf of the Missouri Association of County Clerks and Election Authorities to Jonathan Patterson, Speaker of the Missouri House of Representatives.

38. Attached as **Stipulated Exhibit 33** is a true and correct copy of an August 4, 2026 article by Jen Rice and Yunion Rivas in *Democracy Docket* titled “Missouri blocks anti-gerrymander referendum from November ballot in attempt to silence voters.”

39. Attached as **Stipulated Exhibit 34** is a true and correct copy of a March 27, 2026 article by Jen Rice in *Democracy Docket* titled “GOP derails bid to stop Missouri gerrymander for 2026.”

40. Attached as **Stipulated Exhibit 35** is a true and correct copy of the affidavit of Mike Ambrosini, executed August 13, 2026.

41. Attached as **Stipulated Exhibit 36** is a true and correct copy of the affidavit of Miles Ross, executed August 14, 2026.

42. Attached as **Stipulated Exhibit 37** is a true and correct copy of Merrill Weber executed August 17, 2026.

Respectfully submitted,

CATHERINE L. HANAWAY

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on August 18, 2026, I electronically filed the foregoing Plaintiff's Suggestions in Opposition to Motion to Intervene with the Clerk of Court using the Court's e-filing system.

/s/ Alixandra S. Cossette
Attorney for Plaintiff